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drawn from different academic disciplines. While interrogating the history 
of identity confl ict  in the European context,  an essential  component of 
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Nationalism’s kingdom is frankly of this world, and its attainment 
 involves tribal selfishness and vainglory, a particularly ignorant and 
 tyrannical intolerance […] nationalism brings not peace but the sword.
— Carlton J. H. Hayes
Identity is revealed to us only as something to be invented rather than 
discovered; as a target of an effort, ‘an objective’; as something one still 
needs to build from scratch or to choose from alternative offers and then 
to struggle for and then to protect through yet more struggle.
— Zigmunt Bauman
The disappearance of nations would have impoverished us no less than 
if all men had become alike, with one personality and one face. Nations 
are the wealth of mankind, its collective personalities; the very least of 
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The editors, Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady, have put to-
gether a penetrating and stimulating collection of studies on the sub-
ject of nationhood and identity on Europe’s multi-ethnic peripheries, 
with the main focus on the case of Spain. How Spain has addressed and 
is addressing the challenges of diversity are explored from a variety of 
disciplines, including politics, history, law, international relations, soci-
ology, anthropology, media studies, and even literature. The scope and 
methodology of chapters vary even more widely, from a broad-ranging 
interview with Professor Xosé M. Núñez Seixas on the subject of na-
tionalism to the analysis of an account of Jewish life in Salonika in the 
language of Judeo-Spanish. 
A theme that runs through the volume and which is implicit even in 
the chapters with a particular historical focus is that Spain’s pluri-national 
constitution remains a work in progress, as is evident in the analysis of both 
the Basque and Catalan cases. The larger emphasis on Catalan nationalism 
reflects changing contemporary priorities, with the waning of violence in 
the Basque Country. Still relevant to both cases is the issue of national 
identification: to what extent do people in these regions identify as both 
Basque and Spanish or as both Catalan and Spanish? Or is there a trend to 
identify exclusively with one or the other? This issue has been addressed in 
line with an innovative methodology that Luis Moreno developed as far 
back as 1986. He designed a self-identification scale that asked respond-
ents what weight they gave to different national identities. For example, 
did they feel more Basque than Spanish or vice-versa? Or did they attach 
equal importance to both identities? The Moreno question continues to 
be asked in many different countries and to yield significant results that 
chart changes in sentiment over time. The rise of the politics of identity, 
as well as that of status, has meant that for many voters, these issues have 
become more salient than the bread and butter concerns that previously 




A corollary is that from a policy perspective, the accommodation 
of different identities looms large in the governance of European states. 
In states in which ethnic minorities within a country are associated with 
particular regions in which they constitute a majority of the population, 
the granting of regional autonomy is an obvious step. However, it is rarely 
the end of the matter, as arguments between the region and the centre 
over the exercise of their respective powers are likely to remain a source 
of friction, even under the most carefully designed constitutions. Further, 
dissatisfaction over the terms of autonomy and demands for their radical 
modification short of full independence may generate practically as much 
heat as the original push for autonomy and in the process increase sup-
port for secession. As a number of chapters in this volume underline, this 
is precisely what has happened in Spain.
The inclusion of other cases of multi-national and bi-national states 
gives further weight to the comparative approach to the analysis of these 
issues, with chapters on Russia and the Ukrainian crisis, Ulster Unionism 
during the partition of Ireland, sub-state nationalism in Scotland and 
Flanders, Romania’s relations with its kin-state of Moldova, and separ-
atism as a phenomenon across Europe. One chapter compares the cases 
of Scotland and Catalonia, examining in forensic detail their prospects of 
achieving independence within Europe. Hitherto, the European Union has 
been unwilling to accept the legitimacy of secession within any member 
state, but has been ready to accept as members, states that emerged as a result 
of the collapse of communism and the break-up of states in Eastern Europe, 
i.e. that involved secession outside of the European Union. Whether the 
European Union would be ready to accept Scotland as a member after 
Brexit remains a fascinating question, as does the attitude of the Spanish 
government to such a possibility. 
Even while broadly discouraging the flow of refugees from outside of 
Europe, the European Union has played a generally constructive role in 
the promotion of the accommodation of diversity within Europe. That is 
one reason why Brussels has been a target of populists of a nativist bent. 
But, as the editors point out, the European project has by no means elim-
inated ethnic fault lines, nor should populism and the reaction against 
Preface xiii
immigration and multi-culturalism simply be seen as manifestations of na-
tionalism, even majoritarian nationalism. The multiple angles from which 
these issues are addressed in this volume provide a valuable addition to our 
understanding of the processes of both integration and disintegration.
Adrian Guelke 

Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady
Introduction
Our present world is simultaneously moving towards the opposing dystopias of hyper 
centralisation and endless fragmentation.
— Francis Fukuyama (2018)
This publication has its origins in a multi-disciplinary conference of the 
same name hosted by the Department of Hispanic Studies in Trinity 
College, Dublin University, which, at a time when many Western dem-
ocracies are being pulled apart by identity politics, brought together 
academics from around the world to explore themes of nationhood and 
belonging. In addressing multiple issues within identity formation, this 
volume assembles comparative and single-area case studies from dif-
ferent academic disciplines which enable an holistic view of the evo-
lution of identity-based conflict in Europe, and situate contemporary 
challenges in their historical context.
It is appropriate therefore to set the scene by outlining the conceptual 
and contextual notions that underlie its themes, looking at what is under-
stood by terms like ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ in the search for socio-political 
identity. And as our setting is Europe, it also seems apt to consider briefly 
the problems of an embattled EU at a time when Brexit is spearheading a 
general rising of dissent among its members.
The Resilience of Nationalism as a Sociopolitical Force
Experts recognize that, in divisive power, nationalism in the present western 
world has come to occupy the place once held by faiths, both prompting 
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a visceral adherence and defying rational conceptualizations. As Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr noted: ‘Nationalism remains […] the most vital polit-
ical emotion in the world – far more vital than social ideologies such as 
communism or fascism or even democracy’ (1998: 53). Years earlier, in the 
aftermath of the First World War, Carlton Hayes had made much the same 
point, asking ‘why apostles of nationalism are characterised by a missionary 
zeal that is fiery and why its multitudinous disciples are possessed of a love 
that is consuming’ and linking the question to the assertion that ‘it is the 
latest and nearest approach to a world-religion’ (1926: 6).
Nationalisms and their associated phenomena have continued to defy 
precise definition because they possess perhaps too many dimensions, too 
many facets, too many subjectivities to pin down.1 But, although whatever 
we may measure and quantify of the brain contributes only marginally to an 
understanding of what our thoughts are ‘made of ’, we continue to observe 
that which is as yet definitionally out of reach. In much the same way we may 
note that common to all our understandings of identity, of nationalism and 
of nation are (equally indefinable) emotions, beliefs and desires that con-
tinue to confound debate. Spain’s internal divides provide a clear example, 
as perfectly sound arguments from one region are refuted by perfectly valid 
arguments from another, while all concerned are aware that debate is futile 
without a common understanding of what is meant by ‘nation’.
Definitions are elusive also because, as Ernest Renan (1882) long ago 
realized, nationalism and nation are often compounds of the worst and best 
aspirations of communities, who call upon an ‘imagined’ past in support 
of demands for a future that will cater for present ambitions of ‘national’ 
identity. It is clear that to belong (however understood) and specifically, 
for the purposes of our present concern, to belong to a place, to a definable 
space, remains among the most powerful needs of human beings, and thus 
nationalism has the potential to arouse in us what Schlesinger identifies 
as ‘[t] he hostility of one tribe for another’ (1998: 12). This oldest of tribal 
instincts, still engendering among even the most advanced societies a drive 
to exclude from belonging, and the urge to cast out whatever is perceived 
as not belonging, is implicit in what Alain Touraine maintained: ‘Society 
 1 Among the perspectives from which they may be viewed, in no particular order, 
are: ethnic, geographic, religious, linguistic, historical, socio-biological, instrumen-




is not merely a system of norms or a system of domination: it is a system of 
social relations, of debates and conflicts, of political initiatives and claims, 
of ideologies and alienation’ (1977: 30). Identity, that inherent heart of 
belonging, whatever its subjective and objective components, is realized 
as a social phenomenon, with the person finding expression only in terms 
of a society, and society having meaning only in terms of the person. Thus 
the ability of nationalism to (re)surface and adapt to the times depends 
substantially on its offering a perennially utopian vision of one’s roots, of 
one’s tribal identity within a recognizable community of kindred people. 
In the words of Anthony D. Smith: ‘Just as “the nation” is felt and willed 
and acted out, as well as imagined, so do many of the members of today’s 
nations feel that their own interests, needs and welfare are bound up with 
the welfare and destiny of “their” nation’ (2009: 14).2
But understandings of precisely what is meant by their nation may 
be as many and as varied as the members, and – just as significantly – the 
non-members, of it. In 1913 Joseph Stalin defined the nation along the lines 
of a community of language, territory, economic life and psychological 
make-up.3 Not too differently, but from a non-Marxist perspective, Ernest 
Gellner (1983), asserting that without nationalism there would not exist 
 2 As well as Smith (1971), for other earlier works on nationalism see, for example, 
Deutsch (1953); Rustow (1967). Apart from the 1983 contributions of Gellner and 
also Anderson, the 1980s and 1990s saw a wealth of offerings, among them, again, 
Smith (1995). Publications in the twenty-first century proliferate, with Smith 
(2009) this time challenging modernist and post-modernist views of the birth of 
the nation and nationalism. There are innovative takes on nationalism by, for ex-
ample, Malesevic (2013); Berger and Conrad (2015); Brubaker (2015); edited books 
by Jensen (2016), and by Tierney (2018); and relevant to nationalisms in Spain (the 
topic area of several contributors to the present volume), see García (2018) and the 
edited book by Sepúlveda Muñoz (2018).
 3 While early Marxist thinkers naturally perceived a link between the rise of capit-
alism and nationalism, maintaining that the latter would disappear as it was sup-
planted by worldwide class consciousness, the same view, that capitalism is largely 
responsible for nationalism is still held by, for example, Craig Calhoun (1997); and 
Bernadette McAliskey, addressing a meeting in (London)Derry to commemorate 
the 50th anniversary of the rioting in Northern Ireland that became known as the 
‘Battle of the Bogside’ claimed both that ‘the capitalist classes of Ireland […] extol 
the virtues of the European Union’ and that ‘a focus on nationalism will “sooner or 
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the nation, gave two down-to-earth exemplifications of what constitutes 
a nation:
Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where 
culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of be-
having and communicating.
[…]
A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given 
language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category 
firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their 
shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind 
which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they 
might be, which separate that category from non-members. (Gellner 1983: 6, 7)4
But whereas in the past a shared culture and ethnicity (however indefin-
able or smudged by history) over a sufficient period of time might have 
made it relatively easy to identify, and to identify with, one’s fellow na-
tionals, Europe is increasingly experiencing an era not unlike that of the 
later Roman Empire in the West (itself long hybrid), when movements of 
people, many of them motivated by threats from other groupings, obliged 
overwhelming hegemonic shifts in a remix of cultures and communities 
that would take centuries to resolve into what we today understand as 
‘Europe’. Similarly, today from a different direction, a new wave of migra-
tion is beginning to force a reconsideration of what constitutes a national 
identity, and to oblige a recognition of challenges to the traditional state 
(see, for example, Guibernau and Rex, 2010, ‘Introduction’).
And to muddy even further the already murky waters, Benedict 
Anderson, in taking a conceptual approach, suggested that the nation
is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign […] The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them 
[…] has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations […] It is im-
agined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment 
and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical 
dynastic realm […] Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of 
the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 




conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that 
makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so 
much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. (Anderson 1983: 49–50)
Hayes had similarly equated nationalism with ‘an emotional loyalty to the 
idea or the fact of the national state, a loyalty so intensely emotional that 
it motivates all sorts of people and causes them to subordinate all other 
human loyalties to national loyalty’ (1926: 3). And present-day national-
isms have familiar echoes of a past which tore Europe apart in wars between 
‘nations’ whose claim to that title might be no more than the possession of 
frontiers established by a ruling dynasty, or whose political elite were pre-
pared to have millions of people slaughtered over territorial hegemonies 
disguised as ideological value disputes and ‘home’ defence. On all sides, a 
common call to arms was bolstered by appeal to the solidarity of a people, 
motivated then as now by what Victor Orbán has recently put in these 
terms: ‘This is our homeland, our life, and since we don’t have another one, 
we will fight for it until the very end and we will never give it up’.5
As historian Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (2012: 14) has noted, questions 
about nationalism might be asked about regionalism and regional iden-
tity (local or sub-national identities), and a better understanding of both 
might be arrived at by considering to what extent regionalisms are ‘comple-
mentary’ or ‘opposed’ to national identities and what differentiates them 
from nations, nationalism and ‘separatism’.6 He has claimed that region-
alism and nationalism share common traits, that regionalist aspirations 
 5 Viktor Orbán (2018), ‘Ceremonial Speech on the 170th Anniversary of the 




 6 Particularly relevant in a European context to the current demands of Andalusian, 
Basque, Bavarian, Catalan, Flemish, Galician, Québécois and Scottish national-
isms. And, given the recent rapid rise of pro-independence numbers in Catalonia, 
an interesting speculation on the formation, post-Brexit, of a new Celtic state 
(Celtonia) quotes the latest available census figures (2011) as showing that ‘21pc of 
Northern Irish identified themselves as, just that, Northern Irish, as against British 
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‘generally precede or even accompany sub-state nationalisms.’ It is widely 
perceived that these aspirations may turn into claims when a confluence 
of economic and socio-political circumstances coincides with emotional 
reactions to what is considered disregard for a collective regional identity 
by the nation-state;7 these reactions may include what Wendy Brown (1995) 
identified as a sense of ‘woundedness’, the basis for aggressive individual 
and collective affirmation of identity. Present-day Europe is struggling with 
and currently failing to find coherent solutions to the many disparate def-
initions, feelings, aspirations and expectations that clamour for expression, 
both within a context of EU unity and opposed to it.
The Integration of Nations in the European Union
Though it is well recognized that the establishment of the European 
Union was, at its core, a peace project, unity is today also troubled to the 
east as any moves towards expansion of its membership are viewed by 
Russia as acts of aggression. It matters little that the EU was founded only 
on visions of peace as a continent wounded from two world wars and 
reeling from the horrors of the Holocaust sought to create a new foun-
dation on which all could unite around a common European identity. 
Alliances of any sort are of concern to those not within them and Russia, 
naturally sensitive to any transfer of allegiance on its borders, is not alone 
in wariness of the European bloc. In a world of endless competition, it 
also matters little that, in the words of Walter Hallstein, the first presi-
dent of the European Commission:
This community is not due to military power or political pressure, but owes its ex-
istence to a creative act. It is based on sound legal standards and its institutions are 
subject to legal control. For the first time, the rule of law takes the place of power 
and its manipulation of the equilibrium of forces, of hegemonic aspiration and 
 7 As noted in Charles Kupchan (1995), when the state neglects to perform the basic 






of the game of alliances […] In the relations between Member States, violence 
and political pressure will be replaced by the preeminence of the law. (Quoted in 
Danwitz 2018: 4)
It was hoped that as the strategic importance of the supranational con-
text increased in political, social and economic terms, the significance of 
ethnic, cultural and national differences would diminish, with minority 
identities finding accommodation in sub-state arrangements.
This hope has begun to look increasingly forlorn as in the twenty-first 
century these differences – far from being subsumed within an overarching 
‘European’ identity – are gaining a new intensity in parts of the continent as 
unities (including some not owed to the European Union but rather forged 
over centuries) begin to fracture under the weight of localized perceptions 
of identity. Europe sees itself at ever-greater risk of splitting apart as in the 
analysis of some sub-state nationalist parties the prospect of European 
Union membership reduces the economic and political risks that secession 
would otherwise bring them.
To the internal conflicts of Europe we may add an enforced partici-
pation in other threats that are sweeping the world. As Francis Fukuyama 
has argued: ‘Identity politics has become a master concept that explains 
much of what is going on in global affairs’ (2018b: 92) and ‘[d] emocratic 
societies are fracturing into segments’ (2018b: 93). This threat is fo-
cused less on national and ethnic identity alone as on gender, sexuality 
and social class. It is almost as though globalization, far from being 
an antidote to the narrow tribalism of nationalism, is itself the gen-
erator of another kind of multiculturalism, and one not envisaged by 
its antinationalist proponents. Where once it was possible to conceive 
of ethnocultural congruence as the essential core of multiculturalism, 
of internationalism, the rise of identity politics has added yet another 
component to intraculturalism.
Alongside such unity destabilizers, Jan-Werner Müller cautions 
against over-simplifications that equate the recent rise in populism 
with a straightforward resurgence of nationalism: what we are seeing 
is the instrumentalization of nationalism by populist leaders who ‘seek 
out and thrive on conflict; their political business model is permanent 
culture war. In a way they reduce all political questions to questions 
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of belonging. Whoever disagrees with them is labelled an “enemy of 
the people”’ (2019: 36). Perhaps few recent world events illustrate the 
emotive power of Müller’s innocent word ‘belonging’ or of the divisive 
potential of independence aspirations better than the British people’s 
experience of Brexit.
If these contentions were not of themselves sufficient to erode the EU, 
Cézar Baena and Michael Neubert claim that mistrust of ‘elites’ and ‘the 
establishment’ lies at the heart of many of the societal divisions witnessed 
across Europe today:
In some countries, anti-establishment movements are in power: Lega and the 
Five Star Movement in Italy, Law and Justice in Poland, the Freedom Party in 
Austria, Fidesz in Hungary. These movements share a critique of the EU bur-
eaucracy and its attempts to regulate markets, impose rules on economic and 
technological development, and establish quotas for migrants. Often called 
populists, they seek to dismantle the EU bureaucracy and take power back to 
the people (i.e. the nation state or smaller units of decision-making). Brexit and 
the gilets jaunes movement in France have emerged within this context. (Baena 
and Neubert 2019: n.p.)
Yet  all this seems to have erupted from faultlines thought to be no 
longer active beneath the construction project of European unity. 
By the 1990s, nationalism had seemed to be a spent force, overcome 
by policies of globalization, and with any fears of a kind of feature-
less multicultural identity  – the sort that would make Barcelona in-
distinguishable from Berlin – allayed by notions of federalism. Hence 
the ease with which it was possible to conclude that nationalism was 
ultimately a dead end, merely another artefact of the creators of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ animations.8 Or, alternatively, to dismiss nationalism as 
little more than popular local reactions to what are perceived as dis-
tant elites. It seemed farsighted of Ernest Renan (1882) to have main-
tained that ‘nations are not something eternal’, that they ‘have their 





beginnings and they will end’ and that ‘[a] European confederation 
will very probably replace them’.9 And it did not seem wildly premature 
of Rousseau to have long since observed that ‘these days, whatever else 
one may say, there are no longer any Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans 
or Spaniards, there are only Europeans’ (quoted in Seth and Kulessa 
2017: 132).
But by the new millennium there were already signs of a growing 
unease over internationalist fervour and, perceptively, Smith (2009: 128–9) 
challenged the demise of nations, pointing to their staying power, to their 
ability to continually evolve as socio-cultural communities (‘ethnies’, from 
the French). Research between 2008 and 2009 showed that loyalty to 
Europe among EU citizens took third place after the first loyalty to the 
nation and the second to the region of origin; but, perhaps significantly, 
when asked about what contributed most to a European identity, 41 per 
cent selected ‘democratic values’, with far fewer (at 24 per cent each) opting 
for ‘geography’ and ‘common history’. Overall, the strongest feelings of 
being European were found in the north of Europe and the weakest with 
Britain and Greece.10
Whether causal or correlational, perhaps the most unsettling and 
alarming development has been the rise of nationalism and identity politics 
in Hungary, Poland, Spain and Austria, a mounting populist anti-migrant 
feeling in Italy, Sweden and Germany, an insistent anti-European senti-
ment in, for example, the UK and the appearance of newly formed popu-
list parties of the left and of the right in Austria, France, the Netherlands 
and Spain. Opposition to the very thought of a politically united Europe 
is becoming more overt, with Catalan secessionist aspirations offering a 
 9 ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’ Lecture delivered by Renan at the Sorbonne in March 
1882. Apart from the proliferation in the past decade of international confer-
ences and symposia on nationalism and identity politics, the number of publica-
tions on the EU has also increased – see for example: Cohn-Bendit, et al. (2012); 
Verhofstadt (2017).
 10 <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb713_
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recent illustration: ‘Así no nos interesa esta Europa’ [So we are not inter-
ested in this Europe].11
A factor in the gradual re-emergence of affective nationalism in 
Europe must be a widely perceived dichotomy between the EU as an 
ideal and its institutional realization, with both the European Parliament 
and the European Commission generally viewed unfavourably even by 
the strongest supporters of a united Europe. For example, Germany, cur-
rently showing some 63 per cent support for the EU, manages only 47 
per cent for the Parliament and 38 per cent for the Commission; weaker 
supporters such as England and Greece (48 per cent and 37 per cent re-
spectively in favour of the EU), drop to 35 per cent and 30 per cent for 
the Parliament, and 32 per cent and 26 per cent for the Commission 
(Wike et al. 2019).12
Both England and Greece lay particular emphasis on the ‘national 
sovereignty’ that, within its limits, the sociologist Frank Furedi today de-
fends, supporting the common perception that EU bureaucrats are out 
of touch with the realities of EU citizens, and declaring the EU oligarchs 
as detrimental to the European ethos, as having ‘pathologized’ populism 
by ‘turning it into a toxin poisoning the continent’. National sovereignty, 
he maintains, provides ‘a far more democratic and meaningful setting for 
the conduct of public life than the transnational institutions favoured by 
 11 Carles Puigdemont, the exiled conservative ex-president of the Catalan Generalitat, 
angrily criticized the EU when his claim to an MEP seat was rejected: the Spanish 
government had not included him on the official list on the grounds that he had 
not gone to Madrid to collect his official card and to swear loyalty to the Spanish 
Constitution as required by law (La Vanguardia, 3  July  2019). Reflecting on the 
critical stance taken by Puigdemont and others among his followers, Francesc-
Marc Álvaro reflected:  ‘Two million people who have voted in favour of [pro-
independence parties] may feel justifiably let down by the EU machine but it would 
be dangerous for them to join the ranks of Europhobia, a lair where the company 
is not very pleasant nor the rhetoric very inspiring’ (The Irish Times, 13 July 2019) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/catalan-leader-rails-against-
eu-as-spain-rules-out-referendum-1.3946875> accessed 13 July 2019.
 12 The bodies in question are major parts of the complex European bureaucracy, along 
with the Council of the European Union (easily confused with European Council 






EU cosmopolitans do.’13 This accords with, albeit is less extreme than, the 
perceptions of, for example, Pablo Iglesias (leader of the left-wing party 
Podemos in Spain)14 or Nigel Farage (ex-leader of UKIP and leader of 
the Brexit Party in Britain) who describe the history of the EU as one of 
failure and deception.15
Furedi’s stance is thus given vigour by a key challenge facing European 
attempts at unity: member states do not in fact share a common vision of 
the future EU. The Brexit vote itself as much as its divisive aftermath have 
clearly shown that a perceived otherness, however marginally approved or 
ill-prepared for, can trump any advancement towards a more integrated or 
quasi-federal institution. Reports of the death of ‘the nation’ are therefore 
premature as members of the EU continue to play this ‘national interest’ 
card on issues such as centralism versus regional autonomies, open interior 
borders and immigration from outside Europe. More pulling apart than 
pulling together, the EU has yet, in the first quarter of the twenty-first 
century, to find a consolidated European identity in accord with the ideals 
of its architects. Socio-political foundations once thought to be firmly 
established are being undermined by a seeming inability to present a co-
operative, let alone a united, front.
From one perspective the start of the current wave of internal pressures 
on the EU may be traced to the 2007–8 economic crisis, to be followed 
too closely by the 2012–13 recession. And just when Europe needed most 
to focus on the economy it had to give attention to the ongoing migrant 
 13 Frank Furedi ‘Why I wrote a radical democratic defence of populism’ <https://
www.spiked-online.com/2017/08/22/why-i-wrote-a-radical-democratic-defence-
of-populism/> accessed 20 August 2019.
 14 Mariano Calleja, ‘El populismo de Iglesias y Le Pen, contra la UE’. ABC, 
12  April  2017  <https://www.abc.es/espana/abci-populismo-iglesias-y-contra- 
201703152108_noticia.html> accessed 12 April 2017.
 15 For example: Richard Hartley-Parkinson, ‘Nigel Farage declares June 23 the UK’s 
independence day’, Metro, 24 June 2016 <https://metro.co.uk/2016/06/24/nigel-
farage-declares-victory-for-vote-leave-5963659/> accessed 23 January 2018; Camila 
Domonoske, Brexiteer Nigel Farage to EU: “You’re Not Laughing Now, Are You?”’, 
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and refugee crisis from 2015 onwards (whose main effects were felt by 
Greece, Italy and Germany), to terrorist attacks in Paris, in Brussels, in 
Spain, Denmark, the UK and Germany, and to the unanticipated effects 
of the 2016 Brexit vote.
Within the EU itself national representatives confront its mandarins: in 
the newly elected European Parliament, MEP and committed Brexiteer, 
Ann Widdecombe, vigorously accused the institution of being undemo-
cratic, a charge fuelled in part by the dissatisfaction of many MEPs with 
the process of top-level appointments, and by the refusal of Donald Tusk to 
provide any kind of satisfactory response to it. Widdecombe expostulated:
If I needed any convincing at all that the best thing for Britain is to leave here […] 
it was the way that those elections were conducted yesterday […] there is a pattern 
consistent throughout the history of oppressed peoples turning on the oppressor. 
Slaves against their owners, the peasantry against the feudal barons. Colonies, Mr 
Verhofstadt, against their empires and that is why Britain is leaving […] Nous allons, 
wir gehen, we’re off.16
And in Britain, perhaps more than elsewhere in Europe, new internal di-
visions can be seen to some extent at least as re-articulations of old dis-
contents, notwithstanding the very considerable democratic and egali-
tarian strides made there during the past 100 years. Where irreconcilable 
social discord might previously have fed into a discourse of class division, 
it is now, with the coupling of globalization and multiculturalism with 
the whole European question, able to embrace with greater fervour much 
broader definitions of difference. The Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells, 
influenced by Touraine, perceived in the upsurge of populist identity pol-
itics across the social spectrum – once solely the preserve of the left and 
anti-globalization groups – the consequence of a process of reassertion, 
of reaffirmation of identity by individuals and communities in response 
to globalized networks:  ‘[I] n a world of global flow of wealth, power 
and images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or 
 16 James Crisp, ‘Ann Widdecombe compares EU to slave owners in maiden European 





reconstructed, becomes the fundamental source of social meaning’. He 
goes on to note the dangers of disassociation between how we work and 
the way we feel, between a ‘techno-economic-network society and iden-
tity’ as originator of the need of individuals to rely on themselves and of 
the appearance of ‘communities’ (weaker individuals who come together 
to vindicate a cause: nationalism, environmentalism, etc.) while civil so-
ciety and the state are progressively becoming less effective.17
Contemporary Challenges to Nationalism from 
Globalization and Migration
While, by the 1990s, many experts on multiculturalism believed that glo-
balization was going to change how we interacted and lived, what was 
meant by globalization was not necessarily clearcut, as Natalie Sabanadze’s 
2010 study vigorously and meticulously (if controversially) has pointed 
out.18 And whereas globalization optimists might once have believed that 
frontiers would become irrelevant and peoples, capital and goods would 
freely move – that transnational entities would weaken the nation-state, 
which in turn would lead to a kind of cultural and economic univer-
salism – the economic crisis of 2007–8 was to show that socio-economic 
realities could swiftly confound these aspirations in what has been la-
belled the socialization of losses and the privatization of profits.19
 17 Harry Kreisler. In Conversation with History:  Manuel Castells. <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=0GBB7U5mv0w> accessed 9 December 2018. For an in-
depth analysis of the impact of globalization on identity politics and nationalism 
see Castells (2007).
 18 The controversy is less concerned with the complexities of definitions than with her 
claim that globalization and nationalism have become partnered, the former now 
promoting the latter internationally.
 19 The consequences of such economic practices have also been felt in Germany, par-
ticularly in Eastern Germany, where economic exclusion has prevailed owing to the 
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In Europe and beyond, the present upsurge of nationalism and what 
has come to be known as ‘populism’ were identified by Zygmunt Bauman 
(2000) in a world of constant change. Some eight years later, in discussion 
with Bauman, Mark Haugaard remarked: ‘The so-called “unintended effect” 
of neoliberalism is globalization which augments fears through the constant 
movement of capital, which makes jobs insecure and creates the threat of the 
“economic migrant”’ (Bauman and Haugaard, 2008: 120). In a 2016 inter-
view Bauman was to reiterate that what lies at the root of crises of identity 
and feelings described as nationalist is a ‘continuous uncertainty, which 
makes us afraid.’20 This is highly fertile ground for populism to flourish, for 
representative populist parties from the right and the left across Europe to 
demand power for the people against the elites, that is, against liberal and 
democratic institutions which they consider outmoded and, above all, cor-
rupt, and thus people power against the neoliberal technocrats of the EU, 
and international financial institutions. Examples of these demands abound.
Many are concerned that globalization and multiculturalism have di-
luted the meaning of ‘European’ and simultaneously hastened the decline 
of the unique and continuous historical and cultural narrative that allowed 
for an affirmation of a specific identity as, for example, French, or Polish.21 
Others attribute the rise of terrorism to the inability of traditional societies 
to accept the changes: in maintaining that nationalism (of a certain kind) and 
multiculturalism, both being social constructs, are not mutually exclusive, 
Asari, Halikiopoulou, and Mock (2008: 1) have remarked on ‘the failure to 
produce a discourse that integrates various ethnic groups under the umbrella 
of a common British identity’.22 This present volume illustrates that much the 
same could be said of other countries.
 20 ‘Zygmunt Bauman:  Behind the World’s “crisis of humanity”’, Al Jazeera 
(23  July  2016) <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/ 
07/Zygmunt-bauman-world-crisis-humanity-160722085342260.html> accessed 
23 November 2018. For an analysis of the nature of contemporary fear see Furedi 
(1997, 2005, 2018a) – he considers contemporary fear as a response to moral uncer-
tainty, which has replaced hope, optimism and assurance. For a measured analysis 
of how the West must proceed to preserve its own values and the rights of minority 
cultures against a background of terrorist attacks and fear, see Todorov (2010).
 21 See Guibernau and Rex (2010) for a comprehensive range of insights into and ana-
lyses of the ethnic dimensions of nationalism.








Richard Ashcroft and Mark Bevir have argued that ‘[c] ultural plur-
alism was a clear cause of Brexit. Post-war non-white immigration created 
a modern multiculturalism that some see as a threat to social cohesion and 
security’ (2016: 355). In April 2018 the European Commission published a 
report on the integration of immigrants in the EU (Special Eurobarometer 
469). The survey, conducted across the twenty-eight member states, revealed 
that in all but two (Croatia and Estonia) respondents overestimated the 
number of immigrants living in their country and in nineteen states the level 
of immigration was perceived as more than double what it really was; this 
is a significant indication of a less than positive response to immigration. 
The study is also revealing of the member state divisions that have become 
more pronounced in recent years, as the flow of migrants and refugees to 
the southern borders of the Union have increased. Citizens living in coun-
tries on the Mediterranean coast, and at the Eastern border, are much more 
likely to be concerned about illegal migration.23 As the numbers of migrants 
seeking access to the EU shows no sign of slowing in the near future, and 
with migrant labour an essential requirement for many member states, it 
is therefore a priority concern that, according to the Eurobarometer, 40 
per cent of Europeans view immigration from outside the EU as a problem 
while only 20 per cent see it as more of an opportunity.24
 23 For example, Greek islands are having to cope with the constant arrival of more 
and more refugees fleeing military violence. For an overview report on individual 
islands, with numbers of immigrants from 2015/16, see <https://www.telegraph.
co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/greece/articles/greek-islands-affected-by-
refugee-crisis/> accessed 24 July 2019.
 24 In a recent poll carried out by the EU, both pro-Europe voters and anti-Europe voters 
identified Islamic radicalism as the greatest threat. Only 11 per cent of the former saw 
immigration as a problem while 26 per cent of the latter considered it as much of a threat 
as Islamic radicalism: ‘What Europeans really feel: the Battle for the Political System’, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018; <https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/
summary/what_europeans_really_feel_the_battle _for_the_political_system_eu_
election> accessed 25 June 2019. See also: <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/
publicopinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb713_future_europe.pdf> accessed 25  January 
2019. See also: <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/
eb71/eb713_future_europe.pdf> accessed 25 January 2019. For a more recent com-
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Multiculturalist and cosmopolitan outlooks have increasingly had to 
confront challenges to notions of shared spaces, of racial and cultural hy-
bridity as well as to views of contemporary society as horizontal networks 
rather than territorial spaces or hierarchies.25 In addition, they have had to 
heed the arguments from both right and left that the multicultural pro-
ject (notably in regard to assimilation) has been branded a ‘failure’ and a 
‘tragedy’26 while in academia the realization that there is no agreed and 
clear definition of the concept of multiculturalism presents difficulties in 
researching its failure. Some see the answer lying solely, since 2001, in the 
racial and religious rejection of Muslim immigrants by the majority of EU 
member states, citing the impact on Europe of the displacement of millions 
of peoples by conflicts in which the West has become embroiled,27 fleeing 
‘from tyranny, from poverty, from famine, from ecological disaster’ with 
‘the dream of a better life somewhere else’ (Schlesinger 1998: 12).
Notwithstanding that, as Schlesinger put it ‘the history of our planet 
has been in great part the history of the mixing of people’ his further ob-
servation still resonates: ‘Mass migrations have produced mass animosities 
from the beginning of time’ (1998: 12). Terrorist attacks in Europe simply 
fuel present-day nationalist fears of overwhelming immigration. Examples of 
 25 See Todorov (2010: 182–3) for positive aspects of cosmopolitanism. Our present 
concern is not with the conflicting theoretical notions of hybridity so much as with 
its simplest exemplifications.
 26 Right-wing and conservative groups are not alone in maintaining that multicultur-
alist policies have not succeeded (see, for example, ‘White, Right and Pretentious’, 
The Economist, 31 March 2018, pp. 25–6); between 2010 and 2012 several leaders of 
the EU openly declared their belief that the multiculturalist agenda had failed in 
their countries and expressed concerns about the blurring or weakening of their 
countries’ collective identities. For an interesting analysis of the perceived de-
cline of multiculturalism see Lentin and Titley (2011). An expanded re-edition of 
Taylor (2011) explores political controversies surrounding the concept. For a recent 
publication which examines differences between the more current concept of 
interculturalism and the 1970s concept of multiculturalism see Meer, et al. (2016); 
and, for transculturality’s ability to better accommodate the opposing forces of the 
particular and the global than either multiculturality or interculturality, see Welsch 
(1999).








measures to control both the fear and the immigration are found in France 
where, in 2007, the Sarkozy government established the short-lived Ministry 
of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development; 
Germany has created a Heimat Ministry because, as the Health Minister 
acknowledged: ‘People have a need for comfort and Heimat’.28 Where once 
such measures might have been seen as a sop to the more conservative (and 
generally older) elements of society, today the expansion of youth groups 
and organizations defending an exclusive European-continent identity has 
seen the 2016 and 2017 protests in Germany against immigrants include 
attempts to stop refugee boats.29 Castells has noted that the use of social-
media communication networks allows today’s identitarian groups to be 
both ‘glocal’ and ‘global’ on specific issues, such as immigration or the au-
thoritarianism of the EU,30 and a recent article also identified these populist 
groups as a challenging change in politics.31 Schlesinger put his finger on 
it when he said, with deceptive simplicity: ‘The more the world integrates, 
the more people cling to their own in groups increasingly defined […] by 
ethnic and religious loyalties’ (1998: 12–13).32
Overview of the Case Studies Reported in this Volume
The discordant notes touched on so far in a European-wide context are 
evident as this present volume explores the limitations of a top-down 
 28 ‘Whose Heimat?’, The Economist, 14 April 2018, pp. 6–7. For the rise of nationalist 
feelings in Eastern Germany see Hogwood (2001).
 29 ‘Secure Borders – Secure Future.’ <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/
extremist-files/group/identity-evropa> accessed 20 November 2018.
 30 Harry Kreisler. In Conversation with History:  Manuel Castells. <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=0GBB7U5mv0w> accessed 9 December 2018.
 31 ‘The Self-Preservation Society’, The Economist, 6 July–12 July 2019, pp. 17–19 [19].
 32 While outside the scope of this present volume, the current violence in so 
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approach to national problems of unification. The conference and this 
volume take as their point of departure the case of Spain, a country whose 
attempts at nation-building are instructive not only in a wider global con-
text but in their more immediate impact at EU level today. The unity of 
the state, of loyalty by ‘nations’ within that state to the central authority, is 
a constant theme in Spanish history. While the ways in which El Caudillo 
sought to mould a nation in his image and likeness have been extensively 
analysed by scholars of the Franco era (1939–75), Richard Gow takes an 
in-depth look at what may be regarded as its precursor, the Primo de 
Rivera dictatorship (1923–30). The failure of its attempt to enlist the mili-
tary as key allies in support of national regeneration through the eradi-
cation of corruption and the mobilization of civil society only served to 
reinforce mistrust of the ‘political classes’, a perception which has clear 
resonance today.
Several contributors address the response to competing national iden-
tities in the post-Franco era of the late 1970s and early 1980s when the nas-
cent Spanish democracy sought to accommodate the hopes and aspirations 
of all in a new Constitution. Leyre Arrieta Alberdi considers the response 
of the moderate wing of Basque nationalism (the Basque Nationalist Party, 
PNV) to the new opportunities presented in the transition to democracy, 
and the risks and compromises that this entailed. The significance of the 
European context for minority nationalities is evident. Gorka Etxebarria 
Dueñas, in considering the coexistence of Basque and Spanish nationalism 
at political and social levels during the same period, examines how the 
battle for hegemony on the ground in the Basque Country was played out 
in emotional conflicts in the bitterly contested area of national symbols, 
emblems and flag displays on public buildings.
Reflecting on the failure of the constitutional compromise agreed 
in 1978 to abate national and regional tensions, Joan Romero et al. argue 
that the way in which the original vision of a State of Autonomies has 
been executed in political terms has been seriously flawed. The authors 
conclude, hopefully, that a viable framework for integration does exist, 
provided there is the political will to ‘rebuild bridges’. Again, the European 
context is viewed as a critical support for the plurinational state. This is a 
timely contribution as federal models are currently being considered as a 
Introduction 19
possible basis for conflict resolution in other contexts, notably in response 
to calls for a border poll on the island of Ireland.33 Taking the Basque 
and Catalan Autonomous Communities as negatively impacted by the 
Spanish government’s current model of autonomy, Iñigo Urrutia exam-
ines the legal context in which a new constitutional consensus might be 
developed, drawing on relevant international precedents. He highlights 
the dichotomy that exists between the practices of devolution and the as-
pirations of self-determination, a contributory factor to the ‘constitutional 
crossroads’ at which Spain now finds itself.
Jan-Werner Müller has recently referred to the way that in a represen-
tative democracy, ‘[r] epresentation is a dynamic process, in which citizens’ 
self-perceptions and identities are heavily influenced by what they see, hear 
and read: images, words and ideas produced and circulated by politicians, 
the media, civil society, and even friends and family members’ (2019: 40). 
Fukuyama places particular emphasis on the digital sphere: ‘Social media 
and the internet have facilitated the emergence of self-contained commu-
nities, walled off not by physical barriers but by belief in shared identity’ 
(2018a: 182). Given the critical role played by the media in identity forma-
tion, a study by Marçal Sintes et al. usefully analyses media coverage from 
the moment in 2012 when the constitutional controversy in Catalonia 
became a news story at local, national and international level, and con-
siders the extent to which news coverage reflects, and supports, a pluralist 
approach to national identity.
Taking us from the Spanish case to the wider European context Xosé 
M. Núñez Seixas, in a wide-ranging interview with the editors, reflects on 
what other nations might learn from the Spanish experience, with particular 
reference to the current trends towards emotionally charged referenda on 
national identity questions. Continuing the emphasis on the powerful 
draw of nationalism, Robert Saunders reflects on how ethnic separatism 
has been a driving force in European history for over a century. His ana-
lysis rejects an east/west divide, highlighting instead the common features 
that characterize how the challenge of secessionist movements has been 
 33 See, for example, Burgess (2018), and Spain (2019). For an overview of the legal 
context for the border poll see Basset and Harvey (2019).
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experienced across the continent. In the process of dividing nations and 
re-drawing boundaries, pragmatic choices and compromises have had to 
be made, sometimes with significant implications for the future of people 
and nations.
Decisions about minorities in the redrawing of territorial bound-
aries have had an acutely de-stabilizing effect throughout the course of 
European history, and Daniel Purcell highlights the profound impact on 
Ulster Protestant identity of the choices made by the Ulster Unionist com-
munity at the moment of the partition of Ireland and the establishment of 
the Northern Ireland State. His study exemplifies how any political deci-
sion to ‘leave behind’ part of an ethnic group is charged on many levels of 
emotion and consequence while, equally, the inclusion of minorities who 
identify with a nation outside the state may, as history has shown, have 
political, social and cultural ramifications far into the future.
Both Sorina Soare and Carles Jovaní Gil consider the powerful pull 
of irredentism. Soare reflects on the attitude adopted by post-communist 
Romania to the territory lost to the former USSR, as illustrated in outreach 
to its kin community in the Republic of Moldova through preferential 
access to Romanian citizenship. This has become a concern not only for 
the government of Moldova, which experienced the move as a challenge to 
its sovereignty, but also for the European Union, as a Romanian passport 
could provide access to EU citizenship for Moldovans, thereby implicating 
the EU as a whole in the tensions between Romania and Moldova. Jovaní 
Gil argues argues that the Kremlin, in its approach to the conflict in Crimea 
and the Donbas/Donbass, has been seeking to consolidate a Eurasian bloc 
as a geopolitical and cultural alternative to the West. Political developments 
in Ukraine presented Moscow with grounds for intervention justified as 
protection of Russian nationals abroad, setting a dangerous precedent that 
challenges the conventions established by international law in general and 
the EU in particular.
Katerina Garcia, writing on the cultural and linguistic heritage of 
the Jewish community of Salonika (Thessaloniki), reminds us that for all 
that national and ethnic identity can be defined in legislation, and shaped 
and re-shaped by pragmatic political choices, there is a deeply emotional 
element to it that finds perhaps its truest expression in the arts and cultural 
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heritage of a national or ethnic group and in the traditional practices of 
the family and/or religious community. Such is the strength of this emo-
tional connection and sense of belonging that people will hold fast to the 
identity it both creates and sustains, even at the greatest cost, as the Jewish 
communities of Europe bear witness.
Looking to the future, Fukuyama has suggested that the antidote to 
the increasing fragmentation of the nation-state could be found in ‘creedal 
national identities’ which, he explains, ‘are built not around shared personal 
characteristics, lived experiences, historical ties or religious convictions but 
rather around core values and beliefs. The idea is to encourage citizens to 
identify with their countries’ foundational ideals and use public policies 
to deliberately assimilate newcomers’ (2018b: 106). However, several of 
our contributors have identified cases where a values-based analysis is em-
ployed to make a case for secession on moral and ethical grounds. Mark 
Friis Hau uses an approach more commonly associated with religious be-
haviour to explore how Catalan identity can be construed as a moral, as 
well as a political, choice and how this influences the sense of belonging 
and community that develops as a result. Erik Vanderheyden, in a similar 
vein, considers the example of ‘ethical nationalism’ in Belgium, examined 
comparatively alongside the case of Scottish nationalism, with reference 
to how social policy is articulated in the political discourse of the nation-
alist parties in both cases.
The response of the European Union to conflicting notions of identity 
is of critical importance, given the centrality of shared values to its founding 
vision for European citizenship. Emmanuel Dalle Mulle examines the 
challenges posed by the Scottish and Catalan attempts to enlarge the EU 
‘from within’, highlighting the importance of ‘Independence in Europe!’ as 
a rallying call for both movements, and analysing the contrasting responses 
of the British and Spanish authorities.34
 34 The then president of the European Parliament (2017–19) said that EU in-
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Learning from the Past to Build for the Future?
Of course, from the British perspective, Brexit has fundamentally al-
tered the context, in ways that have yet to be fully clarified. At the time of 
writing, the shock of Brexit among other EU member states has given way 
to a deep frustration at the lasting uncertainty arising from the failure to 
achieve political consensus in the UK. It may prove to be the case that the 
likelihood of other member states seeking to follow the British example 
will have been greatly reduced as the political and social consequences for 
the UK become even more evident.35
Meanwhile, EU leaders must remain confident that the present 
difficulties can be overcome with patient understanding on all sides. 
On 3 July 2019 David-Maria Sassoli, the newly elected centre-left presi-
dent of the European Parliament, declared his hopes for the future of 
Europe and reminded MEPs that there was a need to recall the spirit 
of the founding members of the EU, who determinedly rejected mili-
tary confrontation and nationalism in favour of peace and equality.36 
These were necessary injunctions, as leaders observe the deep fissures 
within the EU not only turning into major challenges to the European 
ideal but acting against any ability to tackle together issues of joint 
concern, among which Michel Barnier, in defending the preparations 
made by the EU for Brexit, identified: ‘Climate change, migration, 
industrial and technological disruptions, and terrorism’ all ‘seismic 
challenges on which Member States cannot deliver alone’.37 He did 
 35 For an overview of the regional tensions within the UK arising from Brexit, and the 
pending political challenges in terms of devolution see Torrance (2018).
 36 ‘MEPs choose David-Maria Sassoli as new European Parliament President’, BBC 
News, 3 July 2019.
 37 In December 2016, in order to preclude separate deals by the UK with individual 
member states, the French politician Michel Barnier was appointed European 









not evade the reasons for disunity, but admitted grounds for division 
among the member states:
There is also the feeling that Europe, its governments and institutions are not re-
sponding to legitimate concerns:
 – A Europe that does not prepare for, and protect against, the excesses of globalisa-
tion. That has for too long advocated economic freedoms without paying enough 
attention to the social and environmental consequences.
 – A Europe that has not been able to fully control its external borders nor stand 
united in the face of migration and refugee crises.
 – A Europe where we have often abandoned jobs and industries without creating 
the conditions for new ones.
 – And above all, the feeling that Europe does not respond to the dreams of Europeans 
or promise them a better future.
This view is not unique to the UK. We need to listen, understand where it comes 
from, and respond. Acknowledge that Europe has sometimes been wrong. Rediscover 
a Europe that allows each nation, people, and citizen to feel protected and part of a 
collective ambition. (Barnier 2019)
Fukuyama states that ‘[i] dentity can be used to divide, but it can and has 
also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the 
populist politics of the present’ (2018a:  183). In an increasingly global-
ized world, European nations have greater incentive than ever to foster 
positive relations of trust to facilitate the kind of political, social and 
economic integration and collaboration that will allow them to com-
pete collectively in the global economy. As recent developments have 
shown, however, economic incentives alone will not suffice to prevent 
the European Union and its individual member states being torn apart by 
conflicts centred on values and emotional understandings of belonging 
and identity and how these translate into concepts of sovereignty and 
perceptions of the legitimacy of political authority. Understanding the 
history of identity conflict in the European context is an essential foun-
dation for efforts to resolve or limit such conflicts in the future. In add-
ition, there is a need to create the space for new and emerging categories 
of identity that are providing alternative routes to building community, 
outside the traditional national/ethnic lines.
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The Basque Country within Spain and Europe: 
Basque Nationalist Party Proposals during the 
Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975–1980)
abstract
This chapter examines the public discourse of the Basque Nationalist Party (the PNV) fol-
lowing the end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain (1975–80). It highlights an important 
transitional period during which the traditional ethnic and religious criteria of ‘Basqueness’ 
gave way to a wider political understanding of identity. The political demands of the PNV 
centred on the restoration of the historical rights of the Basque People to self-government. 
The party’s aim was twofold: to reinforce the consciousness of a Basque identity, while 
simultaneously justifying its involvement in the newly emerging Spanish democracy. The 
wider European context had a defining influence on the party’s self-understanding and 
the way in which it framed its political agenda. The chapter concludes with an epilogue 
on the development of Basque nationalist discourse and its political project over time.
As recently noted by Anwen Elias and Ludger Mees, stateless nation-
alist and regionalist parties ‘have in common their shared demand for 
a reform of the territorial structure of the state in which they operate, 
in order to provide some kind of self-government for a distinctive ter-
ritorial community’ (2017: 133). This is the case today and has been in 
previous historical periods, particularly in times of transition to dem-
ocracy. The Basque nationalist movement made this kind of demand for 
territorial reorganization at the end of Franco’s dictatorship.1
The aim of this chapter is to describe the discourse produced during 
the process of transition to democracy in Spain (1975–80) by the Basque 
 1 This chapter is part of a research project funded by the Secretariat of State for 
Research, Development and Innovation (ref:  HAR2015-64920-P, MINECO/
FEDER) and of the research activity carried out by the Communication Team of 
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Nationalist Party (known by its Spanish initials, ‘PNV’), which represented 
the moderate wing of Basque nationalism.2 In particular, it focuses on the 
place that the PNV thought the Basque Country ought to have, both within 
Spain and in Europe. The party endeavoured to achieve a higher degree 
of self-government for the Basque Country by relying on its fueros [his-
torical rights].3 The Basque Country was on good terms with the Spanish 
state and sought to find a ‘natural’ fit within the European environment. 
While it acknowledged the contribution that migrants had made to its 
welfare (and its ethos) in the past, it maintained with varying success but 
unwavering determination its own ethnic and cultural distinctiveness as a 
‘nation’ within the wider nation of Spain.
This chapter discusses how that determination manifested itself after 
Franco’s dictatorship. It highlights an important transitional period during 
which the historical ethnic and religious criteria of ‘Basqueness’ gave way to 
a wider political understanding of identity, an understanding which, while 
(re)claiming its distinctive nature, also agreed to remain within the Spanish 
state, with its sights set on Europe. The fueros were a key component of the 
 2 The PNV was founded in 1895 by Sabino Arana, who advocated the secession of 
the Basque territories from Spain and France and their reorganization as an inde-
pendent confederation.
 3 The various Basque political cultures throughout history have interpreted the fueros 
very differently. As Professor Coro Rubio affirmed, the fueros have been regarded as 
‘normas consuetudinarias garantes del modo de vida tradicional’ [customary rules 
that guarantee the traditional way of life], ‘códigos liberales’ [liberal codes], ‘restos 
del Antiguo Régimen’ [remnants of the old regime], ‘modelos de descentralización’ 
[decentralization models], ‘compendio de libertades democráticas y expresión del 
derecho de autogobierno del pueblo vasco’ [a compendium of democratic freedoms 
and an expression of the right of self-government of the Basque people], etc. It is a 
polysemic concept that has undoubtedly acquired significant symbolic value over 
time, according to Rubio (2012). Most prominent among these meanings is that of 
‘símbolo de las libertades del pueblo vasco’ [symbol of the freedoms of the Basque 
people]. Following Eider Landaberea, remembrance of the fueros began to take 
shape with their abolition in 1876 and since then ‘los fueros han estado presentes en 
los debates políticos más relevantes de los siglos XIX y XX’ [the fueros have been 
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PNV’s definition of ‘national identity’ and of its proposal for the territorial 
organization of a democratic Spain.
The first section briefly discusses the changes brought about by the 
death of Francisco Franco and the internal reorganization that the PNV 
underwent at the time. The second section analyses the discourse of the 
demands for the restitution of the historical rights of the Basque people 
generated by the PNV. The third section examines the party’s proposals 
for the role that they saw the Basque Country playing within both Spain 
and Europe. The chapter concludes with an epilogue on the development 
of Basque nationalists’ discourse and political project over time.
Reorganization of the PNV in the New Historical Context
The death of Franco in November 1975 opened a new political era in 
Spanish history, one which the PNV had long awaited and prepared 
for, having spent years calculating and analysing the behaviour that they 
should adopt in this new period, estimating their chances, their choices 
and every potential consequence.4 They had adopted a moderate strategy 
in the previous decade. The party had made small advances through 
a pragmatic policy of limited co-operation with Spanish democratic 
forces, both in the Peninsula and in Europe. This long-term strategy was 
aimed at ensuring the PNV’s active role during the post-Franco political 
era. They had planted the seeds for the future, and that future had finally 
arrived.
 4 The party had moderated its demands over several decades, focusing on developing 
a Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country, an objective that it achieved in 
1936. After Franco prevailed in the civil war, the leaders of the PNV and many of 
its members had to take refuge abroad, a point which marked the start of a forty-
year exile. The most exhaustive and complete study of the history of the PNV is 





32 Leyre Arrieta Alberdi
In the late 1960s the PNV underwent an internal reorganization to 
prepare for the new political scene. Their command centre was relocated 
from Paris and the French Basque Country to the Spanish Basque Country. 
A generational handover took place, and the relations between party leaders 
on both sides of the border deteriorated. Disagreements arose not only 
from the lack of communication that geographical distance caused, but 
also from differing political slants: those in exile were more open to co-
operation with others, whereas those in the Spanish territory were more 
radical and uncompromising. These two tendencies coexisted within the 
PNV from very early on. One was more radical and sought independence, 
and the other was more pragmatic in its approach. This has led experts to 
use the metaphor of the pendulum to explain the historical oscillation be-
tween these two positions (Pablo 1999–2001).
At the end of the 1970s, the PNV’s goal was to appear as an approach-
able, young and attractive party, shaking off the traditional image of an-
achronism and exile. ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna [Basque Country and 
Freedom])5 was born in 1959 and their message appealed to a large part 
of the PNV, particularly the young members of Eusko Gaztedi [Basque 
Youth], who were already vocal in criticizing what they perceived as their 
elders’ modest ambitions.6
The key landmark in the process of restructuring and ideologically 
updating the PNV during the first few years of the transition to democ-
racy was the National Assembly held in Pamplona in March 1977. There, 
the party reasserted Sabino Arana’s founding principles, kept the motto he 
devised, Jaungoikoa eta Lege Zarra [God and Old Law] and strove to pre-
sent themselves as a Basque people’s party with mass appeal. As they sought 
 5 All translations are my own. ETA has been the subject of a large number of aca-
demic studies, the most noteworthy being those by Domínguez Iribarren (1998), 
Elorza (2006), Fernández Soldevilla and López Romo (2012), Garmendia (1996), 
and Jáuregui (1985).
 6 The influence of historical leaders such as Juan Ajuriaguerra, Manuel Irujo, Jesús 
María Leizola, Jesús Solaún, etc., did not vanish overnight, but a new generation of 
young leaders had largely taken the helm: Mikel Isasi, Luis María Retolaza, Xabier 
Arzalluz, Joseba Leizaola, Pello Irujo and others, whose names would become 
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legitimacy for the new era after a record of fighting against Francoism along-
side the defeated Spanish Republic they highlighted their near-century of 
history, in contrast to the recent hodgepodge of new political formations, 
stressing its democratic ethos and the continuity of its political project.
However, notwithstanding efforts to defend this ongoing political 
project, the connection with the founder’s ideological proposals was now 
irreversibly damaged, as the party’s identification with Christianity was set 
aside and the integration of migrants from within Spain was accepted.7 In 
this way, the race-based, essentialist definition of the Basque people was 
abandoned; ‘no lo constituye la sangre ni el nacimiento, sino la voluntad 
integradora, la impregnación cultural y la aportación a su desarrollo en 
cualquier orden de la vida’ [they were no longer defined by blood or birth, 
but by the will to become a part of the community, by cultural permeation 
and by contributions to development in all orders of life]. Independence 
was not mentioned at this stage, although references to an ‘Estado vasco 
autonómico’ [autonomous Basque state]’ left this open to interpretation.8 
This eclectic proposal was their way of bringing together the variety of 
internal schools of thought and preserving the allegiance of those who 
might feel tempted by other new proposals of the Basque nationalist scene.
The Discourse: Reclaiming Historical Rights
The choice of the phrase ‘autonomous Basque state’ was in itself a declar-
ation of intent in which ambiguity was valued over specificity. This could 
be interpreted as a demand for a high degree of autonomy from Spain, but 
also as a call for independence. For the PNV, a potential ‘Basque state’ re-
quired the construction of a network of relationships with other peoples 
 7 Alfredo Crespo has stated that by doing so, ‘el PNV parecía establecer una ruptura’ 
[the PNV seemed to have established a break (with the past)]. In his view, the 
party’s modernization process ‘estuvo guiada las más de las veces por criterios 
pragmáticos’ [was mostly guided by pragmatic concerns] (2012: 287 and 290).
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in the Spanish state, within the context of a ‘Europe of the Peoples’, where 
Euskadi [the Basque Country] would finally find its rightful place on an 
equal footing with the other peoples of the continent.
In the words of the nationalist leader Xabier Arzalluz, the central 
point of the party’s discourse was the demand for ‘los derechos propios de 
los vascos’ [the rights belonging to the Basques] (fueros), which became 
the recurring theme of the PNV’s discourse during the early years of the 
transition to democracy.9 For the party’s support base, fighting to recover 
such historical rights provided a legitimate reason to participate in the 
Spanish political transition process, for this would allow them to recover 
what had once been taken away from them.
The Basque people (defined as ‘cuantos viven y trabajan en Euskadi’ [all 
those living and working in the Basque Country]) were the intended subjects 
of those historical rights. Thereby Sabino Arana’s racist and essentialist def-
inition was explicitly set aside. There was now a Basque people who had a 
set of defining ethnic, historical, linguistic and cultural features of their own:
[V] ascos que tienen sus derechos de los que no pueden apartarse si quieren vivir como 
tales. El vasco no olvida y reclama los suyos, y pretende, como todos aquellos pueblos 
que tienen conciencia de su ser, realizarse lo más ampliamente posible.
[Basques who have some rights that they cannot give up if they want to live as such. 
Basques do not forget their rights, but instead demand them, and intend, as do all 
peoples with a consciousness of their own being, to find fulfilment in the widest 
possible sense.]10
Recovering the sovereignty that the fueros once granted would therefore 
provide the Basques with a sense of their ‘political being’. In other words, 
the traditional charters enabled a centuries-old definition of a very spe-
cific Basque national identity and of their communal will.
The transformation of an ancient legal code into the basis for a modern 
political campaign required, in the first instance, a reconstructed narrative 
 9 Xabier Arzalluz (1976). PNV’s rally at Frontón de Anoeta, Donostia-San Sebastián, 
December 1976, El Diario Vasco, 7 December, p. 8.
 10 Interview with Gerardo Bujanda (1977), a member of the EBB (executive com-
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of the past to affirm the existence of a distinctive political identity. At a 
time of change, hope and opportunity (of which the party was fully aware), 
it was necessary to ‘recover’ and update the history of a people thousands 
of years old, as that history shaped the connection between the past (the 
original sovereignty), the present (the fact that they were the same people 
with the same rights) and the future (the advances to be made in their 
self-government). This narrative gave the PNV’s discourse the desired 
continuity and legitimized their political project.11
In their analysis of the past, the PNV identified two historical 
epochs: the first witnessed the supremacy of the ‘modernos reinos europeos’ 
[modern European kingdoms], interpreted by Basque nationalists as 
‘formaciones políticas heterogéneas, en las que coexistían bajo una misma 
Corona entes políticos de estructura diferente y de desigual vinculación 
con esa misma Corona’ [heterogeneous political formations, with polit-
ical entities that had a wide range of structures coexisting under the same 
rule under varying degrees of relation to the Crown]. Such was the case 
of the Crown of Castile, under whose influence several political units 
coexisted: Álava, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and later, also Navarre. Their coex-
istence rested on a pact between these units and the Crown, which saw its 
power diminished by the mere existence of the pact. During this period the 
Basque community enjoyed a high level of self-government.12
According to the PNV’s thesis, the rise of so-called ‘nation-states’ pro-
duced by the application of the doctrines of the French Revolution put 
an end to this period of coexistence. The birth of the nation-state brought 
about centralized, homogenized communities which lost power in favour 
of central governments and stopped being subjects of law in their own 
 11 The argument about the traditional charters also played a central role in the dis-
course of the Basque right during the early transition to democracy. Both the PNV 
and UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático) used the reference to the fueros as 
‘pieza clave de sus distintas maneras de entender y definir la idea de nación y la idea 
de España’ [a key part of their different ways of understanding and defining the 
idea of nation and the idea of Spain]. But while for the PNV the fueros justified the 
existence of a Basque people as a subject of political rights, for the UCD it demon-
strated a specific way of being Spanish (Landaberea 2018).
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right, thus becoming a mere collection of individuals. From this point 
on, individual citizens became the subjects of law. For the PNV, the laws 
passed on 25 October 1839 and 21 July 1876 epitomized this change and 
culminated in a reduction of their power and the suppression of Basque 
historical rights.13
However, the time had now arrived to reclaim the rights that had once 
been taken away. The PNV’s demands and their federal project (an adapta-
tion of the traditional charters) provided the tools to achieve self-govern-
ment. This was considered a right and not a privilege, ‘un derecho de nuestro 
pueblo que nace de su propia identidad y que ya tuvo realidad en épocas 
anteriores’ [a right of our people which stems from its own identity and 
which already existed in previous times], and was therefore a legitimate 
claim in a democratic landscape.14 For the jeltzales15 there was nothing 
revolutionary or extreme about this demand, since it only involved the 
Basque people exercising a right that they had previously possessed and 
which ought to be restored by the budding democratic system.
The essential first step was the formation of an autonomous govern-
ment integrated into the Spanish state, together with retention of their 
original goal of building a Basque state. To achieve this as swiftly as possible 
 13 A law issued on 25 October 1839 confirmed the application of the Basque charters, 
preserved the ‘unidad constitucional de la monarquía’ [constitutional unity of the 
monarchy], and opened the door to a modification by parliament to further adapt 
their status to the conditions of the Spanish liberal state. Since the times of Sabino 
Arana, this law represented the loss of Basque independence in the eyes of nation-
alists. For the PNV the law issued on 21 July 1876 only made the situation worse, as 
it partially suppressed the charters and abolished the tax and military exemptions 
for the Basque provinces. Although it included no explicit abrogation of the char-
ters, it was interpreted as such by nationalists and supporters of the charters alike 
(Rubio 2003).
 14 El Diario Vasco, 2  June  1977, p.  13. Similarly, ‘Euzkadi es una comunidad con 
personalidad propia, y tiene derecho a defender esa personalidad. Dentro de ese 
derecho, se encuentra el de determinar su propio status jurídico’ [Euskadi as a com-
munity has a character of its own and has the right to defend this character and to 
determine its own legal status]. Stated by Juan Ajuriaguerra in the electoral cam-
paign (Deia, 8 June 1977, p. 6).
 15 Another name for members and supporters of the PNV. It derives from the motto 
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and as a way to start addressing the historical debt owed to the Basques the 
PNV supported efforts to draft a democratic constitutional text. Joining 
forces with other parties in the Assembly that shared their charter-based 
discourse, the PNV reached a compromise in support of the Spanish State 
of the Autonomous Regions,16 a decision which would have aroused fierce 
opposition just a few years earlier. Participation in Spanish politics was jus-
tified by the demand for the restitution of the traditional rights.
First, the jeltzales demanded a constitution which would support the 
legal and political structure of a democratic state, the only possible envir-
onment for their project to thrive. Second, they called for it to grant the 
‘ejercicio de los derechos individuales y sociales y el control del poder y de 
quienes lo ejercen’ [exercise of social and individual rights, as well as due 
control of power and of those who exercised it].
The PNV’s concept of individual rights was inextricably linked with the 
rights of the community, since the former were to be exercised by the indi-
viduals belonging to the community of the Basques and operating through 
that community. Third, and perhaps most important, the constitution had 
to guarantee autonomy ‘para los pueblos de Euzkadi, Catalunya, Galicia, 
Andalucía y demás pueblos, para que se estructuren conforme a su propio 
carácter, desarrollen su propia lengua y cultura y resuelvan sus problemas 
con arreglo a su propia manera de ser’ [for the peoples of Euskadi, Catalonia, 
Galicia, Andalusia and others, so that they may organize according to their 
own character, develop their own language and culture, and solve their 
problems while remaining true to their own selves].17
The campaign slogan chosen by the party for the first democratic elec-
tions (‘seguiremos donde siempre hemos estado’ [We will remain where 
 16 This was the name of the new model of Spanish State developed in the period of 
transition to democracy. This model granted autonomy to the nationalities and 
regions within the State. Between December 1979 and February 1983, seventeen 
autonomous regions were created, each with its respective statute of autonomy. As 
argued by Elias and Mees (2017), the ambiguity of the ‘State of the Autonomous 
Regions’ encouraged the PNV (and also the Catalan nationalist party CiU, 
Convergència i Unió) to implement and expand self-government over the 1980s 
and 1990s (2017: 152).
 17 Extracted from the PNV’s campaign for the general election held on 15 June 1977 
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we have always been]) summed up their history and discourse thus far. It 
was specifically based on the Basque traditional charters, and continued 
to advocate ‘los intereses del Pueblo Vasco allá donde se nos discutan’ [the 
interests of the Basque people wherever they are challenged].18 By asserting 
their idea of the old law, the PNV shielded their concept of community, 
which was modernized by the incorporation of federal notions.
The past and its codes of law also formed the basis for the second 
essential element of the discourse for the restitution of historical 
rights: territory. This is one of the defining elements of any nationalist 
project and represents the substrate on which to develop and preserve 
a community.
For the PNV, the ideal was a Basque territory that contained the four 
historical units included in the Spanish state (Álava, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, 
Navarre) and the three included in the French state (Lapurdi, Zuberoa and 
Lower Navarre). Despite their different characteristics, throughout history 
all seven have shared a set of institutions, rights, customs and traditions, 
notwithstanding various attempts to take them away. In the case of Iparralde 
[French Basque Country], this happened in the late eighteenth century, 
and in the case of the other four provinces, in the nineteenth century.19 
These territories were the home of the Basque community. However, des-
pite the official discourse, during the process of transition to democracy 
the PNV mostly focused on the three provinces currently in the Basque 
Autonomous Community plus Navarre, omitting the provinces beyond 
the French border. What was at stake at that time was the future of the 
Spanish State, and that set some specific geographical boundaries to action 
and influence.
Navarre became central to the PNV’s idea of a community, and con-
stant references were made to this territory during the development of the 
 18 El Diario Vasco, 29 May 1977, p. 9.
 19 In the case of Navarre, the PNV dates the beginning of the process to 1512, ‘when 
we were conquered by the Duke of Alba’ and Navarre became part of the Crown 
of Castile. This was stated by Carlos Garaikoetxea, who later became lehendakari 
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Spanish Constitution and the period that preceded the arrangement into 
Autonomous Regions.20 Navarre was the touchstone of the PNV’s histor-
ical chronicle and their definition of a Basque community. However, this 
was precisely the main obstacle in the negotiations that led to the State of 
the Autonomous Regions, and the cause of the frontal opposition between 
the jeltzales and the Navarran UCD (Union of the Democratic Centre).21
The Place of the Basque Country within both the Spanish 
State and Europe
In the PNV’s view, the seven Basque territorial units should be ar-
ticulated on a confederal and a local basis. A  territorial confederation 
would ensure full respect for the institutions and the particularities of 
each Basque region, and would also allow for some shared entities and 
a ‘national’ statute of autonomy (the nation being the Basque Country). 
This framework would enable the ‘personalidad vasca integral’ [integral 
Basque personality] to be preserved, and would provide the mechan-
isms for addressing financial, political and social issues as required, while 
maintaining Basque culture and the Basque language throughout the ter-
ritory. This pact among Basques needed to be supplemented by another 
pact between the Basque territories and the new Spanish democratic 
State. The federal idea, as an updated version of the system outlined by 
 20 Furthermore, when confronted by other nationalist parties, the PNV insisted that 
the primaeval claim for the inclusion of Navarre in the Basque Country was their 
doing and nobody else’s: ‘no olvidemos que hace ya 85 años por vez primera se oyó 
el grito de Nafarroa, Euzkadi da, salido precisamente de este partido’ [Let us not 
forget that eighty-five years ago we first heard the cry of ‘Nafarroa, Euzkadi da’ 
(Navarre is the Basque Country), which came from this party and none other]. 
This was stated by Carlos Garaikoetxea at a press conference after the ordinary 
National Assembly of the EBB held in Pamplona (Deia, 11 March 1978, p. 11).
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the charters, protected Basque identity and at the same time enabled an 
agreement with the emerging Spanish State.
The Constitution was the specific means for realizing the jeltzales’ 
ideas, and very early on the PNV decided to become an active agent in 
the constitutional process and to run in the first democratic election held 
after Franco’s death.
Euskadi within the Spanish State
Participating in the general election turned out to be a good decision. 
After the vote held on 15 June 1977, the UCD had a majority in the whole 
of Spain, and the PNV was the majority party in the Basque Country.22 It 
appeared that the discourse woven around the demand for the historical 
rights of the Basques had reached a wide sector of the population, and the 
PNV had been given the support base to initiate the path to restitution 
through self-government.
However, problems soon arose in the process leading to the 
Spanish State of the Autonomous Regions, the first of which was the 
Navarran question. The irreconcilable proposals of Basque and centre 
Navarran parliamentarians hindered the negotiations between the 
Basque Parliamentarians’ Assembly (established in June 1977) and the 
Spanish government. The agreement for a preliminary structure based 
on Autonomous Regions was reached on 30 December 1977, and two 
important decrees were signed on the following day. The first decree 
approved the Basque preliminary autonomous arrangement and came 
into force in January 1978; this led to the establishment of the Basque 
General Council (CGV). The second decree outlined the procedure for 
the possible incorporation of Navarre into the Basque Country in the 
future. For some nationalists, the fact that this incorporation did not 
take place immediately was interpreted as a concession from the PNV. 
 22 The PNV obtained 290,000 votes (approximately 29 per cent), which granted 
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The party justified its decision on the grounds that a pragmatic approach 
was required at that particular time.
The Basque Country’s preliminary autonomous arrangement was 
not particularly fruitful as far as the PNV’s aspirations were concerned. 
Consequently, their efforts focused on the constitutional process, to ensure 
that provisions to guarantee Basque self-government in the future would 
be included in the Constitution. In December 1977, the rapporteurs sub-
mitted the bill to the constitutional commission. The parliamentary group 
formed by the PNV submitted 101 amendments, most of which rejected 
the model of a unitary State and demanded that the Constitution recog-
nize the sovereignty of the Basque people. Title VIII, on the Autonomous 
Regions, and the First Additional Provision, referred to historical rights, 
which were the most important issues at this stage.
The definition of the Basque community brought to the constitutional 
debates by the PNV was difficult to adapt to the new political, legal and 
institutional framework in Spain. From the start, it was apparent that it 
would be highly problematic to articulate concepts such as ‘soberanía ori-
ginal’ [original sovereignty] and ‘teoría del pacto’ [pact theory] within the 
wording of a Constitution focused on the indivisible sovereignty of the 
Spanish nation. Aware of this situation, the PNV’s spokesperson, Xabier 
Arzalluz, submitted an additional verbal amendment in June 1978, in 
an attempt to reconcile recognition of the Basque historical rights with 
the structure that was being outlined, which was based on Autonomous 
Regions. This second attempt also failed. Instead, the Commission ap-
proved a different verbal amendment, with the agreement of the rest of 
the parliamentary groups, which was included in the First Additional 
Provision: ‘La Constitución ampara y respeta los derechos históricos de 
los territorios forales. La actualización general de dicho régimen foral se 
llevará a cabo, en su caso, en el marco de la Constitución y de los Estatutos 
de Autonomía’ [The Constitution protects and respects the historical 
rights of fueros territories. This fueros-based system may be updated within 
the scope of the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy] (Larrazabal 
1997: 361). Ignoring the guidelines of the EBB, Arzalluz voted in favour of 
this amendment because it guaranteed that the Constitution would refer 
to historical rights. He also submitted and defended the PNV’s original 
amendment as an individual vote before the full Congress.
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The PNV issued a statement on 21 June 1978 expressing its disappoint-
ment with the outcome of the constitutional debates. The party again jus-
tified Arzalluz’s support for the amendment on the grounds that otherwise 
historical rights would not even have been mentioned at all. However, 
the statement criticized the amendment because it made the recognition 
of historical rights conditional upon their falling within the scope of the 
Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy.
The PNV attempted to change the wording of the Provision by nego-
tiating with the UCD and the PSOE [Socialist Party].23 They even agreed 
with the PSOE on a proposal to replace the phrase ‘en el marco de la 
Constitución’ [within the scope of the Constitution] with one that stated 
that the Statute would be the ‘norma institucional básica’ [basic institu-
tional rule], as provided in the Constitution. The UCD approved the 
PSOE’s wording and even seemed to be willing to support the PNV’s 
amendment related to an increase in the jurisdictional competencies of the 
Autonomous Regions, provided that the jeltzales voted against the right 
to self-determination defended by Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE).
The PNV kept its word, but when the amendment was brought to 
a vote in the Congress of Deputies the UCD opted for the wording of 
the Additional Provision that had been provided and approved by the 
Constitutional Commission, instead of the wording proposed by the PNV. 
The PNV’s representatives were so angry that they left the Parliament 
building, so that when the Constitution bill was approved they were not 
present.
They continued to negotiate, but to no avail. On 5 October 1978 the 
Senate also approved the amendment that had been agreed by the Congress 
(the PNV senators voted against it and the PSOE abstained).
Then the Constitution had to be ratified by a referendum. The PNV’s 
National Assembly had mixed views: they ruled out voting ‘no’ because the 
Constitution was a break-away from the dictatorship and it established the 
 23 According to Ludger Mees, ‘el PNV actuó con firmeza y supo aprovechar 
hábilmente su papel que también los demás partidos le otorgaban como actor 
clave para la solución del “problema vasco”’ [the PNV acted firmly and managed to 
make good use of the role that the other parties gave it as a key actor in solving the 
‘Basque problem’] (2013, 341).
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rule of law and they also appreciated some of its positive aspects, such as 
recognition of the various nationalities within the State and the reference 
to the historical rights; however, they were unwilling to support a ‘yes’ vote 
because some articles in the Constitution were difficult for the nationalists 
to accept, and the PNV questioned the concept of the State envisaged by 
the constitutional provisions. They advocated abstention.
This was also a way to put pressure on the central government to in-
crease the Basque Country’s level of autonomy and to distance themselves 
from the nationalist left, which voted ‘no’. The campaign for abstention 
was full of references to historical rights. ‘Defiende los fueros: abstente’ 
[Defend our historical rights: abstain] was one of the most common slo-
gans. The referendum on the Constitution took place on 6 December 1978. 
Abstention was higher in the Basque Country than the Spanish average. 
Very high abstention rates were recorded in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, and 
less so in Álava and Navarra.
After the disappointment with the constitutional process, the PNV 
devoted their efforts to the preparation and approval of the Statute of 
Autonomy. The drafting of the Statute of Autonomy began in November 
1978. The General Basque Council entrusted production of the text to the 
Assembly of Basque parliamentarians, and a Commission was appointed 
to prepare the first bill based on the project submitted by the PNV. The 
Commission included members of parliament from all Basque parties, 
except Herri Batasuna (left nationalist party) which excluded itself. At the 
end of December the Assembly of Basque parliamentarians officially ratified 
the text and submitted it to the Spanish Congress. The debate on the bill 
for a Basque Statute in the Congress began on 2 July 1979. The PNV had 
previously started to negotiate with the UCD and the PSOE, but relations 
with the former were tense. Ultimately, negotiations succeeded largely as 
a result of discussions between Adolfo Suárez (UCD leader, president of 
the government of Spain) and Carlos Garaikoetxea (the then president of 
the PNV’s Executive Committee). An agreement was eventually reached 
on 17 July 1979 and the final version of the Statute was published in the 
Official Gazette of the Spanish Parliament on 1 August 1979.
The Statute was approved in a referendum held on 25 October 1979, 
a date which thus far, for the nationalists, had symbolized the end of 
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Basque independence. The PNV considered it ‘un buen Estatuto. El 
mejor que podríamos haber sacado’ [a good Statute. The best we could 
have got].24 Still far from their ultimate ambition, this was neverthe-
less a fundamental step in the process, a time when ‘se abren las puertas 
para cohesionar institucionalmente la Nación Vasca, dotándole de un 
importante instrumento para su autogobierno’ [a door has opened for us 
to strengthen the institutions of the Basque nation, now that we have an es-
sential tool for self-government].25 Once the Statute was approved, an elec-
tion for the Autonomous Regions was held in March 1980. Results once 
again backed the proposals made by the PNV, the party with the highest 
number of votes. Its leader, Carlos Garaikoetxea, became lehendakari of 
the Basque government and initiated the process of building the Basque 
autonomy. Several milestones were soon achieved, such as the creation of 
the Ertzaintza [Basque police force], the official recognition of Euskera 
[the Basque language] and the establishment of public media. With no 
time to waste, the symbolic elements were put in place: the ikurriña 
[Basque flag] and the Eusko Ereserkia [Basque national anthem], both 
conceived by Sabino Arana, which now functioned as identifiers of the 
Basque community.26
Euskadi in Europe
Continuing on from this first step in the PNV’s discourse about the resti-
tution of historical rights, that is, finding a place for the Basque Country 
within the institutions of the Spanish State, it was now time to move to 
the second step, as described in the document produced by the Pamplona 
Assembly. The ill-defined ‘Basque State’ mentioned in the document had 
to fit (along with other peoples of the Spanish State) into a Europe of the 
 24 Carlos Garaikoetxea, interview with El Diario Vasco, 3 June 1979, p. 3.
 25 Document produced by the EBB (Deia, 22 December 1979).
 26 Whereas the ikurriña was unanimously accepted, the Eusko Ereserkia was ap-
proved only by the PNV and the CDS. Other parties such as the PSE-PSOE, 
EE (Euskadiko Eskerra), and AP (Alianza Popular) favoured a different anthem, 
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Peoples, which was advocated by the PNV so that Euskadi could be on an 
equal footing with the other peoples of the continent.
The reference to Europe was nothing new in the history of the PNV. 
The years following the end of the Second World War had been marked by 
the reasonable (if perhaps excessive) optimism of Basque nationalists, who 
hoped the resulting Europe would be not only democratic, but nation-based 
instead of state-based. Between 1945 and 1950 the PNV’s leaders had played 
an active role in important European organizations thanks to the links they 
had had with senior figures in the Christian Democrat parties from the days 
of the Second Spanish Republic. These organizations included the Nouvelles 
Equipes Internationales (NEI), the leading Christian Democrat association in 
Europe at that time, and the Union of European Federalists (UEF).27
However, 1975 Europe was no longer the Europe that had been dreamt 
of in 1945, a federal union of nations that was able to reconcile the diver-
sity of its constituent elements. The Europe that Basque nationalists now 
faced was based on strong states, whose foundational role precluded the 
independent participation of sub-entities like the European peoples, and 
Western democracies had inclined towards Franco on several occasions.
Despite all the difficulties, the PNV acknowledged that the moral sup-
port of the European organizations of which they had been a part ‘había 
contribuido en grado notable a sostener ante el mundo la justicia de la 
causa vasca’ [had contributed notably to making the world see the justice 
of the Basque cause].28 For this reason, the strategy remained markedly 
pro-European. References to Europe in the text produced by the Pamplona 
Assembly highlighted two principal ideas: the alleged crisis of nation-states 
and the party’s support for a ‘Europe of the peoples’, both of which shaped 
the PNV’s pro-European discourse during the years of the transition to 
democracy. Regarding the crisis of nation-states, the text stated:
Los Estados europeos, anclados aún en sus estructuras de Estado-Nación, no disponen 
ya, sin embargo, de la capacidad de decisión soberana de la que hasta hace poco 
disfrutaron. La aparición de las grandes potencias y la política de bloques les han 
arrebatado el protagonismo político e internacional que ejercieron hasta la II Guerra 
 27 For the pro-European policy of the PNV see Arrieta (2007).
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Mundial. Se anuncian elecciones generales para un Parlamento europeo, porque el 
nuevo marco económico europeo exige ineludiblemente un nuevo marco político. 
Si Gran Bretaña, Francia o Alemania ya no pueden sostener su autoestatalidad en la 
plenitud de soberanía como hasta ahora, es lógico que el pueblo vasco no debe caer 
en la tentación de pretender darse a sí mismo una estructura estatal caduca y superada.
[European states, still clinging to their Nation-State structures, do not have at their 
disposal the power of decision they enjoyed until not long ago. The rising of the great 
powers and their bloc politics have deprived them of the central international and 
political role they had until the Second World War. General elections are announced 
for a European Parliament because the new European economic environment de-
mands a new political framework. If the United Kingdom, France, and Germany 
can no longer remain fully sovereign states as they have until now, it is only logical 
that the Basque people should not fall into the temptation of longing for the same 
obsolete and outdated state structure.]29
From this alleged crisis of nation-states, Basque nationalists deduced 
(as their leader José Antonio Aguirre had done many years before) that 
fighting to provide the Basque Country with the state structures defined 
thus far was unrealistic. The only reasonable alternative was a supra-
national European organization which was not opposed to the independ-
ence of stateless nations and was willing to recognize political autonomy 
within member states. The Europe envisioned by the PNV was united in 
all senses: politically, culturally, socially and financially. It should be
una Europa en la que cada pueblo pueda desarrollarse plenamente a partir de su 
propio ser y peculiaridad, laborando codo a codo con los demás en la construcción 
de una Europa nueva, libre, progresiva, democrática y con vocación mundial […]. 
El Partido Nacionalista Vasco reitera su vocación europea […]. Esa Europa, en cuya 
creación y desarrollo debe influir y participar también el Pueblo Vasco, la concibe 
el PNV: como una Europa de pueblos libres, con una base común de civilización y 
de cultura, libre en su ser político y diferencial y unidos bajo un techo estructural 
común político y económico, susceptible de cubrir un desarrollo comunitario, y no 
exclusivamente como una Unión de los Estados actuales, superados como estructura 
política y dominados por intereses económicos internacionales.
[a Europe in which all peoples may fully develop in their own specificity, working 
alongside other peoples in constructing a new, free, progressive, democratic and 
 29 EAJ-PNV (1977).
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world-oriented Europe […]. The Basque Nationalist Party reaffirms its European 
calling […]. This Europe, that the Basque people must also contribute to building 
and developing, is envisioned by the PNV as a Europe of free peoples, with a common 
base of civilization and culture, free to express themselves in their politics and in 
their differences, united under a common political and financial structure capable 
of fostering the development of communities. It should not be exclusively a reunion 
of the currently existing states, which are obsolete as political structures and ruled 
by international financial interests.]30
Without a doubt, the description most frequently used in the PNV’s 
European proposal was a ‘Europe of the peoples’. This notion implied a 
federal Europe which would be willing to protect small and stateless na-
tions. It would be founded on the right of all peoples to express their will 
and on acknowledging the artificiality of existing states, which the PNV 
believed were limited and ill-adapted to the needs of the real Europe. 
Therefore, it was necessary to create wider political units which allowed 
for the expansion of markets and the financial advancement of peoples. 
In the words of the jeltzale Gerardo Bujanda, the PNV aspired to real-
izing ‘una Europa de los Pueblos en cuya geografía política el pueblo vasco 
pueda desarrollar plenamente su personalidad’ [a Europe of the peoples 
in whose political geography the Basque people may fully develop their 
character], a Europe that was ‘suma de culturas de todos los que han de 
integrarla – incluida, claro está, la de Euzkadi [sic] – formando un todo 
armonioso en que Pueblos y hombres puedan cultivar su personalidad en 
libertad’ [the sum of the cultures of all members, including, of course, that 
of Euskadi, forming a harmonious whole in which peoples and men can 
freely cultivate their personalities].31 Although the phrase ‘Europe of the 
peoples’ had only occasionally been used before, it became common at 
the end of the 1950s, when Francisco Javier Landaburu (chief representa-
tive of the Basque government in pro-European organizations) employed 
it in his book La causa del pueblo vasco [The cause of the Basque people], 
and especially in the 1960s, with the emergence of European regionalism.
 30 EAJ-PNV (1977).
 31 Urrun (1963). ‘Euzkadi-Europa’, Alderdi, 16–17 (April–May), 204–5. Second 
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However, such PNV discourse, woven as it was around the concept 
of a ‘Europe of the peoples’ was not aligned with the party’s practices. 
After the 1948 Hague Congress, faced with the choice of accepting the 
real Europe or being sidelined, they decided to participate actively in the 
Europe of states as a lesser evil and as a stepping stone towards a nation-
based Europe. During the Spanish transition to democracy, once again, 
the party was halfway between theory and practice, between the desire to 
become a free Euskadi in a federal Europe of nations and acceptance of 
the predominant regionalist approach, which allowed the Basque Country 
to take part in the European project only as a region, and not as a nation.
In the years prior to Franco’s death, as nationalists anticipated a transition 
to democracy in the foreseeable future, they started co-operating with Spain-
wide democratic forces as a way of ensuring their participation in European 
institutions.32 In the 1960s this approach enabled the PNV to take part in 
state-wide organizations such as the CFEME (the Spanish Federal Council 
of the European Movement, which they had contributed to establishing in 
1949), the Christian Democratic Team of the Spanish State and, during the 
early years of the transition process, the Democratic Convergence Platform. 
The strategy of moderate co-operation with Spanish forces clearly eased their 
participation in those years. Meanwhile, in their French exile, the PNV kept 
alive their bonds with institutions like the European Christian Democrat 
International (previously NEI, Nouvelles Equipes Internationales), in which 
they were part of the Spanish Christian Democrat Team.
From the Transition to Democracy to the Present Day
In the years before Franco’s death the exiled PNV had been preparing to 
position themselves in the new democratic Spain which it was anticipated 
 32 In previous years, the PNV’s potential co-operation with Spanish forces had been 
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would soon come into being. They intended to participate in the transi-
tion process and in the articulation of the new democratic State in order 
to achieve the highest possible levels of self-government for the Basque 
Country. And the truth is that the party ‘had a remarkable influence’, as 
noted by Alfredo Crespo (2012: 285).
As in previous periods, the PNV adopted a pragmatic approach, but 
without ever relinquishing their aspiration to independence. They struc-
tured their discourse around the claim for the ‘historical rights’ of the 
Basques, which was sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate both the seces-
sionist and the more pragmatic positions (Elias and Mees 2017: 136). Their 
long-term goal was independence, but it was supplemented by a more mod-
erate discourse that interpreted Basque autonomy as the first step towards 
their ultimate aspiration. The Basque Country was articulated within the 
Spanish State through its status as an Autonomous Region. This duality 
also existed in Europe; while the PNV’s discourse advocated a Europe of 
the Peoples in which the Basque Country would be a nation, in practice 
it accepted the Europe of the States of which it was a part, together with 
other Spanish political parties.
Over the following years, the PNV was a key actor in the establishment 
of a fully autonomous structure in the Basque Country. Mees noted that 
the party was ‘el máximo protagonista de la nueva Euskadi democrática’ 
[the major player in the new democratic Euskadi] (2013: 324). Following 
on from the PNV’s ‘pendular’ tradition, their political strategy has con-
tinued to oscillate between the aspiration to become independent from 
Spain and a more moderate realpolitik, which has sought to have a greater 
degree of self-government and more consensus with non-nationalist 
Basque parties.
A clear example of the former was the declaration made by the PNV 
at the end of the 1990s. On 12 September 1998, the leaders of the Basque 
nationalist parties gathered in the Navarrese town of Lizarra (known in 
Spanish as Estella) and signed the ‘Lizarra Pact’, in which they asserted 
that the Basque nation was a political subject entitled to self-determin-
ation from Spain and France. The PNV sought to create a Basque nation-
alist bloc, which was separate from non-nationalist parties such as the 
PSOE, with which they had previously formed a coalition in government. 
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In September 2002 the lehendakari Juan José Ibarretxe presented a pro-
posal for a new political status for the Basque Autonomous Region that 
demanded the right to self-determination and the establishment of a new 
bilateral relationship between Spain and the Basque Country through 
‘free association’. The plan was presented before the Spanish Parliament 
in February 2005. It was supported only by Basque, Catalan and Galician 
nationalists.
The failure of the Lizarra proposal placed the PNV in an extremely 
difficult situation. The more moderate sector of the party criticized the 
pro-sovereignty strategy advocated by Ibarretxe, and the PNV gradually 
turned towards more pragmatic positions under the presidencies of Josu 
Jon Imaz (2004–7) and Iñigo Urkullu (2007–12). In the first decades 
of the twenty-first century the strategy of building up nationalist forces 
has given way to agreements between parties (both nationalist and non-
nationalist). The traditional duality, between radical long-term demands 
for an independent state within Europe and relatively more realistic short-
term demands, has been reinstated.
Taking into account the tenets discussed in this chapter, it is interesting 
to note that the current moderate discourse of the PNV continues to in-
clude the key concepts of ‘historical rights’ and ‘pact’:
Como nación foral que somos, nuestros derechos históricos, amparados y respetados, 
pueden dar de sí tanto cuanto pueda alcanzar nuestra capacidad de lograr pactos 
institucionales, adoptar decisiones políticas que sean refrendadas por la ciudadanía 
y respetadas. El futuro del Autogobierno vasco pasa por la recuperación del espíritu 
de pacto, el mutuo reconocimiento y la bilateralidad.
[Since our nation is based on historical rights, these rights need to be protected and 
respected, and their scope will depend upon our capacity to reach institutional agree-
ments and make political decisions that are respected and supported by the people. 
The future of a self-governing Basque nation is dependent upon the recovery of a 
pact-based approach, mutual recognition and bilateralism.]33
 33 Iñigo Urkullu, lehendakari of the Basque government, general policy debate, 





The Basque Country within Spain and Europe 51
Bibliography
Aja, E. (2014). Estado autonómico y reforma federal. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Archilés, F., and Saz, I. (2012). La nación de los españoles. Discursos y prácticas del 
nacionalismo español en la época contemporánea. Valencia: Publicaciones de la 
Universidad de Valencia.
Arrieta, L. (2007). Estación Europa. La política europeísta del PNV en el exilio (1945–
1977). Madrid: Tecnos.
Arrieta, L. (2012). ‘Por los derechos del Pueblo Vasco. El PNV en la Transición, 
1975–1980’, Historia del Presente, 19, 39–52.
Balfour, S., and Quiroga, A. (2007). España reinventada. Nación e identidad desde la 
Transición. Barcelona: Península.
Baraibar, A. (2004). Extraño federalismo. La vía navarra a la democracia, 1973–1982. 
Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Beorlegui, D. (2017). Transición y melancolía: la experiencia del desencanto en el País 
Vasco (1976–1986). Madrid: Postmetropolis.
Castells, J. M. (1986). Reflexiones sobre la autonomía vasca. Oñati: IVAP.
Castells, L., Cajal, A., and Molina, F. (eds) (2007). El País Vasco y España: identidades, 
nacionalismo y Estado (siglos XIX y XX). Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco.
Castells, L., and Cajal, A. (eds) (2009). La autonomía vasca en la España 
contemporánea (1808–2008). Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Corcuera, J. (1991). Política y derecho: la construcción de la autonomía vasca. Madrid: 
Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
Crespo Alcázar, A. (2012). ‘Autonomía vs. Independencia en el PNV durante la 
transición española’. In C. Navajas Zubeldia, and D. Iturriaga Barco (eds), 
Coetánea. Actas del II Congreso Internacional de Historia de Nuestro Tiempo, 
285–90. Logroño: Universidad de la Rioja.
Domínguez Iribarren, F. (1998). ETA: Estrategia organizativa y actuaciones, 1978–
1992. Bilbao: UPV-EHU.
EAJ-PNV. (1977). Iruña 77: la Asamblea. Bilbao: Geu.
Elias, A., and Mees, L. (2017). ‘Between accommodation and secession: Explaining 
the shifting territorial goals of nationalist parties in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia’, Revista d’estudis autonòmics i federals, 25, 129–65.
Elorza, A. (ed.) (2006). La historia de ETA. Madrid: Temas de hoy.
Fernández Soldevilla, G., and López, R. (2012). Sangre, votos, manifestaciones: ETA y 
el nacionalismo vasco radical. 1958–2011. Madrid: Tecnos.
Fernández Soldevilla, G., and Toral, M. (2015). La calle es nuestra: la Transición en el 
País Vasco (1973–1982). Bilbao: Paradox.
 
52 Leyre Arrieta Alberdi
Fusi, J. P., and Pérez, J. A. (eds) (2017). Euskadi 1960–2011: dictadura, transición y 
democracia. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
Garaikoetxea, C. (2002). La transición inacabada. Memorias Políticas. Barcelona: 
Planeta.
Garmendia, J. M. (1996). Historia de ETA. San Sebastián: Haranburu.
Granja, J. L. de la (2003). El siglo de Euskadi. El nacionalismo vasco en la España del 
siglo XX. Madrid: Tecnos.
Granja, J. L.  de la, Beramendi, J., and Anguera, P. (2001). La España de los 
nacionalismos y las autonomías. Madrid: Síntesis.
Granja, J. L. de la, and Pablo, S. de (2002). Historia del País Vasco y Navarra en el siglo 
XX. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
Herrero de Miñón, M., and Lluch, E. (eds) (2001). Derechos históricos y 
constitucionalismo útil. Barcelona: Crítica.
Jaúregui, G. (1985). Ideología y estrategia política de ETA. Análisis de su evolución entre 
1959 y 1968. Madrid: Siglo XXI.
Juliá, S., Pradera, J., and Prieto, J. (1996). Memoria de la transición. Madrid: Taurus.
Landaberea, E. (2012). ‘“España, lo único importante”:  El centro y la derecha 
española en el País Vasco durante la transición (1975–1980)’, Historia del 
Presente, 19, 53–68.
Landaberea, E. (2016). Los ‘nosotros’ en la Transición:  memoria e identidad en las 
cuatro principales culturas políticas del País Vasco (1975–1980). Madrid: Tecnos.
Landaberea, E. (2018). ‘Representaciones políticas de la foralidad vasca en la 
Transición: los casos de EAJ-PNV y UCD’, Sancho el Sabio, Extra 2, 197–215.
Larrazabal, S. (1997). Contribución a una teoría de los derechos históricos vascos. 
Bilbao: IVAP.
Mees, L. (2013). ‘El nacionalismo vasco democrático durante la Transición (1974–
1981)’. In R. Quirosa-Cheyrouze (ed.), Los partidos en la Transición. Las 
organizaciones políticas en la construcción de la democracia española, pp. 323–43. 
Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
Mees, L. (2015). ‘Nationalist politics at the crossroads. The Basque Nationalist Party 
and the challenge of sovereignty (1990–2014)’. In R. Gillespie, and C. Gray 
(eds), Contesting Spain? The Dynamics of Nationalist Movements in Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, pp. 41–59. New York: Routledge.
Pablo, S.  de (ed.) (2012). ‘La Transición en el País Vasco’, Historia del Presente, 
19, 5–68.
Pablo, S. de, Granja, J. L. de la, Mees, L., and Casquete, J. (eds) (2012). Diccionario 
ilustrado de símbolos del nacionalismo vasco. Madrid: Tecnos.
Pablo, S. de, Mees, L., and Rodríguez Ranz, J. A. (1999–2001). El Péndulo Patriótico. 
Historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco. Barcelona: Crítica.
The Basque Country within Spain and Europe 53
Pérez, J. A. (2009). ‘Foralidad y autonomía durante el Franquismo (1937–1975)’. In 
L. Castells, and A. Cajal (eds), La autonomía vasca en la España contemporánea 
(1808–2008), pp. 285–320. Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Pérez Nievas, S. (2002). Modelo de partido y cambio político: el Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco en el proceso de transición y consolidación democrática en el País Vasco. 
Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales.
Portillo, J. M. (2018). Entre tiros e historia:  la constitución de la autonomía vasca 
(1976–1979). Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg.
Ramírez, J. L. (ed.) (1999). Democratización y Amejoramiento Foral: una historia de 
la transición en Navarra (1975–1983). Pamplona: Fondo de Publicaciones del 
Gobierno de Navarra.
Rubio, C. (2003). ‘Guerra y memoria (La “destrucción” del acta del Convenio de 
Vergara en 1873)’, Sancho el Sabio, 19, 203–26.
Rubio, C. (2012). ‘Fueros’. In S. de Pablo, et al. (eds), Diccionario Ilustrado de símbolos 
del nacionalismo vasco, pp. 357–72. Madrid: Tecnos.
Tamayo, V. (1994). La autonomía vasca contemporánea, foralidad y estatutismo (1975–
1979). Donostia-San Sebastián: IVAP.
Tusell, J., and Soto, A. (eds) (1996). Historia de la transición, 1975–1986. Madrid: 
Alianza Editorial.
Ugarte, J. (ed.) (1996). La transición en el País Vasco y España: historia y memoria. 
Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco.

Nationalism and Identity: An Interview with 
Professor Xosé M. Núñez Seixas1
May we begin, Professor, by asking you for your own favourite description of 
Nationalism, given that during the past century and a half or so no world 
authority has been able to provide an unchallenged definition?
There are indeed as many definitions of nationalism as nationalism scholars, 
and I’m afraid that I shall be no exception to the rule. I’m a pragmatic mod-
ernist, and I tend to be ‘parmenidean’, in Anthony Smith’s terms. In my view, 
nationalism is the political ideology and political culture that holds in the 
public sphere that a given territory is a nation, that is, a subject of sovereignty. 
Within this broader definition, many different ideologies may ascribe to 
a nationalist creed − yet, there are nationalists who are more visible than 
others, depending on the intensity and visibility that their national claim 
acquires within their political agenda. And there are nationalists who define 
the criteria of belonging to their nation − the condition to be a national, a 
member of the nation − in cultural terms, while others put emphasis on civic 
elements, and many others on a blend of civic and ethnic requisites.
What can historians bring to the twenty-first-century debate among political 
scientists, philosophers and sociologists on the revival of nationalist claims 
across the world?
In my view, as far as their definitions of nationalism and the nation are 
concerned, historians of nationalism are in greater agreement than are 
political scientists and sociologists. Yet, historians may make a substan-
tial contribution in three respects. First, they may accurately appreciate 
what is new and what is not so new in the revival of nationalist claims 
− and perhaps question whether there is a ‘revival’ as such. Second, 
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they may better identify why national identity and national allegiance 
becomes so extremely important for people at very specific moments 
− at turning points, junctures where people experience increasing in-
certitude towards the near future (transition from Ancien Regime to 
new liberal order; break up of communist regimes; Great Depression 
since 2007 and decadence of Europe …). Third, historians always have 
a greater sensitivity towards continuity and change, and tend not to 
make snapshots of a moment, or take static pictures, but rather to see 
mid- and long-term evolutions. This is especially important for the ana-
lysis of nationalist mobilization and discourses, since they all claim to 
be rooted in history and tradition and founded on past grievances and 
myths. Historians prefer instead to stress that nations are constructs, 
and that the past is always much more complex than nationalist dis-
courses want it to be.
Further referendums are being called for in, for example, Catalonia, Scotland, 
the UK − how appropriate, in your opinion, is a referendum as a mechanism 
for dealing with contested national identity?
Wherever and whenever there is a consistent claim, sustained by a ma-
jority of people in a given territory over a certain time, to collectively 
decide what their future form of shared government may be, I see no better 
solutions. Certainly, referendums are not necessarily the perfect solution, 
but they are an expression of democratic will. Sooner or later, that reality 
will impose itself. In my view, the main question is not whether a refer-
endum is an appropriate mechanism for dealing with contested identities 
in a given territory, but rather how the referendum must be implemented, 
what are the questions to be asked (just two questions or many options?), 
how binding must the result be, whether a qualified majority is required 
… Obviously, no one discusses whether Norway’s access to independence 
in 1905, based on more than 90 per cent of affirmative votes, was fully le-
gitimate. Yet:  is a 50.1 per cent majority vote enough to legitimize such 
an important step as secession? Doubts may arise. But this must be dealt 
with in democratic terms, allowing democratic deliberation to take the 
protagonist role.
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In the aftermath of a divisive referendum, or a breakdown in political rela-
tions, what can a government do in the short term to heal a divided nation?
If you mean the state government, a first priority should be the recon-
struction of political dialogue and de-escalation of written and oral con-
frontation. By all means, political fractures must not become social frac-
tures. Civil society tends to be wiser than political elites, and to prefer 
bridges and dialogue rather than clash of identities. Yet, in many cases 
international mediation is the only solution left.
Would you agree with those historians who see the major achievement of 
the Spanish transition to democracy as the creation of the ‘Estado de las 
Autonomías’?
It was the best solution that could be achieved in the late 1970s, within 
the rules that conditioned the process of the Spanish transition to dem-
ocracy. Certainly, the State of the Autonomous Communities managed 
to channel ethno-territorial concurrence in a mostly peaceful and con-
structive way, and contributed to reinforcing meso-territorial identities, 
as well as to deepening democratization and welfare. Most Spaniards are 
satisfied with decentralization. Certainly, it may be debated whether the 
spread of political decentralization all over Spain and the creation of re-
gions ‘from above’ was necessary, or whether the financial system was ap-
propriate. Yet, political systems are subject to evolution, and to the chan-
ging demands of each new generation.
What can other nations learn from efforts to deal with competing national 
identities in Spain since the transition to democracy?
Basically, that cohabitation of different levels of territorial governance 
is good for democracy and for building pluralism and democratic con-
sensus. Also, they may note the fact that most social and political actors 
during the democratic transition gave preference to the achievement 
of democracy over the territorial structure of the state, and hence the 
demos of that democracy. I would add that until the first decade of the 
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twenty-first century, Spain was also an example of how hybrid territorial 
loyalties can be, and therefore of how important it is to keep tolerance 
towards ethnocultural and national diversity as a basic principle of demo-
cratic deliberation.
What in your view have been the major influences in converting recent Catalan 
nationalism from a relatively moderate force of compromise into a major threat 
to the Spanish nation-state?
In my view, this has been the outcome of three intertwined processes. 
First, a generational change within Catalanist leadership and enforced 
political competition among political parties:  existing Catalanist elites 
now believed that the time for independence was come. Second, growing 
political and social uncertainties derived from the impact of the Great 
Economic Depression since 2007/8:  social fears may be expressed in 
terms of reinforced national identity and the aim to preserve threatened 
welfare by building a state of its own. Third, the short-term social frustra-
tion generated by the winding evolution of the reform of the Home-Rule 
Statute since 2006 and the parallel reinforcement of Spanish nationalism. 
Among additional factors may have been the fact that the paradigm that 
the European Union will be a union of states has dominated EU politics 
since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and the dream (or the 
utopia) of the ‘Europe of regions’ is definitively dead. Catalonia may be a 
further, peculiar expression of a general phenomenon: the return of the 
nation-state in Europe.
From the three books you have very recently published on nationalism and iden-
tity, each with a different emphasis, what lessons can be drawn in distinguishing 
current Spanish nationalism from Francoist nationalism?
I’ve tried to be consistent with my own definition of nationalism, and 
therefore I  have identified diverse currents of thought and different 
trends under the umbrella of Spanish nationalism, or Spanish patriotic 
discourses. Spanish nationalism is shared by very diverse political actors 
today, from Vox to Podemos, yet each of them has very divergent concepts 
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of what the nation is, who its members are, what its limits may be and even 
what its symbols were in the past and are in the present. I don’t see Spanish 
nationalism as a sheer expression of Francoism, but rather Francoist (or 
rather National-Catholic) nationalism as a distinctive stage in the his-
tory of right-wing Spanish nationalism, within which Fascist features 
coexisted with other markers inherited from Catholic-traditionalist na-
tionalism. Yet, many Republicans-in-exile also upheld a particular view of 
the Spanish nation, and were convinced that they had fought in 1936–9 
and beyond for the independence of the Spanish nation. Since the 1970s, 
there are Spanish democratic nationalists or ‘patriots’, as much as there 
are neo-Francoist or simply ‘constitutional’ patriots who may share some 
nostalgia for Francoist tenets. What is true is that the shadow of the 
Francoist eagle persists, and affects the political legitimacy of openly ex-
pressed Spanish nationalist tenets in the left-wing spectrum.
In light of rising nationalisms, what do you think are the prospects for 
maintaining a European Union in its present form?
I tend to be pessimistic, as the return to the nation-state seems to gain 
more and more acceptance among many European citizens, who believe 
that a solution for their future problems may be found in the past. The 
EU should have advanced more decidedly in the past towards the cre-
ation of a real European demos, empowering the European Parliament 
and creating a really transnational constituency. Now I’m afraid that it is 
too late.
To what extent do you think the rise in sub-state nationalism may be a reac-
tion to multiculturalism and mass immigration?
I don’t see sub-state nationalism as a reaction to those challenges, since 
most of them, from Scotland to Frisia and Galicia, existed before the 
advent of multiculturalism and even of non-European mass immigra-
tion. There are indeed some radical currents within these movements 
which developed as a reaction against mass immigration and gained cur-
rency within them, as happened in Flanders. In many other cases these 
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tendencies do exist, but remain as marginal trends. In most cases, sub-
state nationalisms have attempted to deal with mass immigration in an 
imaginative way, and this necessity has generally reinforced their embrace 
of civic concepts of the nation, as well as their leaning towards progres-
sive positions. Actually, in present-day Europe, state nationalisms are far 
more restrictive towards mass immigration, and feel tempted to return to 
ethnocentric concepts of the nation.
In your view, will increasing globalization eventually completely erode the 
statist ‘nationalities principle’ of every nation having its own state and every 
state its own nation?
This is what many scholars (including myself ) believed in the 1990s. Some 
even predicted the upcoming end of the nation-state and the advent of 
a global era, in which post-national governance will allow regions, na-
tionalities, metropolitan areas and municipalities to gain foot, while 
European and/or transnational co-operation and federalism would erode 
the power of nation-states. Yet, the capacity of state nationalisms, and of 
ethnic nationalism as a driving emotional force in times of uncertainty, 
has been definitively underestimated. A  return to the nationality prin-
ciple, and to the belief in the correspondence of ethnic/linguistic borders 
with political borders, seems for many people to be a safe shelter in a time 
of globalization and uncertainties. Yet, the nations of the future will have 
to be transcultural, post-national, fully civic and, if one will, transgender. 
The extraordinary ability of the national idea to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances will make it possible, I hope.
  
Emmanuel Dalle Mulle
Enlargement from Within? Secession and EU 
Membership
abstract
In their recent drives for full self-determination, separatist actors in Catalonia and Scotland 
have taken for granted their regions’ continued membership of the European Union after 
independence. Is such an assumption warranted? This chapter tries to provide an answer 
by looking at the arguments put forward by the actors involved and at the relevant lit-
erature, especially the legal arguments on the status of a territory seceding from an EU 
member state. It highlights the highly political nature of this situation and presents al-
ternative scenarios concerning the two cases. It concludes that, although final outcomes 
will depend on the characteristics of each self-determination process, it is likely that an 
interim solution preserving at least some core substantive elements of the rights and duties 
attached to EU membership over the territory of these two regions is likely to be agreed 
upon pending the results of negotiations on a permanent settlement.
Introduction
In recent years Catalonia and Scotland have been in the news be-
cause of the growing strength of movements calling for independence. 
A  self-determination referendum was held in Scotland in September 
2014 and, although the No side won, 45 per cent of voters indicated their 
preference for an independent Scottish state. In Catalonia, a long pro-
cess of confrontation with the Spanish state on the organization of an 
independence referendum (declared illegal by the government in Madrid 
and legitimate by the Catalan executive) led to an unrecognized vote on 
the issue being held on 1 October 2017. This saw the heavy-handed inter-
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independence on the part of the Catalan president Carles Puigdemont, 
and the Spanish government’s subsequent application of article 155 of 
the Constitution aimed at taking control of the Catalan autonomous ex-
ecutive. Several Catalan pro-independence leaders were prosecuted and 
some jailed while others, among them Carles Puidgemont, fled abroad.
Separatist actors have predicated their drive for self-determination 
upon the slogan ‘Independence in Europe’. In other words, they have pre-
sented the Union as a means of minimizing the disruption brought about 
by secession and of taking greater advantage of the opportunities offered 
by the single market. Yet, in doing so, they have taken for granted their 
region’s continued membership of the European Union after independ-
ence. Is such an assumption warranted?
This chapter tries to provide an answer by looking, first, at the ar-
guments put forward by the actors involved, that is, the political parties 
campaigning for independence, the governments of the states they belong 
to and the representatives of the European Union (EU), the European 
Commission in particular. Then, the chapter examines the relevant litera-
ture, especially the legal arguments on the status of a territory seceding 
from an EU member state. In that section, it focuses on both the domestic 
and international law regimes, aiming at establishing which state would 
be the rightful successor to EU membership and what procedure would 
then be engaged in to redefine its relationship with the EU. It highlights 
the highly political nature of this situation and deals with such political 
aspects in more detail. The chapter finally presents alternative scenarios 
concerning the specific cases of Catalonia and Scotland.
Currently, demands for full self-determination are still made by large 
swathes of the population in both Catalonia and Scotland. This chapter 
argues that, although final outcomes will depend on the characteristics of 
each self-determination process, it is likely that, regardless of the concrete 
legal procedure that might be followed, an interim solution preserving at 
least some core substantive elements of the rights and duties attached to EU 
membership over the territory of these two regions – notably with regard 
to the single market – is likely to be agreed upon pending the results of 
negotiations on a permanent settlement. While events may overtake some 
specifics within this chapter, the outline of the debates as well as the basic 
principles under discussion will remain valid.
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The Debate over EU Membership of Scotland and Catalonia
The SNP’s case for independence in Europe is an old propaganda 
argument. The point was first made by Jim Sillars (1989), influen-
tial SNP member, in his seminal pamphlet Independence in Europe, 
where he argued that, contrary to Tory thinking, Scotland would not 
be expelled from the EU as soon as it declared independence. Sillars 
pointed to the absence of precise rules about secession within the 
Community’s legislation and, therefore, to the necessity to flexibly ac-
commodate such a situation within the existing treaties. To reinforce 
his argument, he also referred to the case of Greenland – which left 
the EU after long negotiations while remaining part of Denmark  – 
and the (then forthcoming) process of German reunification that, he 
suggested, ‘could be accommodated without the need for serious dis-
ruption to the Community’ (Sillars 1989:  33). Furthermore, quoting 
the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect 
of Treaties, Sillars argued that Scotland’s independence would entail 
the dissolution of the UK and the rise of two new independent states, 
Scotland and the rump-UK, both successors to the UK membership 
of the EEC (Sillars 1989: 34).
The SNP’s arguments have not changed much since. Almost every 
manifesto after 1989 took for granted Scotland’s continued EU mem-
bership (SNP 1992, 1994, 1997b, 1999, 2005, 2009, 2011) and the obser-
vations made above were reiterated in the most complete publication on 
the subject, the 1997 pamphlet entitled The Legal Basis of Independence in 
Europe (SNP 1997a). The debate flared up again in the months preceding 
the 2014 independence referendum. In this context, the SNP’s reasoning 
focused on two versions of the arguments already illustrated: as Scottish 
citizens have been members of the EU and the EEC for about forty years, 
it would be against the democratic principles of the EU to strip them of 
the rights so acquired; and, given the lack of any procedures to deal with 
issues of secession within the EU, Scotland’s membership would be nego-
tiated within the Treaties, notably through the application of art. 48 of 
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the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (see Maddox 2012a; Scottish 
Government 2013: 216–24).
The position of different UK governments has not changed much since 
the SNP adopted the ‘Independence in Europe’ slogan, that is, Scotland 
would cease to be a member of the Union as soon as it declared inde-
pendence and would need to reapply. In the run-up to the referendum, 
David Cameron’s government stated through the Scottish Office that it 
had been ‘consistent and clear in its view that an independent Scotland 
would most likely need to seek re-entry into the EU on renegotiated terms’ 
(quoted in Maddox 2012b). This position was later confirmed in the first 
of a series of UK government papers supporting the case for the Union 
in the run-up to the referendum (Secretary of State for Scotland 2013). 
Nevertheless, no UK major politician assumed a confrontational stance 
towards Scotland’s EU membership. Furthermore, nobody implied that 
the UK, as an EU member state (at that time), would stand in Scotland’s 
way, either by vetoing her entry or opposing automatic membership or a 
kind of fast-track application procedure.
When studying Catalan nationalism one does not find, until very re-
cently, any full-fledged arguments about the issue of Catalonia’s member-
ship of the EU and this is because the Catalanist movement has until re-
cently been dominated by its autonomist wing, represented by Convergència 
i Unió [Convergence and Union] (CiU), rather than its separatist off-
spring, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya [Catalan Republican Left] 
(ERC). Therefore, the debate is just in its infancy and the arguments in 
favour of an automatic entry scenario are not as developed as in the case 
of Scotland. In this respect, it is quite telling that, when making the case 
for automatic Catalan membership of the EU in a speech held in Brussels 
on 7 November 2012, Catalonia’s former president and leader of the CiU, 
Artur Mas, did not use any legal arguments in favour of such automatic 
membership, but rather asked the EU to take into account the democratic 
will of the people of Catalonia and – in his words – to ‘not let us down’ (Mas 
2012). A more complete reasoning was delivered by Oriol Junqueras, leader 
of ERC, in a televised debate with the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Juan Maria Margallo on 23 September 2015 (Catalan TV channel 8TV). 
There, Junqueras based his position in favour of Catalonia’s continued EU 
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membership on two principal arguments. First, there were no provisions 
in the EU Treaties for the automatic exclusion from the EU of a seceding 
territory of a member state. Second, after independence, and unless they 
explicitly rejected it, Catalan citizens would still hold Spanish citizenship 
and therefore EU citizenship. More than that, having enjoyed EU citizen-
ship for about thirty years, Catalan citizens had acquired rights and duties 
that could not be forfeited, since EU citizenship has assumed an expansive 
character in the context of EU legislation and jurisprudence.1
Unlike the reaction of the British government to Scotland, Madrid’s 
response to Catalonia’s call for self-determination has been deliberately 
confrontational. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy called the drive for inde-
pendence ‘madness of colossal proportion’ (quoted in Moffet 2012, see also 
Mateo and Diez 2017), while the People’s Party member and vice-president 
of the European Parliament, Aleix Vidal Quadras, along with two members 
of the military, invoked article 8 of the Constitution whereby the Army 
should ‘guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, defend her 
territorial integrity and constitutional order’ (Diez 2012). More recently, 
major Spanish parties united in their opposition to an independence ref-
erendum that they considered illegal (Diez and Mateo 2017). With regard 
to Catalonia’s EU membership, the consistent position of the Spanish au-
thorities has been that upon independence Catalonia would immediately 
be excluded from the EU and would have to reapply in the same way as 
any other external candidate (see Torres 2016).2
In 2004, in answer to a question by the Welsh MEP Eluned Morgan 
about the consequences of independence for a secessionist region’s EU 
membership, the then president of the European Commission Romano 
Prodi affirmed that
when part of the territory of a Member State ceases to be a part of that state, e.g. 
because that territory becomes an independent state, the treaties will no longer 
apply to that territory. In other words, a newly independent region would, by the 
fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the Union and the 
 1 The full video of the debate is available at:  <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=5tdyg9ff1SU> accessed 27 September 2017.
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treaties would, from the day of its independence, not apply anymore on its territory. 
(European Commission 2004)
Talking to the BBC on 12  September  2012, his successor, José Manuel 
Durão Barroso, asserted that ‘a new state, if it wants to join the European 
Union, has to apply to become a member like any state’ (quoted in Carrell 
2012). Such a scenario, later labelled by some as the ‘Barroso theory’, 
had been hinted at a day before by a Commission spokesman, Olivier 
Bailly, who pointed out that ‘there are two different steps, there is a se-
cession process under international law and the request for accession to 
EU member state under the EU treaties. In the meantime, of course, the 
new country is not part of the EU as he [sic] has to make request for ac-
cession’ (quoted in Carrell 2012). Finally, the president of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker stuck to this line of reasoning when 
quoting verbatim Prodi’s citation above in a reply to a question by the lib-
eral MEP Beatriz Becerra on 7 July 2017 (Pérez 2017).
Therefore, despite its reluctance to provide final answers and its ten-
dency not to state its views ‘on matters which, as things stand, are purely 
hypothetical’ (European Commission 2007), the rare pronouncements of 
the Commission, and some other EU representatives, seem to confirm that 
secessionist regions will most likely have to reapply, although there prob-
ably will be room for flexibility in choosing the precise procedure to be 
followed. According to some EU officials, for instance, the new states could 
be asked to reapply, but could retain a passive membership. This means that 
throughout the application procedure – which might take some years – 
they could still enjoy the advantages of membership but without having a 
seat at the European Council (Fontanella-Khan, Stacey, and Buck 2012).
Legal Arguments in Favour of and against Continued 
Membership
In this section we will briefly review the legal arguments made by the sep-
aratist parties mentioned above and assess their validity with reference 
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to the existing literature. The analysis is divided into three parts. The 
first looks at the domestic constitutional laws of Spain and the United 
Kingdom in order to evaluate whether the independence of Catalonia 
and Scotland would represent cases of secession from or rather dissol-
ution of the parent state and which part would be considered as the 
rightful successor in international law. The second section focuses on the 
peculiar characteristics of the European Union, which is considered to 
have established a new constitutional order different from general inter-
national law, and on what would be the procedure followed to deal, in 
general terms, with the case of a territory seceding from an EU member 
state. The third section leaves the domain of international law and looks 
at the more political aspects of the issue.
Secession and Succession in Domestic and  
International Law
The argument that the independence of Scotland would involve a re-
vision of the Treaty of Union and, consequently, the dissolution of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland implies that the 
1707 Acts of Union, establishing the United Kingdom of Great Britain as 
the Union of England and Scotland, enjoys the status of fundamental law 
and cannot be modified by an Act of Parliament, but should follow a spe-
cial procedure. This, however, is not confirmed by practice. When Ireland 
seceded in 1922 and formed the Irish Free State, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland simply succeeded to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. After all, English constitutional 
law is quite clear about it: Parliament is supreme and no Parliament can 
bind its successor. Furthermore, even if one does not take this principle as 
valid and relies on the Scottish theory of popular sovereignty – whereby 
the Acts of Union in fact constitute fundamental law and any amendment 
requires a special procedure that, being unknown in British constitutional 
law, could only be adopted by a democratic institution representative of 
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the Scottish people  – the 1998 Scotland Act, establishing the Scottish 
Parliament as the representative institution of the Scottish people, pro-
vided that constitutional issues are matters reserved to Westminster. 
Hence, English constitutional theory prevails over Scottish and the in-
dependence of Scotland would not lead to the dissolution of the United 
Kingdom (Schieren 2000: 124).
The case of Catalonia is rather simpler in this respect. First, there is 
no equivalent of the Acts of Union in Spanish constitutional history, as 
Catalonia was absorbed under the Crown of Castile in 1716.3 Although 
recognizing ‘the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which 
make it up’, article 2 of the Spanish Constitution declares ‘the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish nation’ (Cortes Generales 1978: art. 2). Furthermore, 
the 2010 judgement of the Spanish Constitutional Court concerning the 
Statute of Autonomy voted by the Catalan Parliament in 2006 made it 
crystal clear that the Catalans may well call themselves a nation for polit-
ical or cultural reasons, but this term has no legal value. Legally speaking, 
there is only one nation, Spain, while the Catalans are ‘just’ a nationality, 
and sovereignty lies with the Spanish people at large (Delledonne 2011: 8).
These considerations lead us to conclude that, from a domestic consti-
tutional law perspective, Catalan and Scottish independence would repre-
sent cases of secession. But what about international law? Before looking 
at the issue in detail, there are two premises to be made. First, as confirmed 
by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in regard to 
the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of in-
dependence of Kosovo, there is no general prohibition, in international 
law, of an act of declaration of independence (ICJ 2010). Most of the lit-
erature agrees that ‘secession is neither legal nor illegal in international 
law, but a legally neutral act’ (Crawford 1979: 268; see also Cassese 1995; 
Christakis 1999; and Higgins 1994). Second, there is no right to external 
 3 More precisely, Catalonia was under the Crown of Castile from the marriage of 
Ferdinand II of Aragon, of which Catalonia was part, and Queen Isabella I  of 
Castile in 1469, but retained its autonomy until 1716. For a detailed history of 
Catalonia see Balcells, 1996.
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self-determination either, except for former colonies and peoples subjected 
to foreign occupation (Buchheit 1978: 73–4).
Before looking at the practice of the UN in order to see how it dealt 
with similar cases, we need to examine another argument concerning the 
international law regime at large. The SNP has often suggested that the 
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties would 
confirm the claim that upon independence both Scotland and the rump 
United Kingdom would be treated equally – in this case both as successor 
states of the UK (UN 1978: art. 34.1). Yet, besides the fact that the SNP’s 
reading could be questioned, the Convention, albeit in force, has been 
ratified only by twenty-two countries and, more fundamentally, not by the 
United Kingdom and most other EU member states. Therefore, it cannot 
be considered as being legally binding (Borgen 2010: 1027).
In 1947, confronted with the India–Pakistan split, the United Nations 
General Assembly’s Sixth Legal Committee stated that in the case of seces-
sion the successor state automatically keeps its UN membership, while the 
new state has to apply (UNGA 1947). The difficulty lies in establishing who 
is the successor. Practice since then suggests that succession to member-
ship occurs if the country claiming to be the successor state ‘can establish 
sufficient legal identity with the former member’ (Scharf 1995: 67). When 
in 1992 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (made up of Serbia and 
Montenegro) claimed to be the rightful successor to the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the General Assembly, at the re-
quest of the Security Council, turned the claim down and asked the FRY to 
apply. The decision was justified on the grounds that the FRY was made up 
of only two out of six of the former constituent republics and represented 
only 40 per cent of the territory and 45 per cent of the population of the 
SFRY, which was therefore considered as dissolved. Earlier the same year, 
the UN had come to exactly the opposite conclusion when dealing with 
the dissolution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). The 
Russian Federation’s bid for succession to Soviet membership, involving 
a permanent seat on the Security Council, was secured on account of its 
considerable continuing coincidence with the territory, population, re-
sources and administrative apparatus of the former Soviet Union (Scharf 
1995: 43–66). The above cases thus show that
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in determining whether a potential successor is the continuation of a member or 
whether the member’s international personality has been extinguished, the relevant 
factors include whether the potential successor has: (a) a substantial majority of the 
former member’s territory (including the historic territorial hub), (b) a majority 
of its population, (c) a majority of its resources, (d) a majority of its armed forces, 
(e) the seat of the government and control of most central government institutions, 
and (f ) entered into a devolution agreement on U.N. membership with the other 
components of the former State. (Scharf 1995: 67)
All of the above considerations seem to suggest that, in the case of Catalan 
and Scottish secession, the rump Spain and UK, accounting for most of 
the population, territory, resources and including the seat of government 
as well as the headquarters of the armed forces, would be considered the 
rightful successors to Spanish and UK membership of the EU.
Secession within the Legal Order of the EU
As many authors have pointed out, general international law is only of 
partial use with regard to issues of fragmentation within the EU. This is 
because the EU Treaties have given birth to a new legal order that has cre-
ated rights and obligations for its member states as well as for the citizens 
inhabiting them (Tierney 2013:  383). Legal commentators have formu-
lated two main positions concerning the EU membership of a territory 
seceding from a member state.
The first, probably formulated best by Happold (2000) and, more re-
cently, by Crawford and Boyle (2013), consists in the conclusion that, upon 
independence, such territory will find itself automatically out of the EU and 
will need to reapply through the procedure set out by art. 49 TEU. In other 
words, the seceding territory will be treated like any other external country 
seeking accession, which will have to be ratified by all EU member states. 
The second, argued best by former judge of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) Sir David Edward (2013), outlines a different procedure whereby the 
secession of a territory of an EU member state will be dealt with as a case of 
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internal enlargement by means of a modification of the Treaties in accord-
ance with art. 48 TEU. Let us take a look at both positions in more detail.
According to Happold, international treaties – those establishing the 
EEC/EU included – follow the moving treaty boundaries rule, that is, they 
are personal and not territorial, they apply to the members of the treaties 
and not to their territories. Hence, if a territory leaves a member state, the 
treaties no longer apply there. In his opinion, this would be shown by the 
case of Greenland, which, curiously enough, is often cited by separatist 
actors to prove that political expediency tends to prevail over the moving 
treaty boundaries rule. Greenland’s departure from the Union – Happold 
asserts – had to be negotiated precisely because Greenland remained part 
of a member state (Denmark). Had it seceded from Denmark, negoti-
ations would not have been necessary. Happold also cites the precedent 
of German reunification, which required no formal consent by the other 
member states, but was simply treated as a case of absorption of the German 
Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic, whereby, according to the 
moving treaty boundaries principle, the Treaties automatically applied to 
the new territory (Happold 2000: 32–3).4 Along similar lines, in their ana-
lysis of the Scottish case, Crawford and Boyle (2013: 100) point to the fact 
that ‘Scotland’s position within the EU will depend on the EU’s own legal 
order. But there are no legal rules within the EU that specifically govern 
whether it can automatically succeed to membership’. Hence, they con-
clude, ‘on the face of the EU treaties and other indications, it seems likely 
that Scotland would be required to join the EU as a new Member State’. 
This conclusion mainly stems from the acknowledgement that the defin-
ition of the internal territory of EU member states derives from their own 
domestic constitution and not from the treaties making up the EU’s legal 
order: ‘[N]o treaty amendment is therefore required simply as a result of a 
change to the borders of a state’s territory’ (Crawford and Boyle 2013: 101). 
Being automatically excluded from the jurisdiction of the EU, the seceding 
 4 Happold also mentions the case of Algeria, arguing that when this became inde-
pendent in 1962 nobody dared argue that it should be granted EEC membership 
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territory would have to reapply like any other third party through the pro-
cedure detailed by art. 49 TEU. Yet they also add that
all this is not to suggest that it is inconceivable for Scotland automatically to be an 
EU member. The relevant EU organs or Member States might be willing to adjust 
the usual requirements for membership in the circumstances of Scotland’s case. But 
that would be a decision for them, probably made on the basis of negotiations; it is 
not required as a matter of international law, nor, at least on its face, by the EU legal 
order. (Crawford and Boyle 2013: 103)
In other words, the EU can still act flexibly according to political expedi-
ency, but this is not a legal requirement.
A different view is defended by Sir David Edward. Starting from the 
ECJ’s assertion in Van Gend en Loos vs. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen (ECJ 1963), that ‘to ascertain whether the provisions of an 
international Treaty extend so far in their effects, it is necessary to con-
sider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those provisions’ 
and noting that there is no provision dealing with the secession of an EU 
territory in the Treaties, Edward concludes that ‘we must look to the spirit 
and general scheme of the Treaties’ (Edward 2013: 1163). Here, four art-
icles are key, that is, 2, 4 and 50 TEU, as well as article 20 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – with which we will 
deal in more detail below. Article 2 stipulates that the Union ‘is founded 
on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of per-
sons belonging to minorities’, while article 4 provides that ‘pursuant to 
the principle of sincere co-operation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which 
flow from the Treaties’ and ‘shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s 
tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attain-
ment of the Union’s objectives’. Article 50, on the other hand, details the 
procedure that should be followed in the case of withdrawal of a member 
state from the EU and foresees the conclusion of a negotiated agreement 
between the Union and the state to disentangle the complex set of rights 
and obligations uniting these two entities. Given these premises, Sir David 
Edward dismisses the ‘Barroso theory’ already referred to whereby upon 
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independence a seceding region will find itself automatically out of the 
Union, and argues that there would be a legal obligation to follow a nego-
tiated procedure akin to that described in article 50 (Edward 2013: 1165–7; 
for a similar position on the application of art. 50 see Chamon and Van 
der Loo 2014). This conclusion is further grounded on the following two 
points. First, it would be unreasonable to believe that the drafters of the 
Treaty thought it necessary to hold negotiations in the case of withdrawal 
of a member state and not in the case of separation of one of its territories. 
Second, Edward questions the plausibility of the Barroso theory in relation 
to its concrete application:
[I] t seems to be assumed that – at the moment of separation or on some other un-
specified date – the ‘separating State’, its citizens and its land and sea area would find 
themselves in some form of legal limbo vis-à-vis the rest of the EU and its citizens, 
unless and until a new Accession Treaty were negotiated. Until the moment of sep-
aration, they would remain an integral part of the EU; all EU citizens living in the 
separating State would enjoy all the rights of citizenship and free movement; and 
the same would apply, correspondingly, to all other EU citizens and companies in 
their relations with that State. Then, at the midnight hour, all these relationships 
would come abruptly to an end. (Edward 2013: 1165–6)
Arguing that this is an absurd scenario, he concludes that before inde-
pendence comes into force all the parties involved would have a legal duty 
to negotiate the new status of the seceding territory in accordance with 
the principle of ‘sincere co-operation, full mutual respect and solidarity’ 
enshrined in the Treaties (for a similar position see also MacCormick 
2000: 735; Schieren 2000: 131–3) and this because ‘maintaining the terri-
torial and political integrity of the EU and the vested rights of its citizens 
is surely of greater importance than blind acceptance of the contestable 
doctrines of public international law’ (Edward 2013: 1167).
The concept of European citizenship, introduced by art. 20 TFEU, 
plays a momentous role in the arguments of those scholars in favour of the 
internal enlargement scenario. As mentioned above, the EU legal order has 
established rights and duties not only for member states but also for citi-
zens. The ECJ made clear already in 1963 that such rights and duties con-
stitute a ‘legal heritage’ for EU citizens. Recent ECJ jurisprudence (see in 
particular Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi, ECJ 2011), relying 
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on the notion of EU citizenship, has expanded such legal heritage so as to 
constrain national legislation when this might jeopardize the enjoyment of 
rights deriving from the status of individuals as EU citizens (Douglas-Scott 
2014a: 16–18). Hence, although it is certainly not the case that automatic 
EU membership for a seceding territory would directly descend from EU 
citizenship rules, O’Neill (2011) argues that in the context of Scotland’s 
independence, ‘the question to ask is whether the CJEU [Court of Justice 
of the European Union] would consider that the fact that Scotland became 
independent required that all (or any portion) of the previous UK citi-
zenry thereby be deprived of their acquired rights as EU citizens?’ He, 
along with other jurists (see for instance Douglas-Scott 2014a: 19), con-
cludes that the Court would most likely intervene to defend the acquired 
rights of EU citizens. Such a position has been criticized by Crawford and 
Boyle (2013: 104–8). Pointing out that EU citizenship is additional to citi-
zenship of a member state and, relying on public international law rules, 
they have argued that upon secession, the successor state will withdraw its 
nationality (British or Spanish in our cases) from the inhabitants of the 
seceding territory, who will therefore be left solely with the nationality of 
the new state and, as a consequence, will lose EU citizenship. Yet, as argued 
by Barber, this is likely to trigger challenges in court which could eventu-
ally come before the ECJ, which could then ‘conclude that the removal of 
European citizenship from such a large number of people runs contrary 
to European Law’ (Barber 2014). Most notably, as argued by Tierney and 
Boyle (2014: 21) with regard to Scotland’s case, ‘the CJEU could intervene 
to declare a duty on both the institutions of the EU and the Member States 
to negotiate, in a spirit of sincere co-operation, to secure Scotland’s full 
accession and to protect the interests of European citizens in the interim 
period prior to this formal accession’.
An Essentially Political Question?
The two views expressed above differ in that the first foresees the im-
mediate egression of a seceding territory from the EU and a subsequent 
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procedure of reapplication, while the second argues that there is a legal 
obligation to negotiate the new status of a seceding territory with a view 
to minimizing disruption, both in terms of EU territorial integrity and 
the enjoyment of acquired rights by EU citizens. While the former en-
visages the application of art. 49 TEU regulating the admission of new 
members, the latter suggests that negotiations will follow the procedure 
outlined by art. 50 and art. 48 TEU, thus following an internal enlarge-
ment procedure through modification of the existing treaties.5
Yet the difference between these two views might not be so great in 
practice. Even Crawford and Boyle (2013: 98), who have otherwise ex-
pressed clear-cut and assertive opinions about a seceding territory’s need 
to reapply for EU membership, have concluded that ‘in practice, to an 
even greater extent than questions of state continuity or membership of 
the UN, the consequences of Scottish independence within the EU will 
depend on the attitude of other EU Member States and organs, and on 
negotiations’. To put it more bluntly, ‘a purely legal view of the matter is of 
little use’ (Gratius and Kai, quoted in Guirao 2016: 196).
In this connection, there is a growing consensus in the legal literature 
that after a pro-independence vote in a legal referendum – agreed by both 
the seceding entity and the central government of the successor state – the 
best interest of all actors would be to find a swift agreement that minim-
izes disruption (see Armstrong 2014: para. 39, Avery 2014, Douglas-Scott 
2014b, Tierney and Boyle 2014: 11–12). Hence, even in the case in which 
a seceding territory would need to reapply for membership in accord-
ance with art. 49, an interim status preserving ‘core substantive aspects 
of the accession treaties’ would most likely be agreed upon (Armstrong 
2014: para. 39). Hence, regardless of the specific legal route that might be 
followed – either through art. 48 or art. 49 TEU – there seems to be a 
consensus that, while automatic EU membership of a seceding territory 
is likely to be ruled out, negotiations with a view to ensuring an interim 
status preserving key rights and duties associated with EU membership 
 5 For a halfway view, whereby the application of art. 50 will be followed by that of 
art. 49, see Chamon and Van der Loo (2014).
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should be pursued, pending the results of negotiations aimed at obtaining 
a permanent outcome.
But what are these substantive elements? Guirao (2016) convincingly 
distinguishes between the three areas of: membership of the single market, 
membership of the Eurozone and EU citizenship.
The single market is probably the most rosy area for seceding regions, 
meaning that it is probably the area in which, even if the Barroso view 
should prevail from a legal perspective, it is most likely that a political so-
lution will be found to preserve the integrity of the common market and 
thus guarantee the continuation, after independence, of the rights and 
obligations enjoyed by the citizens of the seceding unit before separation. 
This is because the integrity of the single market is one of the key goals of 
the EU, hence its members have not only an interest in trying to preserve 
it, but also an obligation to do so (Douglas-Scott 2014a: 12). Furthermore, 
past EU and EEC practice is in line with this privileged furtherance of 
the single market, even in the presence of political turbulence (see Guirao 
2016: 206). Concretely speaking, the integrity of the single market could 
also be preserved by swiftly granting the seceding territory membership 
of the European Economic Area (EEA), as an interim solution pending 
negotiations concerning its internal or external procedure for full mem-
bership (Chamon and Van der Loo 2014: 627).
Continued membership of the Eurozone might be more complicated. 
As a matter of fact, euro currency membership requires EU membership. 
Hence, if a seceding territory, where the euro is already in use, were among 
those still awaiting accession according to art. 49, it might also have to 
switch to a different currency. Yet this would not necessarily be the case. 
The seceding territory and the EU could come to an agreement similar to 
that in force between the latter and Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City 
(Chamon and Van der Loo 2014: 628) or it could keep using the euro uni-
laterally, as does Montenegro, and even get liquidity from the European 
Central Bank (ECB) if its banks have subsidiaries in Eurozone countries 
(Galì 2014: 88). In this latter case, the greatest problem would be that the 
ECB would not act as a lender of last resort, which might entail huge risks 
in moments of economic and financial distress and increase the costs of 
borrowing in normal times.
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The final question concerns the rights and duties acquired by the citi-
zens of the seceding territory as a consequence of their status as EU citizens. 
Although, as we have seen above, such status is additional to citizenship of a 
member state, ECJ jurisdiction has ruled that even with regard to decisions 
pertaining to nationality the negative consequences for EU citizens should 
be diminished (see Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, ECJ 2010). For instance, 
in the case of the bilateral agreement concerning the free circulation of 
people between the EU and Switzerland, it is asserted that ‘rights acquired 
by private individuals shall not be affected. The Contracting Parties shall 
settle by mutual agreement what action is to be taken with respect to rights 
in the process of being acquired’ (cited in Guirao 2016: 213). This does 
not mean that EU citizenship will be guaranteed in full no matter what, 
but rather that it is likely that both political negotiators and, possibly, the 
ECJ, will try to limit the upheaval caused by the secession of the concerned 
territory by guaranteeing continuity of some rights, most probably those 
linked to the single market.
Yet the specific procedure that would be followed and the agreement 
that would be hammered out would depend very much on the concrete 
circumstances of each secession process, which is why we look now, in 
more detail, at the cases we are concerned with here, that is, Scotland and 
Catalonia.
Scotland and Catalonia: Some Scenarios
Scotland and Catalonia are very different cases when it comes to seces-
sion. While the former region has seen its right to self-determination 
recognized by the UK government and a negotiated independence refer-
endum has already been held – which allows us to think that any future 
popular vote on the matter will also be the result of an agreed procedure – 
the latter has faced the persistent opposition of the Spanish government, 
which has defined any independence referendums as illegal and taken 
concrete measures to prosecute the organizers of any such events.
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Furthermore, the outcome of the vote held in June 2016 on UK mem-
bership of the EU complicated things further by initiating the Brexit pro-
cess, which was initially supposed to end in March 2019, and during which 
most EU rights and obligations would remain in place (Asthana and Mason 
2017; BBC 2018).
After the British elections held in May 2017, the Scottish National 
Party, which leads the Scottish regional executive, seemed to have put on 
hold the possibility of organizing a second independence referendum, 
which had been strongly demanded immediately after the results of the 
Brexit referendum (The Economist 2017). Although it is unlikely that a 
new independence referendum will be organized in Scotland, that could 
still be an option within the 2020 deadline recently agreed by the UK 
and the EU. Hence, we will take here two scenarios into account: that of a 
Yes victory in an independence referendum held while the UK is still offi-
cially enjoying, to the extent agreed to, the equivalent of EU membership 
rights; and that of a Yes victory in a referendum held after that date, that 
is, when (without unlikely but not impossible about-turns) the UK will 
definitively be out of the EU.
On the face of it, the first scenario might look similar to that which 
would have been realized had the Yes vote won in the 2014 Scottish refer-
endum. It would have indeed been a case of fragmentation (Chamon and 
Van der Loo 2014: 614). The crucial difference is that now such a fragmen-
tation would be negotiated as part of a wider process of EU contraction, 
which was not the case in 2014. Hence, there would be an additional interest 
and, according to the considerations made above, even a legal duty, on the 
part of EU member states and the Commission to conduct negotiation 
with the Scottish government with a view to preserving the integrity of 
the single market. The downside of this scenario is that the parallel process 
of Brexit, Scottish independence and redefinition of Scotland’s position 
towards the EU would greatly increase the complexity of these concurrent 
processes, delay the achievement of any final agreement and amplify un-
certainties. In this connection, the specific procedure followed can make 
a substantial difference and even lead to what Chamon and Van der Loo 
(2014) have called a ‘temporal paradox’. If, after the application of art. 50, 
the procedure outlined by art. 49 is followed, that is, Scotland would have 
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to reapply as an external candidate, the region might find itself unable to 
initiate accession talks before having finalized its independence negotiations 
with the UK government, while in order to ensure a smooth transition to 
independence it would need precisely to begin such negotiations over its 
future status with regard to the EU. To avoid such a paradox, EU member 
states might decide to opt for the procedure outlined by art. 48, or internal 
enlargement, but this could be opposed by countries such as Spain which 
are having to deal with secessionist threats within their own borders (see 
for instance Rajoy’s declarations in Torres and McTague 2017).
The argument whereby Spain or other EU countries could oppose 
Scotland’s membership has often been made in public debates. In this con-
text, whether the procedure described by art. 48 or art. 49 TEU is followed 
is not really relevant, since the final outcome would have to be agreed by 
all member states and thus Spain, or other countries, would be able to 
exercise their veto in both cases. However, a total opposition to Scottish 
membership is unlikely. In this connection, reference has often been made 
to the fact that five EU countries have not recognized Kosovo – Cyprus, 
Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – because of their own internal mi-
norities problems, and are therefore unlikely to accept any secession within 
the EU. Yet the comparison with Kosovo does not hold, since the problem 
with this latter case is the unilateral nature of the independence process 
there, rather than secession per se. Scotland’s independence will be most 
likely agreed with the UK and therefore constitutes a very different case. 
Even a former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs ( José García-Margallo 
y Marfil) stated that ‘the constitutional arrangement in Britain is one and 
in Spain another, and [it] is up to them whether to separate’ adding that 
‘no one would object to a consented independence of Scotland’ (Murray 
2012).6 Hence, there is no reason why Spain should oppose Scotland’s 
EU membership, provided that secession happens with the agreement of 
London (Ker-Lindsay 2012).
 6 It is highly unlikely that the UK and/or Spain would oppose the application of 
their own regions if separation occurs consensually. If, on the other hand, the dec-
laration of independence is unilateral, then opposition is almost certain.
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What Spain and other countries can do, however, is to make it harder 
for Scotland to obtain membership. This means pushing for the procedure 
outlined by art. 49 instead of that engaged by art. 48, as well as hampering 
negotiations, notably with regard to the opt-outs currently enjoyed by 
Scotland as part of the UK. The result would probably come down to the 
sum of two opposite interests: on the one hand, that of most EU states to 
minimize the disruption brought about by the secession process (notably 
to the integrity of the common market) and to reduce, as much as possible, 
the contraction of the EU following Brexit; on the other, that of countries 
threatened by separatist movements to show these latter that independ-
ence is a risky affair and EU membership hard to win. Unfortunately for 
Scotland, the complexities of her application would offer Spain the oppor-
tunity to easily make the process more difficult without appearing unco-
operative. As part of the United Kingdom, Scotland enjoys a number of 
opt-out options that would need to be renegotiated and would be hard 
to preserve. Furthermore, the Scottish government would face a true di-
lemma: the more substantive the derogations it would try to ensure, the 
longer the application process (Furby 2010: 5). There are six main prob-
lematic areas: the Schengen agreement, the euro, the UK budget rebate, 
the structural funds, fisheries and co-operation in the fields of justice and 
home affairs. The first seems to be the most complicated, as it threatens 
to force Scotland to impose customs controls at the border with England. 
In contrast, the euro might prove to be less troublesome than it seems at 
first glance, as Scotland could simply put off the adoption of the common 
currency indefinitely, as Sweden has done so far.7 However, Scotland would 
almost certainly have to pay more for its membership and would get less 
back in terms of structural funds (Thorp and Thompson 2011: 10), but 
probably, given the importance of the fishing sector for its economy, it 
would be able to negotiate a better deal concerning rights in its territorial 
waters (Furby 2010: 5). Finally, it would likely have to agree to a full en-
dorsement of the Union’s legislation in terms of justice and home affairs, 
but this does not seem to be a major concern for the Scottish executive.
 7 We do not deal here with the difficulties entailed by the necessity of adopting its 
own currency, or the limitations imposed by any decision to continue using sterling.
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The second Scottish scenario we mentioned above seems not to be 
problematic. If Scotland secedes from the UK after the Brexit process is 
completed, it will already be a third party, hence, there seems to be little 
doubt that there would not be any negotiations to redefine its position 
towards the EU (since this would already be redefined by the Brexit ne-
gotiations) and the region would simply have to apply as an external can-
didate. After more than forty years in the EU club, it would certainly have 
a strong case and, one might believe, the process would be quite swift. But 
again, countries threatened by separatist movements could exploit the 
many complexities normally involved in these kinds of negotiations to 
slow down the process.
In the Catalan case we can discern two scenarios, although these are 
not linked to any process of EU exit initiated by the successor state, but 
rather to the way in which secession could be achieved. While the Spanish 
state has sternly opposed any attempt by the Catalan authorities to assert 
the region’s self-determination by means of an independence referendum, 
the determination of local actors to go on with the independence pro-
cess despite central opposition means that the possibility of a successful 
unilateral secession, although still remote, cannot be ruled out entirely. 
Therefore, the true question in the Catalan case is whether the attempt to 
obtain EU membership by an independent Catalan state would follow a 
consensual or unilateral path.
The first Catalan scenario is certainly the easier to deal with. If the 
Spanish state were ever to accept Catalonia’s self-determination and rec-
ognize an eventual pro-independence vote, there is no reason to believe 
that it would oppose the region’s bid for EU membership. In this case, the 
wider EU’s interest in minimizing disruption might prevail and either 
the internal enlargement procedure would be engaged or some kind of 
interim agreement – or alternatively, accession to the EEA pending EU 
accession negotiations – would be sought. Things could be a little more 
complicated if the Spanish government’s acceptance of Catalonia’s seces-
sion were to occur only after a prolonged period of institutional conflict 
of the kind already seen. In this case, Spain might not be the only country 
unco-operative at EU level – other countries threatened by secessionist 
movements might also prove to be so, if only to show that a hard-line 
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secessionist policy does not pay. Once again, the result would depend on 
whether the EU members’ interest in minimizing the disruption brought 
about by the secession process prevailed over the threatened countries’ will 
to teach their own domestic separatist movements a lesson.
The scenario of Catalonia’s unilateral independence is probably the less 
rosy in terms of avoiding disruption. Leaving aside all questions concerning 
the domestic consequences of such an event, there is no reason to believe 
that EU member states and institutions would have an interest in implicitly 
validating such a process by either recognizing an independent Catalan state 
or facilitating its accession to the EU. This is because territorial integrity 
is a key norm in international relations and international law, so much so 
that it generally prevails over self-determination, except in cases of colon-
ization, foreign occupation or serious violations of human rights, none of 
which seems likely to apply to the Catalan case (see Cassese 1995: 317–23; 
Buccheit 1978: 73–4; Christakis 1999: 152–3; Higgins 1994: 111–28).8 In 
other words, a unilateral secession does risk giving birth to a pariah state 
living in a juridical limbo.
Conclusion
In the last few decades, separatist movements in Catalonia and Scotland 
have campaigned to the sound of the slogan ‘Independence in Europe’, 
thus portraying separation as a smooth process that will not negatively 
affect the economic life of their regions and the welfare of their popula-
tions. The governments of the parent states and the central institutions of 
the EU, notably the European Commission, have generally replied by ar-
guing that any secessionist territories will automatically be expelled from 
the EU upon independence, with obvious detrimental consequences for 
business activities and the welfare of the local populations.
 8 Here, we do not take into account the scenario of a possible violent confronta-
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This chapter has tried to assess the validity of both claims by looking at 
the existing international law literature as well as by examining the political 
aspects of this hypothetical fragmentation of the EU space. The principal 
conclusion is that, although nobody can foresee with a sufficient degree 
of certainty what would happen if and when one of these two regions de-
clared independence, the scenario whereby all EU rights and obligations 
previously held by the citizens of these two territories will come abruptly to 
an end is unlikely at least for political, if not legal reasons. In our opinion, 
even if article 49 were to be preferred over article 48 as the guiding prin-
ciple of the new redefinition of the relationship between the seceding ter-
ritory and the EU (i.e. an external application will take precedence over 
an internal enlargement), an interim agreement preserving at least some 
substantive elements of the rights and duties currently enjoyed as EU citi-
zens by residents of Catalonia and Scotland would be maintained, notably 
with regard to the integrity of the single market.
However, the process would not be at all as smooth and straightfor-
ward as depicted by separatist actors, but would rather be fraught with 
obstacles and uncertainties. Furthermore, it would decisively depend on 
the domestic peculiarities of each process of separation. On the basis of 
this consideration, we have proposed two scenarios for each case.
In the Scottish case, we have distinguished between two options: an 
independence process begun before the completion of Brexit and one ini-
tiated after it. While the latter is quite straightforward, since at that point 
Scotland would already be outside the EU and therefore with no reasonable 
alternative to an external application,9 in the former scenario Scotland would 
enjoy the advantage of arguing its case at a time of ‘contraction’ of the EU 
territory, thus offering member states a possibility of reducing the disruption 
brought about to the integrity of the EU by Brexit. At the same time, the 
simultaneity of negotiations on Brexit, Scottish independence and redefin-
ition of Scotland’s status with regard to the EU would certainly increase the 
complexity and uncertainty of the process and might even lead to the tem-
poral paradox highlighted by Chamon and Van der Loo (2014). Also, the 
 9 Whether this might be facilitated by Scotland’s forty years of EEC/EU member-
ship is an all too different question.
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process of redefinition of Scotland’s relationship with the EU might be made 
harder by EU countries facing domestic separatist threats, above all by Spain.
In the Catalan case, the dividing line lies in whether separation would 
be consensual or unilateral. If the former, the prospects of Catalonia facing 
a smooth accession procedure would seem to be higher, since Spain has 
been the most vocal country in calling for a rigid application of the external 
application procedure; but if the Spanish government comes to accept the 
independence of the region and negotiate it at the domestic level, it seems 
reasonable to believe that it would assume a more co-operative stance at 
the European level. In contrast, a unilateral declaration is likely to generate 
stern opposition not only on the part of Spain, but also on the part of most 
EU member states, since territorial integrity is a key norm in international 
relations and no country will have an interest in creating a precedent in this 
respect. One might argue that the fact that Kosovo has been recognized by 
most EU member states runs counter to such a conclusion. Yet one must 
bear in mind that the Kosovo case was accompanied by ethnic cleansing and 
other serious violations of human rights on the part of the Serbian govern-
ment, which has not so far been the case in Spain – and hopefully it will not 
be for the foreseeable future. As argued by Guirao (2016: 215), ‘pioneering 
voyages, as we all know, can end in glory or catastrophe’ and as in the short 
term it seems highly unlikely that the Catalan government would manage 
to build up enough peaceful political legitimacy to get its independence 
claim recognized, a unilateral secession would probably lead to the latter.
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Flagging the Nation in the Basque Country: The 
Flag War
abstract
This chapter questions whether the concept of ‘banal nationalism’ can be applied to the 
competing national identities in the Basque Country, with reference to the controversy and 
confrontation that surrounded the display of the national flag in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. It explores the competing narratives about sovereignty, power and legitimacy, and 
how these found expression in disputes over the flying of Spanish and Basque flags from 
the balconies of public buildings. The chapter considers how Basque and Spanish nation-
alism exist side by side, both in dialogue and in tension with each other, and how changes 
in the political balance of power can change the context in ways that extend beyond the 
political sphere, impacting civil society down to the level of the individual.
After an outline of its theoretical underpinnings and an overview of the 
socio-political background against which it is set, this chapter considers 
typical examples of the Basque national flag (the ikurriña) – officially 
authorized in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country 
and controversial in Navarre – becoming the iconic central symbol of 
Basque national identity at the heart of the ‘flag war’ of the early 1980s 
and beyond.1
While flags are universally and very obviously associated with dis-
plays of national solidarity and identity at such public events as football 
matches, rock concerts, festivals, parades and so on, what is less obviously 
 1 This chapter is part of research activity developed under the aegis of the Basque 
government’s PREDOC 2015 programme. It draws inspiration, in particular, from 
the concept of banal nationalism introduced by Michael Billig in his seminal (1995) 
work of the same name. I  would like to express my deep gratitude to Alejandro 
Quiroga for his corrections and suggestions. I would also like to thank the peer 
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apparent is the subtle effect of their presence on official buildings, an effect 
described as so banal (so reiterated and quotidian) that it goes largely un-
noticed (Archilés and Quiroga 2018: x).2 This chapter, in exploring the 
Basque Country, ventures into a disputatious territory where the Spanish 
State’s definition of national identity is far from banal, where it is routinely 
and openly defied.3
Since Basque nationalism appeared as an organized political move-
ment in the late nineteenth century, Basque citizens have been interpellated 
as part of both the Spanish nation and the Basque nation.4 This chapter 
focuses on official display of the national flag on town hall balconies, an 
issue that proved to be highly controversial in the Basque Country after 
Franco’s dictatorship (1936–75) and which in the late 1970s and the 1980s 
became central to Basque politics. I will exemplify the fact that, while less 
overtly, it remains an unresolved problem to this day.
The chapter expounds its theme in terms of the banality and basic 
rational logic assumed by those political parties engaged in Basque and 
Spanish nationalist discourses, and hence focuses on the dialogical relation-
ship between Spanish and Basque nationalism. The politicians identified 
with the Spanish nation would assume Spanish national symbols to be a 
 2 Banal nationalism in Spanish history has recently been the focus of considerable 
academic enquiry (Archilés and Quiroga 2018). Additionally, several works have 
used Billig’s ideas to explore sub-State nationalisms in Western Europe, including 
Catalonia (Crameri 2000), Scotland (Law 2001; Higgins 2004) and Wales ( Jones 
and Desforges 2003; Jones and Merriman 2009). These authors have found the 
concept of banal nationalism useful in their analyses, especially when sub-State, 
decentralizing political institutions do exist. This chapter connects both research 
areas: sub-State nationalisms and recent Spanish history.
 3 I use the term Basque Country to refer to the Autonomous Community of the 
Basque Country and the Chartered Community of Navarre in Spain, an area 
claimed as their national territory by Basque nationalists. Here the Basque lan-
guage is taught in state schools and Basque nationalist parties contest elections. 
The French Basque Country, which Basque nationalists also claim, and where the 
Basque language is not taught in the State education system, is not relevant to the 
present discussion.
 4 Distinctions made in this chapter between ‘Spanish’ and ‘Basque’ are intended to 
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normal matter and would perceive the discourse and practice of Basque 
nationalist parties as an attack on that normality.
Banality and Hegemony
Michael Billig’s observations on symbols as a banal daily reminder of 
the national identity spread so rapidly to the social sciences, to cultural 
studies and historical research that by the beginning of the twenty-first 
century he had become an essential reference for researchers interested 
in national identities (Quiroga 2015). I wondered at the extent to which 
his concept of banal nationalism could be validated by the example of the 
Basque Country.
What caught my attention was Billig’s proposal to extend the analysis 
of nationalism beyond the pro-independence political movements and 
the extreme right, and his argument that nationalism is present in every 
nation and reproduced on a daily basis by each state.5 His work – which 
asks every researcher to be aware of the nationalism present in the state and 
of how the term ‘nationalist’ tends to be applied only to other countries, 
pro-independence parties or the far right – suggested the opportunity to 
consider nationalism from the political perspectives of both the Basque 
Country and the Spanish state.
Second, I inferred from Billig’s view a concern about how each state’s 
political and economic elites use nationalism as a tool to maintain their 
leadership and to serve their interests. That is to say, national identities re-
produce social hegemonies and help to maintain the status quo, and where 
the national order is not socially contested, a state is able to reproduce a 
 5 The terms ‘reproduce’ and ‘reproduction’ are to be understood in the sense that 
Billig describes: ‘The reproduction of nation-states depends upon a dialectic of col-
lective remembering and forgetting, and of imagination and unimaginative repe-
tition’ (1995: 10). His contention is that a sense of national identity is constantly 
created and re-created (reproduced) by myriad ‘banal’ (everyday, barely noticed) 
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nationalist sentiment in a banal way. The Basque case of the turbulent 
1970s and 1980s can be read as a unique and stimulating example of a 
contrary scenario.
In considering the link between banal nationalism and social hegemony 
we can take account of the perceptions of Michael Skey (2011), whose 
work is critically based on Billig, which explain the nation as something 
totally interiorized in the habitual scope of the world we live in. In that 
sense, ‘nation’ should be understood as a container, rather than a thing, 
reflecting as such the conflicting social views of what society means and 
of its goals and limits.
The period we analyse in this chapter was one of substantial flux in 
Spanish society, with Francoism widely contested during the 1970s, a multi-
party parliamentary Monarchy finally emerging in 1978 and what is called 
the Spanish Transition ending with the coming to power of the Socialist 
Party in October 1982. Abundant research has been centred on how ideas 
of Spain and Spanish national identity changed and developed throughout 
the period6 and at this time of contested and conflictive issues of political 
legitimacy, power and sovereignty at a national level, Basque national-
ists struggled against the very idea of Spanish national sovereignty itself. 
While many studies are concerned with the Basque Country7 none fully 
deal with the Spanish nationalism of the same period. This chapter seeks 
to complement previous research by exploring the dialogical connection 
between Spanish nationalism on the one hand, and Basque nationalism 
on the other.
I take a flexible approach to the concept of banal nationalism and 
its application to the case of Basque nationalism, without disregarding 
Molina’s contention that the existence of political violence in the Basque 
Country precludes any analysis of the national issue linked to a sort of 
banal nationalism (Molina 2009). I pay attention to the ways in which 
Spanish and Basque nationalists compete to be the hegemonic national 
 6 See, for example, Archilés and Martí (2002); Núñez Seixas (2004); Balfour and 
Quiroga (2007); Taibo (2007); Muñoz (2012); Arroyo and Izquierdo (2012); 
Artime (2016).
 7 Examples include Fernández and López (2012); Escribano and Casanellas (2012); 
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identity in the three different spheres of nationalization and apply Alejandro 
Quiroga’s proposal to analyse mass nationalization processes through those 
spheres: the official sphere of state, regional, provincial and municipal in-
stitutions, the non-official public sphere of political parties, trade unions, 
cultural associations, sports clubs and so on and the private sphere of family 
and friends (Quiroga 2014). For consistent reproduction a national identity 
has to be hegemonic in those three spheres in a certain territory, which is 
not the case in the Basque Country.
In Billig’s analysis, the flying of the national flag on official buildings 
is an example of an almost unconscious shaping of national identity, and 
the case study which follows illustrates the dialogue between Basque and 
Spanish nationalism on the meaning of national identity, sovereignty and 
legitimacy. It does so by examining the role played by flags in the contested 
social space of the Basque Country in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
Basque Autonomy and Its Flag
This first section acknowledges the fact that Basque nationalism was ex-
tremely strong in the private and the non-official sphere during the last 
years of the Franco dictatorship and those years in which the parliamen-
tary monarchy was established. We look at how that situation, in forcing 
the government to authorize display of the Basque national flag and to 
accept the creation of Basque autonomous institutions with a regional 
administration led by Basque nationalists, prepared the ground for repro-
ducing Basque national identity in the official sphere.
The Basque national flag, the ikurriña, was to play a central role in 
this reproduction. Created by the founder of the conservative Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV), Sabino Arana and his brother Luis, in 1894, it 
copied the design of the Union Flag of Great Britain (the Union Jack) with 
a white cross over a green saltire on a red field. During the Spanish Civil 
War (1936–9) it became the official flag of the Basque autonomous govern-
ment, led by the PNV. That government, after a brief existence, went into 
exile during Franco’s dictatorship (de la Granja 2007). Under Franco too, 
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the ikurriña functioned as an anti-Francoist symbol, linked to a powerful 
Basque nationalist message (Casquete and de la Granja 2012).
Basque nationalists reframed the Civil War as an attack by Spanish 
nationalists on Basque autonomy (Muro 2009), and their rhetoric was suc-
cessful when, as strikes and workers’ protests broke out during the 1960s 
(Domènech 2008) the violent overreaction of Franco’s government made 
it possible for Basque nationalists to present the dictatorship as an essen-
tially anti-Basque regime (Casanellas 2014). Notwithstanding that a large 
part of the population had arrived from other Spanish regions in the nine-
teenth century and during the industrial development of the 1950s and the 
1960s, the Basque nationalist discourse influenced all the anti-Francoist 
opposition.
Their message acquired an extraordinary popularity, linked as it was to 
the armed revolutionary group Basque Country and Freedom (Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna; ETA), whose militants became martyrs for all the anti-Francoist 
opposition when they were killed in clashes with Francoist police.8 Their 
prestige reached its peak in 1970, when death sentences passed on some 
ETA leaders were finally commuted following widespread demonstrations. 
ETA’s prestige rose again when in 1973 they assassinated Franco’s right-hand 
man, president of the government, Carrero Blanco, in a bomb attack in 
Madrid (Pérez Pérez 2013).
In October 1975 (Franco was to die in November), ETA started a cam-
paign with booby-trapped Basque ikurriña flags, which exploded when 
attempts were made to remove them, and six members of the police force 
were killed within a few months. The threat eroded police morale and in 
the aftermath of Franco’s death the government could not prevent dis-
play of the ikurriña at local festivals and public celebrations (Egaña 1994; 
 8 The generic term ‘police’ cannot capture the complexities (historical and current) 
of the Spanish policing system(s), but neither can any adjective applied to them 
in English:  ‘military police’ should be used only of members of the armed forces 
whose jurisdiction is limited to military personnel; ‘militia’ has too many inter-
pretations; ‘paramiltary’ tends not to refer to legally constituted forces. ‘Police’ is 
therefore employed throughout for both those who come under military jurisdic-
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Echevarría 2017). Surprise turned into elation among Basque nationalists 
when, on 5 December 1976, in the Atotxa football stadium in San Sebastian, 
the captains of Real Sociedad and Athletic Club took the field with an 
ikurriña. Finally, Spanish president Adolfo Suárez had no choice but to 
authorize its public display in January 1977. Under the social pressure of 
the opposition and ETA intimidation of Francoist local authorities, the 
ikurriña was raised in almost every town council building in the Basque 
Country during 1977.
At that time, the government was forced to organize the first multi-
party election since 1936, after huge popular protests prevented all attempts 
to establish a very restricted democracy (Gallego 2008; Wilhelmi 2016). 
A few weeks before the June 1977 elections, the PNV and the Basque section 
of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) drafted an agreement allowing for 
signatories to be the representatives of the Basque people after the elec-
tion and elaborate an autonomy project for the Basque territories in Spain. 
This ‘pro-autonomy pact’, was supported by the Spanish Communist Party 
(PCE), small leftist Basque nationalist parties, a leftist branch of the former-
Francoist Carlist Party and some Spanish conservatives (Tamayo 1994).
The most significant aspect of the pact was that the elected repre-
sentatives of the Basque people would negotiate with the new Spanish 
authorities regarding political institutions for the Basque people (Deia, 
8 June 1977). Basque and Spanish representatives were conceived as two 
different bodies, with a critical element of the mindset of Basque candi-
dates contesting the 1977 Spanish general election being the concept of 
the Basque people as the primary source of political legitimacy. In the 
Basque Country, although mixed with explicit references to Spain, a per-
ception of Basque uniqueness was present even in the government-formed 
Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) and the post-Francoist Popular 
Alliance (AP) of the far right (Landaberea 2012). Among Basque nation-
alists in the late 1970s there was an almost total rejection of the Spanish 
nationalism of the kind that the Franco regime had tried to impose (Saz 
2012; Estornés 2013).
Although in Spain the UCD of President Suarez gathered major sup-
port, the broad triumph in the Basque Country of the PNV and PSOE 
in June 1977 was a victory for rejection of Spanish nationalism (Miccichè 
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2012; Arrieta 2012). The notion of a specific body that would represent the 
Basque people was so widely accepted that immediately after the elections 
a Basque Parliamentary Assembly was formed, with membership con-
sisting of every elected representative in the Basque provinces, including 
those from UCD and AP. On 21 July 1977 they issued a joint statement:
La Asamblea de Parlamentarios […] manifiesta su decisión de defender el derecho 
del pueblo vasco a recuperar sus instituciones históricas y que el primer objetivo de 
su acción parlamentaria es precisamente conseguir […] libertades originarias de 
los vascos.9
[The Parliamentary Assembly […] announces its decision to defend the right of 
the Basque people to recover its historical institutions and its first parliamentary 
activity’s objective will be to achieve […] the original freedoms of the Basques.] 
(Cited in Tamayo 1994: 254)
Spanish government hegemony having been deeply eroded in the Basque 
Country, a Basque national identity became socially predominant during 
the first years after Franco’s death (Molina and Míguez 2012) not only 
in the private sphere among Basque nationalist families, friends and col-
leagues, but also in the public sphere of political parties, trade unions, 
neighbourhood associations, local festival committees, literature, music 
and so on (Pérez-Agote 1984; Aizpuru 1998; Urrutia 2006; Larrinaga 
2016; Eser 2016). The social acceptance of Basque symbols was not far 
from being banal at the time, and although some authors have argued 
the contrary, on the grounds of ETA violence (Molina 2017; Fernández 
2017), others have underlined the importance of generational feelings 
and the link between Basque nationalism and anti-Francoism (Mata 
1993; Letamendia 1994; Arriaga 1997).10 An implicit and widespread 
anti-Francoist Basque nationalist feeling can be identified among the 
young during the period, in Basque nationalist as well as Spanish migrant 
families.
 9 All translations are mine, unless otherwise stated.
 10 The initial conclusions of my own ongoing research, based on personal inter-
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Related to that Basque nationalism and the protester environment, 
a radical coalition, People’s Unity (Herri Batasuna; HB), was created in 
1978.11 HB did not accept the elected government, nor the Constitution 
project being drafted in the Spanish Parliament, arguing that Francoist 
Army officers were still in power and, therefore, Spain could not be con-
sidered a democracy. They maintained that the Basque autonomy project 
had to be drafted following local elections and should contain the right of 
self-determination, no matter what the recently elected Spanish multi-party 
parliament decided. HB, believing that a leftist and Basque nationalist ideal 
was widely accepted in Basque society, felt confident about future local and 
regional elections, their perception implying that Spanish national identity 
had almost disappeared in the region. This coalition of pro-independence 
parties publicly supported ETA’s assassination campaign against Army 
officers and Spanish policemen in the Basque Country and against their 
alleged local collaborators.
Nevertheless, the simultaneous presence of different and more or less 
successful Spanish nationalist discourses in the Basque Country should not 
be overlooked. Spanish nationalism did not disappear with Franco but con-
tinued being a crucial element in every Spanish political culture (Arroyo 
and Izquierdo 2012; Izquierdo 2014). The major newspapers (still those 
previously linked to Franco’s National Movement) took a pro-democratic 
stand but never supported a Basque nationalist view; the Spanish Football 
League matches were the main event every Sunday afternoon; Spanish radio 
was listened to in the Basque Country and only State television was avail-
able at the time. ETA members from urban areas sang the same Spanish 
hit songs and saw the very same films that might be enjoyed by any young 
woman in Madrid (Florido et al. 2017).
Through nationwide television, newspapers and radio stations, different 
Spanish nationalist narratives were socialized: the central government’s con-
servative message for national concord, the Communist Party’s pursuit 
 11 HB, founded in 1978 as a Basque nationalist coalition of four far-left groups to 
promote a ‘no’ vote in the Spanish Constitution referendum of that year, became 
a political party in 1986. Refounded as Batasuna in 2001 but then proscribed by 
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of national reconciliation and the Socialist Party’s identification with a 
modern and European Spain (Sassoon 2001; Gallego 2008; Andrade 2012; 
Rodríguez-Flores 2018). That is to say, following the theoretical model of 
the three spheres of nationalization, the Spanish national identity was being 
spread, though in a much weaker manner than that of the Basque identity, 
in the non-official public sphere. However, the official public sphere, related 
to State institutions such as the education system, administration, social 
security, the postal service, currency, road signs and so on, reproduced on 
a daily basis a sense of shared territory, symbols and cultural references, as 
it did everywhere else in Spain. Added to that, we can assume that those 
migrants arriving in the Basque Country as adults never lost their Spanish 
national identity.12
Moreover, the Spanish government and the principal opposition par-
ties fostered the positive idea of a newly founded democratic Spain, allegedly 
achieved through the Constitution agreement of 1977–8. As previously 
noted, the primary source of political legitimacy in the Basque Country, 
for both Basque nationalists and Spanish Basques acting in opposition par-
ties, was understood to be the Basque people themselves. Nevertheless, in 
1977 the Socialists and Communists abandoned their conception of Spain 
as a federation of different sovereign peoples. This constituted a U-turn in 
their positions ( Jiménez and López 1989; Quiroga 2009; Geniola 2018).
During Franco’s dictatorship, sub-State nationalists and leftist parties 
shared a common oppositional and underground activity that homogen-
ized their messages. After the 1977 elections, Spanish nationalism became 
the common ground for agreement between the government and the na-
tionwide opposition parties. While not one Basque nationalist party sup-
ported the 1978 Constitution, Spanish national identity became the only 
officially recognized national identity in the Constitutional Monarchy. 
The Constitution established the Spanish people as its unique source of 
legitimacy and state power; hence, other sources of legitimacy such as the 
so-called nationalities that referred to Catalonia, the Basque Country 
and Galicia were discarded or treated as subordinated to that primary 
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source (Álvarez 2005). The Constitution is legally based on the ‘indisoluble 
unidad de la Nación española’ [indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation] 
(Article 2), a provision which sets such a clear limit to every regional pro-
independence political project that Xacobe Bastida suggests that, being 
drafted in such a way, the article amounted to an imposition by high-ranking 
Francoist military on the parliament (2007: 121–2). After approval of the 
Constitution, Spanish nationalism obtained a notable advantage over 
Basque nationalism, which did not have official State recognition. Without 
control of any public institution, and despite an overwhelming presence 
in the non-official public sphere, a banal reproduction of Basque national 
identity was not yet possible.
That situation was to enter a new phase when, after the first local elec-
tions in April 1979, Basque nationalist parties obtained a clear victory. A few 
weeks later, the Basque autonomy project, passed by the Spanish Parliament 
after hard negotiations between the government and the PNV leaders, 
established the ikurriña as the official flag for the newborn Autonomous 
Community of the Basque Country. The fact that this was not challenged 
by Spanish parties indicates the strength of Basque nationalism in the late 
1970s. The official status acquired by its national flag and the election of 
the first autonomous government led by the PNV set the stage for a future 
banal Basque nationalism.
The Basque Flag in Navarre
However, despite the fact that the ikurriña was flown in the Navarrese 
town councils after 1977, Spanish nationalism still flourished in the 
Basque province. Although the Basque Autonomy Law of 1979 stated 
that Navarre could be part of the new Autonomous Community of the 
Basque Country, its incorporation was blocked. UCD obtained six out 
of the nine Parliament seats contested in the province, although gath-
ering only a third of the popular vote. The specific discourse which had 
been developed through the pre-democratic regional institutions in 
Navarre claimed that although its people were Basques, it was already 
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an autonomous region under Franco and did not need to call for a new 
autonomy (Baraibar 2004). Accordingly, Navarrese members of UCD, 
who were linked to the former Francoist regional elites (Aoiz 2005), de-
clined to participate in the Basque Parliamentary Assembly, feeling that 
in this way they might put a barrier between an autonomous and an inde-
pendent Basque Country. Moreover, while the Spanish Constitution of 
1978 had included the possibility of a referendum in Navarre that would 
mean incorporation of the province into the Autonomous Community of 
the Basque Country, the position of the PSOE gradually moved closer to 
that of the Navarrese members of UCD and, when the regional Navarrese 
parliament was elected in 1979, UCD and PSOE voted together to post-
pone such a referendum sine die. As previously noted, Spanish nation-
alism functioned as a shared ground for nationwide parties during 1977 
and 1978 and widened the gap between the main leftist parties and the 
sub-State nationalists.
From an essentially passive, albeit determined stance, Spanish nation-
alism moved into a higher gear after the unsuccessful reactionary coup d’état 
in Madrid on 23 February 1981 (known as 23 F). An offensive strategy was 
adopted to reinforce the constitutional monarchy, and the Spanish national 
flag became a central element. The Spanish political elite felt that Spanish 
symbols needed to be relegitimized and their monopolization by far right 
and pro-military agents averted. The massive anti-coup demonstrations on 
27 February 1981 were marked by the number of Spanish constitutional 
flags. Members of the government were told that they were always to be 
portrayed with the flag in evidence. The patriotic-constitutional fervour of 
1981 made monarchic symbols almost hegemonic in the Spanish democ-
racy, overwhelming the residual use of republican emblems. At the PSOE 
Congress in 1981 the Spanish flag replaced the red flag for the first time 
(Moreno and Nùñez 2013).
A law passed by the Spanish Parliament in June 1981 stated that the 
Spanish flag ‘simboliza la nación; es signo de la soberanía, independencia, 
unidad e integridad de la patria y representa los valores superiores expresados 
en la Constitución’ [symbolizes the nation; it is a sign of the sovereignty, 
independence, unity and integrity of the fatherland and represents the 
superior values expressed in the Constitution] (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 
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12 November 1981). The law also made it mandatory to fly the emblem 
outside every public administration building, and, if displayed with other 
flags, it was to hold a preferential place. It seems that, much as foreseen 
by Michael Billig’s ‘hot’ scenario (when, for example, people take to the 
streets) the 23 F attempted coup allowed the political elite to appropriate 
patriotic sentiment and double the presence of national symbols in so-
ciety. This further step towards ensuring the hegemony of the young par-
liamentary monarchy and its social and political values paved the way for 
further banal reproductions of national identity. According to the PSOE 
spokesman Luis Solana, the Spanish flag should from then on be ‘algo ha-
bitual y normal’ [something habitual and normal] (El País, 23 June 1981), 
precisely, that is, as banal as Billig was to describe. But in small localities 
where Basque national identity was hegemonic, this injunction was system-
atically ignored, with City councils flying either the ikurriña alone or, like 
the Basque autonomous government in the new institutions, no flag at all.
But in Navarre in 1981 the regional parliament officially recognized 
only the Spanish and Navarrese flags.13 While the new regulation did not 
ban the flying of the ikurriña, the Spanish parties were determined to le-
verage the new law and prevent any public presence of the Basque national 
flag in Navarre, understanding that its presence in the official sphere would 
seriously undermine a banal reproduction of the Spanish national identity. 
In December the PSOE started a campaign to remove the ikurriña from 
every town council in Navarre and in order to avoid Spanish nationalist 
rhetoric presented the issue as a simple legal adjustment. Their spokesman 
in Navarre argued that the law allowed for the flying of only the Spanish 
national flag, those of the autonomous communities and a local flag, and 
asserted that the flag of one autonomous community was not that of an-
other (Egin, 1 December 1981).
Basque nationalists considered this issue to be an attack on their na-
tional identity, with PSOE’s arguments about a mere legal fit not ringing 
true during a year celebrating Spanish national identity. The ikurriña con-
tinued to be the national symbol for Basque nationalists, who remained at-
tached to the idea of the Basque people as the source of political legitimacy, 
 13 Obra Legislativa del Parlamento Foral de Navarra, 26 October 1981.
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whatever the Spanish Constitution said, and who knew that if the ikurriña 
disappeared in Navarre they would lose any opportunity to reproduce the 
Basque national identity there in the official sphere. The Basque autono-
mous government was then led by the PNV member Carlos Garaikoetxea, 
a Navarrese himself, who asserted:
[C] on independencia de que la ikurriña haya sido establecida como bandera oficial de 
esta Comunidad Autónoma, en opinión de este Gobierno, constituye un símbolo que 
puede considerarse patrimonio universal de la comunidad natural vasca, cualquiera 
que sea su localización o adscripción política.
[Regardless of the establishment of the ikurriña as the official flag of [only] this 
Autonomous Community, in the opinion of this government it is a symbol that can 
be considered as universal patrimony of the Basque natural community, whatever 
its location or political ascription.] (Egin, 2 December 1981)
The fact that the 1981 celebration of Spanish nationalism was uncon-
tested in most of Spain allowed promotion of the constitutional flag to 
set the scene for a banal reproduction of Spanish national identity linked 
to the new multi-party institutions.14 However, the existence of Basque 
nationalism served to highlight the contrasting goals of Spanish nation-
alism, as was evident at a meeting of the Town Council in Pamplona on 
9 December 1981 when the pro-independence HB, the second largest pol-
itical force in the city, called for demonstrations ‘para que la bandera de 
los vascos no sea quitada de Pamplona que durante siglos y siglos ha sido 
considerada la capital de los vascos’ [to avoid Basque flags being removed 
from Pamplona, which has been throughout the centuries considered the 
capital city of the Basques]. HB councillor Zabaleta recalled that two 
PSOE members were responsible for the ikurriña flying in the Pamplona 
City Hall in 1977 and that the Navarrese PSOE members participated in 
the Basque Parliamentary Assembly (Egin, 10 December 1981). HB and 
PNV asked for a referendum but the Pamplona mayor (PSOE) rejected 
the idea, with the PSOE spokesman Álvarez declaring that ‘mientras 
Navarra no se integre en Euskadi, la ikurriña no sea utilizada por las 
 14 On 6 December 1981, the anniversary of the approval by referendum of the 1978 
Constitution, Spanish flags were distributed with newspapers.
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entidades locales de Navarra’ [as long as Navarre is not incorporated 
into the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, the ikurriña 
should not be used by local institutions] (Egin, 11 December 1981).
Finally, with the majority PSOE, UCD and far right former UCD 
members voting on one side, and the PNV and HB on the other, the 
ikurriña was removed from Pamplona City Hall, with the decision in-
stantly greeted by demonstrators throwing stones at its windows. Following 
these events in the Navarrese capital, and despite the opposition of Basque 
nationalist, communist and far left councillors (Egin, 24 December 1981), 
the ikurriña was also removed from a number of town halls in Navarre 
(ABC, 26 December 1981).
Far left parties denounced the PSOE as ‘alineándose con la derecha 
más reaccionaria y centralista’ [aligning itself with the most reactionary 
and centralist right] and asserted that ‘la retirada de la ikurriña es 
entrar de lleno en la lógica de los sectores golpistas’ [the removal of the 
ikurriña is accepting the logic of those involved in the coup d’état] (Egin, 
12 December 1981). In that context, the sixteen pro-independence members 
of the Navarrese regional parliament (out of seventy seats in total) refused 
further participation, asserting that they could not support ‘una reforma 
que se tambalea cada vez que se marca el paso en los cuarteles’ [a reform that 
totters every time military quarters set the tone] (Egin, 30 December 1981). 
Thus, the parties opposed to the 1978 Constitution, linking removal of the 
ikurriña in Navarre with approval of the unsuccessful coup of 23 February, 
saw a ‘military hand’ behind the exaltation of Spanish national identity in 
1981, and explained the reinforcement of Spanish symbols as the way in 
which that exaltation was embodied in the region.
Following the attempted coup, ambivalence was impossible for the 
PSOE, who felt that the constitutional system needed to be reinforced, with 
the whole Spanish people the sole source of legitimacy. When Pérez Balda, 
the PSOE councillor in Pamplona, was forced to resign after voting against 
the removal of the ikurriña, he declared: ‘[Y] o no cambio de chaqueta […] 
soy socialista, navarro y vasco’ [I do not change sides […] I am socialist, 
Navarrese and Basque] (Deia, 20 December 1981). Other Basque PSOE 
leaders feared that removal of the ikurriña would only encourage more 
support for HB and ETA. But their Navarrese colleagues responded that ‘la 
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ikurriña es hoy pura y simplemente la bandera de la Comunidad Autónoma 
vasca […] no puede ser utilizada con carácter oficial en las instituciones 
de Navarra que, obviamente no pertenece al ámbito territorial de dicha 
comunidad’ [the ikurriña is nowadays solely and simply the flag of the 
Autonomous Community of the Basque Country […] it cannot be used 
officially in the institutions of Navarre, which is obviously not part of that 
community] (Deia, 17 December 1981).
These arguments supported the policy of normalizing the Spanish 
national identity in Navarre, and its counterpart, removing the Basque 
national flag from the official landscape, a policy underpinned in 1982 by 
a Navarrese autonomy law passed by the regional parliament and approved 
by the Spanish Parliament in June. It was called ‘the improvement’, an al-
leged renewal of the previous autonomous status granted by Franco. At 
that point, the Navarrese PSOE members left the Basque section of the 
party to create their own section within the PSOE.
Whatever the differences of opinion among officials, where Basque 
nationalism was particularly strong in Navarre was in the non-official public 
sphere, an area in which attempts were also made to normalize Spanish 
national identity by displacing the ikurriña. One example occurred in the 
summer of 1982 when, for the first time since 1977, the San Fermin fiestas 
started without the ikurriña on the official balcony of Pamplona City Hall. 
The Navarrese regional parliament decided not to support traditional dance 
groups which used the ikurriña (Deia, 3 August 1982) and the official dance 
troupe of Pamplona Town Council was boycotted by the Mayor because of 
the use of the ikurriña in their performances (El País, 30 November 1982). 
Several ikurriñas were removed by the police, no matter whether they 
were flown officially or not. There were even fines for having an ikurriña 
sticker on the rear of a car, with traffic police referring to a ‘distintivo de 
nacionalidad no reglamentario, por ser de varios colores’ [non-regulated 
national symbol, one of several colours] (Egin, 2 July 1982).
In summing up these events, it must be stressed that the Spanish par-
liamentary monarchy was still far from being a stable regime. Hence, the 
swell of nationalist feeling that followed the 23 F attempted coup of 1981 
could be seen from quite different perspectives: the principal nationwide 
parties agreed that popular support for the multiparty system assured the 
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break with Franco’s Spain; in contrast, the pro-independence Basque na-
tionalists and the far left saw it as a surrender to Francoist army officers, 
and continued to describe the Spanish government as basically nationalist 
and reactionary. HB and ETA argued that no government could call itself 
democratic if it did not accept the legal possibility of a future independ-
ence referendum in the Basque Country. Such joint opposition to the es-
tablished parliamentary monarchy made it possible for HB and the radical 
left to contest the following general elections together.
The landslide victory of the PSOE in the general elections of October 
1982 and the formation of a socialist government under Felipe González 
meant that a formerly anti-Francoist opposition was in power for the first 
time since the dictatorship. During the previous months, the PSOE had 
accused president Suárez of using the threat of another military coup for 
his own advantage, and Felipe González would present himself as the 
only chance to achieve a real rupture with Francoism (Marín 2016). The 
socialist government underlined the necessity to modernize Spain, their 
cabinet was described as a group of ‘young Spanish nationalists’ (Quiroga 
2013: 78) and their political project, based on a normalization of Spain 
according to Western European standards, was strongly and successfully 
presented in nationalist terms.
At the same time, the 1978 Constitution had become a shared re-
minder of the unity of the Spanish nation for Spanish parties, whether 
leftist or conservative. Concepts of unity had been linked, especially by the 
PSOE, to other ideas such as inter-regional solidarity and citizen equality, 
and every stance that differed from what was found in the Constitution, 
usually represented by sub-State nationalist movements, was discredited 
as contrary to such equality and solidarity (Muñoz 2012).
In May 1983 new town councils and regional parliaments were elected 
throughout Spain. While the PSOE in Navarre obtained a clear victory and 
Basque nationalist parties had poor results, it was a different story in the 
Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, where the conservative 
Basque nationalist PNV obtained almost 40 per cent of the votes, HB came 
third after the PSOE, and almost 2,000 Basque nationalist local councillors 
were elected against fewer than 500 for Spanish parties. The growth of 
Basque nationalism in the territory where an autonomous government led 
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by Basque nationalists was created, and its decline in Navarre (renamed as 
the Chartered Community of Navarre), is key to understanding the im-
portance of national identity reproduction in the official sphere.
Despite the fact that the victory of PSOE might have been thought 
of as the final proof of democratization in Spain, and although the gov-
ernment made an unsuccessful attempt at peace talks with ETA early in 
1983, during that year the assassination campaign continued against army 
officers, Spanish policemen and alleged collaborators. In response, senior 
officials of that socialist government financed a corresponding campaign 
by a group of police officers and far right mercenaries (known as GAL) 
against pro-independence sympathizers and ETA members exiled in the 
French Basque Country.15
The following section will explore the still-contentious issue of flying 
the competing national symbols, at that time an aspect of the struggle 
between socialists in power and pro-independence Basque nationalists, 
marked not only by verbal clashes in the council chambers but by spon-
taneous street demonstrations.
The Flag War
The summer of 1983 was to mark the beginning of the so-called flag war, 
a conflict which started in Tolosa, a relatively industrialized town near 
San Sebastian of almost 20,000 inhabitants. At that time no flags were 
normally flown in town halls controlled by Basque nationalists but in 
Tolosa, where the Basque nationalist councillors numbered sixteen out of 
nineteen, it was decided that both the Tolosa flag and the ikurriña would 
fly on local celebration days in June. On the morning of 25  June  1983, 
after two days of celebrations, a police unit brought a Spanish flag to the 
 15 Links between far-right mercenaries, Francoist police officers and the Spanish 
secret service had resulted in the assassination of Basque nationalists and far left 
militants since the mid-1970s. But after the 23 F attempted coup d’état in 1981, this 
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town hall. They told the PNV mayor, Mirentxu Etxebarria, that flying an 
ikurriña without the Spanish flag was ‘against the Constitution’. She de-
cided to remove the ikurriña.
Later that day, when Tolosa councillors were summoned, HB members 
and other elected leftist nationalists stated that if the ikurriña was removed, 
they would fly it again. The PNV councillors agreed and the Basque flag 
was flown again in the afternoon (Egin, 26 June 1983). At almost midnight, 
dozens of policemen entered the town hall and raised the Spanish flag. The 
ikurriña of the plenary room was later found full of cigarette burns. The 
mayor described the event as ‘un espectáculo alucinante […] improcedente 
y desmedido’ [an extraordinary spectacle […] improper and excessive]. 
She said that the police only managed to ‘crear tensión’ [create tension] 
(Deia, 26 June 1983).
Pro-independence nationalists were able to present the Tolosa inci-
dent as the imposition of an anti-Basque Spanish nationalist government 
on the Basque Country and on the sovereignty of its town councils. With 
the other councillors abstaining, HB members approved a proposal that the 
Spanish flag brought by the police should be delivered to the Madrid Home 
Affairs Ministry by the Tolosa town council. In the same way that PSOE 
had argued in Navarre two years earlier, HB members presented their de-
cision as a logical adjustment to the established legal scenario: in the town 
councils where Basque nationalism was hegemonic, there was no room for 
the Spanish national flag. The HB members in Tolosa presented the action 
not as ‘una postura visceral’ [a visceral stance] but rather as a way of cor-
recting a sort of administrative error, sending the Spanish national flag back 
to Madrid ‘para que esté entre los que la aman y sienten’ [so that it should 
be among those who love it and have a feeling for it] (Egin, 5 July 1983).
HB declared that the ikurriña should be flown accompanied by the 
local flag only, in every town hall where possible (Egin, 14 July 1983). The 
official presence of the ikurriña without the Spanish flag during local fes-
tivities would be a sign of moving towards a future banal reproduction 
of the Basque national identity in the official sphere. Equally, Spanish 
authorities were aware that this had to be prevented unless sub-State na-
tional symbols were accompanied by a reminder that the territory was in 
fact part of Spain. Eduardo Sotillos, the government spokesman, declared 
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that the state would assert its ‘autoridad legítima’ [legitimate authority] 
in the event of any further acts like those in Tolosa, and the Spanish con-
servatives, then in opposition, described the Tolosa council’s decision to 
send the Spanish flag back to Madrid as an ‘ofensa intolerable’ [intolerable 
offence] (La Vanguardia, 7 July 1983).
Another flare-up in the flag war occurred near San Sebastian, in 
Errenteria, a town of more than 40,000 inhabitants, suffering from in-
dustrial decline, rampant unemployment and high drug addiction rates. 
Although an HB stronghold, it was controlled by PSOE after the 1983 local 
elections, with nine PSOE councillors and the remaining twelve – who 
included five HB councillors – being Basque nationalists. HB asked for an 
extraordinary meeting of the town council to decide which flags should be 
flown on festival days. The mayor rejected the request for a meeting and 
simply directed that the Spanish national flag should be flown along with 
the local flag and the ikurriña (Egin, 21 July 1983).
On 21 July 1983, before the festival began, plainclothes police armed 
with truncheons and chains were guarding the town hall while HB sym-
pathizers were protesting in the Main Square. In this tense atmosphere, 
and just minutes before the start of the celebration, violence erupted and 
dozens of people were injured in the clashes between police and protesters 
that followed. When, an hour later, with an empty Main Square and the 
sole presence of PSOE councillors inside the town hall, the Spanish flag 
was flown with the ikurriña and the local flag, the policemen applauded 
and made the ‘V for victory’ sign (Deia, Egin and El País, 22 July 1983).
Later that day the police left the town hall, taking the Spanish flag with 
them but leaving the ikurriña flying during the night. They returned the 
next morning and hung the Spanish flag again. That day, Basque nationalist 
councillors and festival organizers asked the government representative 
in the region to ban the flying of any flag. While demonstrators marched 
under a banner declaring yes for the ikurriña and no for the Spanish flag, 
the police fired live rounds into the air to discourage an attempt to burn 
the town hall Spanish flag. The celebrations were called off, although the 
mayor opposed the decision (Deia and Egin, 23 July 1983).
These events in Errenteria demonstrated the determination of HB 
to prevent any situation in which a normalized flying of Spanish national 
symbols was possible. A few weeks later, when the PNV mayor of San 
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Sebastian decided that during the local celebrations the Spanish flag would 
be flown with the local flag as well as the ikurriña, HB councillors entered 
the town hall without his permission and removed the Spanish flag (Egin, 
16 August 1983). In contrast, the Socialist Party in Errenteria, recognizing 
that flying no flags during local celebrations would mean no official re-
minders that the Basque Country was part of Spain, reinforced its commit-
ment to Spanish nationalism by flying the Spanish national flag, knowing 
that the police presence would lead to street clashes.
The determination of the PSOE government that the Spanish flag 
should be flown officially at least in large towns meant that even when a 
town council decided to avoid conflict by flying no flags the Spanish au-
thorities intervened. That was the case in Bilbao where, although the PNV 
mayor tried to avoid displaying any flags, police officers entered the Town 
Hall and raised the Spanish flag with the local flag and the ikurriña. With 
police officers guarding the building for the festivals (Egin, 21 August 1983), 
Basque nationalist councillors declared that they would not enter the town 
hall until all the police and all the flags were gone.
While Basque national symbols were hegemonic in the non-official 
public sphere in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (a 
heritage from the 1970s and the widespread anti-Francoist opposition), and 
although informal display of Spanish nationalist symbols was deterred by 
the menace of ETA, a Spanish national identity was constantly reaffirmed 
by Spanish television, radio and newspapers. However, official buildings 
continued to be the only places where a Spanish flag could be flown as 
both the Spanish government and Basque nationalists understood that the 
future possibility of a banal and hegemonic national identity was at stake.
Conclusion
Michael Billig has stressed that the banal reproduction of national iden-
tities, far from being a matter of little importance, is in fact at the heart 
of preserving the established hegemony and social order. Hence, the situ-
ation in the Basque Country during the late 1970s and early 1980s cannot 
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be explained away as being what the conservative opposition to the PSOE 
government, the former-Francoist Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular; 
AP) claimed, that is, a clash between Spanish democrats and totali-
tarian Basque nationalists. The AP, in calling for the pro-independence 
HB coalition to be banned, characterized them as hating Spain and 
Spaniards, and intending to impose their agenda on everybody else (Egin, 
29 July 1983). The PSOE mayor of Errenteria had already made a similar 
point when he stated that ‘unos pocos no deben nunca imponer al con-
junto de la población sus ideas’ [a few people should never impose their 
ideas on the whole population] (Egin, 23 July 1983).
On the opposite side the claim was made that ‘al igual que el 14 de 
agosto de 1936 lo hicieron las fuerzas nacionales, colocaron por la fuerza de 
las armas la bandera española en el mástil del Ayuntamiento tolosarra’ [just 
as the nationalist forces did on 14 August 1936, they placed the Spanish flag 
on Tolosa Town Council’s flagstaff by armed force] (Egin, 14 July 1983). 
The flag war, however, was not, as HB would have it, a re-creation of the 
Spanish Civil War, nor did it reflect a Spanish nationalist government’s 
intent to conquer an autonomous democratic Basque Country. With the 
more conservative PNV presenting itself in the flag disputes as trying to 
‘evitar males mayores’ [avoid greater evils], the president of PNV, Xabier 
Arzallus, declared the flag war a chapter in HB’s ‘intento de agitación 
permanente’ [attempt at permanent agitation]. He emphasized, however, 
that the presence of Spanish police in the town halls only served to reinforce 
the message of HB, creating as it did the appearance of ‘una situación de 
país colonial donde hay que custodiar la bandera’ [a colonial country situ-
ation, where the flag has to be guarded] (Deia, 25 August 1983). The Spanish 
government was aware that, however necessary to ensure the flying of the 
Spanish national flag during local celebrations in Basque towns, a police 
presence only served to undermine its democratic credentials in the region.
In the years that followed, while the flag war was never again to flare 
up with such intensity, a reminder of the ‘hot summer’ of 1983 remained 
during Bilbao festivals, where the town council decided to fly the Spanish 
flag for half an hour on the principal day of the local celebrations. The 
ensuing clashes between demonstrators and police were to become an 
annual event during the 1980s and 1990s (Perugorria 2010). However, the 
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flag issue seemed gradually to settle down in the Autonomous Community 
of the Basque Country as two scenarios arose: wherever the town councils 
had a Basque nationalist majority, only the local flag and the ikurriña were 
present on the municipal balconies; where nationwide parties had a sig-
nificance presence, the Spanish national flag was added. And in Navarre, 
where in 1986 and 2003 the regional parliament issued regulations pro-
hibiting any official flying of the ikurriña, the ban was usually ignored by 
those town councils with a Basque nationalist majority.
If, after the flag ‘hot war’, we fast forward to 2012 and 2013, into what 
might be called the flag ‘cold war’ era, we find the Spanish government dele-
gate in the region reporting more than 100 town councils as not flying the 
Spanish flag on their balconies. Some Basque nationalist mayors reacted 
by placing Spanish flags in the town halls and enormous ikurriñas in the 
main squares. Alongside the Spanish flag, several leftist Basque nationalist 
mayors, in calling for a multinational society, raised the flags of various im-
migrant groups (Bolivian, Ecuadorian, Moroccan, Nigerian, Romanian, 
etc.). Others opted to fly the rainbow flag, the Palestinian flag, the Spanish 
republican flag, and so on, alongside the Spanish flag.
Such responses have done little, of course, to abate the ongoing 
problems of sovereignty in Spain, although the flag wars in the Basque 
country have thrown the issue into sharp relief. As more recent events 
in Catalonia have amply demonstrated, whether only the whole Spanish 
people are the sole source of national legitimacy or whether and to what 
extent there could be a place for separate hegemonic identities in Spain 
is an issue that successive governments of the left and of the right have 
long struggled to resolve, and seem fated to contend with for the fore-
seeable future.
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Al tyempo del kuechko dulse: History, Language and 
Identity in Enrique Saporta y Beja’s Account of Jewish 
Life in Salonika
abstract
Enrique Saporta y Beja’s En torno de la Torre blanca [Around the White Tower] was one of 
the last works to be published in Judeo-Spanish. It is an homage not only to the Salonika 
of the author’s youth, but, above all, to the traditional ways of life of his native Sephardic 
community. Conceived as a fictional, semi-autobiographical narrative against the backdrop 
of the Great War, it is fundamentally a testimony of a place and a time which no longer 
exist, yet which remain as a symbol of the resilience and prosperity of the Sephardim as 
a diasporic community. Ultimately, the novel is a monument to the Judeo-Spanish lan-
guage, displayed in all its lexical and idiomatic richness; in the pages of En torno de la Torre 
blanca, language becomes an intangible dimension within which the collective memory 
of Salonikan Sephardim can be re-created and brought to life.
La lingua maternal: […] En ella vive tu pasado, en ella te sientes presente a ti mismo. 
Las palabras son tu verdadero lougar y tu esperanza.1
— Marcel Cohen
Introduction
The novel En torno de la Torre blanca, written by Sephardi author Enrique 
Saporta y Beja (1982),2 employs the Judeo-Spanish idiom al tyempo del 
 1 [The mother tongue: […] There lives your past, there you feel the present within 
yourself. Its words are your true place and therein lies your hope] (Cohen 1997: 48). 
All translations are my own.










kuechko dulse [literally meaning ‘at the time of the sweet seeds’] to convey 
a feeling of nostalgia for the lost times of his youth, when the Jewish 
community of Salonika was vibrant and prosperous; its closest English 
equivalent would be the ‘good old times.’ The expression kuechko dulse 
has its origins in the Sephardic marriage custom, whereby the bride and 
groom offer each other spoonfuls of nuts dipped in honey as a symbol of 
prosperity.3
En torno de la Torre blanca is one of only three major novels written 
in Judeo-Spanish in the second half of the twentieth century.4 The Judeo-
Spanish vernacular, also known as Judezmo, is the language of the Sephardic 
Jews, a distinct linguistic variety which has evolved in the areas of Sephardic 
settlement since their expulsion from Iberia at the end of the fifteenth cen-
tury. As a diasporic language based on Hispanic Romance varieties, princi-
pally Castilian, it has absorbed a variety of linguistic influences which shape 
mainly its lexis and syntax. Among these influences are especially note-
worthy the other linguistic varieties which form its Peninsular Romance 
basis, and the languages of the environment, such as, for instance, Turkish, 
various Slavic languages, Greek, Romance languages such as Portuguese 
and Italian and, particularly from the second half of the nineteenth century 
onwards, French. Once a commercial lingua franca spoken widely among 
the Sephardic population of the former Ottoman Empire, the Balkans and 
the North of Africa, where it is referred to as Haketiya, it is now (particu-
larly since the Second World War) a severely endangered linguistic variety 
used to various degrees of competence by about 400,000 speakers, as re-
ported by UNESCO (Moseley 2010).5 In such a context En torno de la 
Torre blanca takes a highly significant place in studies of identity, yet, in 
spite of its unquestionable value in both historical and linguistic terms, it 
 3 I am indebted to Dr Evangelos Kapros for this valuable observation.
 4 The remaining two notable works of fiction written in Judeo-Spanish in the post-
War period are El sekreto del mudo by Itzhak Ben Rubi (1952), and La Megila de 
Saray by Eliezer Papo (1999). Among other works of Judeo-Spanish prose are, for 
instance, the novels written by Itzhak Ben Rubi and published in Israeli newspapers 
during the years 1954–67. See Gruss (2015).
 5 According to estimates published on the web page Ladinokomunita, some 200,000 
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has received limited scholarly attention, and the purpose of the present 
study is therefore twofold.
First, it is intended, in outlining Enrique Saporta y Beja’s work, to show 
that it was in fact an attempt to salvage what was left of the memory of pre-
war Jewish Salonika (Thessaloniki), which at the time he wrote had been 
largely obliterated and ‘belonged’ only to those who still remained from its 
original pre-war Jewish population. Simultaneously, it offered the post-war 
generations of Salonika Sephardim an artistic recreation of the ‘Mother 
City’ in the times of her splendor. This image would in turn represent a 
link to their past (albeit a past re-imagined with tones of nostalgia), and as 
such become instrumental in the re-enactment of their identity-affirming 
narrative. The present study does not intend to provide a detailed literary 
analysis of El torno de la Torre blanca but rather briefly to explore its role 
in reconstructing the memory of pre-war Jewish Salonika and in securing 
its place in the collective imagination of Salonikan Sephardim.
Second, the author’s linguistic strategies will be analysed, as the choice 
of language of composition, in this case Judeo-Spanish, is key to the au-
thorial intent. Thus, the text of En torno de la Torre blanca also represents 
an invaluable source for the documentation of the Salonikan Judeo-Spanish 
variety, not merely as material for study in the area of Hispanic linguistics, 
but above all for its key significance as an important marker of Salonikan 
Jewish identity in a broader sense. In the pages of his novel, Enrique Saporta 
y Beja wished to preserve the richness of the Judeo-Spanish linguistic and 
cultural heritage, which was at the heart of his vocation as a folk collector 
and Judeo-Spanish activist. Salonikan Judeo-Spanish thus becomes not 
only a literary medium, but also a space in which the memory of a vanished 
past is recreated and brought to life.
Enrique Saporta y Beja
Published sources on the life of Enrique Saporta y Beja are unfortunately 
rather scarce and therefore the information provided here will focus 




to Haïm-Vidal Sephiha’s introduction to the edition of En torno de la 
Torre blanca, Saporta y Beja was born in 1898 in Salonika, at that time 
a major Ottoman port with a significant Jewish population,6 into a 
Sephardic family of Spanish-Portuguese origin and Spanish nationality. 
His education was characteristic of middle- and upper-middle-class 
Sephardim: he received primary and secondary schooling in the privately 
run Lycée Français de la Mission Laïque Française, which was one of the 
many pro-European educational institutions founded in Salonika and 
other Ottoman cities after the 1860s, as the pro-Western reforms of the 
Tanzimat allowed Western European cultural and political influences to 
be introduced into the Oriental society of the Empire.7 After obtaining 
his Baccalauréat, Saporta y Beja transferred to Paris, as did many young 
Sephardim from his socio-economic background, where he studied 
physics and chemistry, followed by a degree course in Medicine. He did 
not obtain his degree, however, as contracting the Spanish flu in 1919 
prevented him from completing his studies, and thus pursuing a medical 
career. He decided not to return to Salonika, preferring rather to settle 
in Paris (a choice not uncommon among young educated Sephardim), 
where he remained until his death in 1984.
Saporta y Beja showed a keen interest in the language and traditional 
songs and proverbs of his native Judeo-Spanish community, and later in 
 6 At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Salonika’s Jewish popula-
tion numbered about 62,000, half of the actual population of the city. See Molho 
(1996: 75).
 7 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the Tanzimat reforms on Ottoman Jewry 
see Levy (1992:  98–124). The principal institutions which were founded in 
Salonika with the aim of providing (in the views of European philanthropists a 
much needed) Western education to Ottoman Jewish children and youth were 
mainly the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the schools of the Società 
Dante Alighieri, and those of the Anglo-Jewish Association and the Hilfsverein der 
Deutschen Juden. While the majority of middle- and lower-middle-class Sephardic 
children attended the schools of the Alliance, the Lycée Français was, due to its high 
tuition fees, only accessible to children of the wealthiest Sephardic families. Very 
few Sephardic children attended Greek schools, even after the city became part of 
the Greek state in 1912. For a detailed analysis of the educational background of 
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his career became widely acclaimed as a prominent scholar and collector of 
Judeo-Spanish folklore.8 In recognition of his tireless work as a folklorist 
and Judeo-Spanish activist, Saporta y Beja was elected first honorary presi-
dent of the Association Vidas Largas, founded in Paris for the promotion 
of Judeo-Spanish in 1974 by Haïm Vidal Sephiha, foundational figure of 
Judeo-Spanish linguistics and first Chair of Judeo-Spanish at the Sorbonne 
(Sephiha 2001: 58). Simultaneously, its sister organization Los Muestros 
was established in Brussels. The ethos of the Association very clearly cor-
responded with Saporta y Beja’s own interest in the safekeeping of the lin-
guistic and cultural legacy of the Sephardic Diaspora: to the present day 
the Association organizes cultural events with the aim of promoting the 
Judeo-Spanish language and raising awareness of Sephardic culture and 
history. It also publishes works of Judeo-Spanish interest. Most important, 
however, it conducts the Ateliers de judéo-espagnol, regular linguistic and 
cultural gatherings and workshops with the participation of native Judeo-
Spanish speakers, whose chief purpose is to gather and record the memory 
of a slowly vanishing tradition.
With the progressive displacement of traditional Sephardic commu-
nities into the areas of the so-called Second Sephardic Diaspora,9 and par-
ticularly after the annihilation of the vast majority of European Sephardim 
in the Shoah [the Holocaust], Sephardic oral culture as well as its medium, 
the Judeo-Spanish language, were fast becoming relics of a rapidly vanishing 
past. In this context, Saporta y Beja’s efforts as a folklore collector, language 
 8 Among Saporta y Beja’s most noteworthy publications are:  Refranero sefardí. 
Compendio de refranes, dichos y locuciones típicas de los sefardes de Salónica y otros 
sitios de Oriente (1957); Refranes de los judíos sefardíes y otras locuciones típicas de 
los judíos sefardíes de Salónica y otros sitios de Oriente (1978); Selanik i sus djidyos 
(Salonique et ses juifs) (1979).
 9 The First Sephardic Diaspora begins with the expulsion of the Jews from the ter-
ritories of Sepharad. The term Second Sephardic Diaspora denotes the transfer of 
Sephardic Jews from the communities of the First Diaspora to other geographical 
areas, mainly due to the cultural and economic transformations undergone by their 
primary countries of settlement at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies. The terms First and Second Sephardic Diaspora correspond to what Max 
Weinreich refers to as Sepharad II and Sepharad III, as opposed to Sepharad I, 






activist and ultimately literary author were not isolated: contemporary 
Sephardic testimonial literature,10 which particularly from the 1960s and 
1970s onwards acquires the form of autobiographical narratives (Romeu 
Ferré 2011), intended to record what could be salvaged of the wealth of 
Sephardic oral culture. Its main goal was to bridge the void in collective 
memory created by the Shoah, and to ensure the continuity of a cultural 
tradition which would allow for the transmission to the coming gener-
ations of fundamental aspects of Sephardic identity.
It is important to bear in mind that within the Ottoman Empire’s 
complex demographic mosaic, the role of Judeo-Spanish as a marker of 
identity had historically been so central to the Sephardic diasporic experi-
ence that the language had become synonymous with its speakers’ ethnicity 
and religious affiliation: proof of this is that among the various terms used 
to denote the language were djudezmo and djudyó/djidyó, Judeo-Spanish 
for ‘Judaism’ and ‘Jewish’, respectively. So strong was the identification of 
Sephardim with their language, that anecdotal accounts exist from as re-
cently as the early twentieth century of Sephardim for whom it was startling 
to discover that someone might speak Spanish, and not be a Jew.11 Similarly, 
the non-Jewish Ottoman population identified the Spanish language with 
Jewishness (Harris 1994: 217).
In more recent times, and particularly since the Second World 
War, Judeo-Spanish has found itself in a situation of severe linguistic 
 10 The renaissance of Judeo-Spanish literature occurred mainly in the sphere of poetry 
and, to a lesser extent, in prose. Among authors of testimonial literature particu-
larly worthy of mention are the novelist and playwright Itzhak Ben Ruby and the 
poets Clarisse Nicoïdski, Salamon Bidjerano, Lina Albukrek, and Avner Perez, 
to name but a few. Noteworthy among Sephardic folklore collectors are Matilda 
Koen-Sarano and Jaime B. Rosa. There is also a significant body of Sephardic tes-
timonial literature in other languages, which includes works by Annie Benveniste, 
Brigitte Peskine, Nelly Kafsky, and Jacques Aelion. See Sephiha and Weinstock 
(1997: 35–6).
 11 As Tracy K.  Harris (1994:  23–4) notes:  ‘It is true, according to various scholars 
such as Bunis […] that in the research literature of the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries the vast majority of Sephardim interviewed were not aware that they 
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endangerment. For numerous reasons, the language has not been inter-
generationally transmitted,12 and according to the sociolinguistic research 
conducted by Tracy K. Harris (2011: 51), the majority of fluent speakers 
are at present over the age of 70, and there are few people under the age of 
60 who are capable of active language use; at the same time, the number 
of occasional users of the language, and of those who have acquired it 
through processes alternative to conscious inter-generational transmission 
(e.g. passive acquisition) continues to be relatively high (Varol 2000: 25),13 
and in the last several decades academic interest in the language has been 
consistently on the rise.14 As well as that, Judeo-Spanish has a remarkable 
presence on the web and on social media, which encourages its learning 
and use among the internet community.15 Nevertheless, Marie-Christine 
 12 Most notably the annihilation of approximately half of its speakers during the 
Second World War (these are total estimates and include the communities of 
Turkey, which were not affected; in Salonika, 96.5 per cent of the Jewish popu-
lation were deported to concentration camps), and the subsequent reluctance of 
Holocaust survivors to transmit the language to their children. This was report-
edly partly motivated by a fear that they would acquire a particular Judeo-Spanish 
‘accent’, which was known to have revealed Jews to Nazi authorities during the 
German occupation. Last but not least, the imposition of the national languages 
of the new states which emerged in the wake of the dismantlement of the Ottoman 
Empire, gained new momentum after the Second World War and posed added dif-
ficulties to the maintenance of minority languages, including Judeo-Spanish.
 13 Furthermore, field research undertaken by Mary Altabev (1996:  232–46) in 
Istanbul even revealed that within the local Sephardi community, young people 
take an active interest in the language and show active language competence.
 14 Notwithstanding the endangered status of Judeo-Spanish as a spoken language, 
academic interest in Judeo-Spanish and Sephardic literature and culture in gen-
eral has steadily risen since the mid-twentieth century. As Varol (op. cit.), em-
phasizes, Judeo-Spanish speakers generally no longer learn the language in their 
homes; however, they can acquire it in the classroom and in the academic sphere. 
For a complete account of academic institutions which currently provide Judeo-
Spanish language tuition and promote academic research in the field, see Harris 
(2011: 53–60). Likewise, a comprehensive online review of existing initiatives fo-
cused on Sephardi language and culture can be found on the web site Sefardiweb, 
which is a project co-ordinated since 2006 by the Spanish Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas.










Varol mentions that Sephardic Jewish identity is nowadays rather mani-
fested through the ability to alternate between multiple linguistic codes,16 
one of them being Judeo-Spanish: ‘La mezcla lingüística es un rasgo de 
identidad. Los sefardíes son judíos porque hablan muchas lenguas y las 
pueden mezclar, siendo el judeoespañol la más mezclada e identitaria de 
todas’ [Language mixing is a sign of identity. The Sephardim are Jews be-
cause they speak many languages and they can mix them, Judeo-Spanish 
being the most mixed and identity-bearing of all] (Varol 2000: 25).
This notwithstanding, Saporta y Beja’s narrative is situated in a time 
when, despite being subject to pressure due to competition against local 
national and European languages, Judeo-Spanish was still the dominant 
spoken language of the majority of Salonika’s population.
The Historical Background of the Novel
The plot of En torno de la Torre blanca, although essentially fictional, 
bears some clear resemblances with Saporta y Beja’s own life.17 The nar-
rative follows the trajectory of Moises (Muchiko) Toledo, later known 
by his French name Maurice, from the day of his birth into Sephardi 
Salonika of the late 1890s, to the immediate aftermath of the First World 
War, when he returns from the French front to his native city in order 
to reunite with his family and marry his childhood sweetheart Esterina. 
Simultaneously, in the opening thirty-six pages of the novel we encounter 
 16 Historically, multilingualism and the ability to alternate between multiple lin-
guistic codes was common among male Sephardim in particular. In fact, Yom Tov 
Assis (cited in Varol 2000: 23) argues that multilingualism was already intrinsic to 
the life of Jewish communities on the Iberian Peninsula, prior to their expulsion 
in 1492.
 17 For the purposes of this chapter, the original spelling of En torno de la Torre blanca, 
which adheres to the Vidas Largas transliteration norm, has been maintained in all 
quoted passages: here ch represents the voiceless postalveolar fricative [∫], which 
corresponds to sh in Aki Yerushalayim standardized spelling (which was adopted in 
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a parallel reconstruction of the history of the Toledo family: the author 
‘traces’ their lineage back to the Castile of 1391, where one of their ances-
tors, Avram ben Moche ben Acher converts to Catholicism and adopts 
the surname of Toledo, which the family will bear henceforth. We then 
follow the vicissitudes of Maurisyo Toledo, his descendant who, 100 years 
later, secretly reverts back to Judaism and after years of precarious exist-
ence in fear of the Inquisition decides to leave Spain. After a painstaking 
journey to the Kingdom of Navarre and Bayonne beyond the Pyrenees, 
the Convert Maurisyo Toledo arrives and settles in Ottoman Salonika, a 
city which has been described to him as Madre en Israel – Mother City 
among the People of Israel.
The inclusion of this parallel historical context could be interpreted as 
Saporta y Beja’s participation in what Bea Lewkowicz (2006: 85–6) refers to 
as the foundational myth of the cultural memory of Salonikan Jewry: upon 
the rupture of all ties with their ancestral Iberian homeland, their arrival 
in Salonika, a city that thanks to their industry and success would become 
known as the ‘Pearl of the Orient’, is, all the tribulations of exile notwith-
standing, seen no longer as the tragic end of an era, but rather as the posi-
tive beginning of a new age of cultural brilliance and economic prosperity. 
Rather than the distant and, at times indeed cruel and hostile Sepharad, it 
is the welcoming Ottoman Empire and the prosperous Salonika of the late 
Ottoman and early Greek periods when Jews still enjoyed the privileged 
position of demographic majority and dominant economic power, which 
figures prominently in collective memory,18 and which is re-created with 
nostalgia in the pages of En torno de la Torre blanca.
As the narrative brings us forward to modern times, we learn of the key 
historical events that shaped the political and demographic landscape of 
Northern Greece in the first half of the twentieth century: the constitution 
in 1903 of the Balkan Alliance of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, 
and their struggle against Ottoman Turkey for national self-determination; 
the subsequent Balkan wars of 1912–13 which brought the end of Turkish 
 18 ‘Collective memory’ is understood here as defined by Maurice Halbwachs 
(1992): despite being based on individual processes of remembering, it is formed by 





rule in the region; the Young Turks’ revolution of 1909 (Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk was born in Salonika); the capitulation of the local Turkish gar-
rison in November 1912 and the occupation of the city by Greek forces; 
and, finally, the outbreak of the Great War.
The last, but by no means the least, of the historical events portrayed 
in the novel is the Great Fire of 1917, which had particularly disastrous 
consequences for the Jewish community, leaving some 70,000 of its mem-
bers homeless and causing their emigration en masse to countries of the 
Second Diaspora, particularly Palestine, France and the United States 
(Pierron 1996: 96). This catastrophe, together with the influx of about 
1–1.5 million Greek refugees as a result of the exchange of population mi-
norities between Greece and Turkey following the Asia Minor Disaster 
in 1922–3 (Pentzopoulos 2002), contributed crucially to a demographic 
shift in the region and ultimately to reduction of the Jews to the status of 
a religious and ethnic minority within a predominantly Greek Orthodox 
society. The narrative concludes in 1918, however, shortly before these key 
changes take place, and thus the author leaves us with the image of ‘Old 
Jewish Salonika’, Salonika al tyempo del kuechko dulse [at the time of the 
sweet seeds], still resonant with Ottoman accents.
The Novel as Repository of Judeo-Spanish Folklore
Against this turbulent historical backdrop, and in the forefront of the 
narrative, we witness the unfolding of the day-to-day life of Salonikan 
Sephardi Jewry. We are introduced to all the significant landmarks in the 
life of the community (represented by the Toledo family and their friends 
and relations), whose daily existence is dictated, simultaneously, by the 
rotation of the Jewish liturgical calendar. Here Saporta y Beja’s interest 
in Judeo-Spanish folklore is particularly well reflected:  woven into the 
novel’s narrative are a vast array of kantigas and komplas [traditional 
songs of diverse genres], and of course refranes [proverbs], aimed at illus-
trating in the most faithful and idiomatic manner possible the customs 
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and life-cycle celebrations of the Sephardic community of Salonika in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century.
In his descriptions Saporta y Beja focused both on the public and re-
ligious spheres of Jewish life, as well as on the domestic and more intimate, 
offering a very detailed and vivid image of Sephardic life, in a wide range of 
social and cultural contexts.
The following passage, for instance, describes the customs associated with 
the traditional Sephardic wedding ceremony, at the same time listing several 
traditional songs which were performed on such occasions (1982: 42–3):
Para eskapar la tcherimonia el haham,19 a su torno dicho algunas palavras:
[In order to conclude the ceremony, the rabbi in turn said a few words]
‘Akodrate lo ke dize el Talmud: Ama a tu mujer komo a ti mizmo. Perkura de no 
provokar su yoro, porke el Dyo – benditcho El – yeva el kuento egzakto de sus 
lagrimas.’
[Remember what is said in the Talmud: You shall love your wife as yourself. Make 
sure not to cause her to weep because God – blessed be He – keeps an exact count 
of all her tears.]
El kiduch se eskapo. Los kombidados se mityeron a kantar en koro un ayre relijyozo. 
Despues, la djente vino a augurar ‘besimantov’20 i a abrasar el novyo i la novya. Esta, 
esmovida, estaba yorando ansi ke las kushuegras. Ma eran lagrimas de gozo.
[The kiddush was ended. The guests, in unison, began to sing a religious air. Later, 
people started to come and congratulate and embrace the groom and the bride. The 
latter, moved, was crying, as were both mothers-in-law. But those were tears of joy.]
El konsograje i los amigos fueron, estonses, a sientarse por grupos en todas las udas 
del apartamento. Las servideras pasaron, en primero, tablas de konfites21 de almendra, 
kon rozolyo o kon una tira de kanella adyentro. Despues uvo grandes platos de 
dulse: de roza, de vijna o charope, kon agua arrefreskada kon bus del Hortyatch. 
 19 Haham (Heb. hakham [wise man]), in Muslim countries is the title given to a rabbi.
 20 Augurar besimantov (Heb. BeSiman Tov [under a good sign]), to congratulate.
 21 According to Claudia Roden (1996: 498), such tavlas de konfites, or trays of sweets, 
were a traditional symbol of hospitality in Sephardic communities of the Ottoman 
Empire. They were a particularly important gastronomical element on festive occa-








Los marrotchinos vinieron a su torno kon tajikos de almendra, de bimbriyo o de 
alhachu. Los kombidados asentados por amistades o por ofisyo platikavan a bos alta.
[The in-laws on both sides and friends were then seated in groups in all the rooms 
of the apartment. The maids walked around first offering trays of sweets made with 
almonds, with ‘rozolyo’ [rose liqueur] or stuffed with a piece of cinnamon. Then 
they brought large trays of sweets made with rose essence, ‘vijna’ [sour cherry jam] 
and sweet syrup, accompanied by water cooled with ice from Hortiach. Then the 
‘marroshinos’ [meringue pastries] were brought in, decorated with pieces of almond, 
quince and ‘alhashu’ [almond nougat]. The guests, seated together with their friends 
and colleagues, were chatting aloud.]
El tchalgi se mityo a tanyer una kantiga tradisyonal de boda:
[The musician then began playing a traditional wedding song]
Eskalerika de oro, i de marfil22
para ke suva la novya a dar kiduchim,
venimos a ver, venimos a ver;
i gozen i logren i tengan mutcho byen.
[A little staircase of gold and ivory
for the bride to go up and take her wedding vows,
we came to see, we came to see;
may they have joy and prosper, and have great happiness.]
Ansi ke en todas las okazyones alegres de los sefarditas, se kanto romansas datando 
del sekolo XV.
[As on all happy occasions among the Sephardim, there was singing of songs whose 
origins date back to the fifteenth century.]
Avreme Galanika23
ke ya va amaneser
– Avrir, vos avriria
mi lindo amor,
la noche no durmo
pensando a vos.
 22 This is the first verse from a well-known Sephardic wedding song entitled ‘Skalerika 
de oro’ [The Golden Staircase]. Variants of this stanza can also be found in other 
wedding songs in the Sephardic repertoire, such as ‘Morena me yaman’ [They call 
me the Dark One].
 23 ‘Avreme Galanika’ [Open, my beauty] is a very popular Sephardic song, found 
in several textual variants among the Sephardim of the former Ottoman Empire, 
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[‘Open, my beauty,
for dawn is near.’
‘I would open,
my sweet love,
at night I cannot sleep
for thinking of you.’] (Saporta y Beja 1982: 42–3)
Transcending the public and religious aspects of life-cycle celebrations, 
the text at times provides the reader with fascinating details of the daily 
life of the community in its more intimate spheres. The following excerpt 
portrays a selection of nursery rhymes recited by Sephardic parents to 
their children:
Ma lo ke plazia mas a Muchiko era kuando su padre le tomava la mano i fazyendole 
koskiyas en la palma le dizia:
[But what Muchiko loved the most was when his father would take his hand and 
tickling his palm would say]
‘Ven Muchiko, dame la manezika.
Aki mete uevo la gayinika.’
[‘Come here, Muchiko, give me your little hand,
Here the hen has laid her egg.’]
I tomandole los dedos uno a uno kontinuava:
[And taking his fingers one by one he would continue]
Este dize kyero pan.
Este dize no ay mas.
Este dize vamos a arrovar.
Este dize: No, ke mos mata el haham.
Este dize: Por aki, por aki, por aki.
[This one says I want bread.
This one says there is none left.
This one says let’s steal some.
This one says: No, the rabbi would kill us.
This one says: This way, this way, this way.]
suvyendo el dedo fista de debacho el braso i el ninyo se ‘pichava’ de reir. Djugava, 
tambyen kon el, a ‘bau-tach’. Este djugo de kriaturikas konsiste a fazer taparse los 
ojos del bebe despues de averle mostrado una koza. Se eskonde sea en la mano o 
en el vestido. Se dize al bebe de abrir los ojos. Si no la topa presto, se la mostra en 
132 Katerina Garcia
gritando: tach. Kuando en djugando el ninyo se mitia a sarnudar, al primer sarnudo 
Avram le dizia: Bivas. Al segundo: Kreskas i al tersero: ‘Komo pechiko en el agua 
freska’.
[and he would bring his finger up to the boy’s armpit and the child would start 
laughing with delight. He also played with him the game of ‘bau-tash’ [peekaboo]. 
This children’s game consisted in covering the baby’s eyes after having shown them an 
object. The object would then be hidden either in one’s hand or among one’s clothes. 
Then the baby would be called to open their eyes. If they didn’t find the object fast, it 
would be shown at the cry of ‘tash’. If at play the boy started sneezing, at the first sneeze 
Avram would say to him: ‘May you live’. At the second sneezing: ‘May you prosper’, 
and at the third one: ‘Like the little fish in fresh water’.] (Saporta y Beja 1982: 54–5) 
In consonance with the documentary nature of the novel, the wealth of 
folk material collected by Saporta y Beja, of which illustrative examples 
have been shown here, is bestowed upon a receptive readership through 
the medium of Judeo-Spanish, his language of choice.
The Defining Role of Language in En torno de la Torre blanca
As Astrid Erll in her analysis of literature as a medium of cultural memory 
observes, in times of identity crisis literary authors tend to resort to trad-
itional narrative genres (2011: 144–71). Such is the case of Saporta y Beja’s 
novel: his kuento romanseado24 is an homage to tradition – religious, folk-
loric, literary, and above all, linguistic. It is a monument to the linguistic 
and cultural memory of a people dispossessed of almost all physical land-
marks reminiscent of their past. Although speakers of an endangered 
language may retain linguistic fragments or even diverse aspects of their 
culture which take on the role of foremost identity markers the reality is 
that with the vanishing of a language the greatest part of the oral tradition 
and a very significant portion of the cultural memory of a community is 






Al tyempo del kuechko dulse 133
lost (Grenoble and Whaley 2006: 50–68). While some traces may sur-
vive, however precariously, in translation, most of this unique material, 
which has been transmitted from generation to generation and which 
finds its most perfect and exact expression precisely through the native 
language, fades into oblivion. And this is exactly what Enrique Saporta y 
Beja attempted to prevent both through his pursuit as folk collector, and 
as author of En torno de la Torre blanca. His novelistic account appeals 
to readers not just as a picturesque and nostalgic image of a lifestyle and 
a place which no longer exist. The key function of the text is to portray 
and bear witness to a past whose memory is fading, through a language 
that is disappearing, in all its lexical and idiomatic richness. By describing 
in detail the life of Sephardi Salonika through his mother tongue, the 
author provides the necessary context for the language to reclaim its 
social and communicative role, and unfold in all its breadth of register. 
When all traces of the past have been eroded, when its physical territory 
has been altered beyond recognition, the only link existing between the 
author, his readership and ‘sweet Ottoman Salonika’ is memory and lan-
guage. Language becomes an imagined space where memories of the past 
are brought to life, a space where all the rich traditions and lore of its 
people are recreated, a space where they can be preserved and saved from 
what Saporta y Beja calls el negro olvido (1982: 132).25
The link between language, memory and collective identity is particu-
larly strongly experienced by the author’s generation of Sephardi men and 
women who still possess the memory of a vibrant culture and its language, 
 25 [dark oblivion]. This sentiment is expressed in strikingly similar terms by Maurice 
Cohen (1997: 53) in his poignant Lettre à Antonio Saura [Letter to Antonio Saura], 
the bilingual letter that he wrote in Judeo-Spanish and French to the Spanish 
painter:  ‘Reyes deskaydos … Reyes deskaydos son los saloneklis. Deskaydos y, 
aindamas, viejizikos. En New York o en Montreal, en Paris o en Londra, los puedes 
ver indose komo pacharos enfermos ke se akodran del sol. “Ke jaber?”, “Todo bueno” 
[…] Ama se dan de pared en pared. No olvidar: esto es el negro puro’ [Fallen kings 
… the Salonikans are fallen kings. Fallen, and old. In New York or Montreal, in 
Paris or London, you can see them wither like sickly birds remembering the sun. 
‘What is new?’, ‘All is good’ […] But they are hitting against walls. They must not 




and who are painfully aware of their inevitable fall into obscurity and for-
getting. Marcel Cohen describes in these terms the nostalgia of displaced 
Salonikan Sephardim, making an emphatic reference to the paramount 
role played by language in their collective historical experience:
Se akodran del molo donde ivan a rafraganearse kon un trespil en la mano, de la Torre 
blanka ke los turkos yamavan Beyas koule, de las murayas komo el kal ke paresyan 
kaerse tanto ke se reflechyan en la mar. […] Se akodran ke, fin al siglo veynte, los 
exilados de Espagna no tuvieron ni el gusto de aprender realmente al grego o al turko, 
seguros ke stavan de avlar la mas precioza lingua del moundo, una lingua jalis sakrada, 
dulce komo la myel. Se akodran k’al siglo dyez y syete los merkaderes del orguyozo 
Louis el katorse se devyan de aprender djudyo para azer sus etchos en Grecia y Turkya, 
ke los primeros libros imprimidos en los Balkanes y Turkya lo fueron en ladino.
[They remember the docks where they used to pass the time with a trespil [string 
of beads] in their hands, the White Tower which the Turks called Beyas Kule, the 
city walls so white they seemed to fall into the sea, so clear was their reflection 
in the water. […] They remember that, until the twentieth century, the exiles 
from Spain didn’t really wish to learn Greek or Turkish, as they were certain to 
be speaking the most beautiful language in the world, a truly sacred tongue, as 
sweet as honey. They remember that in the seventeenth century the merchants of 
proud king Louis XIV had to learn ‘Jewish’ to be able to conduct their business in 
Greece and Turkey, that the first books printed in the Balkans and in Turkey were 
in Ladino.] (Cohen 1997: 54)
It is in this light that we must approach Saporta y Beja’s text, for here 
language does not merely represent a medium of verbal expression: it be-
comes a statement of the intent and identity of the author.
The Edition of En torno de la Torre blanca
The first edition of En torno de la Torre blanca is an understated one, 
consisting of 337 pages of typewriter font, bound in soft, light green 
paperback. The front cover features the reproduction of a historical post-
card of Salonika’s most iconic landmark: the White Tower, Torre blanka 
for the Jews, Beyaz Kule for the Turks, and Levkos Pyrgos for the Greeks.
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The editorial process was undertaken by Haïm-Vidal Sephiha, who 
wrote a brief introduction and linguistic notes, including a succinct guide-
line for the pronunciation of the vocalic and consonantal sounds of Judeo-
Spanish. In his introduction Sephiha also emphasized the immense value 
of the text for future generations as a repository of the linguistic richness 
of Salonikan Judeo-Spanish:
Grâce à En Torno de la Torre Blanka, nous voici en possession d’un excellent 
matériel d’enseignement de notre langue judéo-espagnole. Enrique y a accumulé le 
vocabulaire de la vie quotidienne et laissé ainsi aux futures generations de veritable 
pages anthologiques.
Grâce à lui, le judéo-espagnol, sa langue maternelle, la nôtre, peut-être sauvé et 
perpétué.26
[Thanks to En Torno de la Torre Blanka, we are in possession of an excellent 
document for the teaching of our Judeo-Spanish language. In its pages, Enrique 
has gathered the vocabulary of everyday life and thus leaves a true anthology for 
future generations.
Thanks to him, Judeo-Spanish, his mother tongue, and ours, can be saved and 
maintained.]
Clearly, Saporta y Beja’s work was from the outset envisaged not only as 
an important testimonial narrative, but crucially as a linguistic document 
and potentially also as a valuable didactic tool. It is therefore reasonable 
to presume that the author’s choice of language register and selection of 
vocabulary also conveyed this intent to a considerable degree.
Transliteration and Orthography
Judeo-Spanish is a language which traditionally belonged to the sphere 
of orality and to rather informal domains, being occasionally trans-
ferred into writing mostly by means of Hebrew square script, Rashi 






script or the hand-written cursive script known as solitreo. The use of 
Latin script became widespread only in the 1920s, and the transliter-
ation of Judeo-Spanish shows a wide variety of uses which, in turn, 
is indicative of the fact that speakers adhered to the spelling conven-
tions of the European languages through which they had received their 
‘Western’ education. Given that until recently Judeo-Spanish did not 
receive institutional support of any kind, its spelling on the one hand 
generally reflects the geographical and/or institutional affiliation of 
the author, and on the other indicates the potential linguistic or di-
dactic purpose of the given text.27
In his novel, Saporta y Beja embraces the Judeo-Spanish transliter-
ation system promoted by the Association Vidas Largas. This choice seems 
logical, given his own French-medium education and background, and 
also given that it is the very system proposed by the organization that 
published his novel, and of which he was honorary president. However, 
I believe that the choice of this particular graphic format conveys added 
motivations: it makes the text at first glance strikingly different from 
contemporary standard Spanish texts as well as situating the author in a 
Francophone context; at the same time it emphasizes the uniquely Jewish 
essence of his work and its belonging to the Jewish cultural and linguistic 
tradition.
 27 The adoption of a prescriptive orthographic norm, a reflection of a unified, cen-
tralized approach to language standardization, alongside the implementation of 
effective language policies, requires strong institutional support, as well as wide-
spread recognition by its prospective users. Although there are institutions with 
the potential to achieve these goals, such as the Autoridad Nasionala del Ladino i 
su Kultura in Israel, this has not yet occurred with regard to Judeo-Spanish (which 
is defined, after all, by its diasporic character). Although the Aki Yerushalayim 
transliteration system (developed by Moshe Shaul and named after the journal 
published between 1979 and 2016)  is the most widely accepted nowadays, there 
currently still exist several transliteration norms which reflect, to some degree, the 
orthographic conventions of the languages of the host countries in the Diaspora. 
Interestingly, suggestions and initiatives to apply Spanish orthographic norms to 
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The Author’s Choice of Register
Another key issue when addressing aspects of the use of language in En 
torno de la Torre blanca is the author’s choice of register and the possible 
underlying motivations of his strategy. Just as would be expected in any 
other language community with a high number of speakers, Salonikan 
Judeo-Spanish of the first decades of the twentieth century was a socially 
stratified language. The language used by the Westernized and thoroughly 
Francophone upper and upper middle classes differed notably from the 
speech of the lower working classes, which was strongly infused with 
Turkish loanwords and turns of phrase. Avoiding both such extremes, 
Enrique Saporta y Beja chose to write in a register that was his own both 
by family background and by education, but which at the same time was 
sufficiently neutral to serve as a model of style for future learners of the 
language. It is a Judeo-Spanish devoid of any excessive Turkish influences, 
save the necessary lexical borrowings:
En la vyeja sivda, ‘al tchorro’ (la fuente) ya avia una koda de mujeres venidas para 
intchir los kantaros i las kuvas. Despues atornavan a la kuzina, ke avian deslechado 
el dia entero, para asender el odjak yelado dezde vyernes la tarde. Se metian a gizar 
o, mas simplemente, a kayentar los restos del medyodia. Los ombres, eyos, asentados 
al portal de la kaye, djugando kon las ambaras del trespil, fumavan sus primer sigaro 
de la semana. Avagariko, la djente de retorno de la paseada entravan en sus kazas. 
En la mehane dezyerta a esta ora, un borratcho etchava su ultimo mekan komo una 
fletcha. Estava tinta i al salir penava para kaminar deretcho.
[In the old city, at the fountain, there was already a long queue of women who had 
come to fill their jars and buckets. Afterwards they would return to their kitchens, 
which they had left unattended for the whole day, in order to light the hearth which 
had been cold since Friday evening. They would start cooking or simply heating up 
the leftovers from lunch. The men, sitting in their doorways and playing with the 
beads on their strings, smoked their first cigarette of the week. Slowly, people returned 
home from their walk. At the inn, which was deserted at that time, a drunkard fin-
ished up his last glass in a shot. He was tipsy and had a hard time walking in a straight 
line.] (Saporta y Beja 1982: 130–1, emphasis is mine)
The relatively small number of Turkish loanwords used by Saporta y Beja 




edited by David M.  Bunis (1999) in his compilation Voices from Jewish 
Salonika, which recreate, for satirical purposes, the speech of traditional 
Salonikan Sephardim generally resistant to the modern ways of life a la 
franka. Alternatively, an analysis of the seminal Dictionnaire du judéo-
espagnol by Joseph Nehama (1977/2003) reveals a large proportion of 
Turkish loanwords, which appear only moderately in the pages of Saporta 
y Beja’s novel.
Saporta y Beja’s style shows remarkably few Hebraisms, which were 
in contrast embedded in the register of more traditional, especially male, 
Sephardic speakers. Among the most common Hebrew loan words are 
the following examples, which generally occur in instances where religious 
practices or traditional customs are described (emphasis is mine):
Ansina, el ninyo avia sido konsagrado djidyo. Resivyo segun la tradisyon el nombre 
de su nono porke era bohor.
[And thus, the boy had been consecrated a Jew. According to the tradition, he was 
named after his grandfather, because he was the first-born.] (1982: 30)
Se la dava atras a Muchiko ke la yevava kon kuidado al nono. Este despues de averse 
kitado los tefilim i ditcho su beraha lo asperava para salir.
[He would give it back to Muchiko, who brought it carefully to his grandfather, 
who, after having removed his tefillin [phylacteries] and having said his berakhah 
[blessing] was waiting for him so they could leave.] (1982: 66)
Enkolgado afuera de la ventana, el kanyel (komo una kacha fetcha de una red de tel 
muy fino) kontenia todos los komeres ya gizados protejyendolos de las mochkas, 
besbas i otras hayekas.
[Hanging outside the window, the ‘kanyel’ (a type of container made with very 
thin wire) contained all the cooked food, protecting it from flies, wasps and other 
insects.] (1982: 62)
Segun la tradisyon djudia se konsidera ke a los tredje anyos el ninyo pasa de la 
kondisyon de tchiko a la de ombre. Se konsidera tambyen ke le a venido el sehel. 
[…] A esta eda […] el faze su ‘bar mitzva’, esta resivido en la relijyon i puede kumplir 
minyan. Estonses puede tambyen kumplir el dezeo de todo djidyo, ke es ke el fijo 
diga el kadich a la muerte de su padre.
[According to Jewish tradition it is considered that at the age of 13 a boy is no longer 
a boy and becomes a man. It is also believed that this is when he acquires the use of 
reason. […] At this age […] he undergoes his ‘bar mitzvah’, he is welcomed into the 
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Jewish faith and he can account for a minyan [gathering of ten men, indispensable 
for the celebration of a religious service]. It is then that he can also fulfil the wish 
of any Jew, which is that the son will recite the kaddish [mourning prayer] for his 
father.] (1982: 114)
En buena balabaya ke era se okupava mutcho de su kaza, tenia syempre mutchos 
kombidados ke tratava a la grande.28
[Being a good mistress of her house she took very good care of her home, and she 
always had many guests which she treated in grand style.] (1982: 64)
Estas flores [las krizantemas] no eran, para los djidyos, flores de bedahey komo para 
los kristyanos.29
[For the Jews, these flowers [chrysanthemums] were not graveyard flowers, as they 
were for the Christians.] (1982: 95)
El numero de pyedrikas dava el kuento de las berahas ke se avian ditcho para ke la 
alma de la persona repozara en ganeden.30
[The number of pebbles represented the number of blessings that had been said so 
that the soul of the person would rest in Heaven.] (1982: 194)
The significant influence of Hebrew on the lexis of some registers of 
Salonikan Judeo-Spanish can be seen, for example, in the written memoirs 
of Sa’adi Besalel a-Levi (1820–1903), edited by Aron Rodrigue and Sarah 
Abrevaya Stein (2012) or, in a yet more notable manner, in Eliezer Papo’s 
novel La megila de Saray (1999), which, although written in Sarajevo Judeo-
Spanish, provides good examples of traditional Sephardic philosophical 
and religious discourse rich in Hebrew loanwords and syntactic calques.
Saporta y Beja’s text shows only relatively moderate French influences, 
considering the general degree of Gallicization that Judeo-Spanish under-
went after the establishment of the institutions of the Alliance Israélite 
Universelle,31 and bearing in mind that the author spent most of his adult 
 28 Balabaya (Heb. Ba’al ha-Bayit [master of the house]).
 29 Bedahey (Heb. Beit ha-Chayim [the house of the living]).
 30 Ganeden (Heb. Gan Eden [the Garden of Eden]).
 31 That the influence of French on Judeo-Spanish was otherwise generalized and 
reached truly overwhelming proportions was first emphasized by Sephiha 











life in France. French loanwords are limited to contexts where the author’s 
cultural and intellectual background manifests itself most evidently. A good 
example of this is a passage in which he addresses the interest and involve-
ment of the Sephardim in issues of modern culture, politics and current 
affairs (emphasis is mine):
Los dirijentes de la revolusyon del 1908 ke estavan afuera fueron yamados a Selanik. 
Maurice vido de muevo su padre en grandes konversasyones politikas kon sus amigos 
turkos i mamines. De muevo, favlavan de la limitasyon de las libertas, de la abolisyon 
de la konstitusyon i de averse, el sultan, desbarasado de los deputados en aserrando el 
parlamento. Los dirijentes de los ‘Jeunes Turcs’ seguros de kontar sovre las armadas 
de Masedonya (ke no avia segido la de Stambol) detchidyeron de fazer una martcha 
verso la kapitala.
[The leaders of the revolution of 1908 who were away were called back to Salonika. 
Again, Maurice saw his father absorbed in heated political debates with his Turkish 
and Ma’min friends. Again, they discussed their limited freedom, the abolition of the 
constitution and the fact that the Sultan had got rid of all the members of the parlia-
ment by dissolving the institution. The leaders of the Young Turks, sure of having the 
support of the Macedonian armies (which had not followed that of Istanbul) decided 
to organize a march on the capital.] (1982: 205)
In brief, the style which Enrique Saporta y Beja presents through this 
work as representative of Salonikan Judeo-Spanish could be defined as 
that of an educated, middle-class, pro-Western speaker. His style is lively 
and rich in Judeo-Spanish vocabulary and turns of phrase, which is re-
markable taking into consideration that En torno de la Torre blanca was 
written many decades after its author left his hometown and ceased to be 
immersed in the vernacular of his native community.
Saporta y Beja’s portrait of Jewish Salonika al tyempo del kueshko 
dulse is, although set within a very concrete historical frame, in many ways 
atemporal. Similarly, the language through which the novel is rendered 
represents a self-enclosed, timeless linguistic reality, but one which is sim-
ultaneously deeply rooted in a concrete place: Salonika. So prominent is 
the role of language in Saporta y Beja’s novel, and such is the care that has 
been devoted to its faithful representation, that one could even venture 
to argue that it is precisely Judeo-Spanish that ultimately emerges as the 
work’s protagonist.
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Guadrar sus Membrasyon kon Kavod i Onor32
En torno de la Torre blanca was from the outset intended to serve not 
only as the semi-fictional memoir of its author, but also as the repository 
of the collective memory of Salonikan Sephardim. Its author, vis-à-vis the 
near-disappearance of his native Jewish community feels compelled to 
bear witness to the vanished world of his youth: it is imperative that he, 
as one of the few who still remember, transmits his memories to the next 
generation:
Es un kuento romanseado ke syerve de kuadro i de preteksto a una deskripsyon de los 
uzos, de las kostumbres i de las tradisyones de los Sefardis de Selanik (Thessaloniki). 
Si no es los de todos, es, al menos, de la majorita de eyos tal komo eran al empesijo 
de este sekolo.33
[This is a novelistic tale which serves as a pretext to provide a description of the ways 
of life, the customs and the traditions of the Sephardim of Salonika (Thessaloniki). 
If not of all, then, at least, of the majority of them, such as they were at the begin-
ning of this century.]
The process of remembrance of the city in pre-war times is particularly 
important given the fact that Salonika was, as attested by the historical 
context provided above, an unprecedented example of a successful and 
influential ‘Jewish’ city within the parameters of the Jewish Diaspora. The 
case of Salonika is also unparalleled in the manner in which its urban land-
scape was altered throughout the twentieth century, to the point of chan-
ging the city practically beyond recognition. After the Great Fire of 1917, a 
much-awaited urban reconstruction was undertaken, forever obliterating 
practically all traces of the city’s Jewish quarters, which were the most se-
verely affected (Fleming 2008: 77). The gradual process of Hellenization 
of Salonika, which had begun in 1912, was one that led, in a physical as 
well as intellectual sense, to the virtual obliteration of the historical and 
 32 [To keep their memory with dignity and honour.] From the author’s foreword to 
En torno de la Torre blanca (Sephiha 1982).








cultural memory of the city. During the Second World War, some 96.5 
per cent of the members of the local Jewish Community were deported 
to concentration camps, mainly Auschwitz.34 In a further step which 
contributed to erasing any evidence of the city’s pre-war Jewish prom-
inence, the Jewish cemetery, which was once the largest in Europe and is 
described in detail in Saporta y Beja’s novel, was expropriated under the 
Nazi occupation and donated to the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 
which used its grounds to build its campus, where visitors can still find 
scattered fragments of Jewish tombstones (Naar 2013).35 Salonika, once 
renowned as the ‘Jerusalem of the Balkans’ and Ir vaEm beIsrael, ‘Mother 
City among the people of Israel’, Saloniko of the Jews, Selânik of the Turks 
and Thessaloniki of the Greeks, a city known by the polyphony of its many 
voices, became what historian Mark Mazower (2005) referred to as a city 
of ghosts. Although the contemporary Jewish Community of Thessaloniki 
strives to keep the memory of its long and illustrious past alive, their sur-
rounding urban space has been entirely transformed, effectively turning 
Salonika from Pierre Nora’s concept of site of memory into a site of am-
nesia (Nora 1997).36
Memory and identity are particularly tightly interwoven in the case of 
diasporic nations; moreover, as Baronian, Besser and Jansen (2007: 11–12) 
point out, ‘memory – understood as the complex relation of personal ex-
periences, the shared histories of communities and their modes of trans-
mission – must be seen as a privileged carrier of diasporic identity’. In the 
pages of his novel Saporta y Beja attempted to evoke an image of Sephardic 
life when Salonika was still ‘Mother City’ to its Jewish children, recre-
ating a landscape whose traces had been largely obliterated. In so doing, 
he offered the future generations of Salonikan Sephardim, both those who 
 34 Data provided by The Simon Marks Museum of the Jewish History in Thessaloniki.
 35 Not until 2014 was a monument erected and unveiled on the grounds of the 
Aristotle University to commemorate the existence and destruction of the main 
Jewish cemetery of Salonika.
 36 For an analysis of the official Greek discourse regarding the obliteration of Jewish 
memory in Salonika see, for instance, Naar (2013). For a breathtaking investiga-
tion of the city’s depletion of its Jewish (and Turkish) landmarks, see Maurice 
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remained within the original home community, as well as those in the 
Second Diaspora, a thread that would enable them to retrace their steps 
back to their past, and in so doing, to affirm and renegotiate their identity. 
This is key as, indeed, with the loss of collective memory, the contours of 
diaspora become blurred and ultimately effaced; and as Baronian, Besser 
and Jansen further observe, ‘forgetting the trans-local diasporic connec-
tions means the ultimate disbandment of diasporic identity’ (2007: 12).
Saporta y Beja’s portrait of Jewish Salonika is, despite its genuine his-
torical background, to a certain degree, mythical. Its Jewish community, as 
portrayed by the author, exists in a chronological contradiction of sorts, in 
what Carol Bardenstein (2007) terms diasporic anachronism. The lives of 
Salonikan Sephardim unfold as if ‘out of time’,37 in an atemporal dimension 
which, as emphasized by Philip Bohlman, is a fundamental characteristic 
of diasporic essence (2008: 48–9). The collective time-line of Salonikan 
Jewry is framed by two liminal events which symbolize both its genesis and 
its near-destruction: Gerush Sefarad38 and the Shoah. Within these two 
landmarks, Oriental Jewish Salonika figures in the collective imagination 
as a timeless image and powerful identity symbol.
It is important to note that the author’s nostalgic evocation of the ways 
of life of old Jewish Salonika to which the Judeo-Spanish language is inex-
tricably linked, is the ultimate expression of a very real sense of loss. It is the 
expression of a shared anguish that is experienced by Sephardim both indi-
vidually and collectively and which has been caused by the drastic disruption 
of the way of life of their community. With the rapid decline in numbers of 
Judeo-Spanish speakers in Salonika as well as worldwide, it is in the realm 
of fiction that the memory of the ‘Mother City’ is brought back to life most 
vividly and where its language can be allowed to resonate in all its grammat-
ical, lexical and idiomatic complexity. And it is this language, enriched with 
the many nuggets of popular wisdom collected in the course of his lifetime, 
that the author wishes the coming generations to know and cherish.
 37 This is demonstrated by Lewkowicz (2006: 111) in her analysis of the accounts of 
some of her Salonikan interviewees, who referred to the arrival of their families 
from Spain as if it had happened only recently.
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Patria and Citizenship: Miguel Primo de Rivera, 
Caciques and Military Delegados, 1923–1924
abstract
In 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera seized power in Spain and established a dictator-
ship that would last until 1930. Obsessed by a belief in Spanish decline and the threat of 
imminent national disintegration, Primo intended to reshape the Spanish national psyche 
and create a new, virtuous citizen. This chapter explores the rise and fall of the ill-fated 
Delegados Gubernativos [Government Delegates], members of a corps of military inspec-
tors dispatched throughout Spain to reform local government and instil patriotism in the 
population. By contrasting official regime discourse on the Delegados with an original 
selection of letters sent to the government by ordinary Spaniards, the chapter shows that 
the Delegados’ work proved to be unreliable and, often, damaging to the regime, a matter 
that rapidly put paid to Primo’s messianic belief that the military could achieve his vision 
of national homogeneity from above.
Introduction
Shortly after seizing power in a coup d’état, General Miguel Primo de 
Rivera, the dictator who ruled Spain from 1923 to 1930, declared his in-
tention to create a new citizenry in the towns and villages of the nation 
(Gaceta de Madrid, 21 October 1923).1 Though not a belligerent in the 
First World War, Spain had been profoundly affected by the conflict and 
in 1917 entered a period of sustained crisis that the creaking, undemo-
cratic institutions of the Restoration State (1874–1923) seemed unable to 
overcome, culminating in this six-year period of dictatorship. From its 








outset, the Primo de Rivera regime was motivated by an obsession with 
the perceived threat of imminent national disintegration and by a belief 
that Spain was afflicted by a backwardness brought on by the widespread 
political demobilization that had previously facilitated the predictable al-
ternation of the main Restoration political parties in government, the so-
called Turno Pacífico [Peaceful Turn].2 In its attempts to overcome these 
dangers, the regime made a considerable impact on the development of 
right-wing thought in Spain by articulating an anti-liberal ideology that 
was both modernizing and nationalist, threads that had not yet been 
synthesized coherently by any mainstream Spanish political movement.
For Primo de Rivera, Spanish political modernity was to be realized 
largely through mobilization of the population and nationalism became 
the primary tool through which the previously apathetic masses were to be 
reconciled to the State in the form of citizens. This led the regime to carry 
out a programme of indoctrination aimed at educating the population in 
the values of a new, authoritarian national identity that would replace the 
identity promoted by the seemingly moribund liberal State, a process of ‘mass 
nationalization’.3 While the regime, like its many authoritarian counterparts 
in inter-war Europe, made use of such means as the public education system, 
cultural associations and the pageantry of mass rallies and ceremonies for 
this purpose, the nationalizing project launched in the earliest months of 
the Spanish dictatorship was perhaps best embodied by the curious and ill-
fated figure of the Delegado Gubernativo [Government Delegate].
Appointed by decree in October 1923, a little over one month after 
Primo’s coup d’état against the Liberal government of Manuel García-Prieto, 
these military functionaries were charged with assisting the army officers 
that Primo installed as Governors in each of Spain’s forty-nine provinces 
in the task of inspecting and reforming municipal and provincial govern-
ment, a notorious site of political corruption at this time (Gaceta de Madrid, 
 2 All translations are my own; however, I have transcribed the original Spanish inclu-
sive of any orthographical errors that are present in the source material. I would like 
to thank both the editors of this volume and its anonymous peer reviewers for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
 3 This is the central thesis in Quiroga (2007). On the Italian case see Gentile (1996). 
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21 October 1923). As the next section will outline in more detail, Primo 
regarded municipal reform as an important nationalist cause and, accord-
ingly, assigned a critical role to the Delegados in this process: first, they 
were to root out and eliminate the patronage networks of caciques [local 
political bosses], the class of local notable that had dominated municipal 
life during the Restoration era and, in the eyes of the dictator, inhibited 
the spirit of citizenship in the population; then, once the corrupting in-
fluence of caciquismo [domination by caciques] had been stamped out, the 
Delegados were to set about catalysing the emergence of the regime’s new, 
prototypical Spanish citizen through cultural and propagandistic means. 
This would require them to serve in a tutelary role to the population and 
curate ambitious programmes of patriotic ceremonies and events, while 
also promoting participation in healthy, civic-minded organizations such 
as gymnastics clubs, scout troops and the regime’s two key institutions, the 
Somatén Nacional [National Somatén], its militia, and Unión Patriótica 
[Patriotic Union], the single party.4
The Delegados, as figures that came to exert a considerable influence 
on municipal politics in the earliest months of the dictatorship, served as 
a public face for the new administration and featured prominently in the 
everyday lives of local residents. Their near ubiquity for this short period 
of time is reflected in the many letters sent by ordinary Spaniards to the 
government on the topic of reform, one of the few channels of public ex-
pression to be tolerated openly by an otherwise highly repressive regime. 
This chapter examines the Delegados’ inspectorial work during the first 
eighteen months of the dictatorship and situates it in the wider context 
of the regime’s nationalizing programme in an exploration of a series of 
correspondences between the population and the authorities from this 
time.5 It argues that while public enthusiasm for the Delegados was ini-
tially high, their efforts soon proved damaging to the image of the regime; 
 4 The Somatén was a Catalan parapolice organization of medieval origin that was co-
opted by the regime and extended nationwide shortly after Primo’s seizure of power 
in September 1923.
 5 While the work of the Delegados has already featured in a number of other studies, 
these have tended to consider their two main roles separately. Such studies in-






indeed, as the letters clearly reveal, these officers knew very little about the 
nation they were supposed to be exalting, a fact that profoundly under-
mined Primo’s belief that the army could lead the national regeneration 
which he proposed.
Such an approach sits well with recent developments in the histori-
ography of contemporary Spain. Although previously neglected as a topic 
of inquiry, a burgeoning literature on the nationalization process in Spain 
has emerged in the last decade.6 Earlier trends in the field had tended to 
emphasize what scholars perceived as a failure by the State to impose a co-
hesive national identity on the population, along with the resulting tension 
between the patria [homeland], that is, the nation or national community 
on a grand scale, and the patria chica [small homeland], the more localized 
realm of everyday existence.7 However, as argued by scholars outside Spain 
beginning in the 1990s, national identification should, in fact, be considered 
something ‘grounded in everydayness and mundane experience’ (Eley and 
Grigor Suny 1996: 22). More recent Spanish scholarship has assimilated 
this broad view into a new generation of studies that suggest that national 
and locally oriented identities were not necessarily dichotomous and could 
co-exist quite successfully. Moreover, an expanding body of research has 
argued that regional identification could serve as a nationalizing channel 
and that individuals could move between these overlapping identities 
quite fluidly as it suited them. Indeed, by the time of the dictatorship, the 
boundaries of the patria chica had expanded somewhat to incorporate one’s 
province, as well as one’s village or town.8
The influence of the new ‘history from below’ on the study of Spanish 
nationalism is quite apparent in these developments. This movement has 
its origins in the work of Lucien Fevre and the French Annales School and 
 6 As a point of departure, see the numerous essays in Moreno Luzón (2007a; 2007b); 
Vega and Calle (2010); Saz Campos and Archilés Cardona (2011; 2012); Gabriel 
et al. (2013); Luengo Teixidor and Molina Aparicio (2016).
 7 The patria chica might be thought of as a Spanish equivalent to Ferdinand Tönnies’ 
concept of Gemeinschaft.
 8 For a discussion of these developments see Molina Aparicio and Cabo Villaverde 
(2012). A number of studies reflect these developments: Quiroga (2013b); Archilés 
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in the celebrated studies in English by E.P. Thompson (Beyen and Van 
Ginderachter 2012: 4). In the 1970s and 1980s the German Alltagsgeschichte 
[history of everyday life] built upon this considerably and began to apply 
similar methodologies to the study of dictatorship, particularly the Nazi 
regime. The Alltag historians’ work was rather idealistic, however, and re-
jected the notion that power relations have an ‘unequivocal disciplining 
effect’ on individuals, highlighting instead the means through which or-
dinary people resisted the discourses of power that surrounded them. 
The result of this was that, for all its promise, the Alltag trend tended to 
marginalize national history or avoid it altogether (Berger 2005: 659). In 
contrast to this, the history written after the cultural and linguistic turns 
in the humanities has wholeheartedly embraced both the nation and the 
idea that it is a discursively constructed entity. However, as Marnix Beyen 
and Maarten Van Ginderachter (2012) have written, while such scholarship 
mostly rejected that this cultural constructivism was entirely elite-driven, it 
tended to ‘critically [engage] its modernist aspects rather than the popular 
impact of nationalizing policies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’. 
This has left significant gaps in the study of nationalism in Spain and else-
where. As Beyen and Van Ginderachter (2012: 10) argue further, inquiry 
into the role played by low- and middle-ranking State functionaries like 
the Delegados in executing the nationalizing policies devised by political 
and administrative elites is an essential but largely unexplored element of 
the history of nationalism.
Insofar as Beyen’s and Van Ginderachter’s observations apply to 
this chapter, while we may debate the degree of creative input which 
each Delegado had into these policies, it is clear that these functionaries 
operated at an intermediate level between the military government’s 
extremely narrow executive in Madrid and the people of towns and vil-
lages of Spain. The letters written by ordinary people about their daily 
interactions with the Delegados, therefore, offer us a privileged insight 
into the mechanics of this nationalizing process from the bottom up. 
The experiences which they narrate show us how personal, local and na-
tional identities overlapped, informed and competed with one another 
at this time. In this way, an examination of the work of the Delegados 
can help us to reconcile the history-from-below approach to nationalism 
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with the modernist, top-down and typically State-centric perspectives 
of historians of nationalization processes, like Eugen Weber (1976) and 
George Mosse (1974/2001), and apply them fruitfully to the Primo de 
Rivera dictatorship.
Municipal Reform as a Nationalist Cause
There existed a long precedent to Primo de Rivera’s thinking on the need 
for municipal reform in Spain. Acerbic critiques of the local govern-
ment structures there became a trope of the fin-de-siècle regenerationist 
writing that entered the popular imaginary after the nation’s traumatic 
capitulation to the United States of America in the Spanish–American 
War of 1898.9 Writers like Miguel de Unamuno, Joaquín Costa and 
Ángel Ganivet espoused the centrality of Castile and its culture to the 
Spanish nation, while identifying the municipality as the point of de-
parture for national regeneration (Quiroga 2007).10 Caciquismo, the 
clientelist and often corrupt practices associated with caciques, was, as 
one historian has written, presented as ‘the key to explaining the back-
wardness of Spain and the overriding obstacle to the urgent modern-
ization of the country’ (Moreno Luzón 2007b: 419).11 Caciques them-
selves were important middle-men in the fraudulent elections behind 
the Turno Pacífico. In exchange for obtaining the votes required to pro-
duce contrived parliamentary majorities, caciques received preferential 
access, favours and shares of State resources from the government of 
the day, which they, in turn, distributed to their own clients as largesse. 
The result of this was, as Primo and others saw it, a political system 
which tended to favour local interests at the expense of collective and 
 9 A concise description of these writings can be found in Pro Ruíz (1998), pp. 191–215 
particularly.
 10 Key regenerationist works include Macías Picavea (1899); Morote (1900); 
Unamuno (1902); Costa y Martínez (1902); Ganivet (1905).
 11 Javier Moreno Luzón’s article provides an invaluable overview of the historiograph-
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national ones.12 However, while the Turno initially proved both stable 
and flexible enough to incorporate most dissenting voices into its fold, 
an increasing sense of fin-de-siècle cultural pessimism and Spain’s defeat 
in 1898 combined to attract a new scrutiny to the institutions of the 
Restoration State. Patronage and rule by notables was by no means a 
uniquely Spanish phenomenon, as scholars of Italy, France, Britain and, 
further afield, America, will attest, yet it was seized upon by cultural 
critics and reform-inclined politicians as an indication of Spain’s na-
tional decadence.13 As José Álvarez Junco (1996:  76–80) has argued, 
caciquismo, therefore, came to be denounced in nationalist terms by 
modernizing elites who wished to see State resources distributed in a 
manner more favourable to the aggrandizement of Spain.
The period 1907–12 saw major efforts by both leading political parties, 
the Conservatives and the Liberals, to carry out municipal reform. The 
first, which came about during the so-called gobierno largo [long govern-
ment] of Conservative leader Antonio Maura, from 1907 to 1909, was an 
attempt to realize a revolución desde arriba [revolution from above] that 
would pre-empt any violent one from below by drawing las masas neutrales 
[the neutral masses] of the Spanish population into political life. A new 
electoral law introduced by Maura during this drive for reform ushered in 
obligatory (but not secret) voting and removed the task of supervising the 
electoral register from municipal governments, thus depriving caciques of 
two of the principal tools they used for vote management.14 A second law, 
 12 More recent scholarship, however, has emphasized the caciques’ role as largely in-
dependent gatekeepers, who used their influence to act as intermediaries in inter-
actions between centre and periphery, rather than as the representatives of repres-
sive or feudal agrarian interests. See Álvarez Junco (1996), particularly pp. 76–80.
 13 On clientelism in Europe generally, see Piattoni (2001). For the American context, 
see Shefter (1994).
 14 Maura’s reforms revealed his general distaste for politicking. Article 29 of his reform 
law provided that no ballot would be required to return deputies to parliament in con-
stituencies where there was just one candidate for election. While Maura’s intention 
may have been to reduce the electoral system’s exposure to manipulation as part of the 
campaigning and voting processes, the measure effectively disenfranchised vast sections 
of the population who were not afforded the opportunity to vote at all. In the general 
election of April 1923, shortly before Primo de Rivera’s seizure of power, for example, 








aimed at directly reforming the local administration, sought to give greater 
independence to municipal governments and to introduce a corporative 
system of voting to local elections. The project, however, faced significant 
resistance across both major political parties and had not yet been com-
pleted when the government collapsed in the aftermath of the Tragic Week 
in 1909. Maura’s personal intransigence meant that he would remain out 
of government until 1918, although his thinking would influence Primo 
in the 1920s.15 In 1911, the Liberal Prime Minister José Canalejas, who led 
an anti-clerical ministry from 1910 until his assassination by an anarchist 
gunman in 1912, reformed the manner in which personal tax contributions 
were calculated by the cacique-controlled local governments of Spain, 
thus achieving a long-standing goal held by progressive parliamentarians 
(Moreno Luzón 1996: 174). However, his attempt to democratize compul-
sory military service – potentially a key channel for mass nationalization, 
though in reality a notorious hotbed of corruption – was only a limited 
success as it retained partial monetary exemptions for those who could 
afford them (Balfour 1997: 206–9). The escalation of Spain’s military cam-
paigns in Morocco, followed by the outbreak of the First World War and 
the prolonged crisis it engendered, largely halted further efforts at reform 
until the advent of the dictatorship in 1923.16
As this was occurring, a distinct military-regenerationist discourse 
emerged within the Spanish officer corps, which had come to view itself 
as the only institution capable of leading reform of the political system.17 
Primo de Rivera was steeped in this culture as a junior and middle-ranking 
officer, and shared many of its sentiments, as he explained in the prologue 
of a textbook on military education published some years before his seizure 
of power (Primo de Rivera 1916: xi–xv). On the third anniversary of the 
 15 A concise treatment of Maura’s character and political reforms can be found in 
González Hernández (1997).
 16 Attempts made by Santiago Alba in 1913 and Manuel Burgos y Mazo in 1919, re-
spectively, to combat the over-representation of cacique-dominated rural areas in 
parliament by modifying electoral boundaries and by introducing proportional 
representation were not passed by parliament (Moreno Luzón 1996: 182–3).
 17 See Espadas Burgos (1984); (1996). For a study of a number of the thinkers behind 







Patria and Citizenship 155
dictatorship, he summarized the vision that drove his efforts to regenerate 
Spain: ‘Célula principal de la nación ha de ser el Municipio,’ [The main cell 
of the nation must be the municipality] he stated in the typical biological 
metaphor of the regenerationists, ‘y de él, la familia, con sus rancias virtudes 
y su moderno concepto ciudadano. Núcleo la provincia, y vértebra principal 
que dirija y riegue todo el sistema, el Estado’ [and of this the family, with its 
traditional virtues and its modern civic ideas. The nucleus will be the prov-
ince, and the State will be the main vertebra, which directs and regulates 
the whole system] (Primo de Rivera 1930: 99). On this basis, caciquismo, 
the corruptor of municipal life, was presented by the regime as one of the 
chief ills of the Spanish nation, the eradication of which was to be one of 
the dictator’s priorities and considered foundational to establishing a new 
national, as opposed to local, identity.
It was in this light that Primo followed his coup d’état in 1923 with a 
series of purges aimed at both the political class in Madrid and the municipal 
administrations in the towns and villages of the country. Article Four of the 
decree which established the Military Directorate on 15 September 1923 
suppressed the Council of Ministers and all posts of Minister of the 
Crown, except for Primo’s own. The following day the combined Cortes 
(the Congress of Deputies and the Senate) were dissolved and a number of 
constitutional guarantees suspended nationwide. The same decree dismissed 
the Civil Governors (roughly equivalent to France’s Préfets) of Spain’s 49 
provinces and replaced them with their equivalents from the military hier-
archy, the Military Governors (Romero-Maura 1977: 54). On 30 September, 
Primo proceeded to dissolve the nation’s 9,254 Ayuntamientos [municipal 
councils] en masse and summarily dismissed their councillors, mayors and 
secretaries in what was the most far-reaching purge of all. The same law pro-
vided that the deposed councillors should be replaced in the first instance 
by each Ayuntamiento’s cohort of Vocales asociados [Associate Members], 
a secondary group of representatives who had a more limited role in local 
affairs and were elected on a corporate basis.18 The immediate task of these 
Vocales asociados was to select a new mayor for their municipality from 
 18 The role of the Vocales asociados was set out in the Municipal Law of 1877. Their 




amongst their members.19 Some three and a half months after the dissol-
ution of the Ayuntamientos, Primo de Rivera also dismissed the nation’s 
Diputaciones [provincial assemblies], although the extent of reform at this 
level was much more limited than in municipal government (Gaceta de 
Madrid, 13 January 1924).
On 9 October, the newly appointed Military-Civil Governors received 
orders from Madrid to begin a general inspection of the Ayuntamientos in 
each province with the expressed aim of purging any public administrators 
they suspected of caciquismo (González Calbet 1987: 221). There was con-
siderable public anticipation of the inspections which Primo promised but 
by the end of 1923 only 815 had been carried out, a figure that represented 
less than 10 per cent of the Ayuntamientos in Spain.20 Public frustration 
at the pace of reform often translated into a fear of being forgotten by the 
regime, a theme that recurred in many of the letters sent to the govern-
ment. As one resident of the village of Potes (Santander) complained in 
December 1923, ‘Aquí en este rincón apenas hemos sentido la influencia 
benéfica del Directorio. No ha habido inspección en ningún ayuntamiento, 
aunque algunos bien lo necesitan, y se dice que ni la habrá’ [Here in these 
parts we have barely felt the beneficial influence of the Directorate. There 
has not been an inspection in any of the Ayuntamientos, even though some 
really need it, and they are saying that neither will there be]. He wondered 
what the effect of this would be on the morale of the population, before 
concluding rather forlornly that there was ‘un poquito de desconfianza, 
de que aquí todo quedara igual’ [a little bit of suspicion, that everything 
will remain the same here].21
The reach of government inspections may have been limited at this time 
but the regime had at its disposal another important tool in its efforts to 
reform local government in the manner it envisaged. In his initial manifesto 
 19 For the laws suppressing the Cabinet, suspending the Cortes and collectively 
dissolving the Ayuntamientos, respectively, see Gaceta de Madrid (16 and 17 
September, and 1 October 1923).
 20 The figures cited are drawn from a nota oficiosa [informal note] written by Primo in 
December 1923 and reproduced in Soldevilla (1923: 453–4).
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to the Spanish people, ‘Al País y al Ejército’ [To the Country and the Army], 
Primo de Rivera encouraged a wave of popular denunciation against ca-
ciques and corrupt officials by promising to punish ‘implacablemente a los 
que delinquieron contra la Patria’ [relentlessly those who have committed 
crimes against the Patria], while guaranteeing ‘la más absoluta reserva para 
los denunciantes’ [the most absolute discretion to accusers] (Primo de 
Rivera 1929: 22). The population responded enthusiastically to the invita-
tion, delivering large numbers of accusations to the government by mail 
over the first four months of the dictatorship. Alarmingly, however, these 
letters soon began to denounce the corruption present in the new muni-
cipal councils that had just been installed by the military government in the 
same language that they used to condemn the caciques who had controlled 
the municipal councils of old. This convinced Primo de Rivera of the need 
for significant modifications to the new councils although, in the absence 
of a popular movement from which to draw loyal cadres, he was forced to 
turn to the military to provide a temporary solution, creating the post of 
Delegado Gubernativo on 20 October 1923.
The dictator envisaged the Delegados’ work as both a continuation 
of the inspections that were being carried out in the Ayuntamientos and 
a means of laying the social and political foundations of the future local 
administration upon which a regenerated sense of nationhood would be 
built. In the preamble to the decree which created the role, Primo stated 
that these figures were to give Spanish villages ‘la sensación de una nueva 
vida, impulsándolos y ayudándolos a emprenderla’ [the feeling of a new 
life, to drive them on and help them to set out on it] (Gaceta de Madrid, 
21 October 1923). As the immediate delegates of the Madrid-controlled 
Military-Civil Governors in each province, the Delegados were each as-
signed to a provincial district or capital and given near limitless powers 
to intervene in municipal politics, making them the final piece in the full, 
though temporary, militarization of the public administration in Spain. 
Despite the faith Primo placed in them to rescue the nation from the grip 
of the caciques, however, he maintained a tight grip over the Delegados and 
controlled them in a short and vertical chain of command that led from 
each officer to their provincial Governor and on to the regime’s de facto 
number-two, General Severiano Martínez Anido, the Subsecretary of the 
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Ministry of the Interior.22 After a series of delays which led to the original 
decree being referred to in the press mockingly as ‘el decreto fantasma’ [the 
ghost decree], 523 Delegados were finally appointed in December 1923, of 
whom 434 served in judicial districts (provincial subdivisions) and eighty-
nine at provincial level. With these provisions at last in place, a new sense 
of nationhood, of Patria as envisioned by Primo de Rivera, might have been 
thought to be set on the road to success.
The Perils of the Patria Chica
Instructions describing in detail the mission of the Delegados as inspectors 
were issued by General Martínez Anido on 7 December 1923. They were as 
far-reaching as the plans for a new social identity were ambitious: upon their 
arrival in each town and village, they were to seize control of the municipal 
coffers and scrutinize the account books for evidence of financial malprac-
tice. The Delegados were also to strive to improve the health and wellbeing 
of the village residents by discouraging unproductive pastimes like drinking 
and gambling, the latter of which was banned outright, and by carrying out 
inspections of the local market, abattoir, hospital and other public utilities 
to ensure they met official standards. This applied equally to schools, where 
the Delegados were to report on the quality of the teachers’ work and speak 
to the children of the importance of the Army and of national symbols like 
the flag. The children were also to be encouraged to take part in gymnas-
tics, rhythmic marching and weight-lifting in order to improve their fitness 
in preparation for conscription or for motherhood.23 Parents, meanwhile, 
 22 It is no coincidence that Primo assigned his most trusted colleague, Martínez 
Anido, to this role in the Ministry of the Interior (Gobernación), as, historically, 
this Ministry was the principal channel through which vote management was co-
ordinated during elections.
 23 In 1925, the regime would expand upon this by creating a body dedicated to pre-
military youth education, the Servicio Nacional de Educación Física Ciudadana y 
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were to be instructed on the duties of citizenship and, most importantly, 
the need to carry out compulsory military service. The Delegados, for their 
part, were ordered to endeavour to learn about local customs and traditions, 
and to attend the fiestas [local festivities] of each village in order to gain in-
sight into their new surroundings. All of this would make the Delegado, as 
Martínez Anido stated with characteristic equanimity, ‘un misionero de la 
Patria, de la moralidad y de la cultura’ [a missionary of the Patria, morality 
and culture] who would be responsible for encouraging ‘el valor ciudadano 
para no consentir caciques’ [civic courage to not allow caciques].24
On 1 January 1924, Martínez Anido issued new instructions to the 
Delegados, which committed them to a further round of purges at muni-
cipal level, this time targeted at the temporary town councils formed by the 
regime after the mass dissolution of Ayuntamientos on 30 September 1923.25 
This required the Delegados to replace deficient local administrations with 
‘personas de alto prestigio social, de solvencia acreditada y a ser posible 
con título profesional’ [people of high social prestige, of accredited solv-
ency and, if possible, those in possession of professional titles]. In the ab-
sence of candidates with any of these qualities, the rather vague category 
of adult ratepayers would suffice. Those that were thought to have been 
too close to the previous regime, or had been councillors before, were also 
to be excluded from the new administrations, although in reality none of 
this proved to be a major obstacle to the caciques of old, who continued 
to meddle in municipal politics across Spain throughout the dictator-
ship. That such seemingly arbitrary criteria were still used to determine 
a candidate’s suitability for the role of councillor or mayor is a clear indi-
cation of the regime’s ideological poverty at this time. In truth, Primo de 
Rivera struggled to match his populist-nationalist iconoclasm with viable 
new ideas. Moreover, it highlights the difficulty that the regime faced in 
 24 ‘Prevenciones que para el mejor desempeño de sus cargos deben tener presentes los 
Delegados Gubernativos’, AHN, Gob. (A), Bundle 17A, File 12, 7 December 1923.
 25 ‘Instrucciones reservadas que los Sres. Gobernadores civiles y Delegados 
Gubernativos deberán tener presentes en sus misiones inspectoras de los 






truly eradicating caciquismo, which, by its very nature, was a shifting, ill-
defined concept.
The regime’s futile eradication efforts were nevertheless spoken of 
in official discourse as a task on a historic scale. Yet, as the Delegados set 
about their work in exalting the Spanish Patria as the primary focus of the 
population’s loyalty, their own attention was directed principally at the 
patria chica and the myriad of localisms that it contained. Their actions in 
wresting control of towns and villages from the grip of the caciques, there-
fore, were guided by the knowledge which they gathered of these often 
unfamiliar surroundings through their inspections of municipal accounts, 
the interviews they organized with local people and the denunciations they 
received from the population. The assessment of what was often mundane 
information about local goings-on through the short channels that led from 
the Delegados to Primo de Rivera in Madrid formed an essential part of 
this enormous bureaucratic undertaking.
The nature of this work of effectively reforming the national con-
sciousness meant that the Delegados found themselves thrust deeply into 
the everyday life of the towns and villages under their supervision. The de-
nunciations, petitions and complaints which they received from a popula-
tion eager to have its voice heard by the government meant that they were 
frequently required to mediate in disputes amongst local residents, some 
of whom sought to take advantage of the repressive atmosphere of the 
dictatorship to settle old scores with neighbours and rivals. Undeterred, 
however, by growing misgivings within the administration about the via-
bility of verifying the accusations made to them via denunciation, Primo 
ordered the Delegados to publish edicts in the villages under their inspec-
tion inviting the local population to highlight deficiencies and identify 
corruption in the municipal administration.26 While this was to prove 
useful to the Delegados in the first instance, what made for a reformed 
national consciousness in the popular mind, as opposed to the official one, 
was soon to become evident from the enthusiasm the population showed 
in denouncing all types of transgressors, many of whom were completely 
innocent. Captain Enrique Tomás Luque, a Delegado who wrote a memoir 
 26 ‘Prevenciones’, AHN, Gob. (A), Bundle 17A, File 12, 7 December 1923.
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of his experience, described in vivid terms how residents varied wildly in 
their interpretations of what constituted legitimate cause for grievance:
Hay quejas que parecen fundamentadas, sobre todo las que se refieren a deudas con 
los Ayuntamientos; en las de índole personal, se advierte en seguida, por el modo de 
expresarse, la envidia o el odio que las alienta, reflejo de la mísera contextura moral 
e intelectual de los denunciantes.
[There are complaints which seem to be substantiated, especially those that refer to 
debts with the Ayuntamientos; for those of a personal nature, one can immediately 
observe, by the manner in which they are expressed, the envy or hate that motivates 
them, a reflection of the wretched moral and intellectual context of the complain-
ants.] (Tomás Luque 1928: 47–8)
Many other Delegados seemed to share Tomás Luque’s metropolitan dis-
dain for his rural countrymen.27 A  homogeneous national community 
was still a very distant goal.
Most Delegados, nevertheless, approached the task of rooting out the 
supposed enemies of Spain with considerable zeal. In December 1923, the 
month they began their work, the Delegados summarily arrested and jailed 
dozens of public administrators and supposed caciques, although this was 
frequently on a dubious legal footing which forced the prisoners’ eventual 
release. This prompted General Martínez Anido to issue new instructions 
on 1 January 1924, in which he emphasized the need for moderation in 
order to maintain the good public image of the regime.28 The numerous 
reminders which Anido sent in the months and years after this, however, 
reveal that few Delegados followed his orders (Quiroga 2007: 94). It is 
clear that the popular mind was not alone in holding its own interpret-
ation of national reform.
In marked contrast to the heavy-handed approach of some Delegados, 
there are numerous reports of cases in which they were accused of 
 27 This was echoed by Rodrigo de la Yglena, a Delegado in the province of Huelva, 
who reported that his progress in carrying out reform had been hindered because in 
the villages, ‘el nivel cultural es deficientísimo y el sentido moral le hace pareja’ [the 
cultural level is highly deficient – and equally so in the moral sense]. AHN, Primo, 
Bundle 77, File 13586, c. May 1928.






collaboration with caciques and other representatives of the so-called old 
politics. Alonso J., a resident of Ayora (Valencia), gave a damning assessment 
of the local Delegado’s work in a letter to Primo in January 1924. While 
expressing his approval at the regime’s efforts to stamp out ‘el caciquismo 
asqueroso, feudal y cesarista’ [disgusting, feudal and caesarist caciquismo], 
the letter-writer complained bitterly that the Delegado’s reforms had left 
the town subject to the whims of a mayor who was ‘sumamente político’ 
[extremely political] and to ‘una administración bastante peor de la de 
antes de existir el actual régimen’ [an administration considerably worse 
than the one before the current regime existed].29
The residents of La Codosera (Extremadura) expressed similar re-
servations in a collective letter sent to Primo de Rivera in 1924. Like so 
many of those who wrote to the government during the dictatorship, 
they began their letter with a disavowal of politics and an appeal to the 
more universal values of the nation. Many of them, they outlined, had 
once belonged to the Maurista wing of the Conservative party but had 
abandoned this affiliation in the aftermath of Primo’s coup.30 In reality, 
however, their lingering rivalries and resentments spilled over into their 
complaint, which they framed in overtly political terms. The Delegado 
assigned to the district of Albuquerque had, in their eyes, been favouring 
former supporters of what they called ‘la desastrosa concentración liberal’ 
[the disastrous liberal concentration] of their former rivals in the muni-
cipal administration.31 Proof of this lay in the twin facts that at least two 
village mayors in the district had once been members of that party and 
that the local Unión Patriótica branch, although formed only recently, 
was also dominated by its members. The Delegado, they believed, was 
surely behind this because he tended to go on long walks and even for 
 29 AHN, Primo, Bundle 58, File 3469, 24 January 1924.
 30 The Maurista [Maurist] movement formed within the Conservative Party around 
the figure of Antonio Maura in the first quarter of the twentieth century and served 
as a particularly important ideological precursor to the Primo de Rivera regime 
through its innovative attempts to create public opinion and form a permanent, 
mass base of support.
 31 This refers to a series of coalitions centred around the Liberal Party and its various 
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dancing sessions with his favourites, who all happened to be Liberals. 
If this special treatment was not enough, he was ‘altanero y despectivo 
con los demás que han profesado otras ideas’ [arrogant and derogatory 
to those who have expressed other ideas].32 Under the suspicious gaze 
of the local population such gestures could be, and very often were, in-
terpreted as signs of favouritism regardless of whether this was truly the 
case or not. The villagers insisted that they were telling this to Primo not 
because they longed for power themselves, but because ‘somos españoles y 
queremos gozar del mismo beneficio que la inmensa mayoría del resto de 
España’ [we are Spaniards and we want to enjoy the same benefits as the 
immense majority of the rest of Spain]. But again we see that this ostensible 
longing for equality of opportunity masked a one-sided interpretation of 
reform: while they invoked the high ideal of the nation as their motivation 
in denouncing the corruption of the Delegado, they dispelled all claims 
to universality by asking Primo to send them ‘un señor Delegado que sea 
completamente neutral y aplaste toda política, principalmente la odiosa 
concentración liberal’ [a señor Delegado that is completely neutral and 
will quash all politics, principally the odious liberal concentration].33 In 
this case, the nation clearly served as a mask for the particularisms that 
lingered on from the pre-dictatorship political landscape.
Those caciques who did not regard the advent of the dictatorship as 
an opportunity to reach a new accommodation with the authorities were 
invariably hostile towards the Delegados. Indeed, some would go to great 
lengths to discredit them, even by denunciation, and not only on political 
grounds: a letter written by José María C. of Granada to Primo at the end 
of January 1924 documents one such situation vividly.34 Identifying him-
self ostensibly as a concerned citizen and journalist who had vehemently 
 32 A similar complaint about a Delegado was made by a doctor in Cebreros (Ávila), 
who decried, ‘En su vida social solo tiene tratos con los antiguos caciques, cuyos 
convites acepta y frecuentemente asiste con su familia a excursiones que organizan 
las familias de los expresados caciques’ [In his social life he only has contact with the 
old caciques, whose invitations he accepts, and he and his family frequently go on 
outings organized by the families of these caciques]. AHN, Primo, Bundle 63, File 
6487, 25 June 1924.
 33 AHN, Primo, Bundle 61, File 5746, 24 May 1924.








defended the new regime in the press, the letter-writer complained that an 
unnamed Delegado in the province of Almería was failing to improve life 
in the local villages. Primo’s bureau referred the complaint to the provin-
cial government of Almería but the Governor expressed doubts about the 
identity of the letter-writer. A lengthy investigation carried out by a senior 
officer later revealed that the complaint had been made falsely by the former 
secretary of the village of Beninar in revenge at the Delegado’s discovery 
of multiple cases of forgery in the municipal records. In his report to the 
Governor, the officer who investigated the case complained that ‘sería una 
lástima no poder meter en la cárcel a tanto sin vergüenza que anda por ahí 
tratando de desprestigiar la actual situación’ [it would be a pity not to be 
able to imprison a wretch like this, who goes about trying to discredit the 
present situation], adding that he had managed to have a former councillor 
jailed for fifteen days elsewhere for speaking ill of the Military Directorate. 
While the file gives no indication of the letter-writer’s eventual fate, the 
vengeful hoax consumed considerable resources and contributed to a sense 
of alienation between the military and the population.35
It is clear from many of our examples that Primo’s vision of a renewed 
national identity was not easily to be achieved by the means adopted at the 
level of local caciques, with attempts at changing the attitudes and lean-
ings of the people, hitherto informed by the liberal regime he sought to 
oust, all too often thwarted by the very officers appointed to implement 
the reforms. Although the Delegados belonged to the military and were 
largely trusted by Primo on this basis, their inspection work was to be tar-
geted exclusively at the civilian elements of the State administration. As 
such, they sat at an often nebulous intersection between the military and 
civilian spheres, leading to frequent cases in which the Delegados were 
seen to undermine the military hierarchy.36 In one such case from February 
 35 Ibid., 28 January 1924 and 3 February 1924.
 36 Samuel Finer (1962/2002:  14–23) has convincingly described the difficulty that 
such crossovers between the separate military and civilian administrations tend to 
present. While the military may temporarily achieve the legitimacy it requires in 
order to intervene directly in the civilian sphere of politics, it is nevertheless hin-
dered by what he calls a ‘technical inability to administer any but the most primi-
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1924, the Military-Civil Governor of Granada complained to Martínez 
Anido that the Delegado assigned to the town of Baza, Major Fernando 
Claudín, had caused feelings of ‘por lo menos intranquilidad y desasosiego’ 
[at the very least disquiet and unease] during his visit to two local villages. 
Subsequently, when the Governor had asked him to report on the polit-
ical situation there, Claudín, taking something of a free hand, included a 
number of accusations ‘en forma sumamente incorrecta’ [in a highly in-
correct manner] against fellow officers in his own garrison, including the 
provincial Chief of Staff, members of the Guardia Civil, the secretary of 
the provincial government and the Governor himself. However, that the 
army, like the other institutions of the Spanish State, could harbour cor-
rupt officials was something that the regime was unwilling to consider. The 
Governor, therefore, felt that he had no choice but to request Claudín’s 
dismissal for insubordination, something which Primo rubber-stamped 
in early February.37 This kind of in-fighting between those appointed to 
clear away the patronage system of caciquismo did not bode well for the 
dictator’s regenerated Patria. Nor was it the only source of concern for the 
regime: not all the Delegados were skilled in the politics of the regions to 
which they were assigned, nor were they capable manipulators of the situ-
ations they found within them.
The Governor of Guipúzcoa, likewise, wrote to Primo de Rivera in 
September 1924 to complain about the conduct of the Delegado assigned to 
the district of Azpeitia.38 The town in question, he noted, was well known for 
its support of the political right and, as such, on the advent of the regime, ‘se 
mostró ardiente y decidido partidario de su tendencia depuradora’ [showed 
itself to be passionate and resolute in its support of its inclination towards 
purging]. The Delegado, though, had altered this favourable situation so 
profoundly that ‘hoy el distrito en masa es hostil a nuestra representación 
y mira con recelo y desconfianza cuanto al Directorio se refiere’ [today, the 
district as a whole is hostile to our representatives and regards anything to do 
with the Directorate with mistrust and suspicion]. The Governor reported 
that the Delegado had repeatedly flouted his instructions in order to wage a 
 37 AHN, Primo, Bundle 59, File 4409, 26 February 1924.






personal war against the integrista [integrist traditionalist] party, which was 
then the main political group there and had deep roots in the local commu-
nity. The Delegado’s decision to do so revealed a clear lack of understanding 
of the politics of the region. The dispute started in the first of the inspections 
which he carried out in the surrounding villages, during which he began 
‘sembrando el terror y dirigiendo amenazas’ [sowing terror and directing 
threats] at the local population, much to the detriment of the regime. The 
Governor thought it unsurprising, therefore, ‘que la animosidad, que en 
un principio se concretaba en su persona, se haya extendido al Directorio’ 
[that the hostility, which was at first fixed on his person, has spread to the 
Directorate]. This public animosity towards the government was encouraged 
by the Delegado’s bizarre and often violent behaviour, exemplified by one 
incident in which he gathered together the mayor of Azpeitia and various 
other local dignitaries in the town hall to burn a Basque flag in front of them, 
which he then ordered be torn into rags to be used to clean the building.39 
This Delegado was also dismissed for these excesses.
The overzealousness of these Delegados, like those who continued to 
imprison public administrators with impunity, highlighted the unwieldy 
aspects of the arrangement. While the archives contain many glowing re-
ports written by happy mayors and town councillors about the services pro-
vided to their municipalities by the Delegados, many other letters showed 
their work to be seriously damaging to the regime.40 These range from cases 
of officers resigning in frustration at the ill-defined nature of their work, to 
others who were convicted of crimes while in the role.41 Many ultimately 
seemed unable to meet the exalted character standards of the new national 
citizen which Primo envisaged.
On a more symbolic level, at the head of the national community, 
the military nationalism that became so influential in the Restoration 
period in Spain, and, ultimately, established the cultural foundations for 
the dictatorship, typically equated the Spanish State with the nation, in 
 39 Ibid., 20 September 1924.
 40 Hundreds of these can be seen in AHN, Primo, Bundle 331 (1 & 2).
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place of the people. The army, as the armed wing of the State and one of 
its foremost institutions, therefore, was central to this vision. It is unsur-
prising then that by the time of the coup d’état of September 1923, Primo de 
Rivera, like a number of other prominent generals, was a popular figure in 
Spain, having served notably as Captain General both of Valencia and of 
Catalonia in the volatile post-war period. The regime’s efforts to legitimize 
the continuation of the dictatorship into the medium-to-long term saw it 
attempt to build upon this popularity through the charismatic construction 
of the dictator and his persona in mass propaganda. This has been shown 
by Alejandro Quiroga to be a process that was characterized by heavy doses 
of paternalism and references to divine Providence.42 The letters that were 
sent to Primo during this time reflected this carefully cultivated image in 
the way that they frequently represented him as a benevolent father to 
the nation, very often in the absence of any significant references to the 
King, Alfonso XIII. In the case of those letters that referred directly to the 
Delegados, their authors frequently made use of the traditional peasant 
letter-writing schema which pitted the good leader of the people against 
ruthless State bureaucrats who abused their power.43 This was a tension 
that ultimately served to challenge not only the seamless integration of 
Nation–State–Army which the regime promoted in its official discourse 
but also the new ideals of citizenship which that integration rested upon.
The residents of the district of Cúllar and Baza (Granada) wrote an ex-
emplar letter of this type to Primo in April 1924 to denounce the actions of 
their interim Delegado, Major Juan Luque Fuentes. Shortly after his arrival 
in the district, Luque, who was a replacement for the popular Delegado 
Fernando Claudín (the same Delegado mentioned earlier in this chapter), 
had unilaterally decided to dismiss several members of the town council, 
which had been elected unanimously earlier in the month. In solidarity with 
their dismissed colleagues, however, the remaining councillors had resigned 
in protest shortly afterwards. The writers of the letter wondered if Claudín, 
 42 That so many ordinary people chose to write directly to the dictator between 1923 
and 1930 is surely a sign that this charismatization process was at least partially suc-
cessful. This process is treated in some detail in Quiroga (2013a).






the original Delegado, knew about this, for they feared that ‘en este asunto 
mangonea un elemento del antiguo régimen caciquil de Baza’ [an element 
of the old caciquil regime in Baza is meddling in this matter]. In a typical 
concluding appeal, they asked Primo to intervene against Luque, who was 
surely acting without his knowledge, and to restore the previous council, 
stating that ‘es lástima que ocurra esto a espaldas de VE que es la garantía 
de la Ley, y más que todo es VE la garantía de la tranquilidad de España’ 
[it is a shame that this is occurring behind the back of Your Excellency, 
who is the guarantor of the Law, and, more than anything, Your Excellency 
is the guarantor of Spain’s peace].44 Many other letters sent to Primo de 
Rivera at this time framed their contents as acts of informing the dictator 
in the most literal, factual sense, without making any explicit requests, in 
the hope that his natural benevolence would inspire him to take action in 
their defence. On this basis it is clear that while the Delegados were styled 
as the servants and saviours of the nation by the regime, in the eyes of many 
ordinary people at this time, Primo remained its ultimate guarantor.45 But 
neither the official promotion of the Delegados’ role, nor the image of 
their leader as prototype was to prove sufficient to create the new citizen.
The Municipal Statute and the Decline of the Delegados
As these few samples of the widespread correspondence have indicated, 
it was becoming clear to Primo that no short-term solutions to reforming 
 44 AHN, Primo, Bundle 61, File 5609, 26 April 1924.
 45 It is worth noting here that in these letters the King, Alfonso XIII, typically fea-
tured only as a secondary figure, who was occasionally invoked as the symbol of the 
nation and as an object of personal loyalty, rather than as a direct actor. General 
Francisco Franco, however, was treated in much the same way as Primo de Rivera 
in the period after the Civil War, as Antonio Cazorla Sánchez’s work on the topic 
shows. See the illustrative case in which a letter-writer urged Franco to take action 
against ‘pillos, ladrones, ambiciosos, y chaqueteros vengativos’ [rascals, thieves, the 
power-hungry, and vindictive brownnosers] so that he would not fail as Primo de 
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civic attitudes were likely to succeed and that if his changes were to have 
any lasting effect on perceptions of nationhood, it would be necessary to 
rethink the overall strategy. The months of March and April 1924 marked 
the first major change of course over the lifetime of the dictatorship, be-
tween a destructive phase that was characterized by the regime’s efforts 
to purge the State administration of corruption and the beginnings of a 
medium- to long-term reconstruction. By this point, the first ninety days 
of military rule, which King Alfonso XIII had initially handed Primo de 
Rivera in September 1923, had long since elapsed and, consequently, the 
general began to take steps to stabilize and perpetuate his regime beyond 
the quirúrgica [surgical] intervention that he had first proposed in his 
manifesto. With the approval of the King, Primo set about institution-
alizing the dictatorship by carrying out a far-reaching legislative reform 
to local government, adopting a single party, Unión Patriótica, and 
commencing the progressive recivilianization of half of the provincial 
Governorships.46
The regime’s definitive reform to local government was implemented 
through a new Municipal Statute, a landmark piece of legislation that was 
overseen by the young Maurista lawyer, José Calvo Sotelo, whom the dic-
tator appointed to a senior role in the Ministry of the Interior as Director 
General of the Administration and, subsequently, Minister for Finance. In 
a bid to end the electoral manipulation that had characterized the earlier 
Restoration era, the Statute firmly established the municipality as the basic 
administrative unit of the Spanish State and limited the scope for direct 
government interference in this realm.47 It was evident that only by some 
such concessions to local diversity would the grander aims of revitalized 
national homogeneity be achievable.
 46 For the Municipal Statute see Gaceta de Madrid (9 March 1924). Its main provi-
sions were implemented in the first week of April 1924. See Noguera y Yanguas 
and Campos y Arjona (1926):  for the instructions issued to the Governors and 
Delegados on the formation of Unión Patriótica, pp.  546–9; for the decree re-
garding the return of the Civil Governors, p. 531.
 47 In this he was assisted by José María Gil-Robles, the future leader of the CEDA, 







New instructions issued to the Delegados by the government at the end of 
March 1924 to coincide with the implementation of the Statute bound them 
to respect municipal autonomy and restricted their freedom to intervene in 
municipal affairs without the prior authorization of the corresponding pro-
vincial Governor (Gaceta de Madrid, 21 October 1923). The move was timely, 
as by now the Delegados were becoming unpopular figures, both among the 
population, as the petitions examined earlier in this chapter show, and within 
the administration itself. In the months following the introduction of the 
Municipal Statute, Martínez Anido was moved to write to the provincial 
Governors to complain that some Delegados were still involved in the smallest 
details of municipal life, contrary to their new instructions. Within the army, 
the future organizer of the July 1936 coup d’état, General Emilio Mola, stated 
his belief that the work of the Delegados was ‘no pocas veces desafortunada 
y hasta inmoral […] y siempre antipática al elemento civil’ [frequently mis-
guided and even immoral […] and always unpleasant for civilian elements], 
and had served only to create public animosity towards the Armed Forces in 
Spain (Mola 1940: 1028 cited in Quiroga 2004: 259). Similar criticisms were 
also made by the senior generals Pardo González and García Benítez.48 José 
Calvo Sotelo, for his part, worried that the Delegados were undermining 
the authority of the restored Civil Governors and contributing to states of 
‘incertidumbre, despego o desasosiego’ [doubt, disregard or unease] across 
government. In October 1924, around the anniversary of the creation of the 
Delegados, in a move that anticipated the creation by Primo of a largely ci-
vilian cabinet (the Civil Directorate) in December 1925, he wrote to the gen-
eral to suggest that it would be prudent to abolish the role altogether, thereby 
loosening the erstwhile militarization of the State administration (Calvo 
Sotelo 1931/1974: 27–9). Although Primo hesitated at doing so entirely, be-
tween late 1924 and the end of 1927 he would go on to reduce progressively 
the number of Delegados from a peak of 523 to just seventy-nine, all of whom 
were reassigned to administrative roles in provincial capitals.49
 48 For Pardo González and García Benítez see Navajas Zubeldía (1992: 99–100).
 49 For the laws ordering the reduction of the Delegados see Noguera y Yanguas 
and Campos y Arjona (1926:  692) and Gaceta de Madrid (21  March  1926 and 
29 December 1927). One of the first decisions taken by the administration formed by 
General Dámaso Berenguer in 1930 upon Primo’s resignation was to abolish the office 
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Conclusion
When Primo de Rivera created the Delegados Gubernativos in October 
1923, he was still entertaining the idea of relinquishing power in the short 
to medium term, even if he had no intention of doing so within ninety 
days of his coup d’état as he initially suggested. At a point marked by ideo-
logical poverty, during which caciquismo was presented by the regime as 
one of the overriding threats to the Spanish nation, the Delegados were 
introduced to the population as the tools with which the regeneration 
of Spain would finally be achieved. Very rapidly, however, their relation-
ship with the population soured due both to their lack of preparation 
and to the impossibility of their task in fully eradicating caciquismo. At 
the root of the mission which Primo originally assigned to the Delegados 
was his messianic belief that civil society could be awoken and reformed 
by the State alone. However, as this chapter has shown, the regime en-
countered a population that was much less malleable and open to its top-
down nationalizing efforts than it had expected. Any incorporation of 
the masses into national life would be a multi-layered process, in which 
the eradication of caciquismo would merely represent a single step. As 
Enrique Tomás y Luque, the memoir-writing Delegado, concluded in his 
own assessment of their work, the task was far more complex than Primo 
de Rivera could have foreseen in September 1923, for, ‘[e]l convertir los 
hombres de hoy en ciudadanos, cuando tan lejos de esto estaban, es labor 
muy lenta, de varias generaciones, aun siguiendo la obra regeneradora, 
tan intensa y enérgicamente iniciada’ [Turning the men of today into citi-
zens, when they were so far removed from this, is slow work, over several 
generations, even if we continue the work of regeneration that we have 
started so intensely and energetically] (Tomás Luque 1928: 246). Indeed, 
the question that dominated Spanish politics for much of what remained 
of the twentieth century was whether the State would base itself on civic-
republican ideals that emphasized active participation in political life, 
or whether that State would attempt to bend its citizenry to its image 
and, ultimately, its will from above. The experience of the Delegados rap-





With hindsight, and assuming that a bankrupt State had not put a de-
cisive end to his reforms upon the regime’s collapse, one can only speculate 
whether Primo’s vision of a new unified citizenry was ever really achiev-
able, with or without military government. As the events leading up to the 
brutal civil war – and the present calls for independence – give sufficient 
evidence, his efforts to create a homogeneous sense of nationhood were, 
at the very least, premature.
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Mark Friis Hau
Becoming Catalan: Narrative Cultivation of Self 
among Catalan Nationalists
abstract
This chapter offers novel perspectives on how Catalan national identity, rather than being 
a predetermined, passively assigned ethnic category, is socially constructed through active 
choices and technologies of the self. Drawing on ethnographic data gathered among 
activists of the pro-independence, left-wing party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 
and employing ethical self-transformation terminology previously used primarily in 
the study of religious behaviour, it explores the construction of contemporary Catalan 
national identity, cultivated and embodied through daily communicative practice and 
shared narratives. As national senses of belonging become inextricably linked with real-
politik, political constructions of ‘the good life’ increasingly take Catalan independence 
and Catalan national identity as the starting point, linking the political and the moral. 
Catalan nationalist activists attempt to align personal and communal narratives by 
discursively equating a Catalan ideal-self with morally correct behaviour, contrasting 
Catalan virtues with Spanish vices.
Introduction
He après dels meus pares i de l’escola que som una nació. Però si creues l’Ebre 
allí ensenyen tot el contrari. Hi ha un conflicte de realitats, hi ha un conflicte de 
reconeixement. Però jo ja em reconeix, no necessito que Espanya ho faci.
[I have learned from my parents and in school that we’re a nation. But you cross 





178 Mark Friis Hau
of realities, there is a conflict of recognition. But I already recognize myself, I don’t 
need Spain to do so.]1 (Eduard, 17 June 2015)
There exists a traumatic freedom in being a Catalan nationalist. You 
cannot be formally born Catalan, although you are born in Catalonia, 
and you cannot hold a Catalan passport. On the other hand, you can call 
yourself Catalan without speaking Catalan or having Catalan ancestry. 
The choice to be Catalan appears at first to be ‘free’, but it can never be 
externally validated, and must be continuously maintained through one’s 
own actions, speech, and values. As Montserrat Guibernau argues, the 
Catalan pro-independence movement specifically demands the right of 
Catalans to be considered a demos, or a people (2014: 5). Recognition as 
a Catalan both individually and as belonging to a specific people is essen-
tially the central issue for Catalan nationalists; they lack such recogni-
tion within the current framework of Spain. ln the Spanish Constitution 
Catalonia is not recognized as sovereign or even as a nation but simply 
as a ‘nationality’, a clever neologism that has no agreed-upon meaning 
(2014: 13). The legal definition of a ‘Catalan’ according to the Statute of 
Autonomy of 1932, reinstated in the Statute of Autonomy of 1979 (Desfor 
Edles 1999: 329) and continued in the Statute of Autonomy of 2005, is 
completely inclusive and counts anyone with administrative residence as 
a Catalan (Article 7). Not only are Catalan national identities not sup-
ported by institutional means, or conferred upon birth, they are actively 
contested by the (Spanish) state, which does not recognize Catalan as 
being a national identity distinct from Spanish nationality.
Explaining Catalan identity to me, my informant Enric, an ERC 
member since the 1980s and a retired schoolmaster, quoted the famous 
 1 The fieldwork on which this chapter is based took place between autumn 2011 
and spring 2012 among activists from a local chapter of the Catalanist, left wing 
party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) in the Barcelona neighborhood 
of Sant Andreu. Follow-up interviews were conducted in the summer of 2015. The 
fieldwork was sponsored by the University of Copenhagen as part of a Research 
Master’s degree program. All translations in this chapter are my own and I alone 
am responsible for any errors or faults. All interviewees appear under their original 




words of former Catalan president Jordi Pujol: you only have to live in 
Catalonia and want to be Catalan to be so. ‘El voler és la clau’ [The will is 
the key],2 Enric emphasized. If ever one could talk of open ethnic bound-
aries, it would seem to be in Catalonia. As Catalan is different from other 
ethnic identities supported by a state apparatus and internal political 
and linguistic recognition, the lack of institutionalization has the conse-
quence that being Catalan is essentially a political choice; it is an identity 
one has to stick with and make work through practice and discipline. 
In this chapter, I argue that through a continuous process of cultivating 
Catalanist3 selves through value-laden narratives, members of the party 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya were able to constitute themselves 
as true and virtuous Catalan subjects. They achieved their goal of being 
recognized as a nation from within through their own narratives about 
themselves. As they recognized themselves as Catalan and constituted 
themselves as Catalan subjects through practice, they sought to make 
irrelevant the lack of recognition they received from Spain or the inter-
national community. They were able to become Catalan through speech 
and force of will.
National Identity in Catalonia
National identity is, and has been for many years, a central issue on the 
Catalan political agenda and in the lives of many Catalans (Villaroya 
2012: 31). During my time in Catalonia I principally worked with local ac-
tivists from the left-wing, pro-independence party Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya. Although often referred to in the literature as a ‘nationalist’ 
party, with the exception of the right-wing parties PP and Ciutadans, 
[Citizens] as Ivan Serrano points out, ‘Catalan parties share a broad 
 2 Enric used the Catalan word ‘voler’, which means ‘to want’, or ‘will’.
 3 ‘Catalanism’ and ‘Catalanist’ are the preferred terms for Catalan nationalism in 
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conception of Catalan national identity that includes elements such as 
a common history, a community with its own traditions and language, 
and a collective will for self-government based on an inclusive conception 
of “Catalanness”’ (Serrano 2013:  531). The people I  encountered in my 
fieldwork necessarily understood their national identity as Catalan and 
thought of Catalonia as a nation distinct from that of Spain. Since such 
an understanding is widespread in Catalonia, it remains an open question 
whether or not ERC members in particular should be termed ‘nation-
alists’. I  do so in this chapter primarily because considerations of space 
limit a larger discussion of the word ‘nationalism’. Although all national 
identities are necessarily socially constructed, being Catalan is generally 
perceived by Catalans themselves as something open, fluid and subject 
to choice. Writing on this open understanding of Catalan national iden-
tity, anthropologist Stanley Brandes has noted:  ‘[T] he Catalan people 
have long maintained an implicit belief in something that anthropolo-
gists have long known, that is, that race and culture are wholly separable. 
Biological ancestry does not make a person Catalan. Catalan identity 
[…] can be acquired through learning, and then internalized to the point 
of thorough identification’ (1990: 34).
The question that arises is what a Catalan nationalist can do to over-
come his or her lack of institutional (and international) recognition. As 
my informant Eduard stated in the opening quotation: one can recognize 
oneself. This type of ‘cultural resistance’ is common among Catalan na-
tionalists, using national symbols, language, and moral narratives to resist, 
contest, and upend Spanish identity (Guibernau 2014: 11). Beginning with a 
mass demonstration in 1977 on the Catalan national day, 11 September, such 
resistance actions enlisting mass support in favour of autonomy or outright 
independence have continually returned to Catalan politics, perhaps most 
notably in the 2012 demonstrations that regalvanized the independence 
movement. Several surveys from 2012 and 2013 showed a majority in favour 
of independence ranging from 52 to 55 per cent (2014: 18–19). It is clear 
that support for independence is experiencing unprecedented momentum, 
with Catalans voting in greater numbers than before and more deeply div-
ided (Burg 2015: 289). Even more significant, the proportion of respond-
ents self-identifying as exclusively Catalan has been increasing since 2010 
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(2015: 293). Although the presence of distinctive, non-Spanish, Catalan 
national identities has long been a powerful political force in Catalonia 
(2015: 293), in the last few years a great number of Catalans appear to feel 
more exclusively Catalan than before. It would seem that more and more 
Catalans are ‘recognizing themselves’ as Catalans.
Nations without states such as Catalonia are complex sites for the 
study of national identifications. Two main sets of identities are at play, 
Spanish and Catalan, and both lay claim to the same territory. Majority 
state nationalism ‘seeks to promote a shared national identity for all the 
citizens of the state, while the nation without state nationalism seeks rec-
ognition as a demos, claiming a right to self-government and self-determin-
ation’ (Serrano 2013: 527). People in Catalonia can feel attachment towards 
either Spanish or Catalan national identity with varying intensities, or both 
as in the case of ‘nested’ identities. There are competing nation-building 
policies at play, and national identities cannot be taken for granted at an 
institutional or personal level. When the state is considered by its citizens 
to be concomitant with the nation, Billig’s seminal concept of banal na-
tionalism (1995) is immensely illuminating. The routine, or banal, limp flag 
hanging by the post office is a more powerful vehicle of national ‘flagging’ 
than the confident battle-flag hoisted high (1995: 6). Billig’s central thesis 
that ideological habits become routine and nationalist imagery permeate 
daily events without calling attention to themselves is a powerful analytic 
tool. In Catalonia, this is necessarily somewhat different as has already 
been explored in the literature on Catalonia (Crameri 2000; Hau 2016). 
Guibernau has argued that the particular constellation in Catalonia where 
a majority state has historically not assimilated its national minorities, 
causes minority nationalists to perceive the state as ‘alien’ (Guibernau 
2013: 371). This leads to feelings of ‘estrangement’ and emotional detach-
ment, which is exactly how I would characterize my ERC informants’ 
relationship to the Spanish state and the central government in Madrid. 
In Catalonia, national identity becomes increasingly politicized, as nei-
ther Catalan nor Spanish national symbols can be considered truly rou-
tine and inconspicuous. When one has to choose which flag to hoist, the 
banality of the action decreases and it becomes subject to evaluation, 
debate – and choice.
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Telling Stories
Stories were a recurring theme throughout my ethnographic interviews 
with ERC activists in Sant Andreu. Sometimes they would be abstract, 
ideological and semi-historical explanations, and sometimes very prac-
tical, concrete and political. I quickly took an interest in such narratives, 
as my interlocutors relied heavily on them when making their case and 
arguments. The stories were often repeated. The same political situation 
or similar stories were told by several interlocutors independently. During 
our later talks, my interlocutors would also sometimes make reference 
to their earlier narratives to make a new point. Sometimes such stories 
would have clear-cut protagonists and antagonists, and a coherent plot, 
but regardless of form they would be normative with clear moral impli-
cations and political consequences. They were stories of how the world 
was perceived by my interlocutors, but also about how the world ought to 
be. I analyse them as ways in which my informants reflected on who they 
wanted to be, and used them to tell the stories of themselves that they 
wanted told.
These stories could be labelled a form of presentation of self in the 
style of Erving Goffman: a semi-conscious performance of how someone 
wants to be perceived (Goffman 1959: 15). For example, my interlocutors’ 
preference for speaking almost solely in Catalan in the otherwise linguis-
tically plural environment of Barcelona could be seen as a personal front 
designed to convey impressions of their great convictions or for keeping 
up appearances as Catalan nationalists (1959: 24). In this light, the lack 
of institutional backing for their national identities leads them to almost 
compulsive ethnic posturing and identity performance.
However, in this chapter I take a different view: my interlocutors 
were not only giving a performance to convince me of their Catalanhood, 
but to convince themselves, using narratives and ethical evaluations to 
form and affirm an identity and idea of self that was more in line with 
the values outlined in Catalanist discourse. Ethnicity, being an aspect of 
a relation, is both self-articulated and subject to validation by others. It 




example the Spanish state and international community, are unwilling 
to recognize one’s Catalan identity, it follows that one must work even 
harder to convince oneself and internalize the recognition lacking from 
the outside.
However, this process should be understood as less of a show and 
more of an exercise, or a technique of the self. In Goffmanesque terms 
this would be an outside mask held in place from within by social dis-
cipline (Goffman 1959: 57), but I find the process to be more similar 
to growing a beard than wearing a mask, as the politicized identity of 
Catalanism is subject to nurture and active cultivation. The perform-
ance does not stop when the audience has left, but when the performer 
has convinced himself to such a degree that he has effected change 
within himself.
Benedict Anderson has famously argued that nations are imagined 
communities (1991), and here I take this as a starting point to investigate 
how a nation might be imagined by the people who consider themselves 
to belong to it. I see that my interlocutors’ social narratives, drawing upon 
nationalist discourse, moral claims and virtues, were ways of engaging 
with and propagating a political Catalanist life. Drawing on Sartre, 
Goffman has stated that we play with our current condition in order 
to realize it, in the literal sense of making it real (1959: 76). Following 
this, I analyse how my informants’ moral and ethical narratives and 
accounts of self are ways to formulate their identities, ‘realizing’ them 
in the process. In order to perform this analysis, I enter into a dialogue 
with the recent poststructuralist analyses of religious self-cultivation led 
by Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, and lean on Foucault’s tech-
niques of the self. Through narratives about ethics, justice, and Catalan 
values, members of Esquerra are able to reimagine their lives and to affirm 
their ‘Catalanhood’, cultivating and disciplining a Catalan self more in 
line with Catalanist discourse. To highlight the process of nationalist 
cultivation among ERC activists, I first relate how a feeling of injustice 
was a central theme in many of my interlocutors’ stories and how this 
can be seen in a moral light. Secondly, I attempt to sketch some of the 
‘core’, archetypical values perceived by my interlocutors as deeply Catalan, 
namely democracy, tolerance and pacifism.
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The Cultivation of Self4
It is an oft-repeated trope that nationalism is religion for the modern era. 
The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to follow such a comparison. 
I  use the analytical framework of cultivation, borrowed primarily from 
Saba Mahmood and Charles Hirschkind’s poststructuralist studies of re-
ligious practices in order to illuminate how nationalist, Catalan political 
activists seek to consciously shape and strengthen their national identities. 
This enables a view of national identity as something continuously main-
tained, nurtured or cultivated into a distinct ideology of selfhood through 
narratives and social actions rather than as a given and unproblematic trait.
A key writer on the theme of cultivation, Saba Mahmood centres her 
work on how female Muslims in the Egyptian Mosque Movement exer-
cise great agency in attempting to discipline themselves into more pious, 
moral selves. Mahmood equates the bodily practices of her interlocutors 
with ‘spiritual exercises’. This term refers to practices both physical, as in a 
dietary regime, intuitive, as in contemplation, or discursive, as in dialogue. 
Common among them is their intention to effect modifications and trans-
formations in the practising subject (Mahmood 2004: 122). Mahmood 
places great emphasis on the social actor’s desire and willingness to change 
him or herself in accordance with a larger ideology through social discipline.
By her own admission, Mahmood’s framework, which we might term 
an active formation of self, self-discipline or cultivation, is greatly inspired 
by poststructuralist thought. The transformation of self is not necessarily 
voluntaristic and autonomous, but formed within historically specific sets 
of formative practices and moral injunctions. This involves the Foucauldian 
paradoxical term subjectivation, referring to how the same processes and 
conditions that subordinate a subject are also the means by which they 
can become a self-conscious agent. That is, there is no undominated self 
 4 In this chapter, I use the terms identity, self and subject interchangeably, as limita-
tions of space restrict a full-fledged discussion. My use of the term ‘self ’ should not 
be seen as an ontological argument or implying the psychological solidity of ‘the self ’, 
but highlights how narratives of selfhood were abundant in my field and had social 






pre-existing the operations of power or a subject formed ‘freely’ from dis-
cursive regimes. Even our abilities and capacities for agency are the product 
of power operations (2004: 28). Even though the subject constitutes itself 
actively through practices of the self, such practices are not invented by 
the individuals, but culturally appropriate models (Martin et al. 1988: 121).
In my analysis this insight can be translated to mean that there cannot 
exist a nationalist subject outside nationalist discourse and further, there 
cannot exist a Catalanist unless he or she is actively being subjectivated by 
and subjectivating him or herself to such a Catalan, nationalist discourse. 
A Catalanist subject in my analysis is a subject who willingly, even if not ‘freely’, 
strives towards inhabiting the tenets of nationalist discourse, while solely 
existing as a social body through the subjectivation of this same discourse.
Of central importance is Michel Foucault’s analysis of the Greco-Roman 
concept epimelesthai sautou, the care of the self, realized as a set of practices or 
techniques exercised by the self on the self by which one seeks to ‘develop and 
transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being’ (Fornet-Betancourt 
et al. 1987: 113). Taking care of oneself constituted not only a principle but 
also a constant practice (Martin et al. 1988: 148). The care of the self was an 
active form of leisure in the Greco-Roman era, and there was a gradual shift 
from oral to written practices such as diary-writing and keeping notebooks 
(1988: 153). Gradually, the self became a theme and an object (or subject) to 
write about, intensifying the experience of self. Among my informants, written 
quotes by famous Catalanists were praised as encapsulating Catalan virtues 
and appreciated for their emotional quality and political salience. However, 
it was oral narratives and voiced expressions of values and selfhood that I en-
countered and have chosen to focus my attention on.
The Case for Catalanism as Cultivation
In many ways, the project of nationalism is not so far from that of 
Mahmood’s pious interlocutors in the Mosque Movement. Nationalism 
relies on specific discourses and assumptions to make its claims and in-
volve social actors’ current actions working towards the completion of 
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future goals and aspirations and, with the declared aim of independence 
for their nation, my interlocutors attempted to cultivate Catalan lives, sur-
rounding themselves with other Catalan speakers, choosing not to switch 
over to Castilian (even though they spoke it perfectly) and repeating 
certain common narratives, all in the process of becoming Catalanist 
subjects and being recognized as Catalan.
Following in the footsteps of Talal Asad, Hirschkind (2011) has made 
the case for studying secular practices as part of the cultivation of a secular 
body. He asks if we can talk of a ‘body’, understood in a social constructivist 
way of embodied dispositions and learned sensibilities specific to secular 
subjects. Hirschkind argues that we must distinguish between spaces that 
are merely secular, and those where there is a process of secular cultivation 
(2011: 634). Similarly in my field, simply being Catalan is not the same as 
being a Catalanist subject. Just as practices we define as secular are not so 
because they are nonreligious, but because they are discursively identified 
and valorized through the discourse of secularism (2011: 639), a practice 
can only be termed Catalanist when it relies upon and engages with a 
Catalanist discourse and when it plays a part in the project of that dis-
course. A certain discourse must be at work for us to begin talking about 
the cultivation of a certain subject.
I then regard a practice or narrative as part of a Catalanist cultivation 
of self if social actors are able to successfully inscribe it within the wider 
discourse of Catalan nationalism. However banal or routine the practice, if 
it relies on Catalanist discourse to make sense as a social act, it has become 
a Catalanist act. To paraphrase from Billig, a Catalanist cannot claim pat-
riotic feelings for Catalonia unless the assumptions about what a nation is 
and what values patriotism involves are already discursively in place (Billig 
1995: 61). National sentiments do not appear ex nihilo in a vacuum.
Cultivating Ideals
The discursive ‘field’ of Catalan nationalism did not emerge as a unified 




influences informed different types of nationalism, ranging from con-
servative to Marxist (Guibernau 2014: 10). Catalanism has always been 
a political terrain, and this is no different today, although it is generally a 
phenomenon of the political left. My informants sought to uphold and 
affirm certain moral claims and virtues implicit in their understanding of 
Catalan nationalist ideology, cultivating specific dispositions in a parallel 
to religious subjects seeking to become more pious. The tales told to me 
during my fieldwork were ways in which my informants could reflect on 
the moral values important for them as political Catalanist activists of the 
centre-left. I saw that their idealism was the virtue most often praised, as 
their political activism was seen in moral, almost spiritual terms.
When I asked Mireia how she first became involved with Esquerra, 
she told me about ‘awakening’ as a Catalanist in ideological, moral terms, 
focusing on the values of justice, equality and liberty, without any men-
tion of the party itself: ‘Arriba un moment que tu dius, ostres, justícia, no? 
Igualtat. I tu comences a veure que tu … ets nascut, crescut i viscut en un 
territori que la llibertat no la tens plenament’ [There comes a time where 
you say ‘well, what about justice’, right? Equality. And you start to see that 
you … You’re born, raised and living in a place where liberty is simply not 
something you have] (Mireia, 24 April 2012).
Carles told me a somewhat similar story of being ‘awakened’ as a 
Catalanist. When he was 6 years old, he had been to a holiday celebration 
in Plaça Sant Jaume, the square in central Barcelona in front of the Catalan 
Generalitat [Parliament]. Here he had seen a Spanish flag flowing and asked 
his parents what it was doing in their country (Carles, 30 March 2012). He 
emphasized that he was not aware of politics at that age, only later forming 
his political views over the following years and getting involved with polit-
ical issues in his early teens. However, he still saw this experience as being 
the first time it dawned on him that his country was not free. The narrative 
of this experience greatly emphasizes the preconscious, affect-filled aspects 
of Carles’s awakening as a Catalanist.
In speaking of their political formation, both Mireia and Carles, rather 
than telling me about how they became active in the party, emphasized an 
ideological, moral awakening. This speaks to how being an idealist was a key 
factor in being a Catalanist, an affective, moral understanding of the world 
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that had to be nursed and cultivated. My interlocutors demonstrated an 
understanding of national identity as processual and subject to evolution 
over time, as when one of them, Jaume, told me that he did not just look 
at the scenic Catalan mountains one day and decide he wanted independ-
ence, but that the realization came with a knowledge of Catalan culture, 
customs and history ( Jaume, 27 February 2012). This finding parallels Ivan 
Serrano’s claim that national identities in Catalonia are not static, but cur-
rently subject to a shift from the ‘non-conflictive, dual, or nested identities’ 
(Serrano 2013: 528). Catalans seem to be becoming more Catalan, as those 
identifying as exclusively Catalan increased from 24 per cent in 1979 to 
more than 40 per cent in the 2010s; claims of exclusively Spanish identity 
have halved during that same period (2013: 527).
This fluid view of Catalan national identity also means that at some 
level it is a consequence of choice, a matter of subjecting oneself to certain 
Catalan dispositions. The disciplined nature of these preferences can be 
seen in Dolors’ insistence on setting her cell phone language to French. 
Catalan had not been available and she was adamant about refusing to use 
Spanish. Similarly when I asked Cristian about speaking Castilian in his 
daily life, he shrugged and said: ‘Intento no fer-ho. Per raons sentimentals’ 
[I try not to. For sentimental reasons] (Cristian, 7 June 2012).
Catalan identity has long been seen as intrinsically connected with 
the Catalan language and since the contentious 1983 Catalonian Linguistic 
Normalization Law (which gave Catalan and Spanish equal official status 
in the region) actors have campaigned ardently to make sure Catalan is the 
main vehicle of social communication in Catalonia (Villarroya 2012: 38). 
This has not yet been accomplished, especially in the multi-ethnic and 
heterogeneous Barcelona, where both language-choice and spatial strat-
egies can become instruments of national identity politics (Hau 2016) 
and where exposure to Castilian is constant – radio commercials are often 
in Spanish, and while some programs and service announcements are in 
Catalan, others are made for a Spanish-speaking audience and music brings 
in a mix of American, Spanish and Catalan artists. My interlocutors, how-
ever, as convinced nationalists, would never switch to Spanish when out 
to eat or at a café, even if the waiter did not speak Catalan. I witnessed 
this once when we went to pay for our coffee and the South American 
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waiter received us in Castilian – in accordance with their usual practice 
they simply replied in Catalan. Speaking to me of a recent vacation in the 
Basque Country, Carles told me he had been very surprised at how good 
his Spanish was, as he never used it in Catalonia. To live in Barcelona while 
avoiding contact with Spanish requires great effort, an extreme preference 
which can be seen as a technology of the self, or a discipline of preference: a 
constant insistence on Catalan, abilities notwithstanding, was part of how 
my interlocutors sought to affirm their national identities and form a more 
virtuous Catalan subject.
They saw nothing ‘natural’ or inherent about being Catalanist. Their 
nationality was not written in their passports, and it was not bestowed upon 
birth. Several of my informants came from mixed family backgrounds, or 
outright Spanish-speaking families. Being Catalan was a quality that could 
be awakened or nursed into being, and the more awareness there was of 
history, the stronger the Catalanist convictions and desire for independ-
ence. My interlocutors saw their national sentiment as something that was 
being continually produced and could be lost if it ceased to be practised. 
Equating the nation and the language, Carles explained the situation to 
me: ‘Tota la vida haurem d’estar atents a la salut de la nostra llengua. Els 
únics que no es preocupen són els espanyols amb el castellà, i els anglesos 
i els mandarins’ [We always have to pay attention to the health of our lan-
guage. The only ones that don’t worry are the Spanish with their Castilian, 
the English and the Mandarin-speakers]. Not even independence would 
allow Catalonia to relax fully: ‘No podrem deixar mai les armes’ [We can 
never lay down our arms] (Carles, 30 March 2012).
Carles did not see Catalan nationhood as an unproblematic given, but 
rather as something one had to work towards and fight for. Billig reminds 
us that identity should not be seen as a reified thing, but rather a short-
hand description for ways of talking about the self within a community 
(Billig 1995: 60). Similarly, I see a Catalanist identity as shorthand for a 
cultivated self. That is, not as a natural tabula rasa, but as a certain type 
of social person acting within a specific symbolic community (cf. Cohen 
1985). While a Catalan individual is already a specific type of disciplined 
person, belonging to a certain nationality, a Catalan nationalist takes this 
a step further, engaging with nationalist discourse, attempting to realize 
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it, and to become a Catalanist subject. From this viewpoint, my inform-
ants were actively practising ‘Catalanhood’ through their narratives and 
linguistic practices.
The Catalanist subject, to be understood as a person submitting to 
Catalan nationalist discourse, was not free from evaluation among my in-
formants. Charles Hirschkind has argued that listening to sermon-cassettes 
in Egypt is a complex of social actions, a technology of the self which is 
designed to fashion a moral, Muslim self (2006: 89). Similarly, my inform-
ants would examine themselves and others for the ‘right’ Catalanist virtues, 
comparing, contrasting and ranking. They sought to identify and affirm 
the idealism that is seen as constitutive of a righteous Catalanist, distan-
cing themselves from other, less virtuous political players on the Catalan 
nationalist political scene. By engaging in their discursive cultivation, my 
informants necessarily entered into a struggle about what ‘Catalanism’ even 
means. There was a certain ‘Esquerran way’ of being a Catalan nationalist, 
which was seen as the ‘right one’, and the most virtuous. Distinctions could 
be made between the ways in which one could be Catalanist, which itself 
was stratified according to certain values and virtues. This was obvious 
when the ERC activists talked about another Catalanist party, the centre-
right CiU,5 traditionally the largest party in Catalonia and the one most 
often in government. Writing on Catalan nationalism, John Hargreaves 
has identified pactisme, translatable as contractualism or the will to ne-
gotiate, as a Catalan core value, and one often highlighted as part of the 
Catalan national character (Hargreaves 2000: 20). Interestingly, this was 
decidedly not a virtue for my interlocutors. CiU was looked down upon 
and ridiculed for their indecisiveness and political manoeuvering. On 
one occasion, Ricard emphasized pragmatic, scheming politics as classical 
traits of CiU politics, saying derogatively: ‘Sempre busquen el consens!’ 
[They always seek consensus!]. Emphatically waving his hand back and 
forth, Carles joined in, stating that it was the same with CiU’s stance on 
independence: ‘És com un joc. Sí – no, sí – no, sí – no’ [It’s like a game. 
Yes – no, yes – no, yes – no]. Enric, the group’s nestor, told me how CiU 
were always scheming, trying to gain influence by supporting whatever 




party stood to win the Spanish elections, first keeping PSOE in power 
during their term and now supporting the PP. They only cared for their 
own interests. ERC, on the other hand, was seen as a party that stood by 
their beliefs. My interlocutors praised their idealism as a virtue, differenti-
ating themselves from other, less zealous Catalanists, as when Carles termed 
himself an ‘independentista ideològic’ [ideological independentist] (Carles, 
30 March 2012). For most Catalans, he said, the struggle for independence 
was about pragmatic, political issues and most of all, money.
But a select few Catalanists were idealists. Another activist, Xavi told 
me he did not care much about the potential economic benefits of inde-
pendence. An independent Catalonia would not necessarily be wealthier, 
but it would be more social, more equal: ‘No més riquesa però menys 
pobresa. (El catalanisme és menys com Lega Nord i més com Chiapes)’ 
[Not with more wealth but less poverty. (Catalanism is less like Lega Nord 
and more like Chiapas)] (Xavi, 26 March 2012). He contrasted the purely 
economic right-wing separatism of the Italian Lega Nord with the poor, 
indigenous-rights Marxist movement ELZN in Chiapas, Mexico. Esquerra 
was more a movement than a party: he compared it to Nelson Mandela’s 
anti-apartheid ANC. Such a discursive equation of left-wing policies with 
Catalanism and independence is not rare in Catalonia. Indeed, recent 
statistical data shows us that left-wing ideologies correlate positively with 
support for independence, while conservative ideologies have a negative 
relation to it (Serrano 2013: 538). Xavi’s claim represented an understanding 
of Catalan independence as an inherently left-wing project and related to 
politically progressive, redistributive policy objectives.
Injustice
In my fieldwork, I  was initially surprised by the widespread use of the 
word ‘injustice’ in what I had otherwise considered rather mundane and 
practical political arguments. At an ERC debate meeting, a young man 
named Hugo came up to me and passionately started explaining to me 
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that Catalonia receives 9 per cent less than what they pay in taxes to the 
Spanish government, what he called a ‘dèficit fiscal’ [tax deficit], empha-
sizing multiple times that this was extremely unfair.
Xavi also spoke of this deficit. Referencing Marx’s theory of surplus 
value, he equated the relationship between Catalonia and Spain with that 
of worker and a capitalist intermediary, somebody making a profit although 
having no part in the production (Xavi, 1 June 2012). At other times, Carles, 
Robert, Oriol, Cristian and Mireia all repeated similar statements on unfair 
taxation. There is a potential political paradox in these statements. The 
ERC considers itself a left-wing party and supports internal policies of re-
distribution in Catalonia. The very principle of redistribution is that some 
receive less than what they pay in taxes, but this was considered a prime 
example of the unjust policies of Spain towards Catalonia.
As Serrano has remarked, this perception of ‘unfair treatment by the 
state in political but also fiscal terms’ (2013: 524) has greatly aided social 
mobilization in favour of independence in Catalonia. It is something not 
only visible in the political debate but talked about and felt deeply in the 
daily lives of independence supporters. I would argue that this view of 
Spanish taxation as unfair should not be seen as solely a question of the 
economy but rather as a moral evaluation of the (ideal) relationship be-
tween the two nations. The problem for my informants did not lie in paying 
taxes as a citizen to the state, but about paying taxes as a Catalan to an 
illegitimate Spanish government. Their moral claim was that the ‘good’ 
Catalan life, or the way Catalans ought to live, was a life independent of 
Spain. It was morally right for interlocutors to fight for less taxation in 
spite of their leftist views, because the fight was not really about money and 
sharing their wealth but about ensuring ‘que podem començar a treballar 
per nosaltres mateixos. Els nostres diners pels nostres interessos’ [that we 
can start working for ourselves. Our money for our interests] (Christian, 
7 June 2012). In other words, being free from taxation is linked to a moral 
demand for national self-determination. As an ideology, nationalism iron-
ically transcends national borders. It is the underlying assumption that all 
nations should recognize the morality of nationhood as universal (Billig 
1995: 9). By engaging with this discourse and drawing upon it, my inter-
locutors could shift the discussion upwards, making the paying of taxes a 
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moral rather than a fiscal issue. It discursively transformed the struggle for 
tax benefits to the wealthiest region in Spain into a just fight for freedom 
and autonomy.
The matter of unfair treatment also came up when I spoke to Carles about 
the mutual animosity between Castilians and Catalans. He explained what 
would happen if you spoke Catalan in regions of Spain outside Catalonia:
Si vas a Saragossa avui per exemple, i hi ha un cambrer, això m’ho han explicat, no 
m’ha passat a mi, ‘habláis catalán? No os atiendo’. Sí! Això passa. Digueu les coses pel 
seu nom. Això és racisme. Això es racisme! No es diu mai d’aquesta manera que és 
molt fort, però és un acte de racisme. Si algú hauria dit: no os atiendo porque habláis 
catalan sino no entiendo porque soís negros? Aquest és racisme això. És el mateix. 
Aqui, afortunadament, no passa. Jo no conec ningú que digui ‘ah, parleu castellà? 
No us atenc’. Això no ha passat mai.
[If you go to Saragossa today for example, and there’s a waiter, well, I’ve been told 
this, I haven’t seen it myself, but the waiter goes: ‘Are you guys speaking in Catalan? 
Then I’m not going to take your order.’ Yes! That happens. Call the things by their 
right name, that’s racism. It’s racism! Nobody ever says it in this way because it’s a very 
strong word, but that’s an act of racism. What if someone had said, ‘I won’t take your 
order because you’re black’? That’s racism. It’s the same thing. Here, fortunately, that 
doesn’t happen. I don’t know anybody who’d say, ‘Oh, you speak Castilian? I won’t 
tend to you’. That has never happened.] (Carles, 30 March 2012)
Carles’ statement that this unfair treatment of Catalans is racism show-
cases the clear moral values embedded in the story. First, that Castilians 
discriminate and Catalans do not. A ‘good’ Catalan is to be respectful and 
speak both Catalan and Castilian, but is not met with the same recogni-
tion from Spaniards.6 The Catalan lives the life of a victim, just like the 
black man in a racist environment. In drawing this comparison to what 
is generally considered a universal value, the equal treatment of all skin 
colours, Carles attempts to draw a parallel between his political views of 
Catalan autonomy and moral claims of equal treatment of all ethnicities. 
By referring to other, larger ethical givens, he lends credit to his telling of 
 6 This perspective might be set  alongside the (previously referred to) refusal of 
Catalan nationalists in Barcelona to respond to a waiter in Castilian:  ‘My inter-
locutors, however, as convinced nationalists, would never switch to Spanish when 
out to eat or at a café, even if the waiter did not speak Catalan’.
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the victimized Catalan. Through drawing upon universalist moral claims, 
Carles actively positions himself on the moral high ground, making his 
political views unassailable, righteous and just. He is also able to construct 
a moral schism between Castilian and Catalan behavior in how they sup-
posedly react to difference and diversity and he can point to a separation, 
to independence, as the logical outcome of such differences in moral 
national character. At the same time, my informants had contradictory 
attitudes towards linguistic plurality. Jaume expressed great annoyance 
at Spanish ‘immigrants’ not learning what he considered a minimum of 
Catalan after several months in Catalonia: ‘No em diguis que no saps les 
paraules bàsiques. Despres de 4 mesos, pots dir un “tallat”!’ [Don’t tell 
me you don’t know the most basic words. After four months here, you 
can say a ‘tallat!’ [a type of espresso known as cortado in Castilian]]. This 
was especially true for those working in the service industry, as Jaume 
wanted to order in Catalan, his ‘llengua pròpia’ [own language] ( Jaume 
27 February 2012).
Here, Jaume’s statements belie the otherwise highly praised ideals of 
inclusiveness and tolerance. Catalonia becomes recast as an intrinsically 
national territory with a language and, by extension, a culture one has to 
submit to and accept as one’s own. The way Jaume draws a line between 
his Catalan culture and that of the immigrants essentially constructs a nar-
rative of who rightly belongs and who does not.
Democracy
In highlighting positive aspects of the national character, or tarannà, my 
interlocutors were in a sense talking to me about the morally good Catalan, 
the ideal self according to the discourse of Catalanism. Along with the con-
cept of seny [rationalism, level-headedness], a democratic bent has tradition-
ally been highlighted as a typically Catalan value (Hargreaves 2000:  22; 
Desfor Edles 1999:  321). For my informants as well, democracy was seen 




discussion of what being Catalan ‘really meant’. Democracy as a virtue was 
primarily praised by my interlocutors in relation to the archetypical example 
of poor democratic institutions in Spain. Catalonia had historically had 
democratic institutions, Carles explained, stating that the first parliament 
in Continental Europe was the medieval Catalan institution Les Corts, a 
council of feudal lords who could vote on the king’s policies:
I aquest és un fet diferencial bàsic, que ens diferencia dels castellans. Perquè els 
castellans, històricament, no ho han tingut això. Han tingut el poder absolut. Han 
tingut un rei que regnava amb poder absolut a Castella. I després el rei borbònic. El 
rei borbònic [who came from] França que tenia una reina també absolutista, jacobina. 
Per tant, això, d’alguna manera, això passa de generació en generació, de segle en segle. 
Fixa’t per exemple actualment en el parlament de Catalunya i el parlament d’Espanya. 
La democràcia espanyola és molt pobra. És molt pobra!
[This is a basic difference, that differentiates us from the Castilians. Because the 
Castilians haven’t had this, historically. They had an absolute sovereign. They had 
a king who reigned with absolute power in Castile. And after that, the Bourbons. 
The Bourbon king, [who came from] France, also had an absolutist reign, Jacobite. 
And in some way, this passes from generation to generation, from century to cen-
tury. Look at the current parliament of Catalonia and the parliament of Spain. The 
Spanish democracy is very poor – it’s very poor!] (Carles, 30 March 2012)
Several of my other informants also expressed the view that Catalonia’s 
current multi-party system showcased a more democratic character than 
the Spanish.7 The obvious ethnic implications of a virtue ‘passing from 
generation to generation’ were completely glossed over. I  see these nar-
ratives as attempts to internalize the ideal of a democratic national char-
acter. For example, Carles was highlighting a morally upright value of 
being Catalan and in doing so, presenting the ideal in order to realize it 
and affirm it. Later, he made the link between history, democratic virtues 
and the national, Catalan identity more explicit:
 7 The prime variable seemed to be the number of parties, though Xavi, Cristian, and 
Oriol all told me on other occasions that the UK was so much more democratic 
than Spain, and the UK also has a de facto two-party system. Oriol explained this 
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Un tarannà és un, és el nostre caràcter. La nostra manera de fer. I el nostre tarannà és 
històricament molt més democràtic que els castellans. Però qui governa Espanya, qui 
ha governat històricament Espanya? Els castellans. De manera que ells han pensat 
tota Espanya, han pensat en una Espanya uniforme. I homogènia culturalment. I clar, 
què passa? Que han intentat homogeneïtzar-nos culturalment i lingüísticament. 
Però no han pogut.
[Our tarannà, it’s our character. How we do things. Our way of being, doing things. 
And our tarannà is much more democratic than the Castilian. But who has histor-
ically governed Spain? The Castilians. They’ve thought of all of Spain as a uniform 
Spain. And culturally homogeneous. And of course, what happens? That they’ve 
tried to homogenize us culturally and linguistically. But they haven’t been able to 
do it!] (Carles, 30 March 2012)
Carles was making a case for the moral justification for Catalan inde-
pendence: A people as democratic as the Catalans should not live under 
the yoke of the despotic Spanish. For him, it was quite simply unfair and 
morally wrong that a nondemocratic people such as the Castilians had 
governed Spain, conquered the Catalans and waged a cultural war against 
them over centuries. This again raises his argument from the political to 
the ethical and just, carrying notions of a moral obligation for supporting 
Catalan independence.
My informants regarded the national, Catalan character as especially 
democratic, and their party Esquerra was seen as the apex embodiment 
of this virtue. All political parties have hierarchies, as Mireia told me, but 
Esquerra was the most democratic, because they truly made use of as-
semblies. She went on to state: ‘El meu vot exerceix realment l’exercici 
democràtic amb tota la força. Jo formo part d’aquest grup i puc canviar les 
coses’ [My vote actually performs the exercise of democracy in full force. 
I’m part of this group and I can change things] (Mireia, 24 April 2012). 
This is connected to the self-image my interlocutors had of being idealist 
and Xavi’s earlier statements that ERC was akin to the South African anti-
apartheid movement and the Zapatistas of Chiapas, being a just movement 
with a focus on a long-term goal rather than specific, current political 
issues (Xavi, 26 March 2012). If the Catalan national character embodied 
democracy for my interlocutors, then Esquerra was the embodiment of 
these democratic morals as a party. Through talking about Esquerra and 
their part in it, they were able to themselves appropriate these attractive 
Becoming Catalan 197
virtues, internalizing them. That this virtue was constantly praised served 
to continually remind my interlocutors of it, essentially helping them cul-
tivate themselves as Catalanist subjects. When positioning themselves as 
the heirs to the virtues of the Catalan national character, my informants 
sought to internalize the recognition as a virtuous people that they lacked 
at an official, Spanish, level.
Tolerance and Pacifism
Tolerance, openness and pacifism were another set of related values seen 
as distinctly Catalan, which I  have chosen to conflate into one analyt-
ical category. These virtues appeared most explicitly when my interlocu-
tors spoke of openness and tolerance in regard to ethnic and political 
issues such as immigration and respect for minorities in Catalonia. My 
interlocutors saw themselves as open to cultural and societal differences 
and naturally peaceful by virtue of being Catalans. Jaume, himself a his-
torian, summed up his views on the tolerant nature of the Catalans by 
saying: ‘Catalunya és terra de pas. Sempre ha estat així, des dels romans’ 
[Catalonia is a marchland. It has always been so, since Roman times] 
( Jaume 27 March 2012). Similarly, ERC members spoke of immigration 
as something positive for Catalonia and highlighted the multicultural 
nature of Barcelona, praising how people from all over the world came 
to Catalonia to ‘become Catalans’. They saw newcomers as adding to the 
Catalan nation, rather than taking away from it.
For my interlocutors, the virtue of pacifist tolerance was at once in-
herent in the Catalan character, but also, or perhaps precisely because of this, 
a virtue to strive towards. One of the most salient examples of Catalanist 
tolerance was the stance towards the small Aranese-speaking community of 
Vall d’Aran, or the Aran Valley. This comarca of around 8,000 inhabitants 
in the Pyrenees speak a language related to Gascon and Occitan, which is 
recognized as official in Catalonia. Robert was explicit that in the event of 
Catalan independence, the Aranese would be free to join – or not to: ‘Si un 
dia volen fer l’altre pas, pues [sic] sí’ [If one day they want to take it a step 
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further, well then they’re welcome]. Robert also told me they had indeed 
had discussions within the party about Vall d’Aran, but they concluded in 
agreement: ‘Si volem que Espanya ens respecti a nosaltres, hem de respectar 
la Vall d’Aran’ [If we want Spain to respect us, we have to respect the Aran 
Valley] (Robert 27 April 2012).
The virtue of auto-determination was thus seen as important to my 
interlocutors and something they would uphold in their own state towards 
their own minorities. This implies following the aforementioned univer-
salist claim of nationalism without hypocrisy; what Catalonia morally 
demands for itself, it recognizes as Vall d’Aran’s equally moral claim. For 
my interlocutors, it was seen as only natural, a necessary link between the 
attributed virtues of the national character and Esquerra’s actual politics. 
They equated their own views and lives with the perceived virtues of the 
national character, presenting it in order to inhabit it, to realize it. It was also 
another way of marking the struggle for independence as ethical, because it 
furthered the universality of the nationalist claim, with Esquerra’s recogni-
tion of Vall d’Aran making Spain’s lack of recognition of Catalonia seem an 
even greater ethical deficit. My informants’ attitudes to the Vall d’Aran can 
thus also be seen as a vital component in creating distance between them 
and Spain, as an independent Catalonia would not force anybody into 
sharing a state with them as Spain had done. The tolerance of Vall d’Aran’s 
right, or that of others, to decide for themselves was a concrete expression 
of the virtue of tolerance, as the ideals of the national Catalan character 
were made into actual policy. For my informants, their stance towards Vall 
d’Aran was determined by the tolerance naturally inherent in the national 
character, but this posturing was of course also a gesture of ‘othering’ to-
wards Spain. Elaborating on this theme, Carles said to me: ‘Mai hem votat 
si volem ser espanyols o no. Mai! Per tant considero que la llibertat és el 
valor més alt de qualsevol col.lectiu humà’ [We’ve never voted on whether 
we wanted to be Spaniards or not. Never! That’s why I consider freedom 
the highest value of any human collective] (Empirical log, 27 March 2012).
In the narratives of my interlocutors, then, Catalans had been denied 
the right to decide for themselves – but they in turn were willing to extend 
this right to others, because that was a key part of being virtuous Catalans. 
In the same vein, Oriol explained how an independent Catalonia would 
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treat their large minority of Spanish speakers: ‘Una Catalunya republicana 
no seria contra res. La independència és per a ser més lliures’ [The Catalan 
republic wouldn’t be anti-anything. Independence has to do with being 
more free] (Oriol, 14 June 2012). The virtuous combined trait of tolerance 
and openness was inherent for the Catalans, and in fighting for this polit-
ically they were striving to affirm their practices as reflecting the perceived 
ideal national Catalan character, with ERC policies following naturally 
from the national ethics of Catalonia.
Since the aggressive police actions during the unofficial Catalan 
referendum on independence (1 October 2017), which left over 1,000 
people injured, the issue of violence and pacifism is now at the forefront of 
pro-independence politics in Catalonia. Although this ongoing develop-
ment still lacks rigorous research, the repressive actions of Spain’s central 
government have propelled ERC members to highlight the non-violent 
nature of their protests. The virtue of tolerant pacifism and the rhetoric 
surrounding it is becoming increasingly important as Catalanist polit-
ical activists seek to emphasize differences between Spain and Catalonia, 
and to distance ERC and the pro-independence struggle from violence 
and conflict. The Spanish police response to the referendum has made 
it not only important for ERC members to highlight such differences, 
but also much easier.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to show how political activists from the 
Catalan nationalist party ERC cultivate certain virtues and values as part 
of a national discipline. Through this discipline Catalan nationalism is in-
ternalized as an inner psychological state and an individual understanding 
of a virtuous, valuable self. ERC activists seek to ‘live out’ their Catalan 
nationality through a dialogue with themselves about their selves as polit-
ical activists, as Catalans, and as Catalan nationalists. Ricoeur has argued 
that through telling a certain story we also tell a story of ourselves, that 
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we construct an identity through narration: ‘It is the identity of the story 
which makes the identity of the character’ (Ricoeur 1995:  147). For my 
interlocutors, their narratives were essential to building Catalan selves and 
affirming the virtues important for a political Catalanist activist. The pres-
entation of ideal characteristics becomes a way of constituting a Catalan 
subject, taking care of oneself and embodying the recognition one other-
wise lacks. This embodiment is an important part of the construction of 
self, as our dispositions are formed through an identification with and in-
ternalization of certain values, norms, and ideals (Schofer 2005: 276).
This continuous cultivation of Catalanist subjects among ERC activ-
ists can only be understood in the light of their current political circum-
stances. My informants felt deeply Catalan, spoke only Catalan, moved in 
circles with people sharing their pro-independence views, and referred to 
Catalonia as a country. The Spanish passport my informants held did not 
correspond to their views of themselves as Catalans, and they felt deeply 
disenfranchised and alienated from the state of Spain. Through cultivating 
Catalanist dispositions, they were able to become the type of person they 
wanted to be, and secure internal recognition of their nationality, even if 
external recognition was unattainable.
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Carles Jovaní Gil
Russian Geopolitical Thinking and the Ukrainian 
Crisis: Neo-Imperialist Aspirations or Merely a 
Survival Strategy?
abstract
The Ukrainian crisis marked the end of a post-Cold War order based on restraint and 
respect for the territorial sovereignty of the republics that emerged from the ashes of the 
Soviet Union. It represented a qualitative leap in Russia’s approach to its ‘near abroad’ as 
Moscow articulated a discourse combining elements of nationalist rhetoric with a strong 
geopolitical rationale which set a dangerous precedent for external interference that has 
tested the responsiveness of the international community. The chapter explores the origins 
of Russian nationalism, its influence on foreign policy and the strategy underpinning its 
approach to the conflict in Crimea and the Donbas. It concludes that the Kremlin im-
plemented a non-arbitrary policy of expansionism rooted in a feeling of ‘geographical 
insecurity’. The intervention in Ukraine has opened a Pandora’s Box that leads the region 
to a future fraught with uncertainty, not least in terms of nationality and identity politics.
The Ukrainian Republic offers intriguing, and in many ways unique, 
opportunities to explore how political pragmatism both moulds and 
emerges from evolving concepts of nationhood and national identity. 
Within the very uncertain bounds of almost unparalleled multi-ethnic 
population shifts throughout history, as well as ancestral and pre-Soviet 
and post-Soviet Russian hegemony, Ukraine has once again been a 
victim of its own singularities:  these include a strategic geographical 
location, conflicting historical narratives, weak state structures and 
socio-political contradictions (Riu 2014). The difficulty of defining, 
let  alone establishing, the kind of coherent sense of nationhood re-
quired by any state is amply illustrated by the considerations explored 
in this account.
The episodes of instability that have affected part of the Ukrainian 
territory since the end of 2013 follow a similar script to events that occurred 
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in other areas of the former Soviet Union such as Transnistria, Abkhazia 
or South Ossetia. In all of them, Moscow fanned ethnic tensions and then 
applied force at a moment of political uncertainty. By doing so, it was able 
to achieve territorial changes and retain considerable power in its geopol-
itical glacis. However, the uniqueness of the Ukrainian case obliges us to 
avoid making simplifications or seeing events as little more than a repetition 
of such instances. The annexation of Crimea exceeded the traditional ap-
proach of Russia to its ‘near abroad’, representing an unprecedented event 
in the post-Cold War order. Additionally, it can be argued that Moscow 
consciously articulated a discourse combining a geopolitical rationale with 
elements of the nationalist rhetoric.
The Origins of Russian Nationalism and Its Influence on the 
Formulation of Foreign Policy
The Russian nationalist creed has evolved over time and now holds a cen-
tral position in current Russian geopolitical thought. Since its origins in the 
mid-nineteenth century, this ideology has gradually permeated all layers of 
society and is at present a virtually all-embracing presence in post-Soviet of-
ficial rhetoric. The most successful of the many expressions of this concept 
is neo-Eurasianism, which lacks a unified programme but encompasses the 
old territorial aspirations of the Russian people on the Eurasian continent, 
an ethereal space whose central area is homologous to Mackinder’s (1919) 
Heartland. Neo-Eurasianists aim to regain regional leadership in order to 
restore lost great-power status. They represent an amalgam of geopolitical 
ideas ranging from the restoration of the Soviet Union or the establishment 
of a continental empire, to the strengthening of economic ties inside the 
former Soviet space or the use of political coercion within that area.
The years that followed the demise of the Soviet Union saw the emergence 
of various schools of thought that attempted to define Eurasia and determine the 
main regional objectives of Moscow. Contrary to what was predicted by some 
politicians and academics, Russia wanted to maintain its political, economic 
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and cultural presence in this space, and most of its elites were convinced that 
the newly created state would be unable to cope with its most pressing internal 
challenges without first responding to those emanating from its traditional 
area of influence. In the light of the post-Cold War, no political party with 
parliamentary representation fully embraces the more aggressive neo-Eurasian 
approaches, although such thinking has permeated – to a greater or lesser 
extent – all the political groups represented in the Duma. This ‘ideological 
entryism’ extends beyond state bodies and the political sphere in its narrow 
sense, and touches intellectuals, academia, the world of culture as well as an 
important part of the Russian society. The diversity and polymorphism of this 
doctrine led Tsygankov (2003) to divide its many manifestations into four 
groups: geoeconomists; civilizationists; expansionists; stabilizers.
Geoeconomists give prominence to geoeconomic over geopolitical 
factors, and state that the main security objective must be economic pros-
perity and the social development of the state. Achieving this scenario of 
stability would require implementing economic macro-projects fostered by 
enormous public and private partnerships comprising Western and Asian 
players. For their part, civilizationists are associated with neo-Soviets or 
Eurasian communists, and look back nostalgically to a glorious past in 
which a proud Russian people enjoyed international respect. Meanwhile, 
revolutionary expansionists call for a conservative revolution and territorial 
expansion to guarantee state security. Finally, stabilizers or democratic 
statists combine democratic Western liberalism with a Russian autocratic 
neo-nationalist substratum. In this latter worldview, Russia is conceived 
as a Eurasian civilization that is not necessarily anti-Western. They advo-
cate a model of state based on strong institutions and the maintenance of 
internal social and political order (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010: 669), 
as well as a pragmatic foreign policy to deal with the multipolar reality of 
the post-Cold War order. Stabilizers accept that Russia no longer has the 
superpower status that the Soviet Union once held, but they advocate oc-
casional intervention in the ex-Soviet space to protect national interests; 
this has led some authors to speak of a new ‘Monroesky Doctrine’. This 
current of thought was dominant for most of Boris Yeltsin’s mandate and 
during the first two terms of his successor, Vladimir Putin (Tsygankov 
2003: 117–20). However, Putin’s return to the presidency on 4 March 2012 
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meant a gradual abandonment of the previous pragmatism in favour of a 
more vivid desire to consolidate Russia as a hegemon in the former Soviet 
space. The events in Ukraine led many observers to conclude that Russia’s 
foreign policy had undergone a ‘paradigm shift’ driven by ethno-nationalist 
ideas. Nevertheless, as Tsygankov (2015: 279) has pointed out, Moscow’s 
actions ‘constituted a major escalation’ encompassing ‘both change and 
continuity in Russia’s foreign policy’. Thus, it would be more appropriate to 
characterize the present-day attitude of the Kremlin towards its traditional 
sphere of influence as that of an ‘assertive stabilizer’ rather than simply of 
an ultra-nationalist expansionist.
Events in Ukraine offer a clear example of this approach to its trad-
itional sphere of influence. In Russian nationalist imagery, Ukraine is known 
as ‘Little Russia’ and represents the cultural and ancestral heart of an an-
cient Slavic culture. Indeed, the ethnic group that founded the Duchy of 
Moscow and the Russian Empire traces its origins to a political commu-
nity founded in the Kievan Rus. Leaving aside the question of identity, 
the geostrategic value of Ukraine was highlighted by Halford Mackinder 
(1919: 194) when he included the country in the western foothills of his 
Heartland. After the Soviet disintegration, the American political scientist 
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997: 41) described Ukraine as a ‘geopolitical pivot’, 
that is, one of those states ‘whose importance is derived not from their 
power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the 
consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behaviour 
of geostrategic players’. For his part, Wilson (2000: 292) has certified the 
pre-eminence of Ukraine on the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard, as its 
choice between integration in Europe or a rapprochement towards Russia 
could be crucial for the continental balance of power.
The Outbreak and Handling of the Conflict in Crimea and 
the Donbas
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed the transfer of Crimea from 
the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR on 19 February 1954, a decision 
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which then had little significance from an administrative point of view. 
The authorities justified the measure as a commemoration of the 300th 
anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, although the text of 
that document did not refer to the status of the peninsula, which did not 
fall under the power of the Tsar until 130 years later. The real motive of 
the Soviet nomenklatura was probably to fortify its control of Ukraine by 
adding 860,000 ethnic Russians to its population. In addition, by trans-
ferring the Crimea, Nikita Khrushchev won the support needed to make 
the party Secretariat the leading position within the Soviet hierarchy 
(Kramer 2014).
The anomaly of Ukrainian control of the Crimean Peninsula would 
become evident in the final days of the USSR, when minorities such as 
the Tatars showed an obstinate opposition to Ukrainian secession because 
they believed that the old Soviet structure protected their rights against 
the assimilationist policies of Kiev. Although the majority of the Crimean 
population voted in favour of independence in the referendum held in 
December 1991, the level of support at 54 per cent was significantly lower 
than in most continental regions of Ukraine (Mankoff 2014). In another 
much-disputed plebiscite in January 1991, which was boycotted by pro-
Ukrainian groups, the vast majority of Crimeans supported the creation of 
an autonomous republic within the future Ukrainian state. This demand 
was eventually granted by the authorities in Kiev and then recognized 
in Chapter 10 of the new Ukrainian Constitution (Hansen 2015: 143). 
However, aspirations for sovereignty in the newly created autonomous 
republic remained unsatisfied. In May 1992, the Crimean Parliament 
passed a declaration of sovereignty that forced the Ukrainian govern-
ment to ease tensions by agreeing a formal division of powers between 
the governments of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea (Karagiannis 
2014: 407). The treaties creating the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) as well as the Treaty of Friendship and the Treaty of Partition1 
in 1997 finally guaranteed Ukrainian sovereignty over the peninsula by 
 1 The treaty stipulated that Moscow would receive 81.7 per cent of the Soviet fleet 
and could continue to base it in the peninsula until 2017.
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recognizing the territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of 
its borders.
As the Russian political crisis grew worse in 2013, Vladimir Putin 
intensified efforts to establish an area of influence that went beyond pol-
itics and economics and included legislation and symbolism. The Russian 
president urged his neighbours to choose integration centred either on 
Brussels or on Moscow (Allison 2014: 1256). Viktor Yanukovych responded 
to Putin’s request on 21 November 2013 by announcing the suspension 
of negotiations for an Association Agreement with the European Union. 
In the same vein, an intention to strengthen relations with the Russian 
Federation and its Customs Union was also announced (Karagiannis 
2014: 407). With regard to other multilateral initiatives sponsored by 
the Kremlin in the former Soviet space, most of them have had modest 
results due to the loss of ideological attractiveness, progressive incompati-
bility of interests, chronic underinvestment and, ultimately, the lack of 
political will of new national elites who have devoted their main efforts 
to consolidating their own niches of power. The entry into force of the 
Eurasian Economic Union in early 2015 raises doubts about its actual 
political scope and capacities ( Jovaní 2015), given the manifest failure of 
initiatives such as the CIS.
The suspension of negotiations for the Association Agreement trig-
gered in November 2013 a wave of protests in Kiev’s Independence Square 
which soon grew into a popular outcry against corruption, misgovern-
ment, economic stagnation and authoritarian practices. Unlike the Orange 
Revolution, which was better planned, the Euromaidan movement was a 
spontaneous manifestation of a subculture of European values and showed 
a high level of support among broad sectors of Ukrainian society (Saryusz-
Wolski 2014: 13). A harsh government crackdown by the paramilitary police 
(known as the berkut) on a few hundred students who initially gathered 
in downtown Kiev prompted millions of Ukrainians to take to the streets 
in major cities. This fact represented a qualitative and quantitative change, 
since the eminently liberal and pro-European nature of the initial protesters 
was partially displaced by a clearer nationalist discourse and the increasing 
prominence of extremist parties such as Svoboda or Right Sector. Such an 
opportunity would be seized by the Russian media to portray the alleged 
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non-democratic nature of the new authorities and its subordination to 
fascism (Goode 2014).
The protests peaked between 18 and 20 February 2014, when dozens 
of protesters were killed and hundreds more wounded. An agreement 
was signed by the Ukrainian president on 21 February to form a national 
unity government, hold new elections and restore the 2004 constitution. 
Nevertheless, his subsequent disappearance led Parliament to depose 
him without fulfilling all the constitutional requirements (Mearsheimer 
2014b: 176). Meanwhile, thousands of pro-Russian citizens were demon-
strating in Donetsk, Kharkov, Odessa and other Ukrainian cities, shaping 
‘a unique theatre for Russian nationalism’ that amalgamated neo-Soviet, 
Orthodox and fascist narratives. In Crimea, dozens of armed men took 
control of key government buildings (Laruelle 2016: 70). Although the 
Kremlin initially denied that these ‘little green men’ (as they became 
known) were Russian soldiers, there was speculation by such specialists in 
military affairs as Igor Sutyagin about the involvement of units of the 3rd 
Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, the Black Sea Fleet and the Rapid Reaction Force, 
as well as about private security companies and units from the Caucasus 
(Karagiannis 2014: 408–9).
In response to a call from Putin (2014a), the Council of the Russian 
Federation agreed on 1 March 2014 to authorize sending troops to Ukraine 
‘to contribute to the normalisation of the social and political situation in 
the country’. After the unanimous support of the upper chamber, the fed-
eral army officially took control of critical infrastructure on the peninsula 
(Hansen 2015: 141). On 4 March, the Russian president gave initial explan-
ations about the supposed legitimacy of the intervention in Crimea. His 
argument was based on four points: the unconstitutional overthrow of 
Yanukovich; a distress call received from deposed Ukrainian authorities; 
the vulnerability of Russian ‘compatriots’ (sootechestvenniki); and the po-
tential threat to the naval base at Sevastopol. This series of – mostly weak 
– arguments was intended to mobilize domestic public opinion around a 
presidential figure and limit any punitive response from the West.
On 11 March 2014 the Crimean Parliament finally approved a declar-
ation of independence. Five days later, and in flagrant violation of the 1994 
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and many other fundamental 
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provisions of international law,2 a plebiscite was held without independent 
international observers and exclusively supervised by members of the Russian 
security forces (Gedmin 2014: 8–9). The outcome of the vote, which was boy-
cotted by Tatars and Ukrainian nationalists, gave an overwhelming victory 
to supporters of reintegration in the Russian Federation. On 17 March the 
Russian president finally signed a decree recognizing Crimea as a sovereign 
state, its annexation being formalized the following day. Putin declared after 
signing the treaty: ‘They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because 
we maintain an independent position, because we call things by their names, 
and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything’ (2014c). After 
approval from the Constitutional Court and ratification by the Federation 
Council, Crimea was incorporated on 21 March 2014. Shortly afterwards, on 
12 May 2014, pro-Russian activists held two referendums, plagued by irregu-
larities, on the eastern flank of Ukraine and proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk 
People’s Republics. Both entities should ultimately unite into Novorossiya, a 
proposed confederation that ‘rests on its dual meaning in announcing the 
birth of a New Russia geographically and metaphorically’, and that would 
result in being ‘an anticipation of Russia’s own transformation’ (Laruelle 2014).
The Geopolitical Substratum of Nationalist Rhetoric
In Ukraine the Kremlin used a combination of hard and soft power in-
tended to deflect criticism by international institutions such as NATO or 
 2 From a legal point of view, and at a minimum, the annexation of Crimea breached: Article 
2.4 (Chapter 1) of the UN Charter; UN Resolution 2625 (XXV, 24 October 1970), 
which regulates the legal principles regarding friendly relations and co-operation be-
tween states; UN Resolution 3314 (XXIX, 14  December  1973), which defines the 
concept of ‘aggression’; the Helsinki Final Act; Council of Europe Resolutions 1990 
(2014) and 2034 (2014); the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and 
Ukraine (1997); the military agreement between Russia and Ukraine (1997); the bilat-
eral agreement on frontiers (2003); the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the 
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the European Union (The Economist, 2015). The first and most obvious 
tactical novelty in this ‘hybrid intervention’ was the use of covert oper-
ations. Although there was no declaration of war, unidentified gunmen 
took control of key parts of the peninsula and Ukrainian critical facil-
ities. In the first weeks the emphasis was on the use of military intelli-
gence, the distribution of arms and the infiltration of small groups of men 
from Russia. Moscow gradually transferred power to its marines, airborne 
troops and special forces. The level of violence was carefully controlled so 
as to blame Ukraine for a hypothetical escalation of hostilities. Although 
military power was crucial,3 Russia also used an intense campaign of dip-
lomatic, economic and media pressure aimed at legitimizing its action, 
isolating Kiev, and empowering local insurgents (Allison 2014: 1258).
Moscow took advantage of the collapse of the 21 February agreement, 
which it had not signed, to accuse the United States and other countries 
of being behind the overthrow of the Ukrainian president. In addition to 
failing to provide evidence of human rights violations against its nationals 
or Russian-speakers in Ukraine, the Kremlin made no real effort to dem-
onstrate that its actions were necessary or proportional. Putin argued that 
Russian forces in Crimea, as well as the Black Sea Fleet, were under threat 
and this justified self-defence on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
Moscow also argued that it faced a potential wave of refugees like that which 
occurred following the Balkan and Libya crises, and that Article 61 (2) of 
the federal constitution obliged Russia to assist its citizens living abroad. 
While it is true that deposed Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and 
the prime minister of the Republic of Crimea requested military help from 
Moscow, the Ukrainian constitution states that only the Rada can approve 
the presence of foreign forces (Allison 2014: 1261–4). Therefore, it can 
be argued that although the majority of the population of the peninsula 
probably approved of Russia’s actions, the regional institutions lacked the 
sovereign authority to accept foreign intervention.
 3 Ukrainian intelligence estimated that by mid-2015 some 9,000 Russian soldiers 
were deployed in the oblasts of Lugansk and Donetsk, and another 50,000 were on 
the other side of the frontier. The Kremlin and various anti-Western media groups, 
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Even though self-determination is not prohibited by international 
law, there is a presumption against its application without agreement in 
the absence of exceptional circumstances (Wilson 2015). The so-called 
‘saving clause’ of the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations4 provides that ‘[n] othing in the foregoing 
paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integ-
rity or political unity of sovereign and independent States’ (United Nations 
General Assembly 1970). Nevertheless, the statement itself provides for 
the right to secede for national groups not under the authority of ‘a gov-
ernment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour’ (ibid.), and this is a situation that 
might apply in Crimea. Be that as it may, the International Court of Justice 
stated in its judgement in the case of Kosovo (22 July 2010) that the right 
to self-determination does not apply when declarations of independence 
are accompanied by threats or the use of force, which would seem proven 
in this case.
The annexation of Crimea and seizure of its assets had an undeniable 
symbolic value for the Kremlin. Putin (2014c) claimed that the action 
was a ‘restoration of historical justice’ following ‘a clear violation of con-
stitutional norms’ during the Soviet era. The Russian leader even resorted 
to identity rhetoric to describe Russians as ‘one of the largest, if not the 
largest, divided nation in the world’ (Putin 2014c), depicting Ukraine as a 
nationalizing state trying to assimilate their compatriots. However, the fact 
that support for ethnic Russian communities in other parts of the former 
Soviet Union has been rather low-key shows that these descriptions were 
used to justify purely geopolitical objectives. While patriotism has been 
ubiquitous in Putin’s discourse, he has also warned repeatedly of the dan-
gers of ethnic-based nationalism both for social cohesion and for Russia’s 
statehood. Moreover, the relationship of the Kremlin with the leaders of 
the self-proclaimed republics in Eastern Ukraine has not always been easy, 
 4 Full title: The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
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and his reputed leniency has been questioned by numerous factions of the 
Russian far right (Chaisty and Whitefield 2015).
The collapse of the 21 February agreement was interpreted by Moscow 
as irrefutable proof that Western powers had backed the establishment of a 
puppet government in Kiev that would push for NATO membership. During 
a press conference in early March, Putin said that Western powers ‘supported 
an unconstitutional seizure of power, declared the government legitimate and 
are supporting that government’ (Saryusz-Wolski 2014: 15). This belief was 
not entirely unfounded, because American diplomacy supported opposition 
to Yanukovych and helped fund support through the National Endowment 
for Democracy. Personalities such as the former US presidential candidate 
John McCain took part in anti-government demonstrations, and the then US 
ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, even called the fall of the Ukrainian 
president ‘an event for history’ (Mearsheimer 2014a). The interim govern-
ment led by Oleksandr Turchynov also presented to the Rada secretariat on 
5 March a draft bill reiterating the objective of joining NATO, and the latter 
had repeatedly expressed its willingness to extend membership to Georgia 
and Ukraine after the Bucharest summit in April 2008.
The new Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, ended the non-
alignment policy proposed by Viktor Yanukovych when he stated in August 
2014 his intention to continue advancing towards NATO membership. 
The speed of the Russian response was not a surprise. A revision of mili-
tary doctrine in December 2014 identified the strengthening of offensive 
NATO capabilities on Russia’s borders as a major threat (Putin 2014b). In 
June 2014 Poroshenko had signed the controversial Association Agreement 
with the European Union, a text that in addition to commercial agree-
ments, proposed ‘gradual convergence on foreign and security matters with 
the aim of Ukraine’s ever-deeper involvement in the European security 
area’ and called for ‘taking full and timely advantage of all diplomatic and 
military channels between the parties’ (Mearsheimer 2014b: 175). The 
Ukrainian president also stated that ‘in five years [they] will have applied 
the Association Agreement and achieved all the conditions for applying 
to join the EU’ (Abellán 2015).
At the national level, Russia has pushed from the beginning for a decen-
tralization of the Ukrainian state that would give the eastern and southern 
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regions a greater degree of self-government. This would in practice mean the 
formation of small protectorates linked to Moscow that would guarantee 
Russian influence on the Petro Poroshenko administration. Among the main 
demands of the Kremlin government was a commitment to respect the inter-
national neutrality of the country, as well as for equal rights for all citizens 
regardless of ethnic affiliation (Wade 2015). Achieving the first goal would 
mean limiting the eastward expansion of NATO and increasing the chances of 
success for the Eurasian Economic Union. After all, Ukraine has an economy 
that is more powerful and dynamic than other partners such as small and weak 
Belarus. However, the Ukrainian industrial sector suffers serious problems and 
requires considerable investment after years of crisis (Yann 2014: 9). For that 
reason, a hypothetical incorporation into the Russian Federation of the oblasts 
of Donetsk and Lugansk would also be unprofitable from a cost-benefit logic 
and could ultimately prove a major source of political tension.
Interventionism as a Survival Strategy?
By initiating an episode of unrest in Ukraine, the Kremlin intended to 
consolidate the Eurasian bloc as both a geopolitical and a cultural alter-
native to the West (Mankoff 2014), and its attitude in the management of 
the crisis can be seen from two diverging theoretical approaches.
The first proposes a sinister scenario in which Moscow embraced the 
most aggressive thesis of neo-Eurasianism in order to push the borders of 
the Russian Federation further west. The event that supposedly justified 
this action was the entry into the Ukrainian interim government of right-
wing factions which called for the abolition of linguistic rights enjoyed by 
the Russian-speaking minority.5 Bermejo reminds us that ‘the protection 
 5 It is worthwhile pointing out that although the Supreme Rada voted to abolish the 
State Linguistic Policy Act of 2012 (which authorized the use of languages other 
than Ukrainian in regions where more than 10 per cent of the inhabitants spoke 





Russian Geopolitical Thinking and the Ukrainian Crisis 215
of nationals abroad is an internationally recognized practice under certain 
circumstances’ and so Russia could be expected to take action if these cir-
cumstances were to arise (Bermejo 2014: 310). However, unlike other cases 
such as the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia in 2008, Ukraine 
did not undertake actions against the physical integrity of civilians in 
Crimea and other regions with Russian-speaking majorities. Moreover, 
votes from these territories were crucial for the victory of the pro-Russian 
Viktor Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential election. With a Russian-
speaking community of around 30 per cent of the population, Moscow 
was assured of the co-operation of Kiev on economic and security issues. 
Therefore, under this logic, winning Crimea by losing Ukraine would not 
seem a rational decision (Charap and Darden 2014: 10).
The second approach, shared in this study, sees the strategic move 
of Russia as a reactive effort to avoid what the Kremlin leadership views 
as a direct threat to the national interests of the Federation (Charap and 
Darden 2014: 10). To understand this position, it is necessary to analyse 
the root causes of the conflict, which means going back long before the 
events of November 2013 and focusing on relations between Russia and 
the United States. The events that led to the 2014 annexation of Crimea 
by the Russian Federation predated the Euromaidan protests and the de-
bates about the Ukrainian rapprochement to the European Union, and 
preceded participation in the Eurasian Economic Union or even the schism 
between Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovich. The root causes stem 
from the early 1990s, when President George Bush and Secretary of State 
James Baker promised Gorbachev that NATO would not expand eastward 
(Kotkin 2014).
Supporters of a pro-Western orientation for Kiev, such as the American 
diplomat George Kennan and liberal sectors of the political class in Moscow, 
warned at the time that an anti-Russian stance would generate hostility 
in Moscow and be counterproductive to the shared interest of stability. 
However, successive American administrations ignored this premise and 
chose to implement a policy of faits accomplis to gradually win ground in 
regions traditionally influenced by Russia. The United States sponsored 
the eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO, approved 
the deployment of Western troops in former Soviet republics, launched 
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controversial military campaigns against traditional Russian allies such as 
Serbia, Iraq and Libya, and supported the so-called ‘colour revolutions’. 
Similarly, Washington was indifferent to the marginalization of Russian-
speaking minorities in the Baltic countries, supported the unilateral dec-
laration of independence of Kosovo, deplored Russia’s recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and did not condemn involvement by pro-
fascist groups in the overthrow of the Ukrainian government in February 
2014 (Lukin 2014).
The attitude of the West gave rise to the empowerment of those in 
Moscow who openly rejected assimilation and advocated a return to a 
great power status in a multipolar world. As a result, events may lead us 
to think that Russia wanted to recover its former area of influence in a 
new ‘zero-sum’ ideological war in which Ukraine would be a domino 
that followed Georgia. However, a more balanced evaluation of the facts 
tells us that Moscow implemented a policy of ‘defensive expansionism’ 
rather than arbitrary expansionism (Kotkin 2014). This stance, rooted in 
a declining imperial idea marked by a sense of inferiority and ‘geograph-
ical insecurity’, has been instrumental in justifying the Kremlin’s action in 
Ukraine (Kaplan 2014), a red line because of its location as a geopolitical 
‘bridgehead’ (Brzezinski 1997: 57) on the European side of the Heartland, 
its sentimental value along the dividing line between Western and Orthodox 
civilizations (Huntington 1993) and the threat it could represent to the 
internal stability of Russia.
Final Remarks: The Return of Greater Russia or Putin’s Flight 
to Nowhere?
The Ukrainian crisis has marked the end of a post-Cold War order based 
on restraint and respect for the territorial sovereignty of the republics that 
emerged from the ashes of the former Soviet Union. It has also set a dan-
gerous precedent for external interference that will test the responsiveness 
of the international community. According to Shevtsova, the annexation 
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of Crimea and the division of Ukraine are not ends in themselves, but 
the means of a doctrine based on reasserting Russia’s geopolitical interests 
and civilizational mission both in its neighbourhood and internation-
ally (Shevtsova 2014: 96). This series of events marks the end of a period 
of relatively stable relations between Moscow and the West, and signals 
Putin’s determination to overcome American unilateralism. This was evi-
dent in the annual address to the Duma in December 2014, when the 
Russian president presented a medium-term external strategy aimed at 
challenging the West and diversifying ties with other government actors 
in Asia (Putin 2014d). In other words, the illusion of a ‘Greater Europe’ 
from Dublin to Vladivostok was buried in favour of a ‘Greater Asia’ 
from Shanghai to Saint Petersburg. This made it even more difficult for 
Washington and Brussels to reconcile efficient sanctions against Moscow 
with its inescapable interests in energy, trade, anti-terrorism and stra-
tegical and nuclear security issues (Nye 2014a).
The Russian authorities also used the campaign in Ukraine to dis-
courage internal displays of social solidarity and avoid direct threats to 
the hyper-presidential national regime. As a result of the management of 
hostilities by the Kremlin, Putin’s popularity climbed to 87 per cent in 
August 2014. Although this would seem to indicate a strengthening of his 
internal position, Nye points out that his victory may not be so apparent in 
the long-term (Nye 2014b). Moscow may have achieved the most urgent 
objective of stopping the advance of Western political structures on its 
western borders, but its actions have helped create a more pro-Western 
identity among Ukrainians. In addition, the crisis weakened the Russian 
economy, undermined its international reputation and ended any pos-
sibility of including Ukraine in projects such as the Eurasian Economic 
Union (McFaul 2014: 170).
Tensions can be seen in Russian society as a consequence of economic 
policies designed for an exterior agenda and increasingly distant from the 
real needs of the people. Moscow’s main weaknesses include both its in-
ability to reform a state-controlled economy that is uncompetitive and too 
dependent on the energy sector, and an excessive tendency to isolationism 
and non-participation in the global economy (Trenin 2009: 64). The GDP 
of Russia is barely one-twelfth of the GDP of the United States; oil and gas 
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account for two-thirds of national income; and the rouble has experienced 
high volatility in the past few years. Fluctuations in oil prices combined with 
political and economic sanctions have damaged state finances, but the struc-
tural weaknesses of Russia exceed any single event (Claudín and de Pedro 
2014). To the difficulties associated with its relatively modest economic 
potential, one must add a dependency on raw materials, technological back-
wardness, lack of investment in basic social services, a demographic crisis, 
underlying ethnic tensions, widespread corruption, political scandals and 
grossly megalomaniac projects such as the 2014 Olympic Winter Games 
or the 2018 Football World Cup (Nye 2014a). Putin’s regime still has the 
resources for survival, but attempts to tackle new challenges by resorting 
to old methods will prove inefficient in the long run. It remains to be seen 
whether a new generation of Russians which demands higher standards 
of living and greater respect for basic freedoms will be willing to repeat 
the sacrifices of the past.
Implementation of most of the points included in the Minsk-II 
agreement, signed in the Belarusian capital in February 2015, has proved 
impossible in the short term. Putin achieved his minimum objective of 
preventing the removal of pro-Russian rebels from the Donbas basin, 
and it cannot be excluded that the model of neighbouring Transnistria 
may be repeated. Although the Russian president has reaffirmed a com-
mitment to maintaining Ukrainian sovereignty in the disputed area, this 
should not be interpreted as a curtailment of ambitions, but rather as 
an affirmation of the will to continue weakening Kiev diplomatically. 
Indeed, Moscow’s proposed constitutional reform for Ukraine along 
federal lines would simply certify by legal means the division of the 
country (Trenin 2015).
Despite the relative return to normality in most areas of the country 
after the presidential elections of May 2014, the situation in eastern Ukraine 
remains highly volatile and could become worse. On 1 July 2018, the latest 
‘comprehensive and indefinite ceasefire regime’ since the start of the con-
flict went into effect, although once again it did not hold. With the active 
armed conflict entering its fifth year, the civilian death toll already stood at 
about 3,000 people in May 2018, while over 9,000 were injured and more 
than 2 million had had to leave their homes in the same period (Office of 
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the United Nations High Commissioner 2016). The deadlock reflects a lack 
of will by the contenders to reach an agreement, and everything points to 
the probability that it will be years before complete stability returns to the 
region. In any case, Kiev is unlikely to regain full control of the Donbas 
basin (Trenin 2014: 15).
For its part, the Crimean Peninsula is now integrated into the Russian 
Federation and everything seems to indicate a continuous strengthening 
of political ties. Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House in January 
2017 opened a chapter of relations with Moscow vitiated by inconsist-
ency. On the one hand, they have been affected by, among other factors, 
the divergent positions on Syria’s civil war, the exchange of diplomatic 
sanctions and the deployment of US troops in Poland. On the other hand, 
the US president has been systematically accused of being a tool for the 
Russians. In June 2018, he called for Russia to be readmitted to the G–7. 
One month later, on 16 July 2018, Trump’s public statements during his 
first formal meeting with Putin in Helsinki caused a huge stir. In addition, 
he has been deliberately ambiguous about the annexation of Crimea by the 
Russian Federation. In regard to the position of the European Union, des-
pite the application of a visa-free travel regime for Ukrainian citizens since 
11 June 2017 and the entry into force of the EU–Ukrainian Association 
Agreement on 1 September 2017, the crisis in which it finds itself does not 
seem to point to a greater commitment to let Kiev off the hook. Quite 
the contrary, the shock wave sent by ‘Brexit’ has served to dash hopes for 
a future EU membership.
Meanwhile, since Vladimir Putin’s re-election in 2018, all the signs 
are that Russia will continue to pursue an assertive policy in its ‘near 
abroad’ aimed at taking advantage of any opportunity that may arise. 
However, since a model based on ‘growth without development, capit-
alism without democracy and great-power policies without international 
appeal […] cannot last forever’ (Trenin 2009: 64), a marked weakening 
in Moscow’s capacity for action abroad must not be excluded in the 
medium term. Regardless of the speed of developments, Putin has al-
ready become ‘a hostage to his own logic’ (Shevtsova 2014: 102), with his 
intervention in Ukraine opening a Pandora’s box that leads the region 
to a future fraught with uncertainty.
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Daniel Purcell
Contested Unionism along the Irish Border at the 
Time of Partition
abstract
Histories of Irish partition and discussions of the Irish border portray the six-county 
settlement as the most ‘natural’ division of the island, creating a false impression of a 
cohesive Ulster Protestant national group with clearly defined territorial claims. This 
chapter focuses on two peripheral Protestant Unionist communities for whom the parti-
tion of Ireland represented a time of particular crisis: those outside the Northern state in 
Cavan and Monaghan, who felt a keen sense of betrayal at the partition settlement, and 
the Unionists of Fermanagh, who were intensely aware of the precariousness of their situ-
ation, being in the most Catholic county in Northern Ireland. These two communities, 
bordering one another and with strong social connections, developed strikingly different 
articulations of what it meant to be an Ulster Protestant. Their experiences illustrate the 
ambiguities of the Irish partition settlement and the way in which national identities were 
fundamentally altered by it.
Brexit has drawn the focus of EU member states to the Irish border 
and exposed a lack of awareness of this reality in the rest of the UK, 
including at senior ministerial level. In order to understand the true 
significance of the border this chapter returns to the origins of the 
divide as viewed through the experience of the Unionist community. 
While the history of Irish nationalism is comparatively well known 
internationally, the Unionist community considers itself to be margin-
alized, overlooked and misunderstood. Drawing on important archival 
sources, this chapter aims to shed light on the self-understanding of the 
Unionist population and the challenges it faced at the time of partition.
Ulster Unionism is, at its core, an Ulster nationalism. While this con-
tention has been rendered problematic by the specific connotations asso-
ciated with the term in Ireland, and in Ulster particularly, the fact remains 




demarcate an area of Ulster Unionist dominance in accordance with the 
Ulster identity put forward by the Unionist community. The establishment 
of a six-county Northern Ireland, moving away from older definitions of a 
nine-county Ulster, therefore required a reconceptualization not only of 
where Ulster lay but also what it meant to belong to it.1
In May 1920, following years of tension between the two dominant 
and opposing groups in Ireland – the mainly Catholic Nationalists and the 
mostly Protestant Unionists – the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) voted 
to accept the principles of Irish partition as set out in the Government of 
Ireland Bill (later Act) of 1920. The point of tension was the political future 
of Ireland: Nationalists who had initially favoured devolved government 
(Home Rule) declared, after the Easter Rising of 1916, for full independ-
ence. Unionists meanwhile wished to remain within the United Kingdom. 
It is ironic then that the first Home Rule government established in Ireland 
was the Unionist Northern Ireland. This change in tone was the final sep-
aration in a series of ‘national moments’ experienced by Ulster Unionists, 
who held a strong majority in the northern province of Ulster. First, they 
had asserted a distinct Ulster identity within Protestant Unionism, then 
they had formally sundered themselves from southern Irish Unionism, with 
its disadvantage of a small, dispersed population. Finally, they accepted the 
principle of partition and established an administration devolved from the 
very entity (the United Kingdom) to which they sought to remain attached.
If this seems inconsistent with the principles of Unionism it can be 
understood as an act of Ulster Protestant nationalism, the culmination of 
a growing sense of their own distinctiveness and confidence in their own 
strength. However, this nationalism was not uncontested. While many 
Catholic Nationalists argued for one Irish nation, the role of Northern 
Ireland as a nation-state for Ulster Unionism was contested even within 
Ulster. The new parliament in Belfast governed a state comprising six of 
the nine counties of Ulster, with Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal, despite 
 1 With the introduction of the 1921 border, the three counties of Cavan, Donegal, 
and Monaghan, while still part of Ulster (‘the North of Ireland’) remained within 
the ‘Free State’ (later called the Republic) while the other six counties of Ulster 
(Antrim, Armagh, (London)Derry, Down, Fermanagh and Tyrone) became 
known as ‘Northern Ireland’.
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having organized on a common front with six-county Unionists, being ex-
cluded from the settlement. The agreed boundaries for the new Northern 
Ireland state contained a significant Protestant majority and the three 
counties had been rejected on the grounds of their significant Catholic 
populations. In this regard, the establishment of Northern Ireland repre-
sented not only a reformulation of Unionism as a national movement but 
a reformulation of the very nation to which it referred.
Groups positioned unhappily along the edge of a political division 
demonstrate how permeable and negotiable their national identities can 
be at times of change and crisis. The two groups of Unionists on opposite 
sides of the partition settlement had opposing goals. The Unionists of 
Cavan and Monaghan were forever in a battle to prove their own Ulster 
Unionism and to assert their right to belong within Northern Ireland. 
Conversely, Fermanagh Unionists attempted to secure their own future 
by undermining the claims of Cavan and Monaghan.
Ulster Unionist Identity in Cavan and Monaghan
Unlike its sister variants of Ulster Unionism, Cavan and Monaghan 
Unionism never developed beyond the crisis of its birth. Pinned to other 
pan-Ulster Unionist institutions – such as the Ulster Unionist party, the 
Ulster Covenant and the Ulster Volunteer Force – it was ultimately sun-
dered from its heartland by the six-county reformulation of an Ulster 
state. Without support from elsewhere in the province, it persisted in a 
cultural half-life for a number of decades, becoming broadly submerged 
into a southern Irish identity.
Cavan and Monaghan Unionism was a border identity in a number of 
ways. Within Ulster Unionism it was peripheral to the point of externality. 
Following partition, it became the new frontier for the southern Irish state. 
Cavan and Monaghan negotiated their uneasy position both before and 
after partition with a constant defence of their rights as Unionists. Partition, 
their definitive, and indeed final, crisis, represented not just a gross betrayal 




Representations of Ulster Unionist identity in Cavan and Monaghan are 
complicated by the clear political utility that the idea held. While the Ulster 
Unionism expressed in the counties both before and after partition may have 
been deeply held, it also represented a clear avenue of escape from an increas-
ingly inevitable southern Catholic-dominated state. As such, there was an 
element of pragmatism to the enthusiasm with which Protestants in Cavan 
and Monaghan (and to a different degree Donegal) bought into the cause of 
Ulster, and, as also happened with Fermanagh, an unusually self-conscious 
process of identity formation.
Counting Loyalism: Key Measures of Ulster Unionism in 
Cavan and Monaghan
With these complications in mind it is instructive to employ a numerical 
survey of key markers of Unionist identity to see how Cavan and Monaghan 
compare. The comparison will allow us to determine whether the counties 
contributed proportionally as much to the Ulster movement as areas such 
as Antrim and Down which were more clearly in the Ulster heartland. 
Differences between the two counties are also significant, as they emphasize 
that Unionist identity in both, while sharing common circumstances, was 
still influenced by local factors.
Signed primarily on ‘Ulster Day’, 28 September 1912, Ulster’s Solemn 
League and Covenant (and the associated Women’s Declaration) had 
marked a hugely significant moment in the development of Ulster 
Unionism, being an oath binding its signatories to oppose any attempt to 
coerce Ulster into Home Rule. The particular depth of fervour implied by 
signing the Covenant is problematic. The Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) 
County Inspector for Cavan noted that, for some, the Covenant was a 
statement of political preference, while for others it was a commitment 
to military resistance.2
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A clearer commitment to take up arms in the name of Ulster came from 
membership of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) a Unionist militia es-
tablished in January 1913 to oppose Home Rule.3 While the UVF suf-
fered from a terminal lack of training and organization, membership still 
implied a strong commitment to fight against both the nationalist Irish 
Volunteers and British forces in the name of Ulster (Bowman 2002). 
Before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, a civil war between 
the two Volunteer forces seemed increasingly likely and the UVF success-
fully landed 24,600 German rifles in April 1914 ( Jackson 1992).
If membership of the UVF represented a commitment to military 
resistance then a more general political commitment can be seen in mem-
bership of the Unionist Clubs. Initially established in the 1890s as a social 
hub, Unionist Clubs were reconstituted in 1913 at about the same time as 
the formation of the UVF and in response to the same threat of Home 
Rule. They were intended to carry out local campaigning and propaganda 
work – in this they were an attempt to lay out a cohesive Ulster identity – 
while also serving as the social and organizational hub within the Protestant 
and Unionist community (Bowman 2013: 28–31). For many Unionists, 
unable or unwilling to commit to military resistance (and the associated 
frequent drilling and possession of a weapon), membership of the local 
Unionist Club still indicated a significant level of political dedication to 
the defence of an Ulster Unionist identity.
War enlistment among the non-Catholic community is a useful 
measure of ‘Ulsterism’. The rate of recruitment in Ulster roughly matched 
that in Britain and was far ahead of recruitment in any other Irish province 
(Townsend 2005: 65). The sacrifice of the Ulster soldiers in the war and 
the losses at the battle of the Somme in particular became central to Ulster 
Unionist identity and rhetoric, a process Thomas Hennessey described as 
‘symbolising the psychological partition of Ireland’ (Hennessey 1998: 198–
200). In Table 8.4 we express enlistment rates from 15 December 1914 to 
15 December 1915 as the ratio of enlistments by Protestants and Catholics 
 3 In 1966 another UVF formed in opposition to the IRA (Irish Republican Army), 





to the number of non-agricultural males of each religion in the county; 
agricultural workers were excluded as they were categorized as performing 
critical war work and thus exempted from enlistment.4
As tabulated figures demonstrate, while the contribution of Cavan 
and Monaghan to some aspects of Ulsterism lagged behind, in others it 
was particularly distinguished. Even where less distinguished, their pro-
portional contribution was well within reasonable bounds. While Cavan 
(Table 8.1) may have had the second lowest percentage of non-Catholic 
men signing the Covenant, the worst contributor was the Ulster heart-
land of Antrim. While the rate of Protestant enlistment was poor in 
Monaghan (Table 8.4), it was underperformed further by County Down.
Table 8.1: Signatories of the Ulster Covenant and Women’s Declaration as a 
percentage of the adult non-Catholic population in 1911 census. Source: Fitzpatrick 
(2014: 243).
Counties Men Non-Catholic % Women Non-Catholic %
Cavan 4,423 71.3 3,722 65.4
Monaghan 5,397 83.2 5,082 80.0
Donegal 9,007 73.7 8,347 68.7
Three Counties average 75.6 70.9
Down 32,379 72.6 35,495 69.7
Antrim 33,185 68.4 39,395 71.9
Armagh 18,754 88.6 20,331 86.6
Belfast 67,316 76.2 61,648 58.9
Tyrone 19,653 87.9 18,532 82.9
London-derry 20,282 81.4 20,403 74.3
Fermanagh 8,219 84.6 6,884 73.8
Ulster average 76.9 69.3
Note. To establish an estimated adult non-Roman Catholic population in Ulster, 
Fitzpatrick took the recorded percentage of non-Catholics in the population aged 
9 years or more (the only age-related breakdown of religion by area) and multiplied it 
by the total population aged over 16 years.
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Conversely, in the areas where the counties perform strongly, they 
are often notably ahead of the rest of Ulster. In spite of Monaghan’s larger 
Protestant population, the Cavan UVF (Table 8.2) boasted a membership 
of 3,451, while Monaghan could only muster 2,188 (Mac Giolla Choille 
1966: 37; Fitzpatrick 2014: 244). For Cavan, this came to over half of all 
eligible men joining. This was over 10 per cent more than in any other 
county. Cavan’s enlistment ratio was only outperformed by Antrim and 
Belfast and was the fourth highest in the country. Monaghan had one of 
the highest rates of signatories to the Ulster Covenant, while both counties 
are among the strongest supporters of the Ulster Clubs. In November 1912 
Cavan had twelve Unionist Clubs in the county with 1,425 members or 23 
per cent of the adult male population. By May 1913 this had become sixteen 
clubs with 1,949 members. Expressed as a percentage of the non-Catholic 
Table 8.2: Membership of the UVF and Ulster Clubs as a percentage of estimated 
adult non-Catholic population. Source: Fitzpatrick (2014: 244).












Ulster average 19.5 29.8
Note. The adult non-Roman Catholic population in Ulster was estimated as 
indicated in the Note to Table 8.1. Membership figures for the Ulster Clubs refer to 
November 1912 and for the UVF refer to 31 May 1914. All data calculated by David 
Fitzpatrick and originally taken from Mac Giolla Choille (1966: 16, 37).
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 5 Booklet entitled ‘C.V.F. Scheme, Copy No. VI’ (PRONI, Farren Connell papers, 
MIC/57119).
population this increase came to 3 per cent, compared to an average increase 
across Ulster of 0.6 per cent (Mac Giolla Choille 1966: 19–20).
Some of this strength perhaps came from their peripherality and their 
likely role as a front in any conflict between North and South. This is re-
flected in the quantity of arms the counties held for the UVF. By March 
1914, Cavan (Table 8.3) boasted 2,676 weapons, including a quarter of all 
Martini-Enfield rifles held in Ulster. Overall Cavan held roughly 10 per 
cent of all arms in Ulster in the period just before the Larne gunrunning. 
By contrast, the county held just 2 per cent of all Protestants in Ulster. This 
peripherality also led to reformulation of Cavan’s commitment to the Ulster 
Volunteers. Aware of their isolation and to diminish their association with 
the actions of the more bellicose Belfast Volunteers, Colonel Oliver Nugent, 
the Commanding Officer of the UVF in Cavan, renamed the organization 
the Cavan Volunteer Force and downplayed any military associations.5
Table 8.3: Arms held by the UVF in each county. Source: Mac Giolla Choille 
(1966: 34).
County Arms Held Non-Catholics




Three Counties 4,536 16







Note. Total non-Catholic population per county identified in Census of Ireland 
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The Ulster Identity and Partition
The Ulster identity put forward in Cavan and Monaghan was relatively un-
complicated, seeking as it did both before and after partition to strengthen the 
nine-county interpretation of Ulster identity and in doing so to undermine 
an intra-Ulster partition. The community had been aware of the possibility 
of a six-county partition settlement since at least March 1914, when Herbert 
Henry Asquith, the British Prime Minister, proposed that exclusion from 
partition should be decided in county plebiscites – a process which would 
leave Unionists in Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal with no hope of escape 
from a southern state. By relying on pre-established political geographies – in 
this case the province of Ulster as traditionally defined – Unionism in Cavan 
and Monaghan saw less handwringing over the national identity of specific 
areas than was seen in Fermanagh. Rather, they were faced with questions of 
how best to publicly demonstrate the depth of their Unionist fervour without 
by doing so conceding the precariousness of their situation.
Public rhetoric in Cavan and Monaghan aimed to underline a ‘natural’ 
Ulster connection. The 1918 Election saw Michael Knight campaigning in 
Table 8.4: First World War enlistments per 1,000 non-agricultural males and 
percentage of non-agricultural males listed as non-Catholic in the 1911 census. 





1911 Census  
Non-Catholic %
Monaghan 50 63 72
Cavan 58 105 80
Donegal 47 70 74
Antrim (incl. Belfast) 135 110 23
Armagh 45 67 42
Down 56 59 29
Fermanagh 116 94 55
Londonderry 72 76 45





North Monaghan as a self-professed ‘Ulster Unionist’ and he was careful to 
pitch his speeches as such. Despite running against the odds, his speeches 
aimed to give the impression that North Monaghan especially was a thriving 
Ulster Unionist outpost: ‘Unionists in this part of Ulster have a fine op-
portunity […] of being represented for the first time truly in the Imperial 
Parliament’.6 In a private communication following partition, prominent 
Cavan Unionist Arthur Maxwell Lord Farnham sadly noted that ‘we in 
Cavan were prouder of being Ulstermen than anyone in the whole Province.’7
Cavan and Monaghan Unionists expressed pride in the achievements 
of the province as a whole. During the War of Independence, the Northern 
Standard noted with satisfaction the ‘almost complete immunity of the 
greater part of Ulster from the dreadful crimes that blackened the rest of 
Ireland.’8 Belfast in particular was a source of admiration. In speeches such 
as that of Major McClean to the Monaghan Unionist Club in 1918, the vir-
tues of the city’s industry and infrastructure were taken as matters of great 
pride.9 The cultural ties connecting Protestants in these counties to the city 
led many of them to attempt to break the general Belfast Boycott.10 For 
example, Newbliss Protestants in August 1920 organized a convoy of fifty 
Ulster Volunteers to escort bread vans from Belfast to the town. The same 
escorts were planned in Clones and Drum, although they were foiled by the 
attack on the bread vans taking place before they could reach the escort.11
Following partition, attempts to reverse the settlement were im-
plemented swiftly and with great intensity but met with little success. 
Resistance was articulated through the traditional Ulster Unionist identity 
the county had bought into – with no concession made to the uniqueness 
 6 Northern Standard, 14 December 1918.
 7 Letter from Lord Farnham to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 13  March  1920 
(PRONI, Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery Papers, D627/435/10).
 8 Northern Standard, 10 April 1920.
 9 Irish Times, 13 March 1921.
 10 The Belfast Boycott was a general campaign by Irish nationalists to boycott goods 
coming from blacklisted Unionist traders in Belfast. This extended to a social and 
economic boycott of merchants who continued to trade with blacklisted traders 
(Dooley 1994: 91–2).













Contested Unionism along the Irish Border 233
of their circumstances. Rhetoric focused on the oath of the Covenant, 
employing a stricter and stricter definition of what the Covenant stood for.12 
Even in the preceding years something of the anxiety of the three-county 
community could be seen in the growing importance of ‘Covenant Day’, 
the anniversary of the signing of the Covenant. This was marked in Cavan 
and Monaghan by religious services around the counties. The Northern 
Standard covered these events quite heavily to counterbalance the other-
wise quiet media focus on Cavan and Monaghan: ‘[V]ery little has been 
said about “the three counties” during the past week, but it is enough for 
us to know that the Ulster Unionists stand where they did five or six years 
ago – a thoroughly united party.’13
In the aftermath of partition, a pamphlet was produced by the dele-
gates to the UUC from the three counties. It opened with a copy of the 
direct text of the Covenant as a combination of reminder and guilt-trip 
to sway other delegates’ minds. The only edit made to the original text of 
the Covenant was to capitalize the word ‘nine’ in the title. It now read 
‘the Solemn Covenant entered into between the Unionists of the NINE 
Counties of Ulster’.14 The pamphlet argued, fairly reasonably, that the same 
demographic and political facts were just as true of the three counties in 
1920 as they had been in 1911. Abandoning the counties now in face of such 
little change was to invalidate the word of Ulster Unionism. Resolutions 
passed by the Unionist Associations of all three counties explicitly charac-
terized the decision as a ‘breach of the Covenant’ and it was described as 
such in Westminster by a Liberal Member of Parliament, T. P. O’Connor.15
Cavan and Monaghan Unionists emphasized the common cultural 
ties between the three counties and the rest of Ulster which had been sun-
dered. In a statement, the delegates from Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal 
appealed to the Unionists of Ulster to show solidarity with them in strongly 
traditional terms, declaring that ‘the Ulster people have stood together for 
 12 Correspondence with the UUC secretary including letters of resignation, April 
1920 (PRONI, UUC files, D1327/18/28).
 13 Northern Standard, 4 October 1918.
 14 ‘Ulster and Home Rule: No partition of Ulster’. Unionist pamphlet (Clones, 1920).
 15 Irish Post and Weekly Telegraph, 13 March 1920; House of Commons Debates, 5th 










many generations and that confidence and reliance in each other has been 
the chief cause of their success and prosperity’ (Buckland 1973: 120–21).16 
In line with this, they primarily portrayed themselves in editorials and 
speeches post-partition as a wronged periphery. They had been selfishly 
abandoned for an unnecessarily large Protestant majority in the new state. 
The three-county media were swift to criticize the dishonesty of the six-
county delegates, maintaining that ‘it is clearly obvious that to attain the 
full measure of selfish safety for themselves they are prepared to jeopardize 
the safety of their Southern friends’.17
The willingness of the six counties to abandon them brought about 
something of a reversal in Unionist ideology in the county: arguments to 
invalidate the Covenant (such as that the Covenant had only applied to 
the previous Home Rule crisis) were disparaged as ‘idiotic’ and ‘childish’. 
A six-county state was dismissed as impractically small, impractically bor-
dered and pointlessly politically uniform. In attacking the idea that the 
three counties should be excluded because of their Nationalist majority 
the key argument touched on the impracticalities of settling on a nation-
ally sound border:
[Cavan and Monaghan have a Catholic majority] That is true. But so does Derry 
City, Fermanagh County, Tyrone County, South Armagh, South Down and the 
Falls Division of Belfast. Yet no one proposes to exclude them. The truth is that it 
is impossible to fix upon any exclusively Unionist area. There are more Unionists in 
the Southern area than there are Nationalists in the three Counties and no provision 
whatever is made for them. In their case we are told minorities must suffer, but that 
doctrine seems to be ignored when the minority is a Nationalist one.18
Perhaps because of this sense of betrayal, as R. B. McDowell has described, 
most Unionists in Cavan and Monaghan adapted surprisingly rapidly to 
their new circumstances (McDowell 1997: 109–10). For some this mani-
fested itself as expressing a willingness to co-operate with the Irish Free 
State, once established, as it was to become the legitimate state to which 
they owed allegiance. Others invested some hope in the ability of the 
 16 Northern Standard, 24 April 1920.
 17 Northern Standard, 19 June 1920; Irish Post and Weekly Telegraph, 20 July 1918.
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Boundary Commission to rescue them from Southern domination.19 
The Unionist judge Samuel Browne KC, to general surprise, opened the 
Clones Quarter Sessions of February 1922 by pledging his allegiance to 
the new Irish government.20 By the 1922 general election the Northern 
Standard was urging its voters to take an active role, saying that
the votes of the Unionists, or ex-Unionists, will play an important part in deciding the 
contest in this country […] the fate of Ireland is in the balance […] we are concerned 
solely and absolutely for the fate of the plain people […] the ex-Unionist voters there-
fore must decide which candidates are more likely to bring peace and prosperity.21
From 1921, Thomas Toal, chairperson of Monaghan County Council, 
formed a profitable alliance with Unionist councillors, whom he referred 
to as ‘exunionists’. These ‘exunionists’ were still indulged when they put 
forward ‘Unionist’ motions (such as a resolution of loyalty to Edward VIII 
on his coronation) even if such motions always failed. That ‘exunionist’ 
members justified such proposals in Free State Ireland through Ireland’s 
dominion status demonstrated the ambiguous meaning Irish independ-
ence had taken on for the community.22 Unionists in both Cavan and 
Monaghan were also successful in electing to the Dáil one of their own – 
Alexander Haslett – for Monaghan in both elections in 1927 and John 
James Cole for Cavan in September 1927. Both men ran under the banner 
‘Independent Unionist’ and presented themselves in very traditional 
Ulster Unionist terms. Both were avowed Orangemen and were elected 
on the last ballot, having collected either no transfers or very few from 
any other party, an indication of their singular appeal (Weeks 2017: 36).
Cavan and Monaghan Unionists were perhaps typical examples of a 
post-war secession minority, isolated politically from their old nation in 
Northern Ireland and socially from their new nation in the Irish Free State. 
Where they distinguished themselves, however, is in how they articulated 
and pre-empted their abandonment. Despite their obvious demographic 
 19 Northern Standard, 11 February 1922.
 20 Northern Standard, 3 February 1922.
 21 Northern Standard, 9 June 1922.










differences from the rest of Ulster and their strong cultural associations with 
southern Ireland, Cavan and Monaghan participated in Ulster Unionism 
with great gusto. For Cavan in particular, it is arguable that they con-
structed an Ulster identity from the ground up after coming within the 
technical, historical definition of Ulster. In this they provided a contrast 
to Fermanagh Unionists who used the Ulster Unionist identity to fight for 
the very settlement which abandoned Cavan and Monaghan.
Ulster Unionist Identity in Fermanagh
If the vision of Ulster Unionism put forward in Cavan, Monaghan and 
Donegal sought to undermine the legitimacy of the Northern Irish state, then 
its counterpart across the border in county Fermanagh aimed to ringfence 
the six-county settlement. In Fermanagh, as in Cavan and Monaghan, the 
cultural geography of Ulster Unionism was seen as fundamental in deter-
mining the political geography of Northern Ireland (Rankin 2009: 29).
Fermanagh Unionism existed in an awkward position at the time of 
partition. Although Fermanagh was markedly more Protestant than its 
three-county neighbours, it still harboured 34,740 Catholics compared 
to 27,096 Protestants.23 If national determination was to be applied on 
a county by county basis then Fermanagh was at serious risk of failing 
to qualify. In 1914, a prominent member of the Ulster Unionist Party, 
Major Frederick Crawford, wrote to party leader Edward Carson that 
any potential settlement of Ulster would probably represent the cumu-
lative abandonment of ‘the Protestants of Cavan, Donegal, Fermanagh 
and Monaghan’.24 Additionally, Protestant control of local bodies in the 
face of an opposing popular majority was most evident in Fermanagh 
 23 National Archives of Ireland, Census of Ireland 1901/1911  <http://www.census.
nationalarchives.ie> accessed 18 July 2018.
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and required some justification (Phoenix 1994: 85). The Earl of Belmore, 
testifying to the Boundary Commission in 1925 conflated electoral suc-
cess in the county with control over its identity: ‘The County Councils 
have been very equally divided. Sometimes one side has the majority 
and sometimes, the other. Fermanagh is sometimes one side and some-
times the other.’25
Anxiety over the shape of any Irish border had always been particularly 
acute in Fermanagh Unionist society. Before the passage of the Government 
of Ireland Act in 1920, these fears had focused on either a greatly reduced 
partition settlement which would leave behind Fermanagh or a greatly ex-
panded one which would dilute the Protestant majority and threaten the 
stability of a northern state. For most Fermanagh Unionists, the Northern 
Ireland that came into being represented an ideal resolution of the parti-
tion crisis. A six-county state had the largest possible Protestant majority 
while still incorporating Fermanagh. However, this did not lead to the 
alleviation of these local anxieties. Rather, they shifted to ensuring the per-
manence of this desirable settlement. In particular, they were concerned 
with defending Fermanagh’s rightful place in an Ulster state. They sought 
to pre-empt the looming threat of the Irish Boundary Commission and the 
growing criticism of the unrepresentativeness of a partition drawn along 
ancient county lines.
These anxieties in Fermanagh Unionism resulted in a unique, bor-
dered, articulation of Unionist identity which, instead of retreating into 
areas of local majority, sought to contest the nature of the county and 
project a Unionist identity even onto strongly Catholic areas. This was an 
identity at once brashly self-confident and insecure. In Fermanagh, unlike 
in Cavan and Monaghan, there was a strong belief that only an active and 
assertive Unionism would secure the county’s future. Fermanagh Unionists 
propounded a theory of their identity that tied them very explicitly with 
the county itself. This was unlike three-county efforts to downplay the 
uniqueness of their situation (and their minority) and tie themselves into 
a broader nation. Fermanagh Unionism went to great lengths to add a dis-
tinct, local, element to their identity.




This identity theory was articulated most clearly by William Copeland 
Trimble, a prominent local Unionist, and an important figure in the de-
velopment of Fermanagh Unionism. As founder of one of the first UVF 
regiments, the Enniskillen Horse, in 1912, he gained great prestige in 
the Unionist community (Bowman 2013: 29).26 Having inherited the 
Enniskillen-based Impartial Reporter from his father, William Trimble 
Sr, in 1883, he became an important local journalist during his editorship, 
publishing between 1919 and 1922 a well-received multi-volume history of 
Enniskillen and also serving as chairman of the Irish Newspaper Owners 
Association (Newmann 1993).27
However, his most enduring and most popular contribution 
to Fermanagh public life was his clear articulation of the reasons for 
Fermanagh’s inherent Protestantism, which he laid out in an editorial 
published in December 1920, after the passage of the Government of 
Ireland Act and just before the establishment of Northern Ireland. This 
article was titled ‘Fermanagh, a Protestant County: Notwithstanding 
the Population’. In this article Trimble described two fundamental elem-
ents of the Fermanagh Unionist claim to belong in Northern Ireland, 
arguing that Fermanagh’s Unionism and Protestantism was inherent to 
it and independent of whatever might appear in the census, and going 
on to say that the Catholic majority in the county was both unrepresen-
tative and non-local.
Demography and Economy: The Non-cultural Argument  
for Fermanagh
As the title of the article suggests, Trimble’s primary goal in this editorial 
was to downplay the significance of Fermanagh’s Catholic majority. His 
contention was that ‘in a matter of this sort heads do not count.’ In his 
 26 Also: Papers relating to the Enniskillen Horse, TNA CO 904/27/1.
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mind, the bulk of the Catholic population in the county was composed 
of landless servants and labourers. These people were less representative 
of the nature of the county as they were landless – they were ‘not of the 
soil’. By contrast, the most significant communities in the county were 
majority Protestant  – ‘the landowning, land-occupying, professional, 
commercial, farming and industrial communities.’28 Unionists paid more 
local property taxes (rates) and thus were more involved in the upkeep of 
the county. They were entitled to a larger part of it.
The placing of emphasis on certain communities as ‘definitive’ was not 
a rhetorical tactic unique to Trimble. A 1925 representation of Fermanagh 
Unionists to the Boundary Commission also sought to undermine the 
county’s religious demography (based on a census they decried as nearly 
fifteen years out of date) by demonstrating Unionist dominance of all key 
professions in the county as well as their prominence on the lists of jurors 
and ratepayers.29
Allusions to these ideas were commonly employed in local politics. In 
an Enniskillen Board of Guardians debate on the payment of workhouse 
officials, a frustrated Unionist, William Elliott, exclaimed: ‘[W] e are the 
ratepayers. These are the men who pay the rates. I am a heavy ratepayer 
and you [Edmund Corrigan, Sinn Féin] are not’.30 Many of the testimonies 
given by Fermanagh Protestants to the Boundary Commission, such as 
that by Rev. W. B. Naylor of Belcoo, also reference the preponderance of 
Protestants on the ratebooks as a reason for their vote to be given greater 
weight.31 Major Charles Falls, Fermanagh County Council’s solicitor, con-
tested the Free State’s claim to control of Lough Erne on the basis that 
Fermanagh County Council had financed the drainage of the lake and 
 28 Impartial Reporter, 9 December 1920.
 29 Bundle of correspondence regarding the boundary of Fermanagh County Council. 
(PRONI, UUC Files, D1327/24/1).
 30 Boards of Guardians were local bodies whose elected members represented elect-
oral areas; their responsibilities included such things as poor relief and fixing of the 
rates to support it. Minutes of Enniskillen Guardians, July 1919 (PRONI, Board of 
Guardians Records, BG/14/A/128); Impartial Reporter, 4 July 1919.











that, while the Council was itself evenly split at the time, the project had 
been funded by the ratepayers and that therefore the Fermanagh Unionist 
claim to the lake was strongest.32 This argument is striking. Falls first con-
flated Unionist ‘investment’ in Fermanagh with the county’s identity and 
then translated that into explicit territorial claims.
The ‘investment’ argument was merely one way in which Fermanagh 
Unionists aimed to undermine the Catholic majority in the county. Equally 
prominent was the theory that the Catholic population in Fermanagh 
was artificially inflated by itinerant Catholic workers from outside Ulster. 
A meeting of Fermanagh County Council in November 1921 degener-
ated into a shouting match between the two sides following a jibe made 
by Unionist councillor Robinson over a supposed Catholic majority of 
8,000 in the county: ‘Mr Healy’s majority was merely made up of servant 
boys and hands from other counties who came up to work on the farm of 
Unionists. They were not Fermanagh men but came from Donegal and 
Leitrim. They could not speak for Fermanagh.’33
The appeal of this argument was obvious, allowing for an unrevealed 
true Fermanagh to exist, hidden behind misleading official information and 
polling tallies. This argument allowed the Fermanagh Times, for example, 
to argue that Catholic dominance of the County Council since 1914 did 
not say anything about the political persuasion of the county.34 Any vio-
lent or dramatic expressions of a Fermanagh nationalism could similarly 
be discounted as an imported nuisance and not a worrying sign of future 
unrest. For example, the campaign of boycotting in the county from 1920 
onwards was frequently blamed on servant boys from Cavan and Leitrim, 
as exemplified by the pseudonymous ‘Fermanagh Radical’ in a letter to the 
Fermanagh Times of 15 November 1921.35 In the same month, ‘South Tyrone 
Radical’ wrote that these servant boys were betraying their employers to the 
IRA by providing information to the raiding parties. It was suggested that 
 32 Charles Falls Statement, Fermanagh County Council Evidence (TNA, Boundary 
Commission files, CAB/61/65).
 33 Minutes of Fermanagh County Council, November 1921 (PRONI, Local Authority 
Records, LA/4/2/GA/3). Impartial Reporter, 24 November 1921.
 34 Fermanagh Times, 22 December 1922.
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all ‘foreign’ labourers be turned over the border ‘and serve Roman Catholic 
masters, where their pay will be lighter and their diet too’.36
The assertion that native-born Fermanagh people were majority 
Protestant and that the county’s Catholic majority was an importation 
had little to do with demographic reality and certainly ignores Protestant 
‘imports’ from elsewhere in Ulster and Britain. In the 1911 census, 85 per cent 
of the total population were Fermanagh-born and of this population 57 per 
cent were Catholic, which mirrors closely the overall rate of Catholicism 
in the county of 56 per cent.37 When Major Charles Falls made a similar 
claim to the Boundary Commission, he was greeted with scepticism as 
Eóin MacNeill noted that the county was not sufficiently agricultural for 
there to be a large market for itinerant labourers.38
That this idea should have had such cachet in Fermanagh is unsur-
prising. It formed part of a larger process of a growing conceptualization 
of southern Ireland as a malevolent and violent entity, thoroughly distinct 
from Ulster. Any solution other than partition was to mean the subjuga-
tion of Ulstermen. In a speech of November 1922, William Coote, MP for 
Tyrone, declared the willingness of Ulstermen and the Orange Order to 
‘make Ulster safe’ before noting that the road to Dublin was ‘strewn with 
the bodies of Loyalists.’39
This contrast became much more marked during the violence of the 
revolutionary years. It underlined Fermanagh’s difference from the Catholic 
south. An anonymous article published in Blackwood’s Magazine described 
the crossing of the border into the six counties as the transition into Ulster, 
and its Protestant inhabitants as ‘quite a different race.’40 A Trimble editorial 
referred to Fermanagh’s peaceful revolution as being akin to the experiences 
 36 Impartial Reporter, 10 November 1921.
 37 All data from National Archives of Ireland, Census of Ireland 1901/1911 <http://
www.census.nationalarchives.ie> accessed 18 July 2018.
 38 Interview with Major Charles Falls, Fermanagh County Council Evidence (TNA, 
Boundary Commission files, CAB/61/66).
 39 Royal Irish Constabulary County Inspectors Report for Fermanagh, September 
1922 (PRONI, Home Office files, HA/32/1/129).













of Down and Antrim – shorthand for traditional Ulster Unionism. By 
contrast, Trimble referred to southern counties ‘deluged with blood’.41 If 
Fermanagh were so Catholic, his argument went, why was its record so 
much closer to Antrim than to Cork? Trimble’s rivals in the Fermanagh 
Times could not help but agree: ‘Southern Ireland is a fitting commentary 
on the Southern Irish: they have made it what it is: and Ulstermen have 
made the North what it is.’42
This perception was heightened by reporting which focused not 
only on the violence of the south but also on its alleged sectarianism. 
Donegal was experiencing a ‘reign of terror’, in Cavan there was a ‘War 
on Protestants’, while the Monaghan Twelfths43 were cancelled because 
of a ‘vendetta against Protestants.’44 Individual Protestant victims of 
revolutionary violence, such as Johnston Hewitt of Cloverhill in Cavan, 
were put to political use as evidence of the inherent sectarianism of the 
south and of the dangers facing Fermanagh Unionists in case of a shift of 
the frontier.45 David Fitzpatrick has also suggested that such events were 
used to further alienate Ulster Unionist opinion and justify a hardline 
official policy being taken in negotiations with the Free State (Fitzpatrick 
1998: 121). These reports became particularly pronounced following 
partition and the establishment of the border, which was portrayed as a 
bulwark against the chaos immediately beyond it. The Fermanagh Times 
constantly expressed fears that the southern border of the county, par-
ticularly south of Lough Erne was being ‘surrendered’ and the whole area 
‘subject to Free State rule’.46
 41 Impartial Reporter, 14 December 1922.
 42 Fermanagh Times, 2 December 1920.
 43 The Twelfth ( July) is the principal day of the (Protestant) Orange Order (founded 
1795) parade season, which commemorates the 1690 victory of William of Orange 
over James II at the Battle of the Boyne, near Dublin. The parades remain highly 
contentious to the present, with certain routes subject to violent protests.
 44 Impartial Reporter, 26  May  1921; Impartial Reporter, 29  June  1922; Impartial 
Reporter, 4  January  1923; for examples in the Fermanagh Times see Fermanagh 
Times, 16 February 1923 and Fermanagh Times, 29 June 1922.
 45 Impartial Reporter, 6 July 1922.
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In 1925, the Boundary Commission received a lengthy submission from 
Fermanagh County Council with statements of loyalists who claimed to 
have been driven out of the south and who were unable to return. James 
Johnston, formerly of Bawnboy, went so far as to claim that half of all 
Protestants in his district had been terrorized and driven from the district.47 
While the pictures of a lawless, sectarian South were drawn crudely, they 
touched upon a genuine fear held by Fermanagh Protestants of what their 
position would be in the Free State. James Cooper, Enniskillen solicitor 
and member of Fermanagh County Council, went so far as to commission 
an extensive private census of Protestant migrants into Fermanagh from 
the Free State in hopes it would demonstrate a vast movement of popu-
lation. Ultimately it captured some 2,047 individuals, although not all of 
them were Protestant.48
The Limits of Ulster: The Cultural Argument for Fermanagh
Despite the esoteric nature of the claim, a common argument for 
Fermanagh’s presence in Northern Ireland was that the county had an 
inalterable, undefinable Protestantism. For Trimble this was rooted in 
history. Fermanagh, before the Ulster plantation, did not exist, but was 
rather a loose collection of farms and tribes subject to constant raids. It was 
only the arrival of Protestant rule and Protestant law which had brought 
peace and allowed the emergence of the modern county.49 This was an 
argument echoed by the Fermanagh Times in a letter by ‘Descendant of a 
Planter’ who made the case for a chaotic pre-Protestant Fermanagh even 
more forcefully: ‘The followers of these less or more warlike chiefs lived 
 47 James Johnston Statement, Fermanagh County Council Evidence (TNA, 
Boundary Commission files, CAB 61/64).
 48 Interview with James Cooper, Fermanagh County Council Evidence (TNA, 
Boundary Commission files, CAB/61/66).










in wattle and mud huts much like what modern travellers find in Central 
Africa.’50
As a result of the centrality of Protestantism and Unionism to the 
emergence of the modern county, Trimble was able to attribute certain 
‘fundamental’ features to it. These were, naturally, the sort of qualities an 
Ulster Unionist would value and added a certain recursive infallibility to 
his logic:
Its record of peace and order, the maintenance of the law, its sentiments of loyalty 
and attachment to the constitution, its administration of public business, its ideas 
of public morality, its code of ethics, its views of honour, its methods of advance, 
its enforcement of sanitation and cleanliness, its manners traditions and customs.51
Such sentiments were not unique to Trimble. The evidence provided 
by Fermanagh County Council to the Boundary Commission provides 
a series of short, consistent statements making various arguments for 
Fermanagh to remain in Northern Ireland. Unusually for evidence pro-
vided to the Commission, these statements were frequently based on 
questions of preference and national identity, as opposed to economic 
and trade considerations. These statements characterized Fermanagh in 
very similar ways, particularly emphasizing its efficient administration 
and record of law and order.52
The abstract, symbolic way in which a ‘Protestant’ identity was con-
ferred on a county can also be seen in a 1925 report by Fermanagh Unionists 
to the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC, predecessor to the Ulster Unionist 
Party). The report characterized certain families as being definitive to the 
county’s identity. Naturally, these families were uniformly Protestant (ex-
amples included the Earls of Belmore and Enniskillen, the Trimbles of 
Enniskillen, the Brookes of Brookeborough).53 In a similar claim, James 
Cooper, future Northern Irish MP and Enniskillen solicitor, claimed that 
 50 Fermanagh Times, 8 September 1921.
 51 Impartial Reporter, 9 December 1920.
 52 See for example George Lester Statement, Fermanagh County Council Evidence 
(TNA, Boundary Commission files, CAB/61/65).
 53 Bundle of correspondence regarding the boundary of Fermanagh County Council. 
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the southern, heavily Catholic, half of Fermanagh could never be rightly 
abandoned because southern border towns such as Belcoo were important 
sites of Protestant history and irrevocably Protestant in their character, 
despite their overwhelmingly Catholic population.54
The association of place with a specific community instead of geog-
raphy allowed Fermanagh Unionists to place their own political identity 
central to the exclusion of their opponent. The Ulsterman was an ethnic 
rather than geographic construction, and Ulster was simply where they 
congregated. It was inherently non-inclusive of Catholics. As Trimble as-
serted: ‘In Ireland there are two races […] races divergent in national traits 
and characters […] The Ulsterman (two-thirds Scotch and one-third of 
him English) is altogether a different man from the Irish Celt.’55
The community’s victories were celebrated along traditional religious 
lines – the Unionist victory in Fermanagh North in the 1918 general election 
was celebrated by the ringing of the Anglican Church’s bells in Enniskillen, 
to the chagrin of the local reverend, Canon Webb. Regarding his com-
plaints that those who rang the bells were Presbyterian, the Fermanagh 
Times jocularly asserted that it was an Ulster Protestant victory and should 
be celebrated as such.56
In his testimony to the Boundary Commission, the Earl of Belmore 
argued that although the county was Catholic, the central and most im-
portant part of it (around Enniskillen) was strongly Protestant.57 Major 
Charles Falls also argued that as Enniskillen was the most important town 
in the county and that it had been constructed by ‘Unionist ratepayers’, 
that the county was indivisible and non-transferable. For Falls, some of 
the strongest Unionist areas such as Florencecourt, Letterbreen and Crum 
were south of Lough Erne and were so crucial to the identity of the county 
that they could not be abandoned.58
 54 Interview with James Cooper, Fermanagh County Council Evidence (TNA, 
Boundary Commission files, CAB/61/66).
 55 Impartial Reporter, 8 March 1917; See also Impartial Reporter, 20 July 1922.
 56 Fermanagh Times, 9 January 1919.
 57 Earl of Belmore evidence (TNA, Boundary Commission files, CAB 61/30).













Not all of the county was seen as equally inviolable, and political 
concerns influenced such discussions. Particularly in relation to smaller, 
border areas, partition presented an opportunity to create a ‘homogeneous 
Ulster’. Trimble and the Reporter entertained some discussion about the 
abandoning of disturbed Catholic border areas such as Belleek and Roslea.59 
James Cooper openly floated the idea of trading the majority of the Catholic 
Belleek region of the county for the Protestant areas around Pettigo.60
However, this was not as simple as trading the green areas of the 
map for orange ones. It was a process that demonstrated that certain 
areas had stronger cultural value and religious associations than others. 
Much as in Cavan and Monaghan, it became of paramount importance 
to define the limits of the cultural Ulster which would in turn define the 
limits of Northern Ireland. Trimble, when discussing the electoral map of 
Fermanagh, claimed that South Fermanagh would have returned a Unionist 
MP in all previous elections were it not for the western shores of Upper 
Lough Erne; such an area was unnatural as it ‘formerly belonged to the 
province of Connaught’.61 For Trimble, the Catholic majority in this area 
and its supposed non-Ulster status were linked. After a major IRA raid 
in the area in 1921, the Fermanagh town of Roslea was declared to belong 
‘more to Monaghan than Fermanagh’.62
This cultural Ulster did not extend to the same borders as its Covenant 
or its Volunteer Force. At the very least, belonging to Ulster was a negoti-
able identity and not one simply bought into. The three ‘southern’ coun-
ties, and Cavan especially, were described as being only passingly within 
Ulster. As Trimble said dismissively, ‘County Cavan was not in the ancient 
Ulster, it was in Connaught.’63 The Fermanagh Times began to refer to the 
nine-counties as ‘geographical Ulster’ while Northern Ireland was ‘true 
Ulster’.64 Only northern areas of Monaghan around Clones and Glaslough 
 59 Impartial Reporter, 19 February 1920.
 60 Impartial Reporter, 17 August 1922.
 61 Impartial Reporter, 9 December 1920.
 62 Impartial Reporter, 27 July 1922.
 63 Impartial Reporter, 9 December 1920.
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seemed to be regarded as truly in Ulster and these were the portions of the 
Free State suggested as likely to be incorporated into Northern Ireland.65
Going against previous definitions of Ulster and opening up the term 
to more shades of interpretation was ideologically problematic. That the 
Ulster of the Covenant and the Unionist Clubs could be broken up at all 
was also ideologically problematic. This unease was motivated less by any 
sense of cross-border solidarity with Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal and 
more by inward-looking anxieties about the future fate of Fermanagh. 
The Fermanagh Times republished a letter written to the Irish Times by 
T. F. Stack, the rector of Langfield in Tyrone, expressing misgivings that 
once the concept of Ulster was undermined in this way then Derry City, 
Fermanagh and Tyrone all lost their best justification for belonging to 
Northern Ireland – namely that they were in geographical Ulster. Once 
this fact was no longer the key national determinant for a county, then 
areas with Catholic majorities had a much stronger argument to defect 
southwards.66 Stack repeated his argument years later to the Boundary 
Commission.67 This was similar to the argument taken outside Ulster by 
the Daily Mail, which felt such a settlement ‘stereotyped partition and 
renounced the spirit of Union.’68
Fermanagh and the Three Counties
The plight of the three counties following partition was greeted with oc-
casional rhetorical sympathy in Fermanagh, but little organized support. 
Trimble, writing for the Reporter, said that the cause of the three counties 
‘excited great sympathy’ but he repeated the Unionist position on why six 
counties were preferable to nine.69 The Reporter, by 1922, was reporting 
 65 Impartial Reporter, 3 August 1922.
 66 Fermanagh Times, 29 April 1920.
 67 Evidence of T. F. Stack (TNA, Boundary Commission files, CAB 61/135).
 68 Fermanagh Times, 29 April 1920.














on events in Cavan and Monaghan as part of its broader ‘South and West’ 
news section.70
Fermanagh delegates to the Ulster Unionist Council did sign a peti-
tion to the Council requesting a meeting to reconsider exclusion, motivated 
by the potential resignation of the three county delegates. However, while 
eighty-six delegates from the six counties signed the document, only six of 
them were from Fermanagh – only half of the total delegates sent by the 
county to the Council.71 Northern signatories to a representation on behalf 
of the three counties included no Fermanagh voices and only two from 
Tyrone. The majority of such signatories came from Down and Antrim, areas 
with Protestant majorities large enough to diminish any fear of inclusion of 
the three Catholic-heavy counties.72 Nor did any Fermanagh delegates resign 
in protest at the decision. Fermanagh Unionism was roused to a far greater 
extent only a year later when the county’s Unionist Association unanimously 
passed a bill opposing any change in the boundaries of a six-county Ulster.73
The Fermanagh Times was less enthusiastic about the settlement 
and reported in April 1920 that ‘some of the strongest Unionists in 
County Fermanagh are altogether in sympathy with the loyalist popula-
tion of Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal.’74 In a speech to the Enniskillen 
Guardians in February 1923, W. J. Brown, a Unionist Guardian, stated 
that the Northern Parliament should have included Cavan, Monaghan 
and Donegal.75 In a letter of April 1920, Colonel Robert Doran, head of 
Brookeborough Unionist Club, told Richard Dawson Bates that he could 
not go against ‘the three excluded counties in whom without a doubt there 
are true hearted loyalists.’76
 70 Impartial Reporter, 26 October 1922.
 71 Delegates extracted from UUC Annual Reports (PRONI, J. Milne Barbour files, 
D972/17).
 72 Representation on behalf of the three counties, April 1920 (PRONI, U.U.C. files, 
D1327/18/28).
 73 Fermanagh Times, 10 November 1921.
 74 Fermanagh Times, 22 April 1920.
 75 Minutes of Enniskillen Guardians, February 1923 (PRONI, Board of Guardians 
Records, BG/14/A/134); Fermanagh Herald, 10 February 1923.
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Even when such expressions did exist, they were not normally focused 
on the problematic Ulster of Cavan or Monaghan but rather on either 
Donegal or the Covenant itself. In August 1920, at the traditional Unionist 
celebrations of the Relief of Derry, a speech was made by the Rev. Thomas 
Walmsley regretting the loss of his cross-border friends. However, this 
speech referred solely to Donegal men.77 Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery 
expressed hope that Donegal, because of its unique geographical position, 
might ultimately be included in Northern Ireland.78 When pressed on why 
he had signed the petition against partition in May 1920, James Cooper, 
member of Enniskillen Council and future Northern MP, reported that 
he and all the Fermanagh delegates to the Ulster Unionist Council had 
done so because of the position of Donegal and the Protestants of Pettigo, 
not Cavan or Monaghan.79
Ulster Unionism on the Irish border represented a putative national 
movement that was granted a state of its own before it had matured suffi-
ciently to formulate clear territorial demands. The use of the ambiguous 
term ‘Ulster’ as its point of identity led to significant struggles over which 
definition of the term to use, or whether to abandon the term altogether. 
As late as 1935, Rowley Elliott, MP for South Tyrone, was arguing against 
renaming the state Ulster as ‘further humiliation for our friends in Cavan, 
Monaghan and Donegal’.80 Thus a very fluid national identity gave rise to 
competing interpretations not only of an Ulster nationality but of how 
these nationalities were even constructed.
The focus of this examination has meant that certain factors of no less 
importance have not been emphasized. One such important factor is that 
the presence of large swathes of unwilling Catholics in Northern Ireland 
further challenged its legitimacy as a nation-state while at the same time it 
could be argued that the acceptance of the territorial boundaries of the new 
Northern Ireland State by a majority within Ulster Unionism undermined 
 77 Impartial Reporter, 19 August 1920.
 78 Letter from John Scott to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 8 April 1920 (PRONI, 
Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery Papers, D627/435/24).
 79 Impartial Reporter, 17 August 1922.










its self-understanding as the political expression of the national identity 
of Ulster Protestantism.
Accepting this political compromise meant that Unionism nei-
ther sought to encompass the entire Ulster Protestant national group, 
nor limit itself to those areas with a definitive Protestant majority. If 
Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal were to be left behind on the basis of 
their Catholic majority but Tyrone, Fermanagh and parts of Derry 
and Armagh were not, then six-county partition was intended not so 
much to express the national self-assertion of Ulster Protestantism as 
to ensure inclusion of those territories which would achieve the most 
secure voting majority. In this interpretation, Ulster Unionism was not 
so exclusively an expression of genuine national identification as an in-
strument of mass political mobilization in the interests of Protestant 
groups in the Ulster heartlands.
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abstract
One of the greatest challenges to integration in Spain stems from the plurality of 
national feelings within its territory. Spain is a state built on the union of various 
kingdoms that, over the centuries, gave rise to specific senses of identity. Monarchical 
absolutism in the eighteenth century, centralist liberalism in the nineteenth century 
and the Franco dictatorship in the twentieth century were unable to create a unified 
national identity within the Spanish territory. Acknowledging this, the Constitution 
of 1978 provided for the coexistence of diverse national realities within the new State 
of Autonomies. Nevertheless, the problem of national and regional tensions has resur-
faced in the last decade. This chapter traces the origins of the problem and analyses 
failed attempts at political resolution, before outlining a possible solution based on 
dialogue and consensus in order to rebuild bridges of integration in a common pro-
ject of a European and plurinational Spanish State.
No discussion of nation and identity can overlook the central import-
ance of Spain: the peninsula has throughout history presented almost a 
paradigmatic environment in which to explore the tangled complex of 
myth, aspiration, and pride that makes up any definition of either, and 
the situation arising after the death of Franco offers fertile ground for 
that exploration.1
 1 This study has been developed within the framework of the research project 
Estructura social, encuestas y elecciones (CSO2013-43054-R) funded by the call 
2013-Proyectos I+D+I-Programa Estatal de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación 
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The Ways of Federalism
The ways of federalism are, as is generally the case in modern states, plural 
and noted for their complex character. This has tended to be true when 
the State has been built by superimposing, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, different cultural and identity realities. The prevailing strategies for 
the construction of the State vary greatly, despite efforts to reduce such 
rich pluralities through political science or constitutional law to a few 
idealized models that have become the legitimizing standards for what is 
considered possible. Nothing could be further from reality. In practice, 
each State has had to seek out its own way. These ways have led key fig-
ures to use violence, pacts, and consensus in many forms and degrees, to 
achieve situations of equilibrium which, although presumed to be stable, 
in actual practice remain susceptible to further change. The recurrence of 
identity and territorial crises in such states, such as the one most recently 
unfolding in Spain, attest to this notion.
In regard to federal solutions to problems of coexistence within a 
State, there is much literature covering a range from normative approaches 
to empirical analyses. In addition, classic authors such as James Madison 
and Johanes Altusius have been revisited in search of new ideas (among 
others: Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995; Maiz 2000; Gagnon 2001; Guibernau 
2002; Tierney 2004; Requejo 2005). Furthermore, multitudes of empirical 
studies have not only endeavoured to describe the reality of federal states, 
but also to analyse their performance and institutional efficiency in great 
detail (among others: Weingast 1995; Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 1997; 
Treissman 2000; Rodden 2004; Wibbels 2005). Most of these studies have 
traditionally been included as part of the debate on the relative merits (or 
lack thereof ) of modern states’ unitary or federal constitutions, without 
taking their normative components into consideration when formulating 
questions and hypotheses about the actual functioning of these states (Maiz 
2006: 46).
The results of these studies and the changes appearing around the 
turn of the century – including globalization, the digitization of society 




issues, major social changes, migratory flows, among others – force us to 
rethink the epistemological foundations of our approaches to the study 
of the issue. In particular, in recent decades the division between both 
models of the State – the federal state (e.g. the United States) and the uni-
tary state (e.g. France) – has been increasingly blurred as federal systems 
began to develop characteristics of unitary states, and unitary states have 
progressively become less unitary (Loughlin 2017: 23). There is a growing 
consensus regarding the plurality of federal solutions (among others: Elazar 
1987; Watts 1996; Burgess 2013) and their evolutionary nature in terms of 
the constant negotiations between the actors involved in their practical 
formulation (Bauböck 2000; Tully 2001). Indeed, it is understood that 
federal states are constitutively unstable by design (Bednar 1999) and thus 
need reinforcement institutions to incentivize politicians at different levels 
of government (Figuereido and Weingast 1998; Filippov et al. 2004; Maiz 
2006: 51).
This factual or, perhaps one could say, positive observation is coupled 
with the assertion that the old classical models of territorial power distri-
bution and identity recognition are incapable of meeting the challenges 
presently facing our societies (Bou 2005: 169; Loughlin 2017: 29). We need 
new normative models that open new paths of understanding by means of a 
permanent dialogue with empirical and comparative types of studies (Maiz 
2006). As the authors of this chapter, we believe that normative consider-
ations are inseparable from the factual realities of a specific society (the case 
of Spain) that is the product of a history which, for better or worse, has left 
its mark and plays a significant role in resolving societal problems (histor-
ical neo-institutionalism). In addition, we adhere to the basic assumption 
that the only thing that is needed is to build bridges that will facilitate the 
processes of coexistence between individuals. We also hold the conviction 
that federal normative approaches would be better suited to achieving them 
(Bauböck 2000; Requejo 2001). In this regard, we understand that Spain – 
like other unitary states in recent decades (the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, etc.) – has gone down the same path, although with evident deficien-
cies, particularly in matters of the functional expression of territorial powers 
and political identity culture that force us to rethink and correct some of 
the agreements or points of equilibrium achieved thus far.
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The 1978 transition to democracy in Spain is considered an unprece-
dented success. The body of agreements arrived at over the course of the 
following years makes up the country’s foundation for stability, institu-
tional development and socio-economic progress. But there is one aspect 
that has defied closure for some four decades, that of recognition of the 
multinational state of affairs, that was believed to be resolved and overcome 
after the establishment of the Autonomic State. Today, this old problem, 
still unsolved, has reappeared as Spain’s foremost challenge: the mistaken 
or deliberate confusion between State and nation has not hidden the real 
existence of plural national feelings. The 2010 ruling of the Constitutional 
Court on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was a turning point, and 
the subsequent secessionist drift of Catalan nationalism highlights the split 
of important links in the integration process of diverse national feelings 
in the project of a constitutional State. We maintain that it has not been 
the model of composite state, designed by the Constitution of 1978, but 
the political practice of insisting on the Orteguian idea of structuring a 
national State, which has blocked the path to a more affectively appealing 
way of understanding a multinational Spain. We consider that politics, 
agreements and consensus must again be employed in order to restore 
bridges of integration in a common project, that of a Spanish, European 
and multinational State.
The Spanish Problem
The construction process of the Autonomic State has been a success for 
the Spanish constitutional State, despite obvious faults in its operation. 
Having said this, one must also admit that the process of recognition of 
the different national identities and feelings, known as nationalities or 
nations has been a historical failure. It is not necessary to be a ‘nationalist 
historian’ to hold this position, but merely to approach Spanish history 
without preconceptions and prejudice. The causes that explain the relative 




of the ‘problem of the Spains’, which Bosch-Gimpera (1996) talked about 
in the 1950s, are long-standing (Romero and Furió 2015). Elorza, for ex-
ample, speaks of ‘secular disruption’ (2012). There is nothing to be said 
regarding State and nation (or to put it differently, ‘state-building’ and 
‘nation-building’) that has not been said before.
In a seminal text by Juan J. Linz, written in 1973, which is as important 
as it is little known, a phenomenon is already summarized that in our 
opinion has hardly changed since then:
[P] ara la mayoría de los españoles, España es un Estado-nación que suscita en ellos 
un sentimiento de solidaridad que no produce ninguna otra afiliación grupal; que 
para importantes minorías ha sido, y seguramente seguirá siendo, sólo un Estado cuya 
autoridad reconocen en su comportamiento, atribuyéndole más o menos legitimidad 
[…] Para estas minorías, España es su Estado pero no su nación y, por lo tanto, no 
es un Estado-nación. Puede que esas minorías que se identifican con una nación 
catalana o, especialmente vasca, sean pequeñas, pero demuestran el fracaso de España 
y sus elites a la hora de construir una nación, sea cual sea el grado de éxito en la 
construcción del Estado.
[For a majority of Spaniards, Spain is a nation-state that gives rise to feelings of soli-
darity that are not produced by any other group affiliation; it has also been, and will 
probably continue to be, considered by important minorities to simply be a State 
whose authority is recognized through its daily behaviour, with a variable conferral 
of legitimacy […] For these minorities, Spain is their State but not their nation, and, 
therefore, it is not a nation-state. It could be argued that those minorities that iden-
tify as a Catalan or, particularly, a Basque nation, are small, but they show the failure 
of Spain and its elites when it comes to building a nation, no matter the degree of 
success in their state-building.]2 (Linz 2008a: 6–7)
For Linz, the most passable way that Spain might still thrive would be 
‘un Estado español unificador de una sociedad multilingüe y, en cierta 
medida, también multinacional, sobre criterios diferentes a los del pasado, 
en una democracia nacida con buena estrella’ [a Spanish State, capable of 
unifying a multilingual and, to some extent, also a multinational society, 
under different criteria to those of the past, in a democracy born under an 
auspicious star] (2008a: 71–3).
 2 All translations are by the authors.
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In 1975, another important study by the same author (2008b) in-
cluded a section with a revealing epigraph: ‘un Estado, tres naciones, cuatro 
lenguas’ [one State, three nations, four languages]. He insisted again on 
the need to make a distinction between nation and State, included a 
peremptory distinction between nations and regions, and introduced a 
remark that was very much to the point on the singularity of a Spanish 
nationalism that probably lacked ‘trasfondo romántico del nacionalismo 
decimonónico que creó Estados-nación como Italia y Alemania’ [the 
nineteenth-century romantic background that gave rise to nation-states 
such as Italy and Germany], coming closer instead to ‘lo que los sociólogos 
han denominado patriotismo’ [what sociologists have designated as pat-
riotism] (2008b: 78–9).
Some years later, in 1980, with the Constitution already approved, 
he understood that the young democratic State was facing two major 
challenges:
[U] no, el paso de un régimen autoritario a la democracia, el otro, de un Estado 
centralizado que no reconocía la diversidad de sus pueblos a uno multilingüe y 
multinacional, además de descentralizado. El paso a la democracia ya había tenido 
una larga y accidentada historia y los españoles tienen una idea más o menos clara 
de lo que significa. El otro cambio es mucho más difícil de entender, está mucho 
más lejos de la conciencia de los españoles, fuera de las regiones periféricas, y en el 
fondo representa una ruptura mucho mayor con el pasado, no solo del franquismo.
[The first one, the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy, and the 
other, from a centralized State that did not recognize the diversity of its peoples to a 
multilingual and multinational one, with a decentralized administration. The move 
towards democracy had already had a long and eventful history, and Spaniards have 
a more or less clear idea of what that means. The second change is much harder to 
understand, is much further from the Spanish consciousness, referring as it does to 
Spain’s peripheral regions, and could be said to entail a much more intense break 
with the past, and not only with Franquismo.] (Linz 2008c: 121)
He concludes with another assessment that is still in force: ‘España […] 
es probablemente el caso más difícil entre las democracias occidentales a 
la hora de encontrar soluciones satisfactorias permanentes’ [Spain […] is 
probably the most difficult case among the western democracies when it 
comes to finding permanent satisfactory solutions] (2008c: 158).
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In practice, political actors would end up partially facing these chal-
lenges – consolidation of democracy, decentralization, political autonomy 
and recognition of official languages different from Spanish – but the 
second revolutionary change set out by Linz was postponed and must still 
be dealt with (Romero and Alcaraz 2015).
The Constitutional Solution
At the time of setting in motion the process of Transition, there were 
many very different views of Spain. The majority of political forces, how-
ever, agreed to focus their attention on the State organization, leaving un-
determined and subject to very different interpretations the debate on 
the Nation and the nations.
The right-wing parties (AP and UCD), with their internal contradic-
tions, oscillated between the traditional essentialist discourse, exclusive 
nationalism and a programme of regional decentralization. The parties of 
the parliamentary left (PSOE and PCE), with their different traditions, 
had already carried out their particular programmatic internal ‘transition’, 
leaving behind any reference to the right of self-determination of the peoples 
of Spain or even to federalism ( Juliá 2013; Blas 2013: 938–9; Archilés 2014; 
Rodriguez-Flores 2014). The democratic peripheral nationalists (CiU and 
PNV, fundamentally), had also faced these debates with their own divisions 
and different blueprints. Nevertheless, the explicit acceptance by Catalan 
nationalist parties and the calculated ambiguity of the PNV towards the 
final text of the Constitutional Draft was very clear.
Almost all had to reconcile past and future in a context that was far 
from stable and without clear and well-defined outcomes. It was unclear 
what result they intended to achieve, but there was common ground: they 
knew what they wanted to escape from (Caminal 2009). It was an exer-
cise in pragmatism, not without improvisation and mutual concessions. 
Much has been written on this issue and the interpretations are many, but 
the fact is that the conflict of incompatible views of Spain occupied most 
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of the time spent in debate. Two Articles summarize the evolution of this 
pact-based process.
On the one hand, Article 1.2 of the constitutional draft, inspired by the 
Constitution of the Second Republic, stated that ‘los poderes de todos los 
órganos del Estado emanan del pueblo español, en el que reside la soberanía’ 
[the powers of every organ of the State are derived from the Spanish people, 
in which sovereignty resides], but, in the same Proposal, AP and UCD 
agreed to introduce the concept of ‘national sovereignty’, giving rise to a 
text essentially identical to the one that was finally approved: ‘La soberanía 
nacional reside en el pueblo español del que emanan los poderes del Estado’ 
[National sovereignty resides in the Spanish people, from whom the powers 
of the State are derived].
On the other hand, the initial version of Article 2 said: ‘La Constitución 
se fundamenta en la unidad de España y la solidaridad entre sus pueblos y 
reconoce el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la 
integran’ [The Constitution is based on the unity of Spain and solidarity 
amongst its peoples, and recognizes the right to self-government of the 
nationalities and regions of which it is comprised]. Discussions focused on 
the inclusion or not of the term nationalities, but the dispute was settled 
with the presentation of an amendment in voce, probably imposed from 
the military stratum and accepted by a large majority of the parliamentary 
groups, including the well-known declaration:
La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, Patria 
común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce el derecho a la autonomía 
de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas.
[The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees 
the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is comprised 
and the solidarity amongst them all.] (Diario de Sesiones, 1978: 2314)
That was the agreement, with the sole and relevant abstention of Basque 
nationalists. Later, different interpretations appeared, along with criti-
cisms from rightists and leftists, who believed themselves to have been 
betrayed, or to have surrendered or yielded too early to the wishes of their 
opponents. For some authors, such as Álvarez Junco:
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[M] ás que una fórmula de compromiso que resolviera el problema con concesiones 
de ambas partes, la redacción constitucional fue un híbrido que intentó dar cabida 
a dos exigencias nacionalistas, inconciliables si se llevan a un extremo. No resolvió, 
pues, el problema con conceptos claros y delimitaciones tajantes, sino que lo aplazó.
[More than a compromise that would resolve the problem by way of reciprocal con-
cessions, the constitutional text was a hybrid that intended to include two nationalistic 
demands, irreconcilable if they are taken to extremes. It did not solve the problem, 
therefore, with clear concepts and categorical demarcations, but simply put it off to 
a later date.] (Álvarez Junco 2013: 814)
However, as we see it, the vagueness of the adopted expression may be 
regarded as a good decision when it comes to the rebuilding of bridges 
of integration: it allows one to interpret the text as saying more than it 
originally intended. It becomes evident that the achieved ‘national pact’ 
involves accepting, on the one hand, the ideological and legal supremacy 
of the Spanish nation, and on the other, what has been known as a ‘pact 
of differences’, which becomes apparent in some particular points (our 
emphases) of the Constitution, notably:
 – The Preamble, when the Spanish Nation proclaims its will to ‘proteger 
a todos los españoles y pueblos de España en el ejercicio de los derechos 
humanos, sus culturas y tradiciones, lenguas e instituciones’ [protect all 
Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of their human rights, 
cultures and traditions, languages and institutions].
 – Article 2, in recognizing the right to self-government of the regions 
and nationalities, bearing in mind that the recognition of a right ne-
cessarily implies a previous reality.
 – The inclusion in Article 2 of the co-officiality of languages different 
from Spanish.
 – The reference in the Second Transitory Provision to the territories that 
in the past had decided to approve a Statute of Autonomy by plebis-
cite project – the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia – to whom 
a first-class autonomy was guaranteed, becoming known as historical 
nationalities, irrespective of the body of the Constitution.
 – The reference in the Fourth Transitory Provision to Navarre as an 
autonomous reality and its possible ‘incorporation’ into the Basque 
General Council – pre-autonomous – or into the future Basque au-
tonomous community.
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 – The legal protection that the First Additional Provision bestows on 
‘los derechos históricos de los territorios forales’ [the historical rights of 
the territories with chartered regimes], that should be updated in the 
eventual constitutional framework and in the Statutes of Autonomy.
Irrespective of the purpose of the fathers of the Constitution, these foun-
dations allow for an interpretation of this text from a multi-national 
point of view that does not have to be pitted against either the national 
sovereignty of the Spanish people or the indissoluble unity of the Spanish 
nation, as stated in articles 1.2 and 2 of the Constitution.
Post-Constitutional Drift
The agreement, in any case, was useful in laying the groundwork for a 
new territorial organization of the State, but subject to a particular de-
velopment. The general idea planned initially by the UCD government 
would end up undergoing substantial modifications. As early as 1979, 
after the approval of the Basque and Catalan Statutes, the government 
presided over by Adolfo Suárez adopted the clear intention of ‘ration-
alization’ of the process of development of the Autonomic State. Some 
relevant steps are well known:  the Report issued by a commission cre-
ated ad hoc by UCD and presided over by Martín Villa; the commu-
nication addressed to the Congress of Deputies by President Suárez in 
May 1980; the so-called Enterría Report that gave way to the Autonomic 
Agreements UCD-PSOE of 1981; the Organic Law on Harmonization 
of the Autonomic Process (LOAPA); the appeal to the Constitutional 
Court by the governments of the Basque Country and Catalonia; and 
the Ruling of the Constitutional Court declaring the text to a large extent 
unconstitutional. This process continued to be settled in a second major 
political agreement in 1992 – with subsequent enlargements and specifi-
cations – between the PSOE and the PP, that essentially opened up the 





The regional autonomic generalization provided a measure of stability 
to the system, at least for a time. For this purpose, the clarifying work of 
the Constitutional Court played a major role, particularly through the 
development of the concept of Constitutional Bloc, that allowed for an 
integration of the constitutional text and the respective Statutes in its ana-
lysis (Pérez Royo 1988). Nevertheless, other realities emerged, increasing 
the complexity of the situation and giving rise to new contradictions; and it 
must be noted that the interventionism of the Constitutional Court did not 
satisfy everybody. Interpretation in favour of the positions generally held 
by the State regarding extension of the basic or cross-cutting subjects to be 
regulated by the State, among other matters, would end up highlighting the 
intrinsic limitation of this mechanism: a rekindling of tensions between the 
growing dissatisfaction of the sub-state national identities and the project 
of rebuilding the Spanish national identity on a renewed basis. Both pro-
cesses were already obvious in the early 1990s. A return to open debate on 
the (identitarian) constitutional pact would emerge in full force when the 
economic and social crisis underscored the inadequacies and weaknesses 
of the territorial agreement that was finally reached.
Re-emergence of the Problem
The gaps and shortfalls in this process of construction of the Autonomic 
State, as well as the strongly identitarian and differential demands from 
peripheral nationalisms, became clearly visible from the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. It is true that during Term VI (1996–2000) the lack 
of a qualified majority by the PP government, presided over by José María 
Aznar, had favoured a better understanding with the nationalist parties 
ruling Catalonia and the Basque Country. Nevertheless, during Term 
VII (2000–4), with the PP now having an absolute majority, disputes 
began to increase in regard to two major points: the reform proposal of 
the Basque Statute – the Ibarretxe Plan – and the reform proposal of the 
Catalan Statute. Intense political and social debate led to increasingly 
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radical positions being adopted and fostered from both peripheral and 
central nationalist perspectives.
The reform of the Statutes of Autonomy promoted by the govern-
ment of Rodríguez Zapatero during Term VIII (2004–8) attempted to 
embed these changes in the constitutional framework while at the same 
time intending to make a qualitative leap in improved co-operation and co-
ordination between the Autonomous Communities and the State. It could 
not, however, avoid the redirection of a good many of these conflicts towards 
the Constitutional Court, whose rulings, rather than contributing to a solu-
tion to the essential problem, seemed rather to be giving rise to a deadlock.
The Basque process of reform concluded in 2005: first, with a vote 
in the Congress of Deputies that ruled out processing the Organic Law 
fostered by the Ibarretxe Plan and, afterwards, with Ruling 103/2008 
of the Constitutional Court, issued on 11 September, that vetoed the 
possibility of citizen consultation on the ‘right to decide of the Basque 
people’. The reform of the Statute of Catalonia, despite approval by the 
citizens of Catalonia, concluded with Ruling 31/2010, issued on 28 June, 
whereby a part was corrected or re-interpreted. This ruling sparked off a 
negative public perception by Catalan society with regard to integration 
with Spanish institutions, and the relationship seriously deteriorated 
further when the economic crisis worsened the negative consequences 
for Catalonia of the budget and state investment deficit, and generated a 
broadly accepted opinion within Catalan society that many of its prob-
lems are a product of an unfair and damaging funding mechanism decided 
by the Spanish State.
On the other hand, the same economic crisis served to reveal more 
clearly the serious functional problems of the Autonomic State. With some 
exceptions, mechanisms of multilateral co-ordination and co-operation are 
ignored, avoided or minimally implemented, thus further undermining 
a system where dysfunctions, co-ordination problems, a weak culture of 
co-operation and more than a few institutional pathologies come to the 
surface (Romero 2008; Sevilla, Vidal and Elias 2009). In this state of affairs, 
however, a reasonable amount of consensus on the diagnosis and proposal 
for improvement exists (see Aja 2004; Rubio and Álvarez 2006; Martín, 
Pérez, Romero, Soler and Vidal 2013).
Rebuilding Bridges 265
But, paradoxically, the strategy followed by the government of Mariano 
Rajoy during Term X (2011–15) was not to foster the many long-standing 
demands for reform, but rather to promote the attempts at political 
recentralization which were supported by the academic, political, judicial 
and media spheres. With the Law on Rationalization and Sustainability 
of the Local Administrations of 2013, within the framework of economic 
recession and in the name of efficiency and a more rational State, Spaniards 
were truly witnessing an unprecedented political offensive by the right and 
a part of the left against the Autonomic State. A process of recentralization 
affecting the Autonomous Communities was championed, with meas-
ures including suppression of regional organs and institutions as well as 
a reduction in the number of regional deputies and elimination of their 
salaries (which also affected local governments). All this was based on the 
false notion that the public deficit, even in recession, has its source in the 
hypertrophic and untidy Autonomic State.
Spaniards were witnessing a delegitimizing discourse that had been 
gaining ground within broad sectors of public opinion, with 23.1 per cent 
willing to support ‘only a central government without Autonomies’ and 
13.9 per cent in favour of a State where the Autonomous Communities 
‘would have a lesser degree of political autonomy than at the present time’ 
(Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2013). This is a centripetal trend 
that has become more pronounced in many autonomous communities with 
the same intensity as the centrifugal forces making progress in Catalonia 
and the Basque Country (Mira, Pérez and Romero 2013). It is precisely in 
these communities that almost half of the population is sympathetic to 
the separatist cause: opinion polls between 2013 and 2018 showed Catalan 
support for independence at close to 50 per cent, having peaked at 48.5 per 
cent in November 2013 and at 47.7 per cent in June 2016 (Centre d’Estudis 
d’Opinió 2013–18).
Nationalist political parties in the Basque Country championed this 
cause in the late twentieth century (whether through violence via ETA or 
peacefully through the Ibarretxe plan), but it was in Catalonia where, at the 
start of this century, the State was challenged by ‘El procés independentista’ 
[The independence process]. In 2013, and following its failure to secure a 
taxation agreement with the State, CiU – the then governing and principal 
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nationalist political party in Catalonia – decided to focus its efforts on 
the independence movement. CiU joined forces with ERC, the other 
major Catalan nationalist party, to found an alliance known as ‘Junts pel sí’ 
[Together for Yes]. This alliance received the support of the anti-capitalist 
nationalist party CUP, the Catalan Parliament’s third most represented 
nationalist party. The overall objective of these parties was to hold a refer-
endum for Catalans to vote on the nature of Catalonia’s relationship with 
Spain. Faced with repeated refusals by Spain’s Prime Minister – the only 
person able to authorize such a referendum (backed in his position by 
PP, PSOE and Ciudadanos) – on 6 September 2017 Catalan nationalist 
leaders (from ERC, CUP and the former CiU, who together held a majority 
in the Catalan Parliament) in defiance of the Spanish Constitution and 
Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, passed a law authorizing a referendum in 
Catalonia, which was duly held in Catalonia on 1 October 2017. If passed, 
the referendum would give the Catalan Parliament (with a nationalist 
majority) an excuse to unilaterally declare independence. In response, the 
Spanish government enforced article 155 of the Constitution, which allows 
the State to intervene in an autonomous community when its authorities 
seriously contravene their constitutional obligations. A number of key 
nationalist leaders of the independence Procés, led by the president of the 
Catalan government, fled Spain to avoid arrest. The train wreck that had 
been expected thus happened.
The Ideological Dispute
The crisis of the Autonomic State, nevertheless, has been years in the 
making. At the beginning of the 1990s, those who played a leading role 
during the Transition assessed the process.
Speeches in the Carlos III University of Madrid in 1991 and 1992 by the 
presidents Pujol and Ardanza are a good illustration of the appraisal made by 
both actors. Pujol regretted that perhaps he had not set out ‘el problema de 




enough] between 1975 and 1977 and, admitting that Spain is a unit, he won-
dered ‘¿qué temor cabe abrigar frente a una estructura que responda mejor 
a la personalidad diferenciada y muy particular de Cataluña?’ [what kind 
of fear can be harboured regarding a structure that better responds to the 
different and very particular personality of Catalonia?] (Pujol 1994: 63–6). 
For his part, the Lehendakari, Ardanza, argued:
Si el Estado, por el mero hecho de serlo, se proclama a sí mismo también nación y 
sobrecarga con ello su naturaleza jurídica y política, añadiéndole otras connotaciones 
históricas, culturales, sociales y hasta emocionales […] nadie podrá extrañarse de que 
cualquier colectividad, por el mero hecho de creerse nación, oponga a esa pretensión, 
a su juicio extralimitada, la suya propia de proclamarse a sí misma también Estado y 
niegue su adhesión […] Una cosa ha quedado clara y ésta es que una Nación puede 
encontrar cabida y encaje en otro Estado, pero no cabe, desde luego, en otra Nación. 
Y nosotros, los nacionalistas vascos, creemos que Euskadi es una Nación.
[If the State, by the mere fact of existing, is self-proclaimed a nation and subsequently 
overreaches its legal and political nature, adding other historical, cultural, social and 
even emotional connotations […] nobody should be surprised that any community, 
by the mere fact of considering itself a nation, counters that pretension, in its opinion 
overreaching, with its own intention of being a self-proclaimed State […] One thing 
is clear, and that is that a Nation can be accommodated within another State, but it 
definitely cannot be contained within another Nation. And we, the Basque nation-
alists, think that the Basque Country is a Nation.] (Ardanza 1994: 27–8)
During 1992, the PP and the PSOE supported several versions of ‘Spanish 
nationalism lite’. Spanish socialism, without abandoning its principally 
Jacobin soul, defending the well-known discourse of a plural Spain and 
on the basis of a positive assessment of the work achieved, attributed to 
the Agreements of 1991 the ‘objetivo de culminar el proceso constituyente 
y enriquecer el funcionamiento del sistema autonómico’ [objective of 
achieving the culmination of the constitutional process and enriching 
the operability of the autonomic system] (Eguiagaray 1993:  100). Not a 
single reference, therefore, to the nationalities. The right, for its part, clung 
to the defence, though still cautious, of the first part of Article 2 of the 
Spanish Constitution, that is, to the idea of a Nation within a State. But 
it also took preventive measures against possible claims by some national-
ities in putting forward what would be a robust strategy of recomposition 
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of Spanish nationalism several years later:  ‘[D] ebemos asumir nuestras 
responsabilidades y defender en todos los foros, universitarios y académicos, 
en los medios de comunicación, y allá donde proceda la existencia de una 
nación que se llama España, la necesidad de un proyecto nacional’ [We must 
assume our own responsibilities and defend in every forum, whether uni-
versity or academic, in the mass media, and wherever else, the existence of 
a nation called Spain and the need for a national project] (Rajoy 1993: 46).
It was when the PP came to power in 1996 that Spanish nationalism 
undertook the major task of implementing a political redefinition of iden-
tity on a new ideological basis, cloaked in apparent modernity. The identi-
fication between nation and Franquism, as explained by Jordi Muñoz, had 
generated a kind of ‘self-limitation’. During the first years of democracy, 
Spanish nationalism lacked ‘democratic credentials’. This limitation of 
Spanish nationalism would be to a significant extent overcome through 
the assumption by the right of a kind of peculiar and ‘traditional’ ver-
sion of Habermasian ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Bastida 2007: 132–55). 
This was a new discourse, a kind of Spanish constitutional nationalism, 
with the failed pretension of becoming an equivalent version of civic or 
political nationalism, that would initially turn the Constitution into a 
‘mito nacional o lugar de memoria’ [national myth or place of memory] 
(Muñoz 2012: 56) and later, into a metaphorical ‘fortaleza’ [fortress] in 
order to oppose any proposal of constitutional reform or recognition of 
the multi-national reality.
Over time, the situation has become even more polarized. The right 
frequently stresses well-known expressions from exclusionary Spanish na-
tionalism that, in several cases, seem to be moving towards some sort of 
‘authoritarian nationalism’. They speak of ‘closing’ a State model. A process 
of recentralization was put forward in the name of efficiency and a more 
rational State, and on the basis that the recession was caused by the develop-
ment of the Autonomic State. Two examples will suffice: the book by Julio 
Gómez, Mario Garcés and Gabriel Elorriaga, Por un Estado Autonómico 
racional y viable [For a rational and viable State of Autonomies] (2010) and 
the publication of the article ‘La España de las Autonomías: un Estado débil 
devorado por diecisiete estaditos’ [Spain of the Autonomies: a Weak State 
Devoured by Seventeen Statelets] by Professor Tomás-Ramón Fernández in 
2013, both under the auspices of FAES. A full consensus in their diagnosis 
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can be noted: the Autonomic State is non-viable and a comprehensive re-
vision and recentralization must be implemented.
Between this nationalist version, advocated by the Spanish right, and 
that defended by those who hold secessionist positions from Catalan and 
Basque nationalist perspectives, Spanish socialism tried to find a middle 
road. In accordance with its traditional position, it advocated the (third) 
way of territorial federalism, but without ever putting forth the option of 
plurinational federalism. The PSOE defended its stance in the document 
Hacia una estructura federal del Estado [Towards a Federal State Structure], 
ratified by its Federal Committee in July 2013.3 It was a renewed version 
of territorial federalism (a constitutional reform in a federal direction, 
where greater emphasis is put on a certain recognition of the peculiarities 
and differential aspects of some nationalities, such as those to be found in 
Catalonia and the Basque Country).
In our opinion, despite the conciliatory intentions of the socialist pro-
posal, the territorial federalist model cannot by itself contribute to solving 
either the political blockade or the real underlying problem. For this reason, 
we support a new political pact in favour of a plurinational federalism, 
capable of dealing with these issues with clarity and normality. This would 
be a project that would make possible both constitutional recognition of 
minority nations in a collective project, following the thesis of Gagnon, 
and an understanding of the Spaniards’ overlapping identities, where a 
majority of those who feel Catalan also feel Spanish (2012). Plurinational 
federalism allows, from a position of freedom and equality, for the building 
of an integrative political realm for all Spaniards with regional identities, 
precisely by expressly including them.
The New Bridges of the Spanish Territorial Model
It is the responsibility of politicians to correct their mistakes and im-
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social divides, has produced the greatest political crisis in Spain 
since the ratification of the 1978 Constitution. This crisis has en-
tailed: Catalonia’s chief executive calling an independence referendum 
in 2017; the subsequent enforcement of the Spanish Constitution’s art-
icle 155 in order to bring Catalonia back in line with constitutional 
provisions and other Spanish laws; the flight and imprisonment of 
some of Catalonia’s executive branch officials and others who played 
key roles in the referendum.
In light of these events, we once again stress that, in our view, efforts 
should be made to emphasize the fact that respect for the rules of the 
constitutional system is one of Spain’s greatest assets as a plurinational 
political community, and it should be one of our better legacies as well. 
Spain needs to convince the majority of the people that preservation of 
any national identity does not have to involve taking the perilous path 
of secession, but rather that being part of a plurinational State is better 
than being forced to decide, even if it were possible, between national-
isms or between one of the possible identities; it needs, in addition, to 
defend the positive values of a multinational, multicultural and multilin-
gual political community. In accordance with the present Constitution, 
significant steps by public powers can and must be demanded in the area 
of the recognition of identitarian diversity. An interpretation of the pre-
sent Constitution in plurinational terms is possible, among other things 
because Constitutions, far from becoming static, can and must adapt to 
new realities. The principal mission of any constitution is to promote co-
existence and social cohesion.
It seems that certain key political leaders have recognized this reality. 
First, Pedro Sánchez, prior to becoming Spanish prime minister, came out in 
support of ‘el reconocimiento en la Constitución del carácter plurinacional 
del Estado, aun manteniendo que la soberanía reside en el conjunto del 
pueblo español’ [the Constitution’s recognition of the State’s plurinational 
character, even though its sovereignty resides in the whole of Spain’s popu-
lation] (Sánchez 2017). Second, resolutions along similar lines were ap-
proved at PSOE’s 39th Congress, held on 16–18 June 2017 (PSOE 2017: 41). 
Last, on 20 September 2018 Basque president (lehendakari) Iñigo Urkullu 
asked his parliament to establish a ‘plurinational democracy’ within the 
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Spanish State (albeit while hoping for this initiative to be interpreted in 
federalist terms).4
It is obvious, therefore, that Spain must improve the Autonomic State 
in order to accommodate in a correct fashion the different nationalisms (in 
constitutional terminology) or internal nations (in academic terminology) 
that, as Ortega would say, we must bear. And, at the same time, it must be 
underscored that, as Juan José Solozábal aptly noted in 2010: ‘[E] l orden 
autonómico es un orden complejo, pero no puede ser un orden confuso’ 
[The autonomic order is a complex order, but it cannot be a confused 
order] (quoted in Azagra and Romero 2012: 225), which means that it is 
also necessary to undertake important reforms regarding the essence of 
and most efficient running of a composite State.
Such a series of reforms must be undertaken within a federal perspec-
tive and coming from a position of respect for a deep diversity, that we can 
summarize as: recognition of the plurinationality of the Spanish State, the 
adoption of a new, fair and efficient funding system, and the establishment 
of a federal dimension in territorial relations and the functioning of the 
State in order to provide it with greater efficiency and political legitimacy 
(Martín, Pérez, Romero, Soler and Vidal 2013).
Recognition of the Plurinational Nature of the Spanish State or of the 
‘Nationalities’ that Make It Up
The Spanish Constitution already recognizes, explicitly, that the Spanish 
Nation is made up of ‘nationalities and regions’ in its Article 2, so the 
recognition of this plurinational reality should be clearly and expressly 
assumed and the Constitution should be reinterpreted to accommodate 
this reality. Apart from the already adduced reasons, the Constitution 
Preamble encourages us to strengthen the pacific and co-operative 
 4 Available <https://www.eitb.eus/es/noticias/politica/detalle/5864507/debate-
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relations amongst the peoples of the Earth after making an express ref-
erence to ‘the peoples’ of Spain. It is obvious that this interpretation re-
quires broad consensus in order to guarantee its durability and stability 
over time. Perhaps, in order to underpin this interpretation, a reform of 
Title VIII of the Constitution could be implemented, this being a reform 
which would not require the special (‘aggravated’) procedures demanded 
by Articles 1.2 and 2 of the Constitution.
If no consensus were reached, the reform of both articles could also 
be considered. A number of possibilities exist that can be summarized in 
the following fashion: to break the connection between nation and sov-
ereignty, thereby making the people, or, if preferred, the citizenry directly 
sovereign; explicit recognition of the multinational nature of the Spanish 
State; and (the most problematic solution) explicit recognition of the dif-
ferent internal nations.
The Adoption of a New, Fair and Efficient System of Funding
Another of the bones of contention in the organization of the Spanish 
territorial model is the funding system. The marked inequalities between 
autonomous communities in terms of per capita (i.e. ‘adjusted popu-
lation’) funding are widely known. This inequality is up to 25 per cent 
amongst communities with a common regime and close to 40 per cent 
with regard to communities ‘de régimen foral’ [with a chartered regime]. 
At first glance, these differences (which could be justified on the grounds 
of dispersion of population or insularity) do not seem reasonable and, 
for many people, are not justified or, at least, are not justified in these 
proportions.
It is essential therefore, to reorganize the funding distribution of the 
communities in a more reasonable way. It is not our place to offer a categor-
ical solution, but we consider that, among those proposed, the most reason-
able (Martín, Pérez, Romero, Soler and Vidal 2013) is the one adopted by 
the Valencian socialists (PSOE-PSPV 2013), and also, at least nominally, by 
the federal PSOE; this would involve the creation of a kind of Guarantee 




of the functions of public expense, in proportion to the state GDP, for the 
following attributions: security, justice, healthcare, education and social 
protection, both autonomic and central. Such a Fund, whose distribution 
should follow population criteria, must develop along with the GDP, and 
not with tax collection, and in order to be maintained in times of crisis, it 
would be necessary to establish safeguards and contingency mechanisms 
similar to those of the pension system.
These Welfare State faculties having been assured, the system would 
guarantee sufficient financial support for the remaining autonomic sphere 
of competence through the collection of taxes transferred to the autono-
mous communities and their participation in state taxes. The distribution of 
this tranche among the autonomous communities, on this occasion, would 
take place according to the agreed necessity indicators: population, GDP, 
territorial extent, population density, dispersion of people in the territory, 
and so on. Otherwise, autonomy would be guaranteed by those additional 
resources that could be obtained by the Autonomous Communities when 
exercising their normative capacity in the tax sphere, establishing their own 
taxes or surcharges on top of those of the state, as well as through their 
participation in the collection results derived from a fiscal effort above the 
average of the Autonomous Communities.
It would be, therefore, a system that would guarantee to all citizens, re-
gardless of their territory of residence and their per capita income, the same 
level of welfare or, at least, fair treatment in terms of education, healthcare 
and social services.
A New Structural and Functional Organization of the Autonomic State
For the establishment of these new bridges upon which Spain’s territorial 
model must be built, in order to provide it with greater efficiency and pol-
itical legitimacy it is also necessary to have at its disposal what we could 
call a federal character in the structural and functional articulation of 
the State.
Many paths in this process can exist, but it seems indispensable 
to at least implement a constitutional reform, both with regard to the 
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configuration of a new model of the Senate, and to reform of Title VIII of 
the Constitution in order to define with clarity and consistency the rules 
that must govern the new composite State, without renouncing the achieve-
ments of the last thirty years of autonomic experience, but amending the 
evident dysfunctions and shortfalls detected. In conclusion, we outline for 
discussion a selection of guidelines for the proposed reforms.
Constitutional Recognition of the Territorial Structure of the State
The architects of the 1978 Constitution were not able to precisely spe-
cify the structure of the future Autonomic State. Nevertheless, over forty 
years later, the development and consolidation of these territorial entities 
has defined Spain’s Autonomic State quite clearly. It seems, therefore, to 
be the moment to recognize this fact and incorporate the autonomic map 
within the constitutional text. Likewise, it also seems evident that local 
government is a State power and its autonomy must be recognized and 
guaranteed as appropriate. In this context, it seems to make little sense, 
within a state organized in autonomous communities, to maintain the 
provincial structure of government in the constitutional sphere.
Reformulation and Clarification of the Distribution of Competences
Autonomy, not only of the autonomous communities, but of the three 
government levels, must be guaranteed by a clear and evident distribution 
of competences which can remove strain on the system and enhance its 
operability. In our opinion, the problems of lack of definition in certain 
spheres of competence will always persist, but we have enough models, as 
well as cumulative and comparative experience, to be able to tackle, with 
full guarantees, a new formulation of the distribution of competences 
that can contribute to the improvement of the performance of the model. 
It is obvious that the ‘hechos diferenciales’ [asymmetries] among com-
munities must be taken into consideration as long as they do not affect 






Constitutional Recognition of the Principles and Basic Rules of 
Functional Articulation of the State
The Constitution must establish the principles and rules that must govern 
the functional articulation of relations among the different levels of gov-
ernment. On a general basis, a common agreement exists in legal doctrine 
regarding the need to reinforce horizontal co-operation. Possibilities here 
are also diverse and not mutually exclusive.
Thereby, the constitutional reform of the Senate is a cornerstone of 
the proper functioning of a composite Spanish State. Although it needs 
further discussion, it seems reasonable to conceive of a reform involving 
a new composition that can better reflect the autonomic intention and 
reinforce the attributions of the Senate in territorial terms. We also con-
sider it necessary to turn the Senate into a permanent forum for the other 
multilateral co-operation bodies.
It is particularly with regard to this last point that the new con-
stitutional text should include the principles and rules that must 
govern the life of the most prominent multilateral co-operation bodies 
along with the Senate, that is, the Conferences of Presidents and the 
Sectorial Conferences. Their institutionalization should no longer be 
dependent on the ever-changing will of the governments in office, but 
should become common practice in the functioning of our model of 
composite State.
In the same vein, the Constitution should regulate the principles 
that must govern the structure of the National State Administration and 
its relational activity with the territorial entities, on the basis of federal 
models and in accordance with the distribution of competences estab-
lished in the constitutional text. We cannot allow ourselves to maintain 
a state administrative structure with our backs turned to the functional 
reality of the autonomous communities or any other level of government, 
which means that its configuration must be adjusted to the needs of a 
multi-level state.
We must also find a constitutionally suitable place for the autonomies 
in the sphere of the European Union and, in general, their role in the 
international sphere. It is essential to reinforce the participation of the 
 
 
276 Juan Romero et al.
Autonomous Communities in the sphere of the European Union, par-
ticularly with regard to issues that are strictly within the latter’s faculties, 
and in those decisions that could affect the management of its faculties. In 
addition, the territorial governments must take part in and be acquainted 
with the State’s external action, which requires their empowerment, but 
always on the basis of respect for State faculties.
For the aforementioned reasons, and for many other issues that go 
beyond the scope of this study, it will be possible to advance the quest for 
a solution to the most serious political crisis currently facing Spain’s con-
stitutional system, rooted in the poorly named ‘problema territorial de las 
Españas’ [territorial problem of the Spains] (Vidal 2013), which has been 
characterized by a long history of disagreements (Romero 2006) and, even 
today, requires solid bridges both in Catalonia and in the Basque Country 
between the opposing parties, this being a problem that is not confined 
to Spain. Other democracies – including Belgium, the United Kingdom 
and Canada – have faced or are currently facing similar situations and they 
have been tackled with courageous political decisions that have enabled 
progress towards new scenarios, both in the present and for the future. 
The direction of the solution was already pointed out by Juan Linz in the 
1990s: ‘[Q] uienes se identifican con una nación no necesitan construir 
Estados nacionales si sus Estados multinacionales pueden ofrecer un techo 
a su cultura e identidad’ [Those who identify themselves with a nation do 
not need to build national States if their multinational States can provide 
a shelter for their culture and identity] (Linz 2008c: 567).
Bibliography
Aja, E. (2004). ‘La consolidación del Estado autonómico’, Corts 15, 393–410.
Álvarez Junco, J. (2013). ‘La idea de España en el sistema autonómico’. In A. Morales, 
J. P. Fusi, and A. de Blas (eds), Historia de la nación y del nacionalismo español, 
pp. 47–75. Barcelona: Galaxia de Gutenberg.
Aranguren, J. L. (1991). ‘Naciones, Estados, nacionalismos, inter-nacionalidad’, 




Archilés, F. (2014). ‘Una improvisada pervivencia:  la Constitución de 1978 y la 
idea de nación española’. In F. Archilés, and I. Saz (eds), Naciones y Estado. La 
cuestión española, pp. 15–49. Valencia: Universitat de València.
Ardanza, J. A. (1994). ‘A propósito del Pacto Autonómico’. In A. de las Heras (ed.), 
Nacionalidades y Estado en España. Madrid: Universidad Carlos III/Boletín 
Oficial del Estado.
Azagra, J., and Romero, J. (2012). Desde la margen izquierda. Valencia: Universitat 
de València
Bastida, X. (2007). ‘La senda constitucional. La nación española y la Constitución’. 
In C. Taibo (ed.), Nacionalismo español. Esencias, memoria e instituciones, 
pp. 113–58. Madrid: Libros de la Catarata.
Bauböck, R. (2000). ‘Why stay together? A  pluralist Approach to Secession and 
Federation’. In W. Kymlicka, and W. Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies, pp. 366–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bednar, J. (1999). ‘Federalism:  Unstable by Design’. Paper presented at APSA 
Meeting, Atlanta, GA.
Blas, A. de (2013). ‘Cuestión nacional, transición política y Estado de las Autonomías’. 
In A. Morales, J. P. Fusi, and A. de Blas (eds), Historia de la nación y del 
nacionalismo español, pp. 934–50. Barcelona: Galaxia de Gutenberg.
Bosch-Gimpera, P. (1996). El problema de las Españas. Málaga: Algazara.
Bou i Novensà, M. (2005). ‘Naciones sin Estado:  ¿Acomodación en democracias 
plurinacionales o secesión’, Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas 
RIPS, 4 (2), 167–81.
Burgess, M. (2013). ‘The penumbra of federalism’. In J. Loughlin, J. Kincaid, and W. 
Swendem (eds), Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism, pp. 45–
60. London: Routledge.
Caminal, M. (2009). ‘L’Estat autonòmic espanyol: entre la resistència nacionalista 
i l’horitzó federal’. In M. Caminal, and F. Requejo (eds), Federalisme i 
plurinacionalitat, pp. 475–540. Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics.
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1996). Barómetro Autonómico 1996. Madrid: 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2005). Barómetro Autonómico 2005. Madrid: 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2011). Barómetro Autonómico 2011. Madrid: 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2013). Barómetro Autonómico 2013. Madrid: 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Centro d’Estudis d’Opinió (2013–2018). Barómentros y estudios de opinión. Barcelona 
<http://ceo.gencat.cat/es/inici/> accessed 23 September 2018.
278 Juan Romero et al.
Colominas, J. (2010). ‘L’intent fracassat del catalanisme polític de convertir Espanya 
en un Estat plurinacional’. In F. Requejo, and A.-G. Gagnon (eds), Nacions a la 
recerca de reconeixement, pp. 139–62. Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics.
Comisión de Expertos sobre Autonomías (1981). Informe de la Comisión de Expertos 
sobre Autonomías. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
Eguiagaray, J. M. (1993). ‘El Pacto Autonómico’. In VVAA, Organización territorial 
del Estado. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca.
Elazar, D. J. (1987). Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Elorza, A. (2012). ‘Delenda est Hispania’, El País, 1 November.
Fernández, J. J. (2009). ‘La progresiva equiparación al Estado como modelo 
autonómico’, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, 24, 323–55.
Fernández, T.-R. (2013). ‘La España de las Autonomías: un Estado débil devorado 
por diecisiete estaditos’, Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo, 158, 25–52.
Figueireido, R. J. P., and Weingast, B. (1998). ‘Self-Enforcing Federalism: Solving the 
two Fundamental Dilemmas’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21 
(1), 103–5.
Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., and Shvetsova, O. (2004). Designing Federalism: A 
Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Gagnon, A.-G. (2001). ‘The Moral Foundations of Asymetrical Federalism: a Normative 
Exploration of the Case of Quebec and Canada’. In A.-G. Gagnon, and J. Tully 
(eds), Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gagnon, A.-G. (2012). Temps d’incertituds. Assajos sobre el federalisme i la diversitat 
nacional. Valencia: Universitat de València /Afers.
Gómez, J., Garcés, M., and Elorriaga, G. (2010). Por un Estado Autonómico racional 
y viable. Madrid: FAES.
Guibernau, M. (2002). ‘Between Autonomy and Secession: the Accommodation of 
Catalonia within the new Democratic Spain’ <http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/
pdf/w48guibernau.pdf> accessed 23 September 2018.
Juliá, S. (2013). ‘Nación, nacionalidades y regiones en la transición política a la 
democracia’. In A. Morales, J. P. Fusi, and A. de Blas (eds), Historia de la nación 
y del nacionalismo español, pp. 886–902. Barcelona: Galaxia de Gutenberg.
Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Linz, J. J. (2008a). ‘Construcción temprana del Estado y nacionalismos periféricos 
tardíos frente al estado: el caso de España’. In J. J. Linz, Nación, Estado y lengua, 
vol. 2, pp. 3–73. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Linz, J. J. (2008b). ‘La política en una sociedad multilingüe con una lengua mundial 
dominante:  el caso de España’. In J. J. Linz, Nación, Estado y Lengua, vol.  2, 
pp. 75–120. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Rebuilding Bridges 279
Linz, J. J. (2008c). ‘La política en sociedades multilingües y multinacionales’. In J. J. 
Linz, Nación, Estado y Lengua, vol. 2, pp. 121–59. Madrid: Centro de Estudios 
Políticos y Constitucionales.
Loughlin, J. (2017). ‘Federalisme, federacions i confederaciones: cap a la hibridació’, 
Debats Revista de cultura, poder i societat, 131, 19–30.
Maiz, R. (2000). ‘Democracy, Federalism and Nationalism in Multinational States’. 
In W. Safran, and R. Maiz, Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. 
London: Frank Cass.
Maiz, R. (2006). ‘Federalismo plurinacional: una teoría política normativa’, Revista 
d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals, 3, 43–85.
Martín, J., Pérez, J. A., Romero, J., Soler, M., and Vidal, J. M. (2013). El federalismo 
plurinacional ¿Fin de viaje para el estado Autonómico? Madrid: Díaz & Pons.
Mira, A., Pérez, J. A., and Romero, J. (2013). ‘Deslegitimación política y descrédito 
fiscal de las Comunidades Autónomas’, Pasajes de pensamiento contemporáneo 
41, 96–113.
Moreno, L. (2008). La federalización de España. Poder político y territorio. Madrid: 
Siglo XXI.
Muñoz Mendoza, J. (2012). La construcción política de la identidad española:  ¿del 
nacionalcatolicismo al patriotismo democrático? Madrid: Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Ortega Álvarez, L. I. (2010). ‘¿Estado federal, integral o autonómico?’ In J. Tutela, 
and F. Knüpling (eds), España y modelos de federalismo, pp.  91–8. Madrid: 
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Pérez Royo, J. (1988). ‘Tribunal Constitucional y Estado autonómico’. In VVAA, I 
Simposium Internacional Autonómico. Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana.
PSOE (2017). Resoluciones del 39 Congreso Federal del PSOE. <https://www.psoe.
es/media-content/2016/04/Resolucion-Politica-39-Congreso.pdf> accessed 
23 September 2018.
Pujol, J. (1994). ‘La personalidad diferenciada de Cataluña’. In A. de Heras (ed.), 
Nacionalidades y Estado en España. Madrid: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid/
Boletín Oficial del Estado.
Rajoy, M. (1999). ‘El problema de la organización territorial del Estado después de 
los Acuerdos Autonómicos’. In VVAA, Organización territorial del Estado. 
Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca.
Requejo, F. (2001). ‘Political Liberalism in Multinational States:  the Legitimacy 
of plural and asymmetrical Federalism’. In A.-G. Gagnon, and J. Tully (eds), 
Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Requejo, F. (2005). Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism. London: Routledge.
Requejo, F. (2007). ‘Federalisme, descentralització i pluralisme nacional. Teoria 
política y anàlisi comparada’, Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals, 4, 35–67.
280 Juan Romero et al.
Rodden, J. (2004). ‘Comparative Federalism and Descentralization. On Meaning 
and Measurement’, Comparative Politics, July, 481–500.
Rodden, J., and Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). ‘Does Federalism Preserve Markets?’, 
Virginia Law Review, 83, 1521–72.
Rodríguez-Flores, V. (2014). ‘El Estado federal en el PSOE: de Suresnes a los Pactos 
Autonómicos’. In F. Archiles, and I. Saz (eds), Naciones y Estado. La cuestión 
española, pp. 245–68. Valencia: Universitat de València.
Romero, J. (2006). España inacabada. Valencia: Universitat de València.
Romero, J. (2008). ‘Autonomía política y nacionalismos’, Pasajes de pensamiento 
contemporáneo 26, 13–24.
Romero, J., and Alcaraz, M. (2015). ‘Estado, naciones y regiones en la España 
contemporánea’. In J. Romero, and A. Furió (eds), Historia de las Españas. Una 
aproximación critica, pp. 371–429. Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch.
Romero, J., and Furió, A. (eds) (2015). Historia de las Españas. Una aproximación 
crítica. Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch.
Rubio Llorente, F., and Álvarez Junco, J. (eds) (2006). El informe del Consejo de 
Estado sobre la reforma constitucional. Madrid: Consejo de Estado/Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Sánchez, P. (2017). Sí es sí. Programa por una nueva socialdemocracia <https://
www.ecestaticos.com/file/ae79792ece6c055d82479339cc80bb23/1494516985-
docdefinitivops_11may2017.pdf> accessed 23 September 2018.
Sevilla, J., Vidal, J. M., and Elías, C. (2009). Vertebrando España. Madrid: Fundación 
Ortega y Gasset.
Solozábal, J. J. (1999). ‘El Estado social como estado autonómico’, Teoría y Realidad 
Constitucional 3, 61–78.
Solozábal, J. J. (2013). ‘Las naciones de España’. In A. Morales, J. P. Fusi, and A. de 
Blas (eds), Historia de la nación y del nacionalismo español. Barcelona: Galaxia 
de Gutenberg.
Taylor, C. (1992). ‘The politics of Recognition’. In C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and 
the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tierney, S. (2004). Constitutional Law and National Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Treissman, D. (2000). ‘The Theory of Two Level States: Exploitation, Redistribution 
and Democracy Stability’. Paper presented at APSA Annual Meeting, 
Washington, D.C.
Tudela, J. (2009). ‘El Estado autonómico treinta años después’, Teoría y Realidad 
Constitucional 24, 191–242.
Tully, J. (2001) ‘Introduction’. In A.-G. Gagnon, and J. Tully (eds), Multinational 
Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rebuilding Bridges 281
Vidal, J. M. (2013). ‘La cuestión territorial en la Constitución de Cádiz de 1812’, 
Revista Española de la Función Consultiva 19, 632–45.
Vidal, J. M., and García, M. Á. (eds) (2005). El Estado autonómico:  integración, 
solidaridad, diversidad. Madrid: Colex-INAP.
Watts, R. L. (1996). Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s. Ontario: Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University.
Watts, R. L. (2010). ‘¿Una federación multinacional encubierta?’ In J. Tudela, and F. 
Knüpling (eds), España y modelos de federalismo, pp. 55–82. Madrid: Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Watts, R. L. (2013). ‘Typologies of Federalism’. In J. Loughlin, J. Kincaid, and W. 
Swendem (eds), Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism. London: 
Routledge.
Weingast, B. R. (1995). ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions:  Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development?’, Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 11 (1), 1–31.




Separatism in the New Millennium: Looking Back to 
See Forward
abstract
From Gavrilo Princip’s assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand to the current crisis in 
the Donbas region of Ukraine, separatism – in both its violent and democratic forms – 
has shaped geopolitics across the continent of Europe. Operating from the principle that 
ethnic separatism has been a driving force in European history for the past 100 years, this 
chapter explores the vicissitudes of minority nationalism and the challenges it has posed 
to European states and societies. Focusing on commonalities across western, central and 
eastern Europe in its wide-ranging account of every national liberation struggle since 1914, 
this chapter contextualizes such movements as a transcontinental phenomenon, thus 
critiquing the ‘east-west’ divide which has long characterized the literature of European 
separatist movements.
A little more than one century ago, a South Slav nationalist named 
Gavrilo Princip plunged Europe into continent-wide conflict when he 
assassinated the heir-apparent of the Habsburg Empire with the goal of 
achieving complete self-rule for his fellow Serbs living under Austro-
Hungarian domination. Over the past 100  years, the European con-
tinent has seen hundreds of other acts of political violence in the name 
of the nation, and more specifically the stateless nation. In the nine-
teenth century, national elites among minority populations generally 
saw their influence confined to university discussion clubs, secret soci-
eties, and other semi-private space; however, via mass education, near-
universal literacy, and new forms of information and communication 
technologies, the advent of modernity endowed aspirant peoples across 
Europe with a variety of new tools to work towards the creation of their 
own sovereign states. In some cases, this involved direct action, often 
resulting in massive loss of life; in other instances, the transition from 
national minority status to full (or partial) independence occurred 
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through peaceful transition. In a few examples, both bullets and ballot 
boxes made the dream of national liberation a reality. However, the 
project remains perpetually unfinished, with dozens of unrealized-
but-active minority nationalism movements at play in contemporary 
Europe, both within the borders of the European Union and beyond.
Whether we use the terms national liberation, secessionism, separ-
atism, or irredentism, the phenomenon of a people, calling themselves a 
nation, but lacking political sovereignty over the lands they inhabit, has 
been a major factor in shaping the course of European history since 1914 
(Smith 1991; Panayi 2001; Laible 2016). Inarguably, nearly every European 
polity – whether democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian – has grappled 
with the threat of separatism in this period, a factor which, I will argue, has 
had acute and far-reaching influences on the historical development of the 
continent and its structures of governance up until today. Consequently, 
I want to provide a brief overview of this often-bloody history, while also 
pointing to instances where the move towards independence has been 
democratic and non-violent. The geographical scope of my essay will cover 
all of Europe, including the former Soviet Union where there is an ongoing 
separatist-irredentist conflict, as well as a number of frozen conflicts wherein 
ethnic separatism lies at the root of the problem.
The actions of the aforementioned revolutionary, Princip, oper-
ating in the name of the secret Serbian society known as Union or Death 
(Ujedinjenje ili Smrt), colloquially branded the ‘Black Hand’, had far-
reaching effects for national minorities, particularly those living in one 
of the four territorial empires (Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Romanov and 
Ottoman) that were dissolved in the wake of the Great War. The nationalist 
aspirations of Czechs, Finns, Lithuanians, and others were achieved with 
the breakup of Austria-Hungary and imperial Russia, whereas the Poles saw 
their long-dead state resurrected. Wilsonian national liberation was doled 
out by the victors of the First World War, both punishing the losers (i.e. 
Austria, Hungary, Germany and Turkey) and attempting to build a ‘cordon-
sanitaire’ against the unpredictable Bolshevik state situated at the eastern 
fringe of the continent (see Johnson 1996). In the decade after the end of 
the First World War, a host of new states came into being – some completely 
sovereign like Czechoslovakia, others national homelands within a large, 
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heavily centralized federation like the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
However, this new world order only triggered more problems with the issue 
of national identity, as dozens of new national minorities were now trapped 
inside what Rogers Brubaker (1996) has called ‘nationalising states’. From 
Germans in the Sudetenland to Hungarians in Romania and southern 
Czechoslovakia, east central Europe traded a set of nationality problems 
stemming from the vagaries of imperial rule for another set based on de-
colonization, new borders, and the ethnicization of the state apparatus.1 
While the former presented a variety of dilemmas to national minorities, 
the latter proved much more lethal as it naturally led to what we now refer 
to as ‘ethnic cleansing’, beginning with the dramatic population transfers 
of Greeks and Turks between Anatolia and southeastern Europe, as well 
as the calamitous relocation of Armenians within Turkey.
In post-First World War Russia, a variant of the ideology that the nation 
and the state should be coterminous (i.e. Leninist national self-determin-
ation) ultimately resulted in a strange hybrid status for the minority na-
tionalities of the former Romanov Empire, wherein these nations received 
a state within a state, from union republics to autonomous regions. With 
its establishment in 1922, the USSR presented a new federal model that 
allowed for the Soviet Union’s 100-plus nationalities to establish some level 
of national self-determination (part of a strategy to ultimately move these 
populations through the Marxist dialectic towards the ultimate realization 
of a worker state where the concerns of so-called ‘bourgeois nationalism’ 
would be confined to the dustbin of history). At the highest level of this 
so-called ‘affirmative action empire’ (Martin 2001) were the union republics, 
each with a titular majority (Ukrainians, Georgians, Kazakhs, etc.); offi-
cially, these were independent states with territorial sovereignty and com-
plete cultural autonomy (the reality was, however, much more complex). 
Within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the geopolitical 
 1 Hungary’s interwar politics were often coloured by the state’s obsession with re-
gaining its lost territories in Romania and elsewhere. Opposition to the basic tenets 
of the harsh peace suffused the familiar refrain: ‘Nem, nem, soha!’ [No, no, never!] 
referring to the Treaty of Trianon, which dismembered the Hungarian half of the 
Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.
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core of the USSR, dozens of republics and autonomous regions are estab-
lished with the ostensible aim of providing cultural and educational oppor-
tunities for non-Russians, including Tartarstan, Yakutia and Buryatia; the 
process is replicated on a much smaller scale in some of the union republics 
providing officially recognized ‘homelands’ for the Karakalpaks, Abkhaz 
and others. In some ways, this sea change avoided the problems inherent 
in the nationalizing state structure of east central Europe and the Balkans; 
however, as Moscow eventually learned, the federal socialist solution cre-
ated problems associated with autonomist nationalism that would fester 
and ultimately bring down the Soviet Union less than seventy years later 
(see Orridge and William 1982).
Importantly, not all was quiet on the Western Front during this time 
frame. The Great War created conditions wherein Irish republicans who 
had struggled in vain against British rule gained increasing momentum, 
culminating in the ill-fated Easter Rising (Éirí Amach na Cásca) in 1916. 
While the rebellion was quickly crushed, forces were put into play that 
would devolve an ever-greater level of home rule to the people of Eire. 
Irish moves towards full independence continued apace even after the es-
tablishment of the Free State in 1922, ultimately resulting in a full break 
from the British Empire and the establishment of a republic. During the 
interwar period, restive populations of Basques and Catalans looked with 
suspicion on developments in Madrid, placing them in opposition to the 
more conservative forces that would soon retake control of Spain. Hoping 
to benefit from an alliance with the left, these minorities embraced the 
new freedoms granted by the establishment of the Second Republic in 
1931. But with the Francoist counter-revolution in 1936, Spain took on 
the character of a nationalizing state as antithetical to the interests of its 
national minorities as any newly founded east central European country, 
making speaking Basque in public a crime while repressing Catalan culture 
and dissolving political institutions associated with the region. In time, 
Franco’s repressive rule would germinate both forms of national liberation 
struggle: a terrorist insurgency among the Basques and a more peaceful 
and economically based movement towards independence in Catalunya.
The Second World War, like the Great War, began due to questions of 
irredenta, in this case, as a response to Nazi Germany’s final act of ‘gathering 
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in’ the ‘lost’ 11 million Germans (Snyder 2010). Whereas the Western Allies 
chose not to stand in the way of Adolf Hitler’s Anschluss with Austria, 
which brought back in 7 million German-speakers, or when 3 million 
Germans ‘returned’ to the Third Reich through the annexation of western 
Czechoslovakia, Britain and France chose to act when Germany invaded 
western Poland to gain access to the Danzig Corridor and reintegrate a 
million Germans living under Warsaw’s rule. This series of events provides a 
dark parallel to current events in Russia’s so-called ‘near abroad’, that is, those 
parts of the former Soviet Union where the presence of ethnic Russians has 
provided Moscow with a rationale for intervention in the internal and for-
eign affairs of its neighbours, from economic manipulation to geopolitical 
bullying to outright invasion. Certainly, the active lobbying on the part of 
the Crimean population for a ‘return’ to Russia (a dual strategy of separatism 
followed by immediate accession) represents the most dramatic of these ana-
logies due to its striking similarity to the actions of the Sudeten Germans in 
1936–8. This is particularly relevant when one considers that the annexation 
only served to provide a foothold for further Russian expansionism, specif-
ically the deployment in the Donbass of so-called ‘little green men’ (Russian 
military personnel who serve outside the normal structure of military action 
to avoid the bad optics of outright invasion) and massive material support 
to anti-Kyiv separatists in the east of the ethnically divided country.
With the end of the Second World War, the nationality question re-
turned to the fore once again. Across the eastern half of Europe, ethnic 
cleansing, a major theme of the war in Nazi-occupied and allied zones, con-
tinued to reign, but with radically different geopolitical contours. While 
the Nazis’ Final Solution had eliminated some 6 million of Europe’s Jews 
(alongside millions of non-Jewish peoples, including Poles, eastern Slavs 
and Roma), the Holocaust provided a final impetus for the realization of 
the Zionist project with the establishment of a ‘separate’ Jewish state out-
side of Europe. Fearful of a second bout of genocide and facing deleterious 
conditions across Europe, many Jews quit the continent after 1945. A sig-
nificant portion of these emigrants joined those who had already moved 
to Palestine over the previous decades, heeding Theodore Herzl’s call to 
create a Jewish homeland in the Levant (a settlement trend that was sig-
nificantly abetted by the 1917 Balfour Declaration) and thus rejecting other 
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identity projects associated with minority nationalism that flourished in the 
interwar period (see, for instance, Lichtenstein 2016). The establishment 
of Israel in 1948 represented a curious sort of separatism, one which came 
into being through emigration from the continent and post-imperial state-
building abroad. Consequently, we can consider Israel as an unintended 
exemplar of ‘European’ minority separatism.
In the zones of Europe that came under Soviet occupation, the Red 
Army oversaw a policy of draconian resettlement policies, combined with 
the remaking of borders, implementation of socialist federalism, and avo-
cation of minority rights to prevent active secessionism/separatism (the 
admixture of totalitarianism also ensured that separatist/irredentist phe-
nomena like the Sudeten German debacle would not be repeated). The 
preliminary stage of this scheme was the deportation of eastern Europe’s 
11.5 million Volksdeutsche, who were sent westward with little more than 
the clothes on their backs. East Prussia was completely emptied of its 
population, as were much of the Sudetenland and the former German-
inhabited lands east of the Oder. The Baltic States, together with Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, all sent packing the vast ma-
jority of their Germans, purportedly in an attempt to avoid a repetition 
of the past. Concurrently, geopolitics, nationalism and the march of so-
cialism were fused in the eastern zones, with mass population exchanges 
of Ukrainians and Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks, and so forth. Tragically, 
these often bloody attempts at squashing separatism only plastered over 
the thorny issues of national identity, they did not extinguish them (a 
case in point being the Ruthenes of Transcarpathia, who were scattered 
among multiple states by post-war delimitation projects orchestrated by 
the Soviets, most notably the geopolitical excision of Carpatho-Ukraine 
in eastern Czechoslovakia, and saw their identity forcefully submerged in 
the new world order) (see Magocsi 2010). Yet, the death and displacement 
from this period serve as permanent testament to the power of separatism 
on the European continent, if only as a reminder of the lengths to which 
national governments went to negate the threat from within.
Generally unknown to the West, these forced expulsions and popu-
lation exchanges were executed with blueprints established shortly before 
in the USSR, wherein Stalin had ordered massive transfers of ‘suspect 
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nationalities’ within the borders of the Soviet Union. For real and imagined 
crimes against the Soviet state, eight nations were deported in their entirety 
from their federally recognized national homelands within the USSR. The 
political territories were then summarily erased from the record, though 
certain ones were restored following Stalin’s death in the 1950s. These 
‘punished peoples’ included the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars, the 
Chechens and Ingush, the Karachay and Balkar peoples, the Kalmyks, 
and the Meskhetian Turks (see Polian 2004).2 Packed onto cattle cars and 
shipped to Siberia or Central Asia for these ‘relocation projects’, the peoples 
suffered mortality rates of over 30 per cent either in transit or within the 
first year of ‘resettlement’. Generally speaking, those ethno-political terri-
tories in the North Caucasus were restored under Nikita Khrushchev, as 
was Kalmykia, but the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Meskhetian 
Turks failed to gain the legal right of return.3 Fearing irredentism or pro-
fascist sabotage, the state forced portions of other populations to join these 
unfortunate nations in internal captivity, including Balts, Poles, Greeks, 
Koreans, and Romanians (or Vlachs).4
Elsewhere in the socialist sphere, fears about separatism resulted in 
highly regimented national spaces within new federal structures. In the 
 2 Unlike the other Soviet nationalities, the Meskhetian Turks did not have an eth-
nically delimitated ‘national homeland’, but instead were resident in the Meskheti 
region of southern Georgia.
 3 The Meskhetian Turks were the victims of pogroms in the last days of the Soviet 
Union, leading to a secondary dispersion to Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, 
and have often sought assistance from Turkey for their plight, thus reigniting ques-
tions about pan-Turkism across Central Asia. The Crimean Tatars’ right to national 
institutions has become a major issue of contention in post-annexation Crimea, as 
many Tatars fear losing the rights granted to them following Ukraine’s independ-
ence in 1991. The Volga Germans tended to adapt well to their new surroundings; 
however, since 1991, many have employed German right of return laws, which are 
especially welcoming to so-called Spätaussiedler [late emigrants] from the former 
Soviet republics, to immigrate to Germany.
 4 During his early administration, Khrushchev also put an end to the Karelo-Finnish 
Soviet Socialist Republic, established in 1940, thereby reducing the role of ethnic 
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new Yugoslavia, Josip Broz established a six-part state to ensure that all 
the country’s major nationalities would be politically represented. The 
old Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes thus established ‘homelands’ 
not only for those ‘named’ South Slavs, but also for the Montenegrins and 
Macedonians, as well as the Bosniaks (though this group shared their state 
with Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats). Within Serbia, special status 
was granted to Kosovo – originally known as the Autonomous Province 
of Kosovo and Metohija – as it was to the ethnic melting pot of Vojvodina, 
thus laying the groundwork for the future breakup of the country which 
would define European ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era. In so-
cialist Czechoslovakia, which had seen its Ruthenian and Ukrainian mi-
norities mostly stripped from it by Soviet-dictated territorial changes, 
there was an institutionalization of the split between Czech and Slovak 
lands, paralleling the efforts of Tito (and similarly creating a subsequent 
glide path for the 1993 ‘Velvet Divorce’ that would produce separate Czech 
and Slovak republics).
Following the USSR’s victory in the Great Patriotic War, Moscow set 
about instituting totalitarian controls combined with the illusion of sov-
ereignty both within the USSR (specifically in relation to the recently an-
nexed nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – as well as to the quickly 
forgotten independent nation of Tuva in southern Siberia)5 and across 
the Eastern Bloc. For certain marginalized minorities, the imposition of 
socialism served them well, at least initially. The Turks of Bulgaria saw 
improvement in their status, as did the Lusatian Sorbs in East Germany 
and Romany in Yugoslavia. However, in keeping with Marxist-Leninist 
notions of political development, most efforts at supporting cultural de-
velopment soon gave way to assimilationist schemes that sometimes did 
more harm than good, ultimately provoking calls for genuine autonomy. 
On balance, socialist countries’ fears about separatism as ‘bourgeois dis-
ease’ led to totalitarian controls put in place to encourage assimilation or 
 5 The fact that ethnic Russians do not enjoy majority status in the region serves as 
evidence of the historical provenance of Tuva as an independent state in the twen-
tieth century. The People’s Republic of Tannu Tuva represented the third socialist 
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remove the ‘problem’ altogether. Such was the case with the harsh treat-
ment of the Hungarian/Székelys population in Romania and the ‘sale’ of 
Germans and Jews to West Germany and Israel respectively under Nicolae 
Ceaușescu (see Pacepa 1990). In Poland, a country that had achieved a 
dramatic level of heterogeneity due to Allied-dictated border changes and 
population transfers from 1944 to 1948, the only lingering issue was the 
notion of Kashubian ethnic identity in the post-war period, something 
that the state strenuously opposed. Similar attitudes towards expressions of 
Ruthene national identity were commonplace in Ukraine. Despite official 
policies of fostering minority cultures (korenizatsiya) which allowed for 
the promotion of national cultures and advance of ‘titulars’ within their 
republics, Russianization of the Soviet peoples through language continued 
apace throughout the post-Second World War period.
In the western half of Europe, post-war deprivation and recovery com-
bined with the threat of Soviet expansion towards the Atlantic dampened 
the minority issue in most countries. In some cases, the issue of minority na-
tionalism became deeply imbricated in the larger forces of history. Examples 
of separatism being subjugated to larger geopolitical concerns included the 
Danish negation of the Faeroese independence referendum in 1946, and the 
quashing of Vlach separatism in Greece, which became untenable after the 
conclusion of the Civil War in 1949.6 Yet, the issues of separatism continued 
to simmer below the surface, though not yet reaching a boiling point for 
some two decades after 1945. While a wide variety of pro-separatist parties 
began to form in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s – including the 
Frisian National Party in the Netherlands, the Flemish People’s Movement 
in Belgium and the Union Démocratique Bretonne in France – the real 
groundswell came with the tectonic shift towards identity politics that 
characterized the late 1960s.
 6 We might include here separatism being impressed into service for geopolitical 
stratagems in the instance of Iceland. The Danish colony was occupied by British, 
Canadian and – somewhat later – American forces in the context of the Second 
World War. Using the pretence of supporting Icelandic independence, the US was 
able to secure a valuable near-Arctic outpost for its military forces in the North 
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By 1968, war in Southeast Asia, a dramatic clash between left and right 
ideologies, the emergence of gender and sexuality as politicized identities, 
new questions of decolonization combining with changing attitudes to im-
migration and race, as well as a host of other factors, emerged and created 
a political nexus that would challenge the status quo in Western Europe. 
In many ways, both the ‘East’ and ‘West’ were linked in 1968 through the 
violent events in Czechoslovakia, which created a catalyst for change east 
of the Iron Curtain. With the brutal ending of the experiment in ‘socialism 
with a human face’, there came the realization that ‘freedom’, whether pol-
itical or cultural, was illusory within the one-party system, and the high-
minded ideals of socialism were always subject to the geopolitical whims 
of Moscow. So, with Eastern Bloc tanks sitting on the streets of Prague, 
many in the eastern part of Europe began to view themselves as ‘captive 
nations’, a discourse that opened the door for smaller nationalities to be 
seen likewise, from Croats and Slovaks to Estonians and Tatars.
As Western Europe erupted in protest, in generational and class conflict 
and militant student activism, new discourses came to the fore across the 
continent to deal with the nationality issue. Taking a page from the book of 
other practitioners of political violence, those supporting ethnic separatism 
began to see the value in adopting the mechanism of direct action to achieve 
their political goals. In France, terrorism was the result of a spill-over from 
its colonial war in Algeria (with Pied-Noir and Algerian attacks occurring 
on French soil) and elsewhere other countries in democratic Europe grap-
pled with a wave of ‘red’ terror propagated by such groups as Action Direct 
(France), Brigate Rosse (Italy), Rote Armee Fraktion (West Germany), and 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (Greece). Meanwhile there was 
a spillage of separatist nationalism from other parts of the world, most spe-
cifically Palestinian militant actions on European soil (most notoriously 
with the 1972 attacks on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games). 
These outbreaks of political violence provided powerful examples for a gen-
eration of separatists who had seen their plans for independence suffocated 
by Cold War politics and the need for ‘national cohesion’ during Europe’s 
economic recovery in the 1950s and early 1960s. It was during this period 
that Europe witnessed the emergence of multiple terrorist organizations, 
which were typically guerrilla adjuncts to pre-existing political movements 
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for independence. These included Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 1968; the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 1969; L’Armée Revolutionnaire 
Bretonne (ARB), 1974; the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), 
1976; and the Catalan Terra Lliure (TL) in 1978. Almost overnight, iden-
tity issues associated with cultural heritage, language, and ethnicity were 
linked to killing in the name of the nation. Bloodshed became a tragically 
normal part of life in certain parts of western Europe in the coming dec-
ades, with the ethnically divided city of Belfast, Northern Ireland, coming 
to function as synecdoche for the darkest side of ethnic separatism.
However, violence was not the exclusive strategy in separatist circles 
during this transitional period which lasted from the 1960s into the 1980s. 
Other approaches included the emergence of the Celtic League, which 
sought to stimulate the integration and cultural autonomy of Ireland, 
Scotland, Wales, Brittany, Cornwall and the Isle of Man, of which only 
the counties of the Republic of Ireland could be considered truly inde-
pendent.7 Elsewhere, international rivalries between neighbouring states 
over their respective minorities also emerged as an issue, with co-operation 
and conflict seeming to manifest in equal measures. In 1972, Austria and 
Italy proved able to work together on the issue of Germans in South Tyrol, 
producing a rather innovative form of self-government that would later 
emerge as a paragon of success by providing a path that does not end in out-
right independence but one which does benefit both the state and the mi-
nority nation and effectively ended separatist tensions in the region. In the 
eastern Mediterranean, however, the situation turned violent as the threat 
of enosis between Cyprus and Greece prompted a Turkish invasion of the 
island in 1974, thus creating an unrecognized statelet within the territorial 
boundaries of Europe that still exists today, one that even the promise of 
EU accession could not fix.8 At the other end of the Mediterranean Basin, 
 7 While the Isle of Man is a Crown Dependency (not subordinated to the govern-
ment of the UK) for all practical purposes it is not independent and its citizens are 
British subjects.
 8 The division of Cyprus between Turkish and Greek zones ultimately proved a 
doleful model for a number of other quasi-states that would come out of the USSR 
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Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s death and a new constitution returned 
much of Catalunya’s lost autonomy, allowing the state to proceed forward 
towards ever greater levels of self-government and perhaps – if current 
trends continue – even independence.
As the so-called second Cold War (Halliday 1986) began in the 1980s 
with the advent of a belligerent anti-Communist in the US White House 
(i.e. Ronald Reagan), pressures on the USSR to release its ‘captive na-
tions’ grew stronger. Opposition to decades of russianization across the 
USSR, but particularly in the Baltic States, which had enjoyed the taste 
of independence in the interwar period, began to grow, primarily through 
the organization of underground and later – under perestroika and glas-
nost – open and government-permitted cultural movements. In the small 
republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, groups supporting distinct 
cultural traits (language, music, dance, etc.) were mobilized to establish the 
groundwork for the political parties that would ultimately emerge by the 
end of the decade; in fact, later these movements would be described as the 
‘Singing Revolutions’ (Lane et al. 2013), due to the centrality of traditional 
music and song in fomenting national sentiment. In Ukraine and Belarus, 
the actual and metaphorical (political) fallout of the 1986 Chernobyl 
Disaster would galvanize many activists against Moscow, fuelling calls for 
greater levels of self-governance and eventually independence from the 
USSR. One of Europe’s oldest nations, the Georgians, also began to move 
towards increasingly strident engagement in identity politics within the 
Soviet structure, adding to the centrifugal pressures on the already strained 
Soviet state. Even Kazakhstan, which had seen massive increases in stand-
ards of living, literacy, and infrastructure through Sovietization pulled at 
the ties that bound it to the Kremlin, with inter-ethnic riots breaking out 
in 1986, the first example of such tensions to be widely reported in the 
West in more than twenty-five years.9 Two years later, demonstrations by 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh would spark bloodshed and ignite a 
separatist-irredentist conflict that remains unsolved to this day.
 9 However, it should be noted that the country was the last republic to depart the 
USSR, strangely leaving the borders of the USSR as coterminous with those of 
Kazakhstan for four days in 1991.
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Elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc, the steady breakdown of the totali-
tarian model led to an increasing politicization of national movements. 
In Bulgaria, then derisively referred to as the ‘16th republic of the USSR’, 
the Turkish struggle against the Bulgarian state turned violent, including 
bomb attacks on public transport, a bloody riposte to the acts of physical 
violence and intimidation exhibited by the security forces as well as to 
repressive measures against the practice of Islam and other forms of cul-
tural expression (Chary 2011). In neighbouring Romania, the revolution 
that would ultimately unseat and then claim the life of long-time dictator 
Nicolae Ceaușescu was actually triggered by minority nationalism when 
László Tőkés, a Hungarian Calvinist pastor in Timișoara, took on the state, 
sparking wider uprisings against the regime in late 1989. Following the dra-
matic political changes across the whole of eastern Europe, a sea change 
occurred that would initiate what I have called elsewhere the ‘Third Wave 
of Decolonization’ (Saunders 2012), that is the breakup of the socialist fed-
eral states of the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.
Arguably, the USSR’s path to dissolution began when it illegally an-
nexed the three Baltic States in the context of the Second World War, for 
it was here that the loudest and most articulate voices for national lib-
eration emerged, personified in the person of Vytautas Landsbergis, the 
face of Lithuania’s campaign for independence in the early 1990s. From 
when I was a teenager, I remember his calls for assistance directed at the 
US and other members of the international community. Influenced by 
neighbouring Poland’s newfound freedoms and well-versed in the lan-
guage of democracy and national sovereignty, he – along with countless 
other activists – challenged the Kremlin to a dangerous game of chicken 
that ultimately took the lives of more than a dozen Lithuanians, but ultim-
ately also triggered the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Centrifugal forces 
pulled the fourteen non-Russian republics away from the centre, each with 
its own designs on making the complete transition from union republic to 
independent and internationally recognized nation-state (as was happening 
in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). This occurred just as centripetal forces 
within the Russian core worked towards a sort of de-imperializing separ-
atism of ‘Russia for Russians’ (Otto 1990), with the aim of sloughing off 
the economic demands of maintaining the vast array of military-industrial 
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subsidies that kept the Baltic peoples wealthier than the average Russian 
and ensured that every Tajik and Turkmen had full access to education, 
housing, employment, and so on.
While the situation in the Baltic rim might have been contained under 
other circumstances, the very structure of the USSR became its greatest 
weakness, particularly given the almost ironic push for separatism among 
the imperial ethnicity, that is, the Russians. The federal system which was 
replete with a complex network of autonomous regions quickly became 
a double-edged sword for the Soviet state. The curious ethnic gerry-
mandering of Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian-controlled), of Transnistria 
(‘Slavic’-controlled), and of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia all led to ethnic tensions, military conflict, and secession, ultimately 
producing the acronym of TAKO, a geopolitical shorthand for separatist 
republics which are frozen in a state of unrecognition but which possess 
full territorial sovereignty. Inside the Russian Federation, Chechnya tried 
to emulate the route to independence taken by the fourteen union republics 
(and Russia). Recognizing that such a path was dependent on Soviet-era 
federal territorial delimitations, that is, being a union republic rather than 
an autonomous republic within a union republic, Chechen leaders voted 
in favour of elevating their country’s status against the wishes of Moscow. 
The subsequent establishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on 
1 November 1991 sparked a bloody war and cascading ethnic feuds and 
reprisals across the northern Caucasus region (see Zürcher 2007). After a 
cessation of hostilities in the mid-1990s, the goal of Chechen independ-
ence simmered amongst the population but, facing almost impossible odds 
against the Russian state, alternative ideologies proliferated, particularly 
Islamist jihad which uncomfortably married itself to nationalist separatism 
in the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), darkly mirroring the hybrid-
ization that has characterized the Palestinian independence campaign 
(1948–present).
An even more violent version of the dissolution of the USSR oc-
curred in Yugoslavia. Six months before the USSR would pass into his-
tory, Slovenia and Croatia departed the socialist federation to establish 
their own independent nation-states, triggering the Wars of Yugoslavian 
Succession (1991–2001), a series of conflicts that lasted over a decade. The 
Separatism in the New Millennium 297
Balkans, a melting pot of ethnicities and religions under Ottoman rule, 
was engulfed in conflict with ethnic conflict at its root. During the 1990s, 
‘Bosnia’ became a byword for violent separatism combined with ethnic 
cleansing of minority populations, rejuvenating a host of hoary prejudices 
about the purported ‘barbarism’ of the Balkans ensconced in 200 years of 
western travelogues about the region (Todorova 1997). Macedonia, a region 
so defined by national diversity that it gave a name to the mixed fruit or 
vegetable dish macédoine, gained independence but was immediately drawn 
into complications with the push for a ‘greater Albania’ linking the popu-
lations of Albania, Kosovo, and western Macedonia, further underscoring 
the bloody ties between separatism and irredentism. Safely ensconced 
within Serbia, the highly diverse Vojvodina region remained one corner 
that was able to preserve stability combined with intense heterogeneity 
(see Dragojevi 2008).
Elsewhere in post-socialist Europe, the last of the three ethno-national 
federations met its end, though thankfully without bloodshed or even ran-
cour. Czechoslovakia’s relatively magnanimous breakup provides us with 
a happy alternative, wherein a clean and peaceful break between fraternal 
nations might occur, in this case with both moving forward towards NATO 
and EU accession with exclusive control over their respective nation-states. 
Interestingly, however, both states now grapple with calls for more au-
tonomy or independence from other groups, namely the Moravians in the 
eastern Czech Republic and the Magyars in southern Slovakia.
As Europe transitioned into the new millennium, there was a prolif-
eration of new forms of separatism, or what might be better described as 
‘post-modern national movements’ (Duerr 2015: 88) or what some scholars 
label ‘separatism by other means’ (Cabestan and Pavković 2013: 189). In this 
category, I would include the following examples from western Europe:
 – the 1998 Good Friday Agreement which effectively ended large-scale 
separatist violence in Northern Ireland and promoted a model of in-
creased devolution of power within the United Kingdom and ever-
growing economic links between the Republic and Ulster;
 – the spread of Finland’s Åland and Italy’s South Tyrolean models, 
which provide for near-complete economic and cultural autonomy 
within a nation-state that recognizes that diversity promotes strength;
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 – the Sami parliaments of Norway, Sweden, and Finland and the cre-
ation of (an imagined) Sápmi  – one people and three countries 
without the need for a ‘proper state’ but instead sustainable co-
operation and transborder flows;
 – Belgium’s government crisis (2007–11), which allowed Flanders and 
Wallonia to grow apart, thus representing an interesting if uninten-
tional abandonment of many post-Westphalian principles of govern-
ance without any drastic reverberations;
 – Greenland, Scotland, and Catalunya all seeking legal means towards 
separation from their ‘imperial’ states, both with and without permis-
sion, thus relying on (geo)economic considerations for the survival of 
the state (both parent and child) with transnational corporate/finan-
cial interests being deeply imbricated in these processes.
In post-Soviet space there have also been innovative moves towards quasi-
independence, though given the long history of socialism and one-party 
rule, these differ greatly in nature from the previously mentioned ex-
amples from western Europe; they include:
 – the Tatarstan decision to begin issuing passports, restricting (na-
tional) conscription, and conducting international trade agreements 
independent of Moscow (though such actions were later limited 
under Russian president Vladimir Putin);
 – Gagauzia’s push towards a post-modern separatism incorporating 
new forms of cultural autonomy and renewed links with Turkey and 
a drawing closer to the Russian Federation;10
 – spurred by Russia’s hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympics, a Pan-
Circassian movement for recognition of ‘Europe’s first genocide’ 
(Richmond 2013) and a ‘right-of-return’ for the various popula-
tions who identify as Circassian, including Adyghe, Kabardins, and 
Cherkess (Sochi, the site of the games, is near the site where tens of 
thousands of forced deportations occurred, resulting in mass casual-
ties and dispersal across the Middle East).
 10 Moldova’s Gagauz are an Orthodox Christian, Turkish-speaking population which 
does not seek outright independence from Europe’s poorest country (like Palestine, 
its geography is non-contiguous and non-advantageous), but are instead pursuing a 
variety of other methods for maintaining a separate identity after the end of Soviet-
era support for such projects.
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However, despite these trends towards new forms of separatism that 
eschew bullets and bombs, there is a disturbing continuation of political 
violence as a vehicle for secessionism. On the small scale, we can point 
to the April 2014 arrests of twenty-four people for plotting violence in 
support of Veneto’s secession from Italy, including Franco Rocchetta, a 
former Lega Nord MP. On the intermediate scale, I would refer to the 
more recent violence between ethnic Albanians and Slavs in Macedonia, 
labelled ‘terrorism’ by the Slav-dominated government using the all-too-
easy jargon of a post-9/11 world where such nomenclature is shorthand 
for much more complex forms of political action. On the macro-level, 
the situation in Crimea signals a return to the geopolitics of the interwar 
period, while the situation in the Donbass signals the emergence of a 
tragic new model of separatism-cum-irredentism involving great powers, 
namely the Russian Federation, the US, and the European Union.
In concluding this chapter, which has aimed at providing an historical 
overview of the role played by separatism in Europe’s history over the past 
century, I will leave the reader with a series of questions about the future 
of separatism in Europe:
 – Does EU membership provide an umbrella and/or safety net for ever 
greater devolution of power to national minorities, ultimately re-
sulting in a continued fracturing of the existing nation-states of the 
union within a greater whole or, given the questions surrounding 
Brexit, do the Irish border and stirrings of Scottish independence por-
tend simply more fracturing of the EU itself ?
 – Is there truly a difference between east and western Europe in terms 
of separatism in the new millennium? Is irredentism something 
that now exists or only exists east of the Oder? If so, what is pre-
dicted about the long-term effects of the Soviet experiment (1922–
91) and the establishment of national homelands for all sizeable 
minorities?
 – Does the relatively unfettered ability of wired minorities to commu-
nicate, co-ordinate, and educate via the internet create a new world 
order wherein separatism can be achieved in a virtual environment? 
With online preservation and promotion of dead and moribund lan-
guages (e.g. Cornish, Manx, Scots English) and traditionally margin-
alized tongues (e.g. Frisian, Breton, Sorbian, Romany), are we on the 
threshold of a major transformation in minority identity in highly 
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connected countries like the UK, France, the Netherlands, Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary?
 – Will current trends promoting hybrid, cosmopolitan and trans-
national identities ultimately weaken longstanding efforts for au-
tonomy and independence or will they actually strengthen certain 
movements?
 – With the Russian Federation now in its second decade of supporting 
ethnic separatism in its so-called ‘near abroad’ (specifically, histor-
ical support for breakaway republics in Transnistria, Ajaria, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and new heat being generated in the Donbass), 
can we expect to see more violent separatist movements popping up 
across post-Soviet space and even further afield? And if so, where 
are the future hotspots? Russophone populations in Latvia, Estonia, 
Kazakhstan? Or perhaps Ruthenes, Magyars, and Poles in western 
Ukraine as suggested by recent Russian propaganda efforts?
While this list of questions represents only a few of those we might ask 
about the future of separatism in Europe in the new millennium, these 
issues point to the continued salience of the politics of secession and the 
power of minority identity on the continent. Undoubtedly, nationalism 
among Europe’s ‘smaller peoples’ (Lehti and Smith 2003) remains alive 
and well even as we move into the third millennium and will likely con-
tinue to influence the larger flows of European history.
Bibliography
Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question 
in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cabestan, J.-P., and Pavković, A. (2013). Secessionism and Separatism in Europe and 
Asia: To Have a State of One’s Own. London: Routledge.
Chary, F. B. (2011). The History of Bulgaria. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
Dragojevi, M. (2008). ‘Contesting Ethnicity:  Emerging Regional Identity in 
Vojvodina,’ Studies in Ethnicity & Nationalism, 8 (2), 290–316.
Duerr, G. M. E. (2015). Secessionism and the European Union: The Future of Flanders, 
Scotland, and Catalonia. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Halliday, F. (1986). The Making of the Second Cold War. New York: Verso.
 
 
Separatism in the New Millennium 301
Johnson, L. (1996). Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbours, Friends. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Laible, J. (2016). Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe: Party Politics and the 
Meanings of Statehood in a Supranational Context. New York: Springer.
Lane, T., Pabriks, A., Purs, A., and Smith, D. J. (2013). The Baltic States: Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. New York: Routledge.
Lehti, M., and Smith, D. J. (2003). ‘Introduction: Other Europes’. In M. Lehti, and D. 
J. Smith (eds), Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences, 
pp. 1–10. London: Frank Cass.
Lichtenstein, T. (2016). Zionists in Interwar Czechoslovakia: Minority Nationalism 
and the Politics of Belonging. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Magocsi, P. R. (2010). A History of Ukraine:  The Land and Its Peoples, 2nd edn. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Martin, T. (2001). The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the 
Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Orridge, A., and William, C. (1982). ‘Autonomist Nationalism:  A Theoretical 
Framework for Spatial Variation in Its Genesis and Development.’ Political 
Geography Quarterly, 1 (1), 19–39.
Otto, R. (1990). ‘Contemporary Russian Nationalism’, Problems of Communism, 39 
(6), 96–105.
Pacepa, I. M. (1990). Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescus’ 
Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption. Washington, DC: Regnery.
Panayi, P. (2001). An Ethnic History of Europe since 1945:  Nations, States and 
Minorities. Harlow: Longman.
Polian, P. M. (2004). Against Their Will:  The History and Geography of Forced 
Migrations in the USSR. Budapest: Central European University Press.
Richmond, W. (2013). The Circassian Genocide. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press.
Saunders, R. A. (2012). ‘Brand Interrupted: The Impact of Alternative Narrators on 
Nation Branding in the Former Second World.’ In N. Kaneva (ed.), Branding 
Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the ‘New’ Europe, 
pp. 49–78. New York: Routledge.
Smith, A. (1991). National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
Snyder, T. (2010). Bloodlands:  Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. New  York: 
Basic Books.
Todorova, M. (1997). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zürcher, C. (2007). The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood 
in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press.

Marçal Sintes Olivella, Josep-Lluís Micó-Sanz, and 
Francesc-Marc Álvaro Vidal
The Pro-Independence Movement in Catalonia: 
Impact on the International Agenda and Media 
Pluralism
abstract
This chapter analyses the media coverage of the Catalan pro-independence movement, fo-
cusing on its impact on the media agenda and on the pluralism of the coverage. Adopting 
both a quantitative and qualitative approach, the study evaluates just under 4,800 news 
items and other samples of commentary from Catalonia, Spain and the international 
media. The timeframe begins with the National Day of Catalonia in 2012 (11 September) 
and ends just after the elections to the Catalan Parliament on 25 November of the same 
year. This was the point at which the Catalan independence movement became a major 
international news story. An analysis of the articles generated reveals the increasing po-
larization in Spain, but also the efforts of the Catalan media to adopt a more pluralist 
approach to the societal divisions.
Introduction
Among the most powerful of all recent national identity claims must 
be that of Catalonia, part of a peninsula that has been called a mini-
continent, part of the Spanish hegemony for centuries, and yet still for 
many of its inhabitants a place apart, a wholeness of itself. If anyone had 
been in any doubt about the strength of that claim, it was to be mani-
fested most overtly in the events that followed a certain public gathering 
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The present study is the first carried out with the objective of analysing 
the impact on the international media of the movement in favour of the 
independence of Catalonia. In addition, it is relevant that the study covers 
both conventional media – print, radio, television – and digital. As far as we 
know, no comparable analysis has been carried out more recently, neither 
in respect to its international dimension nor with regard to the number 
of media and journalistic pieces covered.
The investigation not only robustly embraces a significant number 
of items – 4,795 journal pieces from more than 100 Catalan, Spanish and 
international media sources – but was complemented by interviews with 
the presidents and members of two Catalan governments. The combination 
of such qualitative data with quantitative and content analyses enriches the 
results and gives more meaning to the conclusions drawn.
Furthermore, our analysis was conducted on a key period for the 
pro-independence movement, from 11 September 2012 (Catalan National 
Day) until a few days after the elections to the Catalan Parliament on 25 
November that same year.1 It was at this time that the new and much greater 
scale of the civil and political independence movement, dominating Catalan 
and Spanish political life then as it still does today, put it firmly on the na-
tional and international public, political and media agenda.
That year, on the second Tuesday of September, hundreds of thou-
sands of people travelled by car, motorcycle, bus and train from all over 
Catalonia to Barcelona city centre, coming together not to commemorate 
a victory, but rather in memory of a heavy defeat over 300 years ago, in 
1714.2 However, on that pleasant afternoon in 2012, no one was thinking 
about old defeats. On the contrary, the atmosphere was festive and peaceful 
and, although there was tension in the air, nobody expected, at least not to 
such an extent, that celebration of the Catalan National Day would become 
 1 The Catalan Parliament is called the Generalitat after its 1359 founding name.
 2 Each year, on 11 September, National Day commemorates the capture of Barcelona 
by Castilian and French troops who supported the Borbón dynasty. Barcelona and 
Catalonia, which were defeated, were in favour of Archduke Carlos, of the Austrian 
dynasty. After the War of Succession, the people endured an extremely harsh repres-
sion, Catalan institutions and laws were suppressed and Castilian was imposed as 
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the largest demonstration ever seen in Catalonia, more massive even than 
the renowned 1977 rally in which the general public flooded the streets to 
demand, less than two years after the death of Franco, ‘Llibertat, amnistia i 
Estatut d’Autonomia!’ [Freedom, amnesty and the Statute of Autonomy].3 
Additionally, it was more numerous than the demonstration against the 
Iraq war in February 2003.
The 2012 demonstration (Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals 
[CCMA] 2012; The Guardian, 11 September 2012) rallied under a very dif-
ferent slogan from that in 1977: ‘Catalonia, nou Estat d’Europa’ [Catalonia, 
new European State]. The Catalan government and the Barcelona police 
jointly estimated the official attendance figure at 1.5 million people. For its 
part, the Spanish government reduced the count to 600,000. This demon-
stration was regarded by the international press as the great starting point 
of the most recent Catalan civil and political movement for self-determin-
ation and independence. According to official figures, Catalonia had a 
population in 2012 of around 7.5 million, or about 16 per cent of the total 
Spanish population, and its GDP accounted for about 19 per cent of the 
Spanish total.
The protesters waved Catalan flags as in 1977 – but esteladas (the 
independentist Catalan flags with a star) – were mostly to be seen.4 Among 
the slogans on display at that time were several in English, such as ‘Freedom 
for Catalonia’ or ‘Yes, we CAT’. The desire to present their demands to 
Europe and the world at large has always been foremost in the minds of 
the sovereigntists – in favour of Catalonia being able to decide its own 
future through a referendum on independence – and in the mind of the 
independentists – in favour of Catalonia becoming a new independent state. 
President Artur Mas and subsequently President Carles Puigdemont trusted 
 3 All translations are by the authors. The Statute of Autonomy, which would set the 
parameters of self-government of Catalonia within the Spanish state, was approved 
in 1979.
 4 The estelada [star] flag was inspired by the Cuban and Puerto Rican flags (it is like 
the Catalan flag, four red stripes on a yellow background) but adds an isosceles tri-
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that, if the dispute between Catalonia and the central government of Spain 
became aggravated, the EU would intervene and even force negotiations.
The protest was organized by the Catalan National Assembly (ANC),5 
an entity that seeks Catalan independence and whose formal foundation 
had occurred only a few months before. After the resounding success of 
the 2012 event, the ANC became, along with Òmnium Cultural (an or-
ganization established in 1961 during the Franco dictatorship and dedi-
cated to defending and promoting Catalan language and culture), one of 
the two largest civil drivers of the Catalan self-determination and inde-
pendence movement. The 11 September 2012 demonstration was headed 
by representatives of the ANC and the Association of Municipalities for 
Independence (AMI). This partnership brought together the Catalan city 
councils supporting independence.
The president of the Catalan government, Artur Mas, of the centre-
right autonomist coalition Convergence and Union (CiU),6 did not con-
sider it appropriate to attend the rally, given his institutional position. 
However, he did encourage others to participate. In fact, many leading 
coalition representatives attended: the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
[Republican Left of Catalonia] (ERC), and the left-wing Iniciativa per 
Catalunya Verd-Esquera Unida i Alternativa [Initiative for Catalonia 
Greens-United Left and Alternative] (ICV-EUiA), as well as some mem-
bers of the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), federated to the Socialist Spanish 
Workers Party (PSOE).
For many, 2012 heralded the resurgence of Catalan sovereignism and 
separatism not only because of the massive September demonstration, but 
also because of the early elections called after the refusal of the Spanish 
Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, to negotiate a new funding system for 
Catalonia with the Artur Mas government. This demonstration and the 
subsequent elections would signal a change in strategy for the majority of 
 5 All acronyms that appear in the text are those that correspond to the names in 
Catalan, except for the Spanish parties PP and the PSOE.
 6 Coalition between the Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya [Democratic 
Convergence of Catalonia] (CDC) and the Unió Democràtica de Catalunya 
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Catalan nationalists, which went from asking for greater self-government, 
an approach based on devolution, to demanding a referendum so that the 
Catalans themselves could decide on independence.
Objectives
In this focus on the key year of 2012 our intent is to address two sig-
nificant aspects of the independence process in Catalonia. The first 
objective is to analyse to what extent, at that point in time and sub-
sequently, sovereignism managed to convert its political independence 
claim into a relevant issue on the international public agenda. Our 
second goal is to check whether, as claimed by the Spanish government 
of Mariano Rajoy and the political parties opposed to Catalan inde-
pendence  – which have repeatedly denounced the ‘adoctrinamiento’ 
[indoctrination] of the population by the Catalan media – these media 
were in fact in favour of self-determination and independence or not. 
This verification was carried out by comparing the praxis of the Catalan 
media with that of the Spanish media, focusing on prominent pundits 
and collaborators.
The Spanish State and the Independence Process
Early Elections
Just one week had elapsed after the great 2012 rally, when the then King 
of Spain, Juan Carlos I, in an unprecedented initiative, published a web 
letter defending the unity of Spain and, after referring to the harsh eco-
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circunstancias, lo peor que podemos hacer es dividir fuerzas, alentar 
disensiones, perseguir quimeras, ahondar heridas’ [In these circum-
stances, the worst thing we can do is to divide forces, encourage dissen-
sion, chase after ghosts, and rub salt into wounds] (De Borbón 2012). 
The letter came as a surprise as, rather than maintaining a neutral stance, 
it constituted a clear intervention in a matter of a political nature by the 
monarchy.7 Moreover, the Spanish government, headed by the leader of 
the Partido Popular [Popular Party] (PP), Mariano Rajoy, who had been 
in power for less than a year, considered that the massive response to the 
call for the demonstration was attributable to the unrest caused by the 
economic crisis.
On 20 September, two days after the king’s intervention, the presi-
dent of the Generalitat, Artur Mas, travelled to Madrid to meet Mariano 
Rajoy in an atmosphere of considerable political tension. However, the goal 
was clear: to demand the negotiation of a new funding agreement for the 
Catalan regional community.8 At that time, the main goal of the Generalitat 
government was the resolution of the Catalan funding problems – a topic 
that we will come back to later – that is, they officially avoided demanding 
a referendum on self-determination or independence.
The meeting ended with Rajoy’s refusal to negotiate a financing system 
with Catalonia that at least partially softened the fiscal deficit (the dif-
ference between the money Catalonia receives and the contribution to 
the State’s coffers from Catalans and Catalan companies). For the period 
1986–2014, the average deficit with the state calculated by the Generalitat 
was 8 per cent of GDP (according to the monetary flow method). If the 
cost-benefit method is used, this figure is 6 per cent. In 2014, the most 
recent year for which statistics are available, the fiscal deficit was 8.4 per 
 7 Juan Carlos I, and later his eldest son and successor, Felipe VI, have spoken on some 
occasions about the dispute between the government of Madrid and Barcelona. 
In all, their position was to support the central government. The position of the 
Spanish monarchy is in contrast to that shown by Elizabeth II to the Scottish refer-
endum of 2014.
 8 This is the official name given to administrations of the ‘nacionalidades y regiones’ 
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cent (monetary flow method) or 5.9 per cent (cost-benefit method) of 
Catalan GDP, equivalent to 16,570 and 11,590 million euro respectively.9
After the total failure of the Madrid meeting between Rajoy and Mas, 
the situation escalated. The president of the Generalitat reacted by calling 
early elections in Catalonia and along with CiU promised the general 
public that a referendum on self-determination would allow all to decide 
for themselves on their own future. In those regional elections held on 
25 November 2012, the CiU coalition went from sixty-two seats down to 
fifty (the Catalan house has 135 seats), while the ERC independence party 
went up to twenty-one, a gain of eleven more than before. For the first time, 
the Candidatura d’Unitat Popular [Popular Unity Candidacy] (CUP), 
a separatist anti-capitalist and pro-independence radical-left formation, 
entered Parliament (Generalitat de Catalunya 2012). These three forces 
became from then on the political drivers of the independence process. In 
2012, the independence movement won seventy-four seats in parliament, 
that is to say, surpassing the sixty-eight seats required for an absolute ma-
jority. Turnout rose to 67.7 per cent, nine points above the Catalan elec-
tions that had taken place in 2010.
In late 2012, the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió [Centre for Opinion 
Studies] (CEO), offering the most reliable poll among those conducted 
on the political situation in Catalonia, published its monthly barometer 
results. The fieldwork – a sample of 2,500 interviews – was done between 
22 and 31 October. According to the CEO, at that time 35 per cent of the 
Catalans interviewed felt themselves to be as much Spanish as Catalan. 
The sum of those who felt more Spanish than Catalan or only Spanish 
was 4.5 per cent. Conversely, those who declared themselves more Catalan 
than Spanish, or Catalan only, rose to 58.3 per cent. Supporters of Catalan 
independence represented 44.3 per cent of respondents, while supporters 
of a federal Spain accounted for 25.5 per cent. Supporters of Catalonia re-
maining an autonomous region were 19.1 per cent, and those who advocated 
diminished self-government, 4 per cent (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió 2012).
In December 2012, Artur Mas and the leader of ERC, Oriol Junqueras, 
signed an agreement to form a government that allowed the former to be 
 9 Catalan Department of the Vice-Presidency, Economics and Inland Revenue, 2017.
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invested as president of the Generalitat. In January, the Catalan Parliament 
voted the Declaration of Sovereignty, one of whose objectives was to pursue 
the referendum on self-determination. Out of the 135 possible votes, the 
Declaration received eighty-five in favour, forty-one against and two ab-
stentions (some members of parliament did not vote). The question and 
the date of the future referendum were published in December. Meanwhile, 
Mariano Rajoy’s government and the Spanish Congress of Deputies re-
jected allowing a referendum in Catalonia.
In 2013, what was perhaps the most spectacular demonstration so 
far occurred on 11 September: an estimated 1.6 million people formed a 
chain, holding hands along the entire length of Catalonia, from the nor-
thern border with France to the southern border with the autonomous 
Valencian Community, a distance of about 400 kilometres (TV3, 2013). 
The Catalan chain was inspired by the so-called Baltic chain, which in 1989 
united the capitals of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Finally, the announced 
referendum had to be transformed into a non-binding ‘procés participatiu’ 
[participatory process] and was held on 9 November 2014 (a few weeks 
after the referendum on the independence of Scotland). Almost 81 per cent 
of the more than 2.3 million who voted (out of an estimated 5.4 million 
eligible Catalans) were in favour of independence.
Background: The Failure of the Statute
Jordi Pujol (CiU), who was president of Catalonia for nearly twenty-three 
years, was always reluctant to reform the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. He 
thought it might be counter-productive, that is, he feared that it might 
end up harming Catalan interests.10 In the 1995 Catalan election campaign 
the need to change the statute to respond to the needs and aspirations of 
the Catalan people had already been highlighted by the main opposition 
candidate, the Socialist Joaquim Nadal. This initiative was unsuccessful at 
 10 For the governments of Jordi Pujol, see volumes 1 and 2 of his memoirs (Pujol 2011; 
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that time, as Pujol managed to form a government and continue to preside 
over the Generalitat. However, it was taken up again by Nadal’s replace-
ment as Socialist presidential candidate, the former mayor of Barcelona, 
Pasqual Maragall. In 2003, an alliance of the left (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA) 
won the elections for the first time, dethroning CiU and taking over re-
gional power in Catalonia. During this campaign, Maragall had prom-
ised a new Statute of Autonomy, a basic pledge that, nevertheless, also 
contained an element of electoral tactics and a move to attract those who 
would ultimately be its main allies in the new cabinet: ERC.
During that election campaign in 2003, specifically on 13 November 
(the voting would take place three days later), the socialist José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero, the Spanish prime minister at that time, proclaimed 
to 16,000 people gathered at a rally in Barcelona: ‘Apoyaré la reforma del 
Estatuto de Catalunya que apruebe el Parlamento de Catalunya’ [I will sup-
port the reform of the Catalan Statute approved by the Catalan Parliament]. 
Maragall was exultant. Later it would turn out that Rodriguez Zapatero – 
who had declared himself to be in favour of what he called ‘España plural’ 
[plural Spain] – had promised something he was not going to deliver. 
Maragall’s tripartite left-wing coalition, the result of what was known as 
the Tinell Pact among the left-wing parties, would rule for three years until 
its chequered career, marked by tension and rivalry between its partners, 
precipitated the call for a new election in 2006. During those three years, 
great energy was invested in the drafting of a revised Statute of Autonomy 
that would replace that of 1979. In 2006, the leftist coalition managed to 
retain the government – led by a new socialist president – José Montilla.
From the very beginning, the wording of the draft statute was subject 
to great difficulties, in part because of disagreements among government 
members (ERC being a pro-independence party and the PSC, Maragall’s 
party, federated with the Spanish PSOE). There were also ongoing differ-
ences between leftist parties and CiU representatives. The latter, despite 
having won more seats in the elections, had been removed from power 
and did not fail to take advantage of the new statute drafting to put pres-
sure on the members of the tripartite coalition, favouring bolder wording 
and, at the same time, seeking to provoke contradictions among the ruling 
left. CiU had a significant ace in the hole: without their acceptance of the 
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project it would not flourish, given that the statute needed a qualified ma-
jority to pass. On 30 September 2005, the Catalan Parliament finally gave 
its approval to the proposal of an organic law amending the Statute: the 
leftists with CiU voted 120 in favour, and PP voted fifteen against. Once 
the proposed new statute was approved in Catalonia it needed to be sent 
to the Spanish Parliament for approval.
In January 2006, the president of the PP, Mariano Rajoy, then in op-
position in Spain, began a campaign to promote wider public opposition 
to the Catalan Statute. To this end, tables were set up in different Spanish 
cities, including Barcelona, with the aim of collecting signatures – in all, 
about 4 million were obtained. The move angered the Catalan parties that 
supported the new Statute, with many incidents between the Catalan and 
Spanish representatives during the negotiations.
The process ended up being refloated in a meeting between José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero and the opposition leader in Catalonia, Artur Mas 
(CiU), which ended on the night of 21 January 2006. The event took place 
at the Moncloa Palace, the official residence of the president of the central 
government. Although the Catalan nationalists of Mas were not numeric-
ally significant in the Spanish Parliament, the PSOE did not want in any 
way to be left out of the agreement on the Statute. The consequent accord 
reached by Mas and Zapatero angered members of the government of the 
Generalitat, particularly ERC, which rejected the text resulting from the 
negotiations with Madrid; this would lead to new elections in Catalonia.
On 8 April 2006, the then vice-president of the Spanish government 
and deputy general secretary of the PSOE, Alfonso Guerra, who presided 
over the Constitutional Commission during the handling of the Statute, 
had declared at a PSOE youth congress that the draft was ‘infumable’ [un-
tenable] and therefore had to be polished or ‘cepillado’ [planed down] 
by the Commission like wood in the hands of carpenters.11 In addition 
to calling for opposition by the PP and ERC, he also asked for a no vote 
from the CUP (at that time an extra-parliamentary political organization). 
However, the Spanish Parliament, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, 
 11 Guerra made these controversial statements during his speech at the PSOE youth 
congress held in Baracaldo (in the Basque Country).
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after much discussion, definitively approved the draft on 10 May 2006. On 
18 June, the Catalan general public were called to a referendum to approve 
or reject the new Statute of Autonomy, but the duration of the process, the 
cuts made in the text and the fatigue of Catalan society led to an abstention 
rate of 50.6 per cent. The text was endorsed by 73.9 per cent of the vote.
Following the referendum, there was a cascade of appeals before the 
Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court] (TC), all on the grounds 
that the statute was excessive in terms of power granted to Catalonia and 
was at odds with the 1978 Spanish Constitution. The first to file an appeal 
was the PP, claiming that it was a parallel constitution and challenging 
114 out of a total of 223 articles of the text, a good number of which are 
expressed in a similar way in the Andalusian Statute currently in force. 
The Andalusian Statute was approved in 2006 with the votes of PP and 
endorsed by the Andalusians in 2007. Then the Spanish Ombudsman ap-
pealed against the Catalan Statute, along with five regional communities 
governed not only by the PP but also by the PSOE.12
The debate within the TC would last until 2010. In 2009, with the 
imminent possibility of an unfavourable judgement, twelve Catalan news-
papers published a joint editorial in defence of the Statute. The article was 
entitled ‘La dignitat de Catalunya’/‘La dignidad de Catalunya’ [The Dignity 
of Catalonia] and warned of the historic significance of the decision that 
the members of the Constitutional Court had at hand. It also denounced 
manoeuvres to alter the balance of forces within that court and the anom-
alous situation in which the institution found itself. The editorial referred 
to the fact that the appointment of one judge had been refused, one place 
remained empty after the death of its incumbent, and four other judges 
(the TC consists of twelve seats) had continued in office after their term 
expired. The text warned: ‘No ens confonguem, el dilema real és avanç o 
retrocés; acceptació de la maduresa democràtica d’una Espanya plural, o el 
seu bloqueig’/‘No nos confundamos, el dilema real es avance o retroceso; 
aceptación de la madurez democrática de una España plural, o el bloqueo 
 12 These communities were autonomous regions: Murcia, La Rioja, Aragón, Valencia 
and the Balearic Islands.
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de esta’ [Let us not be confused, the real dilemma is advancement or re-
gression; acceptance of the democratic maturity of a plural Spain, or the 
blocking of this].
Then it gave further information on this, evoking the agreements that 
made the transition from dictatorship to democracy possible in Spain:
Estan en joc els pactes profunds que han fet possible els 30 anys més virtuosos de 
la història d’Espanya. I arribats a aquest punt és imprescindible recordar un dels 
principis vertebradors del nostre sistema jurídic, d’arrel romana: Pacta sunt servanda. 
Allò pactat obliga./Están en juego los pactos profundos que han hecho posible 
los treinta años más virtuosos de la historia de España. Y llegados a este punto es 
imprescindible recordar uno de los principios vertebrales de nuestro sistema jurídico, 
de raíz romana: Pacta sunt servanda. Lo pactado obliga.
[What is at stake are the profound pacts that have made the thirty virtuous years 
of the history of Spain possible. And at this point it is essential to recall one of the 
central principles of our legal system, of Roman origin: Pacta sunt servanda. Pacts 
must be complied with.]
Finally, the editorial predicted:
[P] erò ningú que conegui Catalunya posarà en dubte que el reconeixement de 
la identitat, la millora de l’autogovern, l’obtenció d’un finançament just i un salt 
qualitatiu en la gestió de les infraestructures són i continuaran sent reclamacions 
tenaçment plantejades amb un amplíssim suport polític i social./[P]ero nadie que 
conozca Catalunya pondrá en duda que el reconocimiento de la identidad, la mejora 
del autogobierno, la obtención de una financiación justa y un salto cualitativo en 
la gestión de las infraestructuras son y seguirán siendo reclamaciones tenazmente 
planteadas con un amplísimo apoyo político y social.
[But nobody who knows Catalonia will doubt that the recognition of identity, im-
provement of self-government, obtaining a fair share of funding and a qualitative leap 
in the management of infrastructures are and will continue to be tenaciously defended 
with very broad political and social support.] (La Vanguardia, 26 November 2009).
When eventually, in July 2010, the Constitutional Court issued its judge-
ment on the Statute of Autonomy, the resolution did not have unanimity 
among the judges. The ruling left the term ‘nación’ [nation] without legal 
validity in the preamble of the Statute. In addition, it annulled the pre-
tensions on the Catalan language, on the establishment of an autonomous 
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judiciary power and on improving the financing of Catalonia. In total, 
fourteen articles were annulled and twenty-seven were conditioned by 
the interpretation defined by the Constitutional Court judges. The ruling 
caused great consternation in most of Catalan society, with the socialist 
president of the Generalitat, José Montilla, addressing the Catalans 
to emphasize his ‘indignación’ [indignation], criticizing the PP’s atti-
tude and noting that the Constitutional Court was ‘lamentablemente 
desacreditado y moralmente deslegitimado’ [lamentably discredited and 
morally delegitimized] to issue that statement.13
On 10 July 2010, a protest demonstration organized by Òmnium 
Cultural passed through the centre of Barcelona under the slogan ‘Som 
una nació, nosaltres decidim’ [We are a nation, we decide]. This slogan 
can be interpreted as a direct allusion to the strange situation created since 
the TC substantially modified a Statute of Autonomy not only approved 
by the Catalan and Spanish parliaments, but also endorsed by the public. 
With the exception of the PP and Citizens (Ciudadanos), the demonstra-
tion received the support of most of the political parties of the Catalan 
Parliament, as well as many Catalan public figures, the unions and nearly 
1,600 Catalan civil organizations. The president of the Catalan govern-
ment, José Montilla, was at the front of the demonstration. The Statute 
that ultimately came into force was substantially different from that which 
the Catalan citizens had endorsed through a referendum.14
From Reformism to Independentism
From the restoration of Spanish democracy, Catalan nationalism had 
mostly opted for political reform in Spain and its economic moderniza-
tion, confident that with this, acceptance of the diverse nature of the state 
would lead to recognition of the distinct identity of the Catalan people. 
Catalan nationalism, which in its political dimension has its origins in 
 13 From the institutional statement by President Montilla on 28 June, 2010.
 14 For the independence process in Catalonia, see Minder (2017); on the contem-
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the late nineteenth century (Balsells 1992; Cacho Viu 1998; Keating 1996; 
Solé Tura 1985; Termes 1999) has been defined by Guibernau as ‘emanci-
patory nationalism’, which she describes as ‘a democratic type of nation-
alism emerging in nations included within larger states who do not iden-
tify with them, who do not feel represented by the states of which they 
are a part and who do not feel politically and culturally recognized by the 
state containing them’. This same author also highlighted that the will of 
the British government to recognize Scotland as a nation and its willing-
ness to allow a referendum on independence contrasted with the Spanish 
position to ban the referendum in Catalonia (Guibernau 2013: 372).
Catalan nationalism – which has always maintained a clear pro-European 
stance – was constructed from the 1960s on, in one of the movements in 
opposition to the dictatorship of General Franco, close to the left (mainly 
Communists and Socialists). Since Franco’s death in 1975, this would effect-
ively contribute to the stabilization of the Spanish political situation and 
facilitate the advent of the new democratic regime, the Transition. And it 
would remain so from the restoration of the Generalitat of Catalonia and the 
first regional elections in 1980. Surprisingly, those elections were won by Jordi 
Pujol and CiU, which ousted the two main leftist parties, the PSC and the 
communist Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya [Unified Socialist Party 
of Catalonia (PSUC)]. Pujol would remain in power for almost twenty-three 
years until the arrival of the government of Pasqual Maragall hand-in-hand 
with the Tripartite Left. During three government terms, Pujol enjoyed an 
absolute majority in the Generalitat. Throughout their successive mandates, 
CiU laid the foundations of Catalonia today and its current welfare system 
(health, education, social policy, and so on). This period was also charac-
terized by defence of the Catalan language and culture, supported by the 
productive economy and by better funding and investment for Catalonia.
Pujol and the CiU group in the Congress of Deputies in Madrid, 
always in exchange for trade-offs, provided for the necessary parliamentary 
support for both the PSOE and the PP when one of them did not have a 
sufficient majority. Similarly, they supported the governments in regard 
to the entry of Spain into the European Community (1986) and the Euro 
system (1999) and when the time came to address the crisis that erupted in 
Spain and Europe in 2008. Ideologically close to the Christian Democrats 
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and a fervent pro-European, Jordi Pujol always promoted negotiation and 
agreement with the powers-that-be in Madrid, and opposed independence, 
to the extent that, as noted above, he consistently rejected reform of the 
Statute of Autonomy of 1979. Things changed considerably between 2003, 
when Pujol left power, and 2010, when judgement was pronounced on the 
new Statute. If we look at the opinion polls on the Catalans’ position, we 
realize that from 2000 to 2010 the position favourable to independence 
became progressively stronger. For a variety of reasons, the Catalans’ percep-
tion had changed in regard to the relationship between Catalonia – whose 
origins date back over 1,000 years – and the Spanish State.
The growth of the sovereignty and independence movement in Catalonia 
has multiple origins. Certainly, a significant cause has its origin in frustration 
and outrage that parts of the Statute already approved by Catalan citizens 
in a referendum were deleted or revised or differently interpreted by the 
Spanish Parliament and the Constitutional Court. But other origins are also 
particularly relevant. For example, a second element is the belief that the ac-
cumulation of very high annual fiscal deficits – which have already been dis-
cussed here – were severely damaging Catalonia and the welfare of the general 
public. This issue, combined with the economic crisis that erupted in 2008, 
undoubtedly contributed to dissatisfaction with the Spanish government’s 
treatment of Catalonia. A third major element presents greater difficulties 
of definition, because there is a less tangible cause. This is the perception, 
widespread in Catalonia, that political and institutional Spain not only fails 
to recognize or appreciate its own internal diversity but in many cases treats 
Catalonia with contempt or worse, as evidenced by attempts to suppress key 
features of its identity. Among the most important of such features is the 
Catalan language, spoken in the regional autonomies of Valencia and the 
Balearic Islands, in the area of Aragon bordering Catalonia and, beyond the 
Spanish borders, in Andorra, in the south of France (Northern Catalonia) 
and in the town of Alghero on the island of Sardinia.
In relation to this, perhaps one of the issues that has caused most dis-
satisfaction has been the insistence of PP – and afterwards the new party, 
Citizens, instituted in 2006 from a general public platform – to question 
the linguistic model in Catalan schools. In the system of public educa-
tion, children and young people use Catalan as their first language, as it 
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is considered in need of protection. This model has been pursued with 
considerable success, as indicated on several occasions by the PISA Report 
that all children and young people know both languages. The PISA report 
notes that the reading comprehension in Spanish of Catalan students ranks 
above the Spanish average (Silió 2016). The PP has often attributed the 
defence of the Catalan language to a desire to obtain ‘privilegios’ [privil-
eges] through ‘chantaje’ [blackmail] in the conviction that these accusa-
tions against Catalans are a profitable electoral weapon in the rest of Spain. 
Moreover, in José María Aznar’s second term (2000–4) another source of 
dissatisfaction among Catalans was the PP’s refusal to negotiate improve-
ments to self-government by the Generalitat and its financing, together 
with the determination of the Spanish right to recentralize state power 
and convert the city of Madrid – through the concentration of economic 
power and huge investments in infrastructure – into a megalopolis that 
Barcelona could not compete with.
The Catalan draft Statute of 2006 had aimed, albeit timidly, at progress 
in the areas cited: identity, language and culture, as well as the economy 
and investment, and its failure was rejection of the different Catalonia and 
the different Spain it proposed. This would probably account for the fact 
that during the years 2000 to 2010 the independence movement gained 
significant ground until it stabilized at between 40 per cent and 50 per 
cent of all Catalan citizens.
From 2012 to the Present Day
From the ‘procés participatiu’ [participatory process] of 9 November 2014, 
which was held despite opposition from the Spanish state, many things 
have happened. From that date on, Catalan and Spanish policy entered a 
period marked by escalating pressure from the Spanish government and 
the state in general in an attempt to block the sovereignism and inde-
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CiU having been dissolved in June 2014 over separatist disagreements 
within the coalition, when early elections to the Catalan Parliament were 
held on 27 September 2015, CDC and UDC ran separate campaigns. 
The election was won by an electoral coalition called Junts pel Sí ( JxSí) 
[Together for Yes]. Mas wanted to give the elections a plebiscitary character 
to turn them into a kind of vote on independence. However, JxSí needed 
the pro-independence and anti-system votes of CUP to gain control of the 
Catalan Parliament and, in exchange for their support, CUP demanded that 
Mas should withdraw from the presidency of the Generalitat. In January 
2016, Carles Puigdemont became the new president and five months later, 
in June, announced that he would call a referendum on independence.
When, during the referendum voting on 1 October 2017 – which 
was to proceed in spite of opposition from the Spanish government, the 
Constitutional Court, and the Judiciary – agents of the National Police and 
Civil Guard assaulted voters in a number of polling stations, the images of 
police violence circled the globe. Almost 2.3 million people voted, nine out 
of ten in favour of an independent Catalonia. King Felipe VI, in a televised 
speech on 3 October, described what happened as ‘deslealtad inadmisible’ 
[unacceptable disloyalty] and warned of the ‘extrema gravedad’ [extreme 
gravity] of what was happening. He stressed that the State should ensure 
‘el orden constitucional’ [the constitutional order] and avoided referring 
to the more than 1,000 people hurt and injured. That same day there was 
a general strike – ‘aturada de país’ [halting of the country] – in Catalonia 
to protest the violence.
Puigdemont would declare Catalan independence in the Catalan 
Parliament on 10 October, although in the same act it was suspended 
pending international mediation, something which was not going to happen. 
Finally, on the 27th, Puigdemont declared independence. However, it was 
not to be implemented. The Spanish flag on the Palace of the Generalitat 
in Barcelona was not even hauled down, and the statement was not pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the Generalitat of Catalonia, something 
required if it was to become law. The reaction of the Spanish State con-
sisted of implementing Article 155 of the Constitution, which meant the 
immediate suspension of all Catalan government members and the take-
over of the Generalitat. At the same time, elections were also called for 21 
320 Marçal Sintes Olivella et al.
December, in which the pro-independence parties would manage to win 
seventy seats in parliament, two more than required for an absolute ma-
jority. The record turnout exceeded 79 per cent, with Puigdemont once 
again the candidate with the greatest support.
By early 2018, the principal civil and political independence leaders 
were either in custody – accused of serious crimes – or refugees in various 
European countries. Others were free, but were awaiting Spanish judicial 
processes – as was the chief of the Mossos de Esquadra (Catalan regional 
police). Puigdemont took refuge in Belgium but was later arrested in 
Germany while returning by road from Finland. German judges dismissed, 
although they had not yet definitely denied, the order for his extradition to 
Spain for the crime of rebellion (punishable by a maximum of thirty years 
imprisonment) and said that if asked they would deliberate on the accus-
ation of embezzlement of public funds. Puigdemont and Jordi Sánchez 
(leader of Òmnium Cultural, in prison for the second time) were pro-
posed as candidates for president of the Catalan government, but their 
legal situation prevented their inauguration. A third candidate, Jordi 
Turull, failed to gain the support of the CUP. The 1 October referendum 
brought sharply into view the attention paid by the international press to 
the Catalan question, and this was also to be the case with the declarations 
of independence on 10 and 27 October; these events served to consoli-
date the Catalan situation on the international agenda, which was both 
the impetus for our investigation and the guide to its research processes.
Methodology
The methodology consisted in the quantitative analysis of the informa-
tion appearing in the press, television, radio and internet at Catalan, 
Spanish and international levels. The research focused on the period 
from 11  September  2012 (Catalan National Day) until a few days 
after the elections to the Catalan Parliament on 25 November that 
same year. The test sample starts on 10 September and extends until 
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30 November 2012.15 The quantitative analysis included a total of 4,795 
journal pieces from more than 100 media sources: Catalan, Spanish and 
international.16 The investigation was complemented by author inter-
views of members of the two different Catalan governments, including 
its presidents. The pieces can be characterized as follows:
 – selected information published in printed newspapers;
 – news programmes from selected radio and television channels;
 – news distributed by selected digital newspapers;
 – the main radio and television current affairs programmes including 
news, interviews, talk-shows and political debates.
However, the principal object of analysis was the headline for all media, 
whether print, radio, television or Internet.
Media Sampling
For the purpose of the investigation, and with the exception of the inter-
national press, the sample was selected for each outlet and territory ac-
cording to the criterion of coverage and influence of each of these media. 
To maintain a certain geographical balance, a higher number of foreign 
newspapers was chosen.17
Given the territorial and political framework that the emerging 
pro-independence movement is articulated in, we directed our attention 
 15 This material was quantified using indicators such as time and space occupied; the 
pre-eminence given to this content by the media and the secondment of contribu-
tors and experts.
 16 See Appendix A for the list of all media analysed.
 17 Not all media reached a sample of seven in some categories: Catalan television and 
radio and international digital newspapers (because the number of newspaper com-
panies representing the area in question did not reach that figure). In the case of the 
internet, our study included both digital newspapers without printed press – called 
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to European media, focusing the analysis on the most influential coun-
tries among the European Union (EU) founders: Germany, France, Italy, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. In this selection, the UK was added, al-
though it joined the EU project later than the others, as it is still, despite 
the uncertainties of Brexit, a state with considerable power and influence. 
In addition, the Scottish case presents characteristics similar in many ways 
to those of Catalonia. We have considered it worthwhile to add the United 
States to our selection, as a traditional ally of the EU and a pre-eminent 
player in the international landscape. In this way, there are many of the 
major trading partners of Catalonia in this sample.
We also deemed it essential to give greater attention to two of the 
sectors: television and the printed press. While the circulation of printed 
newspapers is generally declining internationally, this medium still exerts a 
considerable influence on political, economic, social and cultural elites. As 
such, both media are crucial factors in shaping public opinion. As for the 
printed press, we thought it necessary also to include some non-generalist 
but nevertheless major publications specializing in economics. The leading 
global audio-visual channels are reference points for many media, and so 
have also been included. In total the sample includes 104 communication 
means in seven languages: twenty-four Catalan, twenty-eight Spanish and 
fifty-two internationals.
In the case of audio-visual programmes, the approach was to select the 
midday and evening television news, and the programmes with talk shows, 
debates, interviews, and so on of a political nature. As for the radio, we have 
selected information programmes, usually in the evening, together with the 
most relevant current affairs programmes, which are usually broadcast in 
the morning. With regard to digital-only newspapers, online media units 
were sampled using two different procedures. From the date on which 
the investigation began – 15 November 2012 – we proceeded to capture 
all the headlines studied. The capture was always carried out at 4 p.m. For 
the analysis of past publications, we conducted a retrospective search. We 
considered that employing Google for the enquiry would provide better 
and more homogeneous results.18
 18 For Catalan media the following categories were chosen:  independencia, 
independentisme; federalisme, federal, federalist; sobiranisme, sobiranista; 
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Data: Factor Analysis
Each individual piece of text information was collected and assigned the 
following data fields: basic identification (headline, publication, source, 
date and text genre) and related data on the time, place and duration, 
as well as the rank or position in the publication (cover or summary or 
home page, section, page, columns).
Among the news headlines, we differentiated between those that were 
referential and those that were evaluative. The referential headlines are ob-
jective and we can determine if they are true or false; the most common ex-
amples are statements such as: ‘Rajoy avisa a Mas de que “se está equivocando 
y mucho”’ [Rajoy warns Mas that ‘he is making a mistake and a bad one at 
that’] In these headlines, we have also focused on determining the subject 
of the statement. For evaluative headlines we first determined whether the 
assessment was positive, negative or not indicated. If the news text was an 
interview, then we refer to the political (or ideological) affiliation of the 
person concerned: unionist, independentist, federalist, or not indicated.
Opinion: Factor Analysis
For opinion texts the overall objective was twofold: first, political, ideo-
logical and professional identification of the author of the text, and 
second, the headline analysis. For the first objective, in addition to the 
basic reference data  – medium, date and headline  – we identified the 
kind of opinion article – column, external pundit contribution, in-depth 
article, editorial, letter to the editor, and so on  – and the journalist’s 
espanyolisme, centralisme, espanya, unitat. For Spanish media the categories were: 
independencia, independentismo; federalism, federal, federalista; soberanismo, 
soberanista, españolismo, centralismo, españa, unidad. For international media, 
the search was carried out thoroughly from the word ‘Catalonia’ translated into the 
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credentials:  author, expert, politician, and so on, as well as their ideo-
logical leaning. This part included a study of chat shows, a very popular 
format in Catalonia and Spain. For the second objective the headlines 
were classified as thematic (that is limiting themselves to the question at 
hand), evaluative/evaluation (issuing a judgement), or inappropriate (ex-
tremely negative or offensive). Also, as in the news elements, we indicated 
whether the action was presented as positive or negative, and who it was 
directed at or who suffered the consequences.
Results and Discussion
The first objective of our investigation was to determine whether in 2012 
sovereignism had the ability to reach beyond the Spanish borders, to the 
extent that it was incorporated into the international public agenda. In 
this regard, it is significant that, of the overall total of 4,795 items ana-
lysed (see Appendix A), international media produced 233 news items 
through print, television and radio during our study period (4.65 per 
cent of the overall total), while Catalan and Spanish media published 
4,562 pieces (95.35 per cent). As expected, the Catalan and Spanish media 
provided much more information than foreign media. From Table  11.1 
(Appendix B) it can be seen that, for example, in the case of television, the 
total number of recorded spots was: 397 in Catalonia, 232 in Spain and 
twenty-five internationally – a total of 654.
In all media (print, broadcasting and digital), news items were the 
predominant reporting genre in Catalonia, in Spain, and in the rest of 
the world (Tables 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5). Regarding opinion genres, in 
Catalonia and Spain many more opinions were provided by columnists 
than by editorials, by letters to the editor or by analyses written by experts 
(in-depth articles and external pundit contributions). In the international 
media, columnists and external pundits contributed 31.3 per cent each to 
the overall total (Table 11.6).
Of the headlines analysed throughout the period, internationally the 
subject that appears most is ‘Catalonia’: in printed media (Table 11.7), 
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‘Catalonia’ accounts for 29.9 per cent of the headlines, while in television 
(Table 11.8) this ratio is much higher – rising to 70 per cent – and in online 
media (Table 11.9) it was 62.5 per cent. In the case of both Catalonia and 
Spain the subject that dominates headlines in all three media is Artur Mas, 
who was the then president of the government of the Generalitat. This 
was to be expected, given that the perspective of the international media 
is more detached than that of the Catalan and Spanish.
Headlines were mostly categorized as evaluative (Table 11.10). The case 
of the press (General) is the most striking: evaluative headlines account 
for 63.1 per cent versus 33.5 per cent for referential (and 3.4 per cent where 
the distinction was not applicable). For international television, evaluative 
and referential headlines were equal at 28 per cent. In the international 
online media, in contrast, evaluative headlines at 42.9 per cent far ex-
ceeded referential.
The typology of international headlines (Table 11.11) was considerably 
more negative than positive in newspapers (44.9 per cent negative versus 
17.4 per cent positive, while the rest were neutral or indeterminate). For 
magazines, the proportion of negative (37.5 per cent) was significantly 
higher than positive (25 per cent); this was even more marked in the case 
of online media (38.5 per cent versus 7.7 per cent). However, in TV head-
lines the positive (37.5 per cent) were higher than the negative (25 per cent), 
making international television the only outlet where positive reporting 
exceeded negative.
The second objective of this research was to ascertain whether the al-
legations of bias made by the Spanish government and unionist politicians 
were true. The total number of opinion pieces (column, pundit, article, 
etc.) analysed was 1,922. Most of these opinion headlines have an evaluative 
function first, then thematic thereafter. Most of the inappropriate headlines 
occurred in the Spanish media. This tendency was clearest in online media, 
given that the percentage of opinion headlines presenting an inappropriate 
function reached 3.4 per cent. As for the leaning of print media contribu-
tors and experts (Table 11.12), perhaps the most significant point of our 
analysis is the strong polarization observed, although there was a greater 
diversity among the Catalan media than among Spanish media. In the 
first case, those which can be labelled as sovereigntists take precedence at 
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59.5 per cent. Conversely, in the Spanish media the unionists take the first 
place, at 71.4 per cent. The more inappropriate opinion pieces were those 
of the Spanish media. In addition, and taking the strong polarization into 
account, we can observe that the pluralism of the Catalan media is higher 
than that of the Spanish.
In the case of print media contributors, Table 11.12 indicates that while 
sovereigntists dominated in Catalonia (59.5 per cent), in Spain it is the 
unionists, with 71.4 per cent of the total. Table 11.13 indicates that in the 
Catalan online media, sovereigntists accounted for 77 per cent versus 10 per 
cent of unionists and 13 per cent of federalists. In the Spanish online media, 
the percentages were: 54.3 per cent, unionists; 11.2 per cent sovereigntists 
(in favour of self-determination); 14.7 per cent federalists. In radio talk 
shows (Table 11.14), in the case of Catalonia nearly half the pundits were 
sovereigntists (49.7 per cent), and in the case of Spain 61 per cent were 
unionists and only 1.7 per cent were sovereigntist voices for independence. 
For television talk-show guest ideologies (Table 11.15), in Catalonia 45.5 
per cent were sovereigntists, while on Spanish television, unionist guests 
accounted for 69.7 per cent; unionists among Catalonia commentators 
comprised 15.8 per cent while in Spain the sovereigntists (separatists) made 
up 5.9 per cent.
The majority opinion of the Catalans, in any media, was sovereigntist. 
In the Spanish media, conversely, the main point of view was unionist. The 
Catalan digital media and the Spanish printed media included a higher 
percentage of opinion contributors of the respective majority currents. The 
greatest balance was found in the international newspapers and magazines. 
As for the politicians interviewed, we should highlight the fact that the 
Spanish press mainly interviewed, and in this order, representatives of the 
PP and the PP in Catalonia, then those of PSC and Citizens, condemning 
representatives of political parties favourable to the self-determination of 
Catalonia to virtual silence.
As we have seen, during the study period, 233 pieces on Catalonia were 
broadcast or published in the international media we analysed (Table 11.1). 
Today the international presence of Catalonia is perceptibly far greater than 
it was then, and there can be no doubt that the independence movement 
has become a player in an international issue. This emergence of Catalonia 
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on the international agenda dates from the key year of 2012 and has con-
tinued to increase and consolidate itself since. This is actually one of the 
principal objectives pursued by sovereigntism since 2012, the year in which, 
as we have seen, the movement broke out of its shell in full force. However, 
in that year, both Catalonia and President Mas were associated with nega-
tive actions or assessments in the international media.
In fact, after the great rally of 2012, the Generalitat government imple-
mented a specific programme for a channel of fluid communication with 
international media and their correspondents in Catalonia and Spain. The 
programme was dubbed The Eugeni Xammar International Programme 
for Communications and Public Relations.19 Additionally, in November 
of the same year, the Catalan government agreed to give a strong impetus 
to diplomatic action abroad. To do this, they created the Public Diplomacy 
Council of Catalonia (Diplocat) from the existing Catalonia World Board. 
Their goal was to explain the Catalan process internationally, including their 
aspirations to exercise the right to self-determination and independence. 
Diplocat, the Catalan paradiplomacy, which was abolished in 2017 by the 
Spanish government based on Article 155 of the Constitution, worked hard 
and contributed to making what was happening in Catalonia known inter-
nationally. The Catalan government also tried during the process to attract 
the attention of foreign correspondents, traditionally based in Madrid and 
therefore very exposed to the narratives on Catalonia propagated by the 
government of Rajoy and the Spanish media.20
As we noted earlier, a new analysis of the international agenda would 
be necessary to check to what extent the presence of Catalonia and the 
independence movement has increased on the international agenda. It 
would also need to determine whether assessment at the international level 
 19 Eugeni Xammar (1888–1973) was a notable Catalan journalist and international 
correspondent, besides being a diplomat and translator.
 20 One of these journalists, Sandrine Morel of Le Monde, a critic of sovereigntism, 
published a book (2018) in which she exposes the pressure of a member of the Partit 
Democràtic Europeu de Catalunya [European Democratic Party of Catalonia] 
(PDECAT), the successor of the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia, to pub-
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remains largely negative or whether, in light of the events from 2012 to the 
present, the international perception has become more positive. As we have 
seen, the debate in Catalonia and Spain about the Catalan aspiration to 
decide their own future through a referendum on self-determination, took 
place using terms of great polarization. There is a structural explanation 
for this. Catalonia and Spain can consider themselves safely included in 
the ‘Mediterranean model or polarized pluralism’ (Hallin and Mancini 
2004), which is characterized by a high degree of parallelism, of corres-
pondence, between the political system and the media. However, there is 
less unanimity between Catalan and Spanish media. While in the former 
we find a greater representation of voices against self-determination and 
independence, the latter tend to ostensibly minimize or marginalize the 
voices of sovereigntism and independence.
In this section, although we do not have global studies, we do have 
different analyses conducted on pluralism on television both in Catalonia 
and in Spain. These analyses tend to confirm our results in part. El Consell 
de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya [The Audiovisual Council of Catalonia] 
(CAC), a regulator that produced different analyses, found in a study 
on 1 October 2017, the referendum voting day, that, in news treatment 
on Catalan and Spanish television channels, TV3 (the leading Catalan 
public television channel) ‘va oferir aquell dia més pluralitat de veus en 
la seva programació’ [offered on that day more diversity of voices in their 
programming] compared with the Spanish public television (TVE) and 
the private Spanish Telecinco, Antena 3 TV and La Sexta (CAC 2017). 
Another example available is the collective study on the 2017 Catalan 
elections by the UK Democracy Volunteers. In the ‘Media Monitoring’ 
section, the report analysed Catalan and Spanish newspapers, radio and 
television, noting the strong bias against independence in the Spanish 
media (Ault 2017).
Also in this section, we should take into consideration an important 
element that relates to the structure of the Catalan media market. While 
the Spanish media, both written and audiovisual, have a widespread dif-
fusion and readership/audience in Catalonia, this does not happen the 
other way around. Without doubt, this makes it possible for the Catalan 
public to receive a greater diversity of points of view than the general public 
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in the rest of the country. In a nutshell, we can say that 2012 was the year 
when the movement for Catalan independence became an issue that went 
beyond the Spanish borders for the first time in a loud and clear manner. 
Likewise, the international presence in 2012 became a prime objective of 
the independence movement and the Generalitat government redoubled 
its diplomatic efforts to publicize the Catalan situation to the world to 
garner support for holding a referendum.
While an assessment of Catalonia’s presence on the international 
agenda may not have been a primary objective of this study, it is evident 
that this presence has been increasing progressively. However, we do not 
know whether international public opinion about the Catalan independ-
ence movement amounts to a positive assessment, although in this regard 
there might have been significant fluctuations throughout the different 
periods or stages since 2012. It also seems clear that the Spanish media 
were – and appear to continue to be – virtually unanimous in their position 
of rejecting a referendum on self-determination and promoting frontal 
condemnation of independence. As we have already said, the Spanish 
media are widely read and watched by the Catalan general public, some-
thing that does not happen on a reciprocal basis, which is to say that the 
Catalan media are hardly followed outside Catalonia. Our analysis has 
clearly shown that, for their part, the Catalan media made greater efforts 
to accommodate a diversity of opinions and views and provide more plur-
alism in their reporting.
More recent events have served to highlight the probability that the 
conflict between opposing views of nationhood and identity, in both 
Catalonia and Spain, is not likely to be resolved in the short term. This 
underscores the pressing need to continue the line of research that began 
with this study, the results and conclusions of which, drawn from a very 
wide spectrum of media opinion, not only shed light on the present inde-
pendence movement in Catalonia and its impact on Spanish perceptions 
of statehood, but lead into and meld with other definitions of and aspir-
ations towards identity worldwide. Continuing such analyses through 
further periods of time, following national and international opinions 
as they evolve and mutate, can only enhance our understanding of the 
issues involved.
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Appendix A: Media Analysed
Catalan
Printed press Television Radio Digital newspapers
(pure players)
La Vanguardia TV3 Catalunya 
Ràdio
Vilaweb




news on Channels 
One and Two)
RAC1 Nació Digital
El Punt Avui 8tv La Xarxa 
(COM Ràdio)
Racó Català
Ara Barcelona TV RNE Ràdio 4 El Singular Digital / 
El Món




Regió 7 El Debat
El Nacional
Spanish
Printed press Television Radio Digital newspapers
(pure players)
El País Telecinco Cadena SER Lainformacion.com
El Mundo Antena 3 Onda Cero 
Radio
El Confidencial
ABC La 1 RNE Radio 1 Publico.es
La Razón Cuatro COPE Periodista Digital
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Spanish
Printed press Television Radio Digital newspapers
(pure players)
El Correo La Sexta ABC Punto 
Radio
The Huffington Post
La Voz de 
Galicia





















CNN (US) Political (US) Stern (Germany)
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International












The Guardian (UK) Le Soir
(Belgium-
Wallonia)
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Appendix B: Analyses
Table 11.1: Number of journal pieces
Catalonia Spain International Total
Printed media 1,385 914 194 2,493
Broad-casting 397 232 25 654
Online media 1,062 572 14 1,648
Total 2,844 1,718 233 4,795
Table 11.2: Number of front-page or table-of-contents pieces
Catalonia Spain International Total
Printed Media 244 175 23 442
Broad-casting 90 218 2 310
Table 11.3: Most common genres in printed press (%)
Catalonia Spain International
News 79.4 91.6 70.1
Interview 8.7 2.2 3.3
Chronicle 6.5 3.6 7.1
Reportage 5.4 2.6 19.0
Table 11.4: Most common genres in broadcast media (%)
Catalonia Spain International
News 91.9 100 84.0
Interview - - -
Chronicle 5.5 - -
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Table 11.5: Most common genres in online media (%)
Catalonia Spain International
News 99.7 87.9 85.7
Interview 0.3 3.5 -
Chronicle 6.6 7.1
Report 1.9 7.2
Table 11.6: Opinion articles typology (%)
Catalonia Spain International
Column 63.3 63.5 31.3
External pundit 17.3 12.9 31.3
In-depth article 6.9 12.9 18.8
Editorial 6.8 9.8 10.4
Letter to the editor 5.8 0.9 8.3
Table 11.7: Main subjects in printed press headlines (%)
Catalonia Spain International
Artur Mas (17.3) Artur Mas (9.3) Catalonia (29.9)
PSC (6.4) Spanish gov’t (6.0) Mariano Rajoy (11.5)
ERC (6.4) Mariano Rajoy (4.7) Artur Mas (10.3)
Table 11.8: Main subjects in broadcasting media (%)
Catalonia Spain International
Artur Mas (28.7) Artur Mas (38.1) Catalonia (70.0)
Generalitat (7.7) Catalonia (6.7) ICV (10.0)
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Table 11.12: Ideology of print media contributors (%)
Catalonia Spain International
Sovereigntists 59.5 3 12.5
Unionists - 71.4 18.8
Federalists 0.8 2.3 2.1
Unidentified 22 23.3 66.7
Table 11.9: Main subjects in online media (%)
Catalonia Spain International
Artur Mas (15.7) Artur Mas (18.4) Catalonia (62.5)
ERC (10.0) PP (7.1) Other (37.5)
PSC (8.0) CiU (6.6)





Evaluative 63.1 28.0 42.9
Referential 33.5 28.0 17.4
Inappropriate 3.4 44.0 37.7
Table 11.11: Typology of international headlines (%)
Newspapers Magazines Online media TV
Negative 44.9 37.5 38.5 25.0
Positive 17.4 25.0 7.7 37.5





336 Marçal Sintes Olivella et al.
Bibliography
Álvaro, F.-M. (2014). Ara sí que toca! El pujolisme, el procés sobiranista i el cas Pujol. 
Barcelona: Pòrtic.
Antich, J. (1994). El virrey: ¿es Jordi Pujol un fiel aliado de la Corona o un caballo de 
Troya dentro de la Zarzuela? Barcelona: Planeta.
Ault, J. (2017). ‘Catalonia Regional Elections 21st December 2017 – Interim Report’. 
London: Democracy Volunteers <https://democracyvolunteersdotorg.files.























The Pro-Independence Movement in Catalonia 337
wordpress.com/2017/12/catalonian-regional-election-2017-interim-report1.
pdf> accessed 10 November 2018.
Balsells, A. (1992). Història del nacionalisme català:  dels orígens al nostre temps. 
Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament de la Presidència. Entitat 
Autònoma del Diari Oficial i de Publicacions.
Burgen, S. (2012). ‘Catalan independence rally brings Barcelona to a standstill’, The 
Guardian, 11 September <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/11/
catalan-independence-rally-barcelona> accessed 5 December 2018.
Cacho Viu, V. (1998). El nacionalismo catalán como factor de modernización. 
Barcelona: Quaderns Crema.
Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO) (2012). ‘Baròmetre d’Opinió Política, 28’ 
<http://ceo.gencat.cat/ca/barometre/detall/index.html?id=4308> accessed 
13 November 2018.
Consell de l’Audiviosual de Catalunya (CAC) (2017). ‘TV3 va respectar el pluralisme 
en la jornada de l’1-O i la TV pública estatal va presentar manca de pluralitat de 
veus’ <https://www.cac.cat/actualitat/tv3-va-respectar-pluralisme-la-jornada-
l1-o-i-la-tv-publica-estatal-va-presentar-manca> accessed 18 November 2018.
Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals (CCMA) (2012). ‘1,5 milions de 
persones demanen la independència’ <http://www.ccma.cat/324/15-milions-
de-persones-demanen-la-independencia-de-Catalunya-en-una-manifestacio-
record/noticia/1884457/> accessed 13 November 2018.
Culla, J. B. (2017). El tsunami. Com i perquè el sistema de partits català a esdevingut 
irreconeixible. Barcelona: Pòrtic.
De Borbón, J. C. (2012). ‘Carta de S.M.  el Rey Don Juan Carlos’ <http://www.
casareal.es/ES/FamiliaReal/rey/Paginas/rey_cartas_detalle.aspx?data=51> ac-
cessed 2 December 2018.
Departament de la Vicepresidència i Economia i Hacienda de la Generalitat de 
Catalunya (2017). ‘Els resultats de la balança fiscal amb el sector públic central 
els anys 2013 i 2014’ <http://economia.gencat.cat/web/.content/70_analisi_
finances_publiques_balanca_fiscal/arxius/resultats-BF-2013-2014.pdf> ac-
cessed 18 November 2018.
Dowling, A. (2013). Catalonia since the Spanish Civil War: reconstructing the nation. 
Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press.
García, L. (2018). El Naufragio. Barcelona: Ediciones Península.
Generalitat de Catalunya (2012). ‘Resultados definitivos; Eleccions al Parlament de 
Catalunya’ <https://www.gencat.cat/governacio/resultats-parlament2012/09AU/
DAU09999CM_L1.htm?d=0> accessed 10 December 2018.
Guibernau, M. (2013). ‘Secessionism in Catalonia:  After Democracy’, 
Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 12 (4), 368–93.
338 Marçal Sintes Olivella et al.
Hallin, D. C., and Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of 
media and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keating, M. (1996). Nations against the state:  The new politics of nationalism in 
Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
La Vanguardia (2009). ‘La dignidad de Cataluña’ [Editorial], 26 November 
<http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20091126/53831123016/la-dignidad-
de-catalunya.html> accessed 18 November 2018.
McRoberts, K. (2001). Nation Building Without a State. Canada: Don Mills; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
March, O. (2018). Los entresijos del procés. Madrid: Catarata.
Martí, J. (2018). Cómo ganamos el proceso y perdimos la República. Barcelona: 
Economía Digital.
Minder, R. (2017). The struggle for Catalonia. Rebel politics in Spain. London: Hurst.
Morel, S. (2018). El huracán catalan: una mirada privilegiada al laberinto del procés. 
Barcelona: Planeta.
Pujol, J. (2011). Memòries (II). Temps de construir (1980–1993). Barcelona: Proa.
Pujol, J. (2012). Memòries (III). De la bonança a un repte nou (1993–2011). 
Barcelona: Proa.
Silió, E. (2016). ‘¿Qué comunidades sacan mejor nota en PISA?’, El País, 7 
December <https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/12/02/actualidad/ 
1480709130_114964.html> accessed 10 November 2018.
Solé Tura, J. (1985). Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España:  autonomías, 
federalismo, autodeterminación. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Termes, J. (1999). Les arrels populars del catalanisme. Barcelona: Empúries.
TV3 (2013). ‘TV3 Especial Via Catalana – Les Millors imatges de la Via Catalana’ 
[TV3 Via Catalana Special – The best images of the Via Catalana], 11 September 
<https://youtu.be/iff J1TgljE0> accessed 2 December 2018.
Sorina Soare
Romania: The Challenges of Contested Identities
abstract
The Romanian post-communist legislators rapidly implemented regulations providing 
facilitated access to Romanian citizenship for those former citizens who had lost their 
Romanian citizenship against their will or for other reasons not imputable to them – an 
implicit reference to the inhabitants of those territories that Romania lost to the USSR 
following the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The current Republic of Moldova (RM) was 
part of these territorial losses. The chapter examines how the definition of citizenship has 
evolved in post-communist Romania and the impact of preferential admission to citizen-
ship upon the Romanian-speaking community originating from the RM. The focus of the 
analysis is the interplay between the demand side (the procedural elements codifying the 
existence of ethno-national ties) and the supply side (the substantive outcomes of prefer-
ential access to citizenship within a specific community).
Since the early days of Romanian post-communism, references  – ex-
plicit and implicit  – have been made to the need to invest in formal 
and informal relations with the territories of the current Republic of 
Moldova (RM), which once belonged to the so-called Greater Romania 
(1918–40). The case of Romania–Moldova is fascinating not only with 
respect to its Soviet-era and post-Soviet definitions of national iden-
tities but, more widely, in the light that its contrary views, implementa-
tions and failures may throw on the present escalation of nationalisms 
evident very clearly in the precarious union of European states. The 
extent to which its story is their story is a matter for discernment, as 
the account may serve as a stand-alone review of evolving Moldovan–
Romanian relations as well as a pointer to arguments and resolutions 
relevant to other current and potential nationhood and identity dis-
putes. In the Romanian context, beyond the rhetoric of the slogan 
‘Basarabia e Romania’ [Bessarabia is Romanian land]1 few projects or 






deadlines for unification have been publicly produced over the last two 
decades.2 In Moldovan society, competing nation-building plans have 
blossomed, filtered by divergent nationhood projects and trajectories 
for regional integration. Meanwhile, the Moldovan issue has maintained 
its relevance in Russian politics as illustrated by the well-known scen-
ario drafted in 2004 by Stanislav Belkovski, which referred to a pos-
sible unification of Bessarabia with Romania, endorsed by Russia in 
exchange for Transnistria’s independence. Surprisingly, the Belkovski 
plan received a degree of positive assessment in Romanian politics, al-
though not officially endorsed (Pop et al. 2005: 86–7). Since then, both 
in Romania and the RM, several demonstrations in support of the uni-
fication have been organized, but without any significant impact. The 
most recent was organized on 1 December 2018, on the occasion of the 
centenary of Romanian Unification. Meanwhile, in March 2018, the 
Romanian parliament had organized a special session dedicated to the 
anniversary of the unification with Moldova after the First World War. 
The official statement endorsed the position Romania has taken on the 
topic of re-unification over recent decades: ‘We underline that such an 
act would depend on their will and we declare that Romania and its 
citizens are, and will always be, ready to welcome any organic move to 
reunification by Moldovan citizens as an expression of their sovereign 
will’ (reuters.com 2018). All in all, while the Romanian population has 
regularly testified its interest in a project of unification, popular en-
dorsement in the RM has not taken off and the Russian position has 
remained sceptical.3
 2 Among the very limited concrete examples, there is the so called ‘Country 
Project – The Unification with the Republic of Moldova’ endorsed by the People’s 
Movement Party (PMP) (Program PMP 2016), echoed by different 2018 declar-
ations of support among the central and local elites of the PMP.
 3 According to a March 2018 survey conducted by the Moldovan Center for 
Sociological Research, among Moldovan citizens, 35 per cent would cast their vote 
in favour of a project of unification with Romania and 47 per cent against (Adevarul 
2018). Note that, in the summer of 2015, endorsement among the Romanian popu-
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In this context, the Romanian post-communist legislators rapidly im-
plemented regulations providing facilitated access to the status of Romanian 
citizens (reacquisition – redobândire – of citizenship) for those former 
citizens who had lost their Romanian citizenship against their will or for 
other reasons not imputable to them – an implicit reference to the inhab-
itants of those territories that Romania lost to the USSR following the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (Dumbrava 2015; Iordachi 2009; Knott 2018). 
The Romanian post-communist legislators, endorsed by all the main par-
ties, institutionalized the extension of Romanian citizenship entitlements 
beyond the circle of national residents, to specifically include those who 
were no longer residents or nationals but who were historically included 
within a national definition of the Romanian state (Iordachi 2009). The 
post-1991 legal changes targeted in primis citizens of the current RM, ter-
ritory lost by Romania in the Second World War. Initially a subject of 
academic research, with limited public impact, these provisions were to 
become a topic of Europe-wide debate. News about Moldovans exploiting 
their Romanian passports in order to gain access to the privileges enjoyed 
by Romanians as citizens of an EU Member State multiplied in line with 
widespread immigration concerns among national and European represen-
tatives (Knott 2017). In this context, the literature focused intensively on 
national identity as a particularly useful lens for interpreting the relations 
between the two countries. Initially, scholars focused on the legal provi-
sions linking specific ethno-national claims and preferential acquisition 
of citizenship. Progressively, this has been integrated with bottom-up in-
terpretations underlining the motivations of both individuals and their 
communities for taking advantage of these provisions (Chinn and Roper 
1995; Danero 2015; Dumbrava 2014, 2015; Heintz 2008; Iordarchi 2009, 
2013; King 2000; Knott 2015; Negură 2013; Waterbury 2014). To my know-
ledge, there have been no systematic attempts to explore the interplay be-
tween the demand side (the procedural elements codifying the existence 
of ethno-national ties) and the supply side (the substantive outcomes of 
preferential access to citizenship within a specific community). This chapter 
is an attempt to fill this gap. The analysis relies on the literature of the com-
plex evolutions in the institution of citizenship, with a special focus on the 
different impacts of the facilitated practices (and connected experiences) 
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pertaining to the acquisition of a citizenship in line with Brubaker’s (1996) 
triadic nexus (i.e. kin-state, kin-community abroad and home state). It also 
deals with the implications of these practices for the literature on national 
identities and, partially, the study of migration (i.e. the literature on the 
enfranchisement of citizens residing abroad).
In relation to case studies, the premise of this chapter is that an in-
depth case study can be more rewarding analytically, as it not only enables 
the specification of the conditions under which particular outcomes may 
occur, but also identifies the mechanisms through which they arise (George 
and Bennet 2005; Yin 2014). A caveat has to be mentioned. While a case 
study has the advantage of providing an in-depth and multi-layered analysis, 
a major weakness is connected to its limited capacity to produce scientific 
generalization. However, a recent scan of the literature reveals a consider-
able number of scholars who acknowledge that case studies can contribute 
to scientific development by generating hypotheses and building theory 
(Flyvbjerg 2006; Steinberg 2015; Yin 2014). The utility of thoroughly exe-
cuted case studies is connected to the need for a systematic production of 
exemplars, considering that a discipline without exemplars is ineffective 
(Steinberg 2015).
In light of the above, the focus on Romanian–Moldovan relations 
can be justified on various levels. It is a particularly challenging research 
argument, considering the geopolitical implications of an ongoing pro-
cess of state-building, as illustrated by the 2014 Crimean crisis or the 
enduring Transnistrian question, with theoretical inputs for the more 
general debate on existing kin-relations identity politics in the region. The 
process of extra-territorialization of the Romanian citizenry in relation to 
the Moldovan kin-community is, however, far from being a unique case 
in the post-communist area. Forms of facilitated citizenship acquisition 
for kin-communities living outside the confines of the national state have 
been amply documented across the region (Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Serbia) (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). The extension of citizenship rights 
varies greatly: Romanian and Croatian laws entitle their kin-communities 
to vote; others privilege quasi-forms of citizenship. Accordingly, a focus on 
Romanian-Moldovan kinship seems to be particularly appropriate, con-
sidering the complexity of the institutional relations and their tortuous 
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evolutions over the last twenty-eight years. Initially synchronized, the 
positions of the institutional actors in Bucharest and Chișinău have re-
mained more or less divergent up to the present day. In parallel, the level 
of allegiance of the community to the varied offer of citizenship-based 
practices developed in Bucharest has remained relatively low, if one ex-
cludes their participation in parliamentary and presidential elections 
in Romania in 2009 and 2014. Considering the above, this chapter is 
based on qualitative material, desk research and primary sources (official 
statements, public discourses, legal texts, transcriptions of parliamentary 
debates, official statistics), and the case selection is pragmatically motiv-
ated by access to reliable in-depth data covering the perspectives of both 
supply and demand.
Last but not least, there is a quantitative criterion of relevance. 
According to international statistics, Romania experienced its highest-ever 
levels of emigration between 2000 and 2015, and emigration from Romania 
is considered to be increasing at a faster rate than from any other state not 
facing a conflict (World Migration Report 2018). Meanwhile, Romania 
also figures among the European Member States with the lowest levels of 
immigration, if one excludes the number of citizens ‘reacquired’ since 1991. 
Indeed, according to various estimates, the number of Moldovan citizens 
who ‘reacquired’ Romanian citizenship reached 800,000 between 1991 and 
2017 (Adevărul 2017), of which 175,339 gained Romanian citizenship be-
tween 2015 and 2017 (Romanian National Agency for Citizenship statistics 
quoted by Ziarul National 2018). Beyond the regular caveats when it comes 
to suspect round figures, different reports insist on a potential underesti-
mation of the number of Romanian citizens with Moldovan origins. This 
underestimation is due to the fact that the Romanian Agency in charge of 
the management of the applications of citizenship does not include chil-
dren in its statistics, but includes them within the individual files of their 
parents. Considering these caveats, if we refer to the 2014 census, out of 
the 2,998,235 Moldovans, those with Romanian citizenship would repre-
sent approximatively 27 per cent of the population. This explains why the 
community of Romanians in Moldova represents a central element in the 
statutory missions of the wide constellation of diaspora-focused institu-
tions covering ministry, inter-ministry and sub-ministry levels since 1995.
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With these things in mind, the case of the Moldovan community is 
treated as representative for post-communist settings (Yin 2014). It is well 
known that, in the last three decades, the entire area has witnessed a prolif-
eration of policies concerning the integration of diaspora/kin-communities. 
From the early 1990s, these policies and practices have become central across 
the region due to the relevant percentages of ethnic-kin communities living 
in the territory of a neighbouring country or nearby host countries. Across 
the region also, these policies have challenged the traditionally conceived 
sovereignty of nation-states and strengthened the diffusion of ethnic pol-
itical identities. Exploration of the historical background presents the 
core-elements for the existence of sizeable kin-communities beyond the 
frontiers of the home-state.
Considering the relevance of these policy interventions (home-states 
and kin-states; kin-majorities and kin-minorities), this case study has a 
double theoretical purpose. First, it aims at a better understanding of the 
dynamics between the supply side and the demand side. More specific-
ally, it aims to identify the practical and symbolic aspects of the policies 
incorporating kin-communities within the majority society. It also aims to 
take into account the relevance of additional incorporated benefits such 
as education, travel, labour aspects. Second, and more modestly, it aims 
to contribute to the most recent literature, with a focus on the strategic-
instrumental approach to citizenship. As such, the main empirical contri-
bution of this text is related to providing an updated overview of the legal 
provisions for the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship targeted at ethnic 
Romanians from Moldova.
From a methodological point of view, the analysis contributes to the 
literature by exploring the interplay between the demand side and the 
supply side, through providing a more nuanced understanding of the dy-
namics behind the processes of renationalizing communities. All in all, the 
conclusions complement the existing solid research in the field by offering, 
hopefully, new insights in relation to what Harpaz and Mateos (2018: 1–2) 
call ‘the instrumental-strategic attitudes to nationality’ (see also Joppke 
2018; Knott 2018).
This chapter seeks to map the motives for both providing and seeking 
Romanian citizenship by focusing on how and why experiences and practices 
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associated with Romanian citizenship located outside the boundaries of 
the territorial nation-state have evolved into an incomplete equivalence 
between the status of citizenship and the perception of belonging to an 
ethnically homogeneous community. All in all, the case under scrutiny 
provides additional evidence for the current academic debate related to 
the multiplication of forms of non-exclusive and controversial national 
memberships. The Romanian citizenship provisions (redobândire) echo the 
symbolic attempt to reproduce a homogeneous national community with 
close ties of allegiance to the (Romanian) home-state, and hence regularly 
focus on a narrative praising an ethnically homogeneous group tied to the 
Romanian state by a primordial identity; on the demand-side, however, 
the citizenship policies implemented by the Romanian side are less about 
symbolic resonance and re-inclusion in an organic community, and more 
about practical outputs such as the rights and privileges connected with 
access to EU citizenship.
The analysis is structured as follows. Section one specifies the main 
theoretical framing for the identity politics analysis. Section two examines 
the historical relations between Romania and the current RM, presenting 
the different meanings of identity politics across history. Section three pre-
sents an analysis of the causal mechanisms connecting nation and citizen-
ship in the Romanian–Moldovan case. The final section concludes with a 
summary of the main findings.
State under Siege: Kinship and Citizenship in Post-
communist Societies – a Theoretical Overview
Following the dismantling of the communist regimes, nationalism 
has been very much at the forefront of politics. Highly sensitive con-
cepts like nation and national identities have been used in order to re-
build kinship-communities by mobilizing groups that were perceived as 
sharing historical, ethnic, religious and cultural identity features, even 




states (Brubaker 1996). In the wider context of the post-1989 diffused 
globalization, the traditional understanding of citizenship as the connec-
tion between an individual and a polity has been fine-tuned (Nussbaum 
1998; Smith 1997; Turner 2000). The literature has pinpointed post-
nationalized forms of citizenship in line with the multiplication of forms 
of (quasi-)citizenship outside the territory of the (national) state’s sover-
eignty (Soysal 1994). One consequence of the extra-territorialization of 
these forms of citizenship is the fact that ethnicity was not only an issue of 
domestic policies, but rapidly became a matter of international relations, 
with consequences ranging from radical and violent resolutions to more 
accommodative economic relations and cultural policies. While research 
focused on Western democracies illustrates that post-Second World War 
disputes between states have generally been resolved in a peaceful manner 
(Kornprobst 2008), in the post-communist area this complex web of 
identity affiliation has sown the seeds of discord between sovereign states 
(Laitin 2001; Saideman and Ayres 2008). Unsurprisingly, scholars have 
interpreted these ethnicized forms of citizenship as potential sources 
of violence, due to attempts to achieve congruence between the mem-
bers of the nation and the borders of the state (Brubaker 1996; Smith 
2002). In parallel, the relocation of elements of citizenship outside the 
national state has also transformed the boundaries of the demos. With 
increasing immigration, the transformation of the practices of citizenship 
has become a key element of the literature on the enfranchisement of citi-
zens living abroad (Bauböck 2006; Ellis et al. 2007; Knott 2017; Kostelka 
2017; Lafleur 2015). However, the de-territorialization of state has not 
always been accompanied by a cosmopolitan and de-ethnicized account 
of citizenship. This is starkly illustrated in relation to the post-Yugoslav 
case by Ragazzi and Balalovska (2011). From a different perspective, 
scholars like Fowler (2004) or Knott (2015, 2018) argue that the classic 
assumption that territoriality and citizenship go together has radically 
changed. Together with the transformation of international norms on 
dual citizenship, increased international migration and minority rights 
regimes, the ability of states to claim exclusive juridical authority in their 
own territories has diminished (Fowler 2004: 186–7). The upshot is in-
terpreted as ‘fuzzy citizenship’ (ibid. 205–6). On this basis, scholars like 
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Joppke (2010, 2018) have chronicled a strategic instrumentalization, and/
or ‘lightening of citizenship’.
The perspective adopted by the literature has primarily focused on 
top-down institutional relations (Dumbrava 2014; Iordachi 2009, 2013), 
and, for a while, little was known about the bottom-up perspective. Few 
analyses are available on the impact of bottom-up dynamics (Danero 
2015; Knott 2015, 2018). The pioneering work of these authors in this 
field reveals the different perceptions of the kin-group members regarding 
both their homeland and the kin-state. In addition, Knott (2015) empha-
sizes the differential demographic and power status of the kin-group: a 
kin-majority, she rightly argues, cannot relate to the home state as a 
‘host-state’ in the same way that a kin-minority does; in my view, the 
kin-majority is, at least putatively, the founding political community in 
the homeland territory.
Drawing on the available literature, from the demand-side perspective, 
I suggest that a commitment to providing preferential access to citizen-
ship is influenced by both domestic and international inputs. The more 
consensus there is on the topic in the domestic arena, both in relation to 
political competition and the population, the more the co-ethnics are 
targeted as the strategic community to focus on for the preferential ac-
quisition of citizenship. Still, this endeavour can be influenced by the kin-
state’s engagement in alternative and strategic international socialization 
projects (e.g. NATO or the EU). Intensive ethno-nationalistic policies for 
kin-minorities/majorities would most likely not be a reasonable option 
vis-à-vis those international actors with a significant capacity to sanc-
tion a widely supported trans-partisan objective such as the EU/NATO 
project in the Romanian case. At the same time, we can expect that, after 
achieving the main objective, a change would occur in both the intensity 
and the content of policies towards kin-majorities/minorities, considering 
the limited range of post-accession leverages. From the demand-side per-
spective, one might expect that the desirability of preferential access to 
citizenship among kin-populations living abroad would depend on the 
kin-state’s capacity to push the targeted population to accept the kin-state 
not only as pragmatically appealing but also as trustworthy. Moreover, the 
attractiveness of preferential access to citizenship should increase when 
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the rights regarding the new status are not just combined with political 
and social entitlements in the kin-state, but also with limited losses in the 
original community.
Competing Identities: An Historical Perspective on 
Romanian–Moldovan Relations
Prior to the 1991 declaration of independence the RM had never been an 
independent state (Chinn and Roper 1995: 293). Situated in a territory 
with variable geography, its inhabitants have been subjected to various 
changes and contestations of identities and loyalties. These identity-
shaping projects have been interpreted, among others, as proof of an un-
realized nation-state (Brubaker 1996), of a weak state and uncertain citi-
zenship (Heintz 2008), and of a territory with no strong and unifying 
national idea, but a conglomerate of different competing nationalizing 
agendas acting at separate levels (Negură 2013). Along with redrawing 
borders and population transfer, a historical overview can illustrate not 
only the tortuous relationship between Romania and the RM, but also 
the continuities and discontinuities in various national identity pro-
cesses with a direct impact upon the different senses of belonging and 
membership.
Conflicting Processes of Identity-Building (1812–1991)
The historical origins of the medieval provinces covering the territory 
of Romania and the RM have been blurred by a complex sequence of 
historical events. First, there is the delayed ‘awakening’ of the Romanian 
national consciousness and the nineteenth-century creation of a na-
tional and unitary Romanian state, following the union of Wallachia 
and Moldova. Meanwhile, the Eastern part of the Moldovan territory 
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allegiance of the new territories to St Petersburg, a process of modern-
ization, urbanization and industrialization backed the tsarist rhetoric 
of a distinct Moldovan identity (King 2000; Vahl and Emerson 2004; 
Van Meurs 1994). After 1918, an intensive process of Romanianization 
was implemented through a top-down nationalizing agenda based on in-
dustrialization and schooling/literacy campaigns. Still, the allegiance of 
local communities to the nationalization process remained partial, while 
stronger differences arose between the old elite, loyal to Bucharest and 
the younger generation of elites who supported greater autonomy for 
Moldova (Negură 2013). By the end of the 1940s, the Soviet-Romanian 
border was restored on the line agreed after the Molotov–Ribbentrop 
pact and the 1947 Peace Treaty had confirmed the international recogni-
tion of Soviet sovereignty in Bessarabia. The Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MSSR) was created; its inhabitants lost their Romanian citi-
zenship rights and instead received Soviet citizenship.
Meanwhile, in communist Romania, the newly established Popular 
Republic exhibited strong anti-nationalist principles, stemming from its 
rigid interpretation of the Universalist-Leninist model, tacitly accepting the 
annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union. As 
of the late 1950s, the communist regime in Romania progressively adopted 
policies and symbolic gestures of independence from Moscow. In pur-
suing an ethnicization of the Communist Party, national variations were 
introduced and encouraged in public discourses and legal regulations. In 
line with the nationalist discourse implemented since the early 1970s, the 
communist Romanian president, N. Ceaușescu, for instance, criticized 
not only the tsarist annexation of Bessarabia, but also the official position 
towards the Soviet annexation in the 1940s (King 2000; Van Meurs 1994). 
However, prior to the fall of the regime in December 1989, the nationalistic 
rhetoric on Bessarabia was never translated into official talks with Moscow 
aiming to challenge the post-Second World War frontiers and endorse a 
project of territorial unification.
Meanwhile, throughout the communist period, the newly estab-
lished MSSR underwent a modernization process which impacted not 
only the social structure but also its ethnic composition, while failing, 
however, to solve the different interpretations of national identity which 
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had coexisted since the nineteenth century. In short order, the MSSR 
became one of the most Sovietized republics, characterized by high rates 
of linguistic assimilation towards Russian and high levels of inter-ethnic 
marriage (Panici 2003). The Moldovan identity crisis re-emerged in the 
context of Soviet liberalization, as testified by the 20th Congress of the 
Moldovan Communist Party in 1988, which debated the ethnic problem. 
The language dispute was eventually solved in favour of recognition of the 
Latin alphabet and Romanian cultural heritage, as well as the symbolic 
adoption of a flag similar to the Romanian tricolour, and the Romanian 
national anthem. From the beginning, reunification was endorsed almost 
exclusively by urban intellectual elites, while the prevalently rural society 
was rather sceptical (Negură 2013). Among the weaknesses of the early 
1990s project there was also the implicit exclusion of other ethnic and 
linguistic minorities. Significantly, tensions multiplied in relation to the 
Turkic-speaking minority (the Gagauz) and the Slavs (mostly of Russian 
and Ukrainian origins). While the issue of the Republic of Gagauzia was 
rapidly solved, tensions exploded on the bank of the Dniester River and 
degenerated into armed confrontations. Romanian-oriented politics was 
to be progressively dismantled.
Post-Communist Evolutions (1990–2015): Romanian Perspectives
By declaring that ‘România este stat naţional, suveran şi independent, 
unitar şi indivizibil’ [Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and 
indivisible National State] (art.  1) the post-communist constitution in-
directly excluded the significant percentage of the population made 
up of ethnic minorities (10.53 per cent in the 1992 census). The debates 
preceding the adoption of the Constitution are highly evocative of this 
understanding of the nation. Beyond ideological differences, there was a 
strong consensus among the MPs representing the Romanian majorities 
(Preda 2001: 745). The only discordant voices belonged to the representa-
tives of the ethnic minorities, in particular the Hungarian MPs. On these 
grounds, the choice of 1 December as the date for the post-communist 
national holiday is both a symbolic message to the Hungarian minorities 
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by marking the unification of Transylvania with the Romanian Kingdom 
in 1918 and an emblematic recollection that this union included the 
lost provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina. The organic nature of the 
Romanian state was further reinforced by the provisions of art. 7 of the 
Constitution:
Statul sprijină întărirea legăturilor cu românii din afara frontierelor ţării şi acţionează 
pentru păstrarea, dezvoltarea şi exprimarea identităţii lor etnice, culturale, lingvistice 
şi religioase, cu respectarea legislaţiei statului ai cărui cetăţeni sunt.
[The State shall support the strengthening of links with the Romanians living abroad 
and shall act accordingly for the preservation, development and expression of their 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity, under observance of the legislation 
of the State of which they are citizens.]
Although no specific references are made to who ‘the Romanians living 
abroad’ are, the article implicitly refers to those kin-groups (e.g. kin-
minorities in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary and kin-majorities in 
the RM) that the post-communist state aimed to invest in by fostering 
historical ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious bonds. Without any at-
tempt to challenge the frontiers and the regional status quo, Romanian 
international affiliations became an increasingly significant factor in 
determining not only the diplomatic relations with the home states of 
these kin-groups, but also the different social and political policies pro-
vided by the Romanian state.
The Institutional Level
Since the end of the post-communist period the Romanian position on 
the Moldovan issue has remained hesitant. The relationship between 
Romania and the RM was rapidly framed by the complex regional arrange-
ments and Bucharest’s westward-oriented foreign policy (Ivan 2009). The 
risk of ethnic conflict, as well as the complex Russian-Romanian relations 
and widespread support for European integration, led to a ‘bell curve’ 
in the relations with Chișinău (Angelescu 2011: 130). In the early 1990s, 




Flowers,4 the condemnation of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and rec-
ognition of the RM within two hours of its proclamation of independ-
ence on 27 August 1991, all of them leading to a leitmotiv: the celebra-
tion of ‘the emancipation from the tutelage of Moscow and a first step 
towards reunification with Romania’ (Cebotari and Ejova 2014: 43). In 
order to catch up with the other Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC, mostly ex-communist), starting in 1994, national politics volun-
tarily adapted to the EU requirements and controlled so-called ‘politically 
unfit’ behaviour (Gherghina and Soare 2016). In this context, Romanian 
politicians laid emphasis on the endeavour to promote ‘friendly and 
good-neighbourly relations’ and to limit ‘the risks of ethnic conflicts to 
future EU/NATO members (Bulgaria, Hungary) and non-EU/NATO 
members (Russia, Ukraine and Serbia)’ (Angelescu 2011: 131).
The relations with the RM represented a particularly thorny issue, 
openly exploited by the Transnistrian conflict (Angelescu 2011). The ac-
tivism of the early 1990s was to be replaced by a pragmatic position. The 
symbolic involvement of the Moldovan pro-unionist former prime minister 
in the 1992 Romanian presidential elections and his electoral agenda – 
the restitution of the Romanian treasure deposited in Moscow during 
the Second World War or endorsement of the restoration of Romanian 
citizenship for all Romanians from abroad (Miclescu 2002: 65) – had a 
limited effect, given that his candidacy received 2.75 per cent of the vote.
The attempts to negotiate a basic treaty between the two countries 
echoed the complexity of the situation. Neither Romania nor the RM could 
agree on how to define the nature of their relations, hesitating between the 
symbolic adjective ‘brotherly’, compliant with the politics of two Romanian 
states (favoured among the pan-Romanists) and the neutral ‘neighbourly’ 
(widespread among the Moldovanists) (Ivan 2009). The ‘two brotherly 
Romanian states’ concept was to be abandoned after the Moldovan 1994 
parliamentary elections in favour of a vaguer concept of ‘privileged relations’ 
 4 The first event was organized by the ‘Bucureşti – Chişinău’ Cultural Association 
and the Popular Front, with an estimated attendance of 1.2  million people 
(6  May  1990). Romanian inhabitants were allowed to cross the USSR border 
without a passport or visa. The second event allowed 150,000 Moldovan citizens to 
cross the Romanian border (6 June 1991).
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(Ivan 2009: 123). With the aim of Romania becoming a credible partner 
for NATO, in the 1996–2000 period, Romanian foreign policy advocated 
the need for trilateral relations, with the RM being included in a regional 
cluster with Ukraine (Angelescu 2011). Starting in the early 2000s, the ac-
cession negotiations put additional pressure on the Romanian authorities 
to manage the unsolved problem of a bilateral treaty on good neighbourly 
relations and friendly co-operation. As of 2001, Romania introduced a visa 
requirement for citizens of the RM, who had previously been able to enter 
Romanian territory with just ID cards. While these provisions came into 
force immediately for all ex-Soviet states, it was postponed in the case of 
RM citizens until 2005, when a preferential bilateral agreement regulating 
the visa regime was signed.5
Over the last decade, the relevance of Moldovan issues in Romanian 
politics has remained constant, although, with the exception of the People’s 
Movement Party (PMP), founded in 2013 by supporters of President 
Băsescu, no parliamentary party has endorsed concrete unification pro-
jects. The Moldovan issue occupies a major place in strategic government 
documents such as the 2016 Foreign Affairs Ministry partnership with the 
Diaspora or the 2018–20 Program of Government. In terms of the projects 
managed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry for the diaspora, 22.7 per cent of 
the available budget was implemented in Moldova. These strategic invest-
ments have become a routine aspect of Romanian foreign policy.
During this period, Romania undertook to support the RM through 
a wide range of instruments such as 100 million euro of non-refundable 
financing covering infrastructure, education and training (e.g. annual 
training programs at homologous governmental institutions for prison 
affairs, diplomats, civil servants and so on), and emergency humanitarian 
assistance, including, for example, reconstruction of houses flooded in 2010 
(Roaid 2016).6 Economic relations also multiplied. By 2014, there were 
 5 The visa issue was fully resolved, as part of EU visa liberalization, on the eve of the 
EU Association Agreement signed by the RM in June 2014.
 6 Roaid, the International Development Cooperation Agency, is ‘the national insti-
tutional mechanism devoted to Official Development Assistance, set up by Law 






4,500 Moldovan companies in the Romanian capital (Adevarul 2014) and 
Romania became the RM’s prime commercial partner (Relații bilaterale 
2016). After fulfilling the goal of becoming an EU member state, Romania 
invested in advocating the Moldovan cause in Brussels.
In parallel, in terms of party politics, while – with the exception of the 
national-populist Greater Romania Party (PRM) – all the parliamentary 
parties endorsed the Moldovans’ Romanian identity, no party raised the 
Moldovan question openly until around the middle of the first decade of 
the new century. Even in the case of the PRM, the nationalistic rhetoric 
was dominated more by the Magyar issue in Transylvania than by unifica-
tion with Moldova. It was mainly under the Băsescu presidency (2004–9, 
2009–14) that the union with Moldova became an open topic of discussion. 
After the 2007 enlargement, Romania was actively involved in providing 
political, diplomatic and economic support to the Moldovan European 
project. The thesis of a reunification between Romania and the RM was 
boosted during President Băsescu’s second mandate when, in 2013, he 
declared that, after the achievement of the first two strategic objectives, 
namely membership of NATO and the EU, the next goal should be union 
with the RM within the EU (Angelescu 2011). By the 2016 parliamentary 
elections, with differences of intensity, all the parliamentary parties had 
focused on the special Romania–Moldova relationship, and the topic of 
unification has become one of the flagship issues for the PMP.
The Bottom-up Perspective
In direct connection with the above, although Romania has recognized 
the electoral rights of its citizens living abroad since the 1990s, it is in the 
context of the 2008 electoral reform that Romania has allowed external 
voters to form separate constituencies to elect their representatives. The 
system of reserved seats implemented in 2008 and maintained after the 
2016 amendment of the electoral law gave a major weight to Romanian 
voters abroad. In this context, as demonstrated by Knott (2017), Bădescu 
and Burean (2016) and Popescu (2012), Romanian voters in RM pro-
vide the most relevant part of Romanian diaspora voters in terms of 
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absolute numbers. This element, coupled with the impact of these votes 
in extremely tight elections (2008, 2009 and 2014), has induced the 
main parties to open local offices in Chişinău, the capital of Moldova 
(Bădescu and Burean 2016). However, beyond the unanimous assessment 
that Moldovan votes are important electoral capital, the involvement of 
Romanian parties across the Prut has remained underdeveloped in com-
parison with the professionalized organizations in Romania.
However, the capacity of a home-state to implement engagement 
policies for its kin-communities cannot be exclusively connected with 
an institutional approach conducted through foreign service or business-
focused initiatives. The Romanian state’s constant interest in reinforcing 
claims of shared national identities fails to mobilize the home-community. 
Ghinea et al. (2011) identified a rather complex landscape when it comes to 
the way Romanians relate themselves to RM. While Romanians strongly 
endorsed a project of unification with the RM, they had limited contact 
with the Moldovan community, either through travel or within forms of 
socialization (Ghinea et al. 2011: 11–12). Significantly, over 64 per cent of 
Romanians considered that unification would be more beneficial to the 
interests of Moldovans than Romanians, and their endorsement of a uni-
fication project waned significantly when they were asked questions on 
the financial costs (Ghinea et al. 2011: 88). All in all, symbolic references 
have surfaced during electoral campaigns or public speeches, emblematic 
official visits have been organized, and pro-unionist groups launched but, 
to date, close to thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the project of 
unification is far from capturing the public imagination.
Post-Communist Evolutions (1991–2015): Moldovan Perspectives
Since the late 1980s, Moldovan politics has been torn between contra-
dictory feelings about relations with Romania. Definition of the ethnic 
composition of the RM is a significant contributor to this issue. Using 
the same ethnic categories as in the communist period, according to 
the official data Moldovans constitute the largest declared ethnic group, 




ethnic groups are Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz and Bulgarians. The 
Romanian ethnic group accounted for less than 1.0 per cent of the popu-
lation under the communist regime and 2.2 per cent in the 2004 census 
(Recensamantul populatiei 2004:  30). Notable also is the presence of 
small numbers of Jews, Belarusians, Poles and Roma. Despite the meth-
odological bias identified in relation to ethnic identity, the categories 
were maintained in the 2014 census. The issue of this complex ethnicity 
must be integrated with what King (1997) called the politics of lan-
guage. Since the early 1990s, the complex linguistic debate on the dis-
tinctiveness of the Moldovan language corpus after the abandonment of 
the Cyrillic alphabet in 1989 has been politically driven. While for the 
Romanian scientific community it has been largely taken for granted 
that the idea of a distinct Moldovan language was and still is a polit-
ical construction, lacking scientific or linguistic foundation given the 
limited differences in terms of vocabulary or grammar between the two 
languages, in 1994 the Constitution of Moldova enshrined its distinct-
iveness: ‘Limba de stat a Republicii Moldova este limba moldovenească, 
funcționând pe baza grafiei latine’ [The State language of the Republic 
of Moldova is the Moldovan language, and its writing is based on the 
Latin alphabet] (art. 13 (1)). Up to this point, in recent years, the 1991 
declaration of independence took precedence over the constitutional 
codification.
However, and more specifically, in December 2013, the Moldovan 
Constitutional Court ruled that the official language is Romanian, based 
on detailed references to the historical context and technical expertise 
(The Constitutional Court, 2013). With no implementation of this con-
stitutional amendment, the pro-European Liberal Democratic Party 
in 2017 initiated a proposal to amend Article 13 of the constitution in 
favour of Romanian. Once again the Constitutional Court of Moldova 
delivered a positive opinion in favour of Romanian, considering the 
legal changes from Moldovan to Romanian a mere ‘technical’ matter. 
However, President Igor Dodon vocally criticized the initiative and pro-
posed instead to handle the language issue through a referendum. In a 
tense climate, the project of change to Romanian was blocked by the 
Parliament in Autumn 2018.
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Considering the different fault lines established over time around 
specific interpretations of Moldovan identity, in the early 1990s the pan-
Romanianist discourse lost public support and the balance of power shifted 
to a soft-Moldovanism (1994–8). The 1994 non-binding national identity 
referendum confirmed the prevalence of the sovereigntist view: 95.4 per 
cent of the participants voted against union with Romania. A short-lived 
soft Romanianism characterized Moldovan politics from 1998 to 2001. The 
Moldovanist discourse was permeated by radicalism under the Communist 
Party of Moldova (2001–9) in line with widespread Soviet-era symbolism 
and an emphasis on a U-turn on economic reforms (Tudoroiu 2011: 240). 
After the electoral victory of the Pro-Democratic alliance in 2009, a soft 
Romanianism became the reference point for politics in Chișinău. In 
2014, the legislative elections maintained a weak pro-European parlia-
mentary majority, which was rapidly destabilized by the events of 2015 
and early 2016.7 The 2016 presidential elections marked a turnabout in 
the RM’s relations with Romania when the first election by direct vote 
in two decades resulted in the victory of the pro-Russia candidate, Igor 
Dodon. A former Minister of the Economy in two communist cabinets 
(from 2006 to 2009), Dodon placed emphasis on the need to strengthen 
ties with Russia and expressed his opposition to the trade deal signed 
with Brussels in 2014, endorsing instead RM membership of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. In parallel, Romania was openly targeted as the enemy, 
particularly in relation to elements of soft-power deployed on the RM ter-
ritory (e.g. scholarships, funds for NGOs, etc.), which were considered to 
be part of a strategy of unionism. The same interpretation was applied to 
the conflict in Transnistria. According to President Dodon, the conflict 
 7 Moldovan society had been progressively inflamed by a banking scandal involving 
the disappearance of 1 billion dollars and the falsification of his diplomas by the 
Prime Minister, Chiril Gaburici, who was eventually obliged to resign in June 2015. 
The difficulties faced by the pro-European parties in forming a government were 
partially solved by the minority government backed by the Communist Party in 
July 2015. By the beginning of 2016, new tensions had emerged following a con-
troversial ruling of the Constitutional Court, which cancelled the constitutional 




broke out only because of Moldova, because Moldova wanted unification 
with Romania:
Totul a început din cauza faptului că la Chişinău au existat minţi fierbinţi, care au dorit 
unirea cu România. […] Eu înţeleg că în primul rând vina este a conducerii Moldovei, 
eu asta recunosc. Eu de nenumărate ori am spus că noi trebuie să recunoaştem asta 
şi să ne cerem scuze, deoarece au murit sute, mii de cetăţeni. Desigur asta nu se uită, 
eu pe ei îi înţeleg foarte bine, dar trebuie să privim în viitor.
[It all started because of the hot minds in Chișinău who wanted to unite Romania and 
Moldova. […] In my understanding, it is first the fault of the Moldovan leadership, 
I recognize that. I have repeatedly said that we must recognize this and apologize 
for the deaths of hundreds, thousands of citizens. Of course, they cannot simply 
forget, I understand them very well, but we have to look to the future.] (I. Dodon 
quoted by Adevarul 2016)
In direct connection with this statement, Dodon expressed his inten-
tion to amend the Education Law by changing the subject ‘Romanian 
History’ to ‘Moldovan History’. All in all, Romania is presented as a 
threat to RM’s security and, in his understanding, people holding double 
citizenship should not hold leading positions (TRM 2016).
Today, close to thirty years after independence, three major polit-
ical interpretations of the Moldovan identity coexist. The Moldovanists 
advocate the consolidation of Moldovan statehood and a balanced East-
West orientation in foreign policy; within this perspective two main sub-
types coexist: an exclusive Moldovanism which promotes the existence 
of Moldovan ethnicity distinct from Romanian identity, and an inclu-
sive civic interpretation, based on a stand-alone agenda, which attempts 
to integrate other ethnic and linguistic groups. The pan-Romanianists 
adopt a different stance: they deny the existence of a Moldovan identity, 
militating in favour of a common Romanian history and culture. This 
agenda has an openly Western orientation and endorses projects of unifi-
cation with Romania, ranging from an accommodative and elastic inter-
pretation of Romanianism to an exclusivist and radical pro-unionist pos-
ition. The third group refers to a Euroasianist vision, widespread among 
supporters of reintegration into the zone of Russian influence, who are 
consistent promoters of anti-Romanianism. The most recent political 
evolutions in Chișinău have increased the relevance of the Moldovanist 
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supporters. This change of perspective in Moldovan politics is a direct 
result of President Dodon’s critical voice regarding alleged Romanian 
irredentism. Symbolically, in March 2017, President Dodon stripped the 
former Romanian president, T. Băsescu, of his recently obtained Moldovan 
citizenship.8 Tensions with Bucharest multiplied, as illustrated by reac-
tions to the publicized gift received by president Dodon from President 
Putin during a visit to Moscow in January 2017. The object of controversy 
was a 1790 map, drafted during the Russian-Ottoman war, representing 
Greater RM, including the current homonym Romanian province, nor-
thern Bukovina and a part of the Romanian Dobrogea region.9 President 
Dodon’s insistence on signing a Border Treaty with Romania has further 
stressed the relations with Bucharest. This treaty has been regularly post-
poned by the Romanian authorities, who consider it a de jure recognition 
of the aggressive 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which became the basis 
of the current RM. Pro-Russian forces in Moldova have regularly inter-
preted Romania’s refusal to sign the treaty as proof of their commitment 
to a strategy of reunification.10
It is noteworthy that Moldovan citizens have not actively reacted to 
these controversies, which are for the most part elements of party compe-
tition and less socially relevant. As illustrated by Knott, the prevalence of 
socio-economic issues linked to the process of democratization (employ-
ment, corruption, migration, etc.) account for the limited impact of the 
identity issue on society. After so many years since the RM declaration 
of independence, not only does Moldovan national identity remain a 
political object with blurred origins in line with the competing interpret-
ations fed by systematic alternations in power and politicized surveys, 
but the Romanian position continues to be lost in an equilibrium of 
strategic diplomacy and in ambiguous ethno-nationalistic relations with 
its kin-majorities/minorities.
 8 Traian Băsescu became a Moldovan citizen on 3 November 2016.
 9 On this occasion, President Dodon declared: ‘Half of today’s Romania is actually 
Moldova’ (balkaninsight.com 2017).








Romanian Kin-state Policies: Co-optation through 
Citizenship
Following Brubaker, citizenship can be described as ‘a universal feature of 
the modern political landscape. Every state formally attaches to the status 
of citizenship certain rights, including usually political rights, and cer-
tain obligations’ (Brubaker 1989: 30). Given this, the citizenship debate 
in post-communist Romania not only refers to the rights and obligations 
of political and social membership, but also to (symbolically) belonging 
to a nation-state with distinctive identity features that are supposed to re-
inforce the in-group amity within and beyond the current frontiers. The 
importance of delineating membership of the post-communist state is il-
lustrated by the adoption of the succinct decree law no. 7, nine days after 
the fall of Ceaușescu’s regime. The main focus of the decree is to guarantee 
the right of repatriation to all Romanian citizens residing abroad (art. 1) 
and the reacquisition of citizenship by former Romanian citizens living 
abroad (art. 2). Beyond the symbolic investment in bridging the gap with 
(former) Romanians living abroad during the communist regime and re-
building a post-communist community, the importance of this 12-article 
decree relates to the implicit recognition of dual citizenship (Iordachi 
2013; Muraru and Tănăsescu 2011).
Modelled on the traditional ius sanguinis principle, active since its first 
codifications in the nineteenth century (Iordachi 2009), the new citizen-
ship legislation was defined in March 1991. Within the transitory and final 
dispositions, the legal text included provisions regulating the situation of 
former Romanian citizens who had lost Romanian citizenship for various 
reasons before 22 December 1989, who may reacquire it on request, even if 
they have a different citizenship and do not wish to establish residency in 
Romania. Those from whom Romanian citizenship was withdrawn against 
their will or for other reasons – as well as their descendants – are held blame-
less in this regard. Though apparently redundant, an important difference 
is put forward by Iordachi (2013: 11): the first paragraph refers to cases of 
individual losses of citizenship, whereas the second covers denaturaliza-
tion en masse following territorial changes. By allowing these new citizens 
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to retain the citizenship of their current homeland, a new legal category 
was produced: non-resident dual citizens living in neighbouring countries 
(Iordachi 2013: 11). It is precisely this category of citizenship that allows 
us to evaluate the Romanian state’s interest in bridging the gap between 
the autochthonous community and kin-communities, tantamount to the 
manifestation of an attempt to undo the unjust deprivations brought about 
by communist rule (Dumbrava 2014; Iordachi 2013).
By 2000, the provisions on the reacquisition of citizenship were clari-
fied. Romanian citizenship could be granted to persons who had lost it and 
to their descendants to the second degree. The reacquisition of citizenship 
applied to minors too, while it did not have any direct consequences upon 
the citizenship of a spouse. In direct connection with the agreement on 
Romanian citizens’ visa-free travel in the Schengen space, these provisions 
were temporarily suspended in 2001 before being implemented again in 
2003. Meanwhile, a significant change was introduced through emergency 
ordinance no. 62/2002: this single article unified the previous provisions 
on the reacquisition of citizenship with the restoration. Emergency ordin-
ance no. 43/2003, however, brought further changes. Former Romanian 
citizens who had lost their Romanian citizenship against their will, or for 
reasons that could not be imputed to them, before 22 December 1989, 
as well as their descendants up to the second degree, could reacquire it, 
but they had to comply with almost all the conditions for the naturaliza-
tion of foreign citizens, including command of the Romanian language. 
Considered to be an indicator of ethnic selectivity, this specific provision 
was to be removed by emergency ordinance no. 36/2009. In response to 
criticisms formulated by different EU Member States against pragmatic 
reacquisitions of citizenship – the Romanian passport was seen as a key, 
giving access to the EU labour market – a new provision introduced a limi-
tation on freedom of movement for former citizens during their first four 
years of citizenship (Iordachi 2013). Numerous non-governmental organ-
izations from Romania and Moldova criticized this provision as a form of 
open discrimination, leading to its cancellation by emergency ordinance 
no. 52/2007. The legal text issued in 2007 openly declared its aim was to 
speed up procedures for dealing with the high number of applications for 
restoration of citizenship, which were taking an average of three and a half 
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months to process (Iordachi 2004: 254). Between 2007 and 2017, thirteen 
amendments were produced that redefined the citizenship framework. 
Among the most relevant changes is the simplified citizenship restoration 
procedure. Most of the following changes focused on correcting deficiencies 
in the administrative procedures or speeding up the bureaucratic process.
In brief, three main stages can be identified in the process of post-
communist regulation of citizenship. The early 1990s regulation delineated 
a permissive frame of reference with a symbolic focus on the restoration 
of citizenship, motivated by the aim of repairing the injustices of the past. 
In parallel with the criticisms raised by EU member states in relation to 
the opportunistic reacquisition of citizenship incentivized by the 2001 
visa-free agreement, a temporary closure of the system occurred. In the 
years that followed the first manifestation of dissent over application of 
the regulation on an inclusive basis, Romania modified the terms of ref-
erence as a response to potential criticisms from Brussels. Filtered by new 
provisions such as command of the Romanian language or limitations to 
freedom of movement, the attitude of the Romanian legislator from 2001 
until 2007 was mainly guided by rational cost-benefit calculations. On the 
eve of accession, the rewards of EU membership triggered a restriction in 
the application of principles formally still motivated by the moral obliga-
tion to repair the injustices of the past. It is only after 2007 that the system 
progressively reopened. Pressure from civil society and increased awareness 
among legislators themselves of the deficiencies of the bureaucratic process 
led to multiple amendments aimed at rationalizing the efficiency of the 
reacquisition process. The pace of the changes further increased following 
the personal involvement of President Băsescu in managing the content of 
the necessary amendments.
Lost in Dual Citizenship Practices and Experiences
By the end of the 1990s, Romania’s investment in maintaining relations 
with kin-minorities/majorities based on the facilitated reacquisition of 
citizenship had raised numerous criticisms of hidden nationalism and ir-
redentism from within the RM, in particular after 1994. The timing of 
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these criticisms was in line with the profusion of the Moldovanist vision in 
local politics. Political investment in the sovereigntist option for Moldova 
explains the virulence of criticisms of the provisions for restoring citizen-
ship. In parallel with the imposition of a radical Moldovanism between 
2001 and 2009, the reactions of criticizing and voicing discontent shifted 
to boycotting such things as educational agreements that promoted stu-
dent mobility to Romania.
From 1994 until 2009, rhetoric focused on two principal issues: dual 
citizenship in Moldova and an ‘expansionist’ Romania. Apart from the legal 
incompatibilities, debates on the first issue focused on the consequences 
of dual allegiance in terms of loyalty and sovereignty. The partial amend-
ment of the Moldovan constitutional provisions on citizenship in 2002, 
together with the consequent changes in the Law on Citizenship, helped 
to ameliorate the issue (Gasca 2012). The alleged attacks on sovereignty 
remained a leitmotiv of the argument. President Lucinski judged the pro-
liferation of dual Moldovan-Romanian citizens to be a strategic attempt 
to increase Bucharest’s control throughout the lands of the former Greater 
Romania (Iordachi 2004: 253–4). Indeed, following the 2000 Moldovan 
law on citizenship, the foreign minister was charged with identifying and 
denaturalizing all persons who held dual citizenship, in an indirect refer-
ence to Romanian-Moldovan citizens. The virulence of these attacks in-
creased under the Voronin presidency. In order to counterattack against 
Romanian interests, Chișinău invested in strengthening Moldovan iden-
tity by symbolically supporting the publication of a Moldovan-Romanian 
dictionary and a history of Moldova. The 2004 census further illustrated 
the politicization of the ethnic dimension, as the Moldovan Institute of 
Statistics included two distinct options of ethnic affiliation: Moldovan 
and Romanian. The fact that only 2.2 per cent of the population chose 
to identify as Romanian (compared with 75.8 per cent as Moldovan) was 
used by the authorities as proof of the weakness of the unionist project, 
while Romanian and other pro-Romanian local intellectuals accused the 
census of methodological bias (Negură 2013).
By 2009 the range of reactions had diversified. The authorities in 
Chișinău imposed a visa regime on Romanian citizens. In a public statement, 
President Voronin declared that Moldova would lift the visa requirements 
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when the EU, of which Romania is a member, did so for Moldovans (rferl.
org 2009). Such criticisms targeted an implicit collusion between Bucharest 
and Brussels. Within this context, the incompatibilities maintained by the 
amended version of the law prohibiting people with dual citizenship from 
holding certain categories of public office triggered criticisms not only from 
institutions such as the Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the 
Council of Europe and the Venice Commission, but also from Romanian 
members of the European Parliament, who asked the Council and the 
European Commission to examine its conformity with EU norms (Gasca 
2012: 19). The European Court of Human Rights upheld the complaint 
of two leading Moldovan politicians, both holders of dual Romanian and 
Moldovan citizenship, who claimed that these provisions infringed their 
human rights (Gasca 2012: 19). Beyond the court’s decision, this claim is par-
ticularly relevant in illustrating the European ramifications of the tensions 
generated by applying the restoration of citizenship to former Romanian 
citizens at an international/European level. It is also an important heuristic 
for assessing the different fault lines dividing Moldovan politics.
In 2009, President Vladimir Voronin spoke about a new ‘iron curtain’ 
raised by the EU against Moldovan citizens. Speaking on national televi-
sion, he said: ‘What the European Union is doing to Moldova is not good. 
To open Europe only for those Moldovan citizens who hold Romanian 
passports is humiliating for the Moldovan people. They should not insult 
us and make us travel to Europe via Romania’ (euobserver.eu 2009). In the 
same period, E. Boc, the Romanian Prime Minister, publicly rejected alle-
gations by the Voronin presidency that facilitating acquisition of Romanian 
citizenship by Moldovan citizens had strategic value in Romanian foreign 
policy (euobserver.eu 2009). The atmosphere became particularly heated on 
the occasion of the 2009 elections; protesters demanded repeat elections.
But the citizenship issue was becoming almost peripheral by the time 
that President Voronin, with backing from Russia, accused Romania of 
an attempted coup through manipulation of the emotions of its young 
people. Meanwhile, Bucharest denied all the allegations and its Foreign 
Minister declared that Romania continued support for closer ties between 
Moldova and the EU. After 2010, in line with the pro-European syner-
gies between Bucharest and Chișinău, the level of tension diminished. 
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By 2014, it was further reduced by the abolition of the visa regime for 
Moldovan citizens travelling in the EU. Still, the potential for tensions 
remained latent, given the diplomatic incident linked to the expulsion of 
a Romanian citizen, the leader of the Action 2012 platform at the gath-
ering of Moldovan and Romanian NGOs for the union of the RM with 
Romania (balkaneu.com 2015).
The frontiers of these institutional clashes are somewhat porous. 
The complexity of the kinship issue and its impact on citizenship status 
is illustrated by the case of Ilie Ilascu, a former member of the Moldovan 
Popular Front known for his opposition to the creation of a Transnistrian 
Republic.11 Arrested and sentenced to death by a Transnistrian court, he 
became a symbol for national identity both in the RM and Bucharest. 
Imprisoned in Tiraspol, Ilascu became a Moldovan MP in 1998 and, two 
years later, was elected to the lists of the national-populist PRM in the 
Senate of Bucharest. His fast-track acquisition of Romanian citizenship 
put him in clear breach of both Romanian and Moldovan law: President 
Luchinski’s rejection of Ilascu’s renunciation of Moldovan citizenship put 
the newly elected Romanian senator in breach of Moldovan law; similarly, 
according to the Romanian Constitution, non-resident citizens could not 
stand in national elections. But the Romanian parliament validated his 
mandate (Iordachi 2004: 251). Given his notoriety, both the Romanian and 
Moldovan authorities treated the violation of their legal framework as an 
exceptional situation. Accorded such special status, he received the highest 
order of Romania, ‘The Star of Romania’, on 10 May 2001, and, together 
with other colleagues charged by Tiraspol with terrorist allegations, ‘The 
Star of Moldova’ on 2 August 2010. Ilascu was to regain public attention 
in both countries when, in 2013, threatened with the loss of public housing 
granted by the Romanian authorities, he received wide press coverage and 
eventually retained his state housing privileges.
In the wider European context, alarmist news about the impact of the 
facilitated reacquisition of citizenship by former citizens had multiplied im-
mediately after the Commission recommended opening negotiations with 
Romania in March 1999. Various other international actors intervened. The 




‘expansionist’ power of Bucharest was used by the Kiev authorities as a reason 
to criticize the implementation of a permissive citizenship restoration policy. 
In this context, various Western cabinets voiced their concern that double citi-
zenship was an opportunity for Moldovan citizens to bypass the visa system 
for the Schengen area. Despite the temporary suspension of the procedures for 
the restoration of citizenship in Bucharest, the Western media estimated that 
between 650,000 and 1 million people would migrate within the EU’s borders 
after the accession of Romania (Dumbrava 2013). President Băsescu himself 
contributed to the diffusion of these estimates and conspiracy theories.12
If we change perspective and look at the direct beneficiaries, Moldovan 
citizens, the first difficulty concerns the unavailability of official statistics. 
The various estimates available in the press or in different statements tend 
to clash with figures provided by NGO reports or the official figures of the 
National Authority for Citizenship (NAC). According to data provided by 
the NAC (2016), there were over half a million requests for the reacquisi-
tion of Romanian citizenship, including applications from Moldavans, over 
a period of fourteen years (2002–April 2016). A major increase in the number 
of applications received and processed was observed after 2009, in the after-
math of the implementation of simplified procedures, with an overall 54.6 
per cent of the applications received being registered in the three years 2010 
to 2012. The lifting of the last restrictions in 2014 led to a slight increase in 
the number of applications registered between 2015 and 2017 (NAC 2017).
Note that the National Authority does not collect data on applicants’ 
motivations. It is, therefore, difficult to provide an assessment of the rela-
tionship between strategic and symbolic acquisition of Romanian citizen-
ship. The pioneering work of Panainte et al. (2013) identified a mix of prag-
matic and idealistic motivations. Job market requirements after graduation 
were the main motivation, while the need to legally confirm Romanian 
identity was mentioned exclusively in relation to stories told by acquaint-
ances. For other scholars, the pragmatic dimension prevails too: Gasca’s 
 12 In 2009, president Băsescu voiced his support for speeding up the process of res-
toration of citizenship, given that, according to him, over 1 million Moldovans, a 
quarter of the population, ‘would become, not from a moral, but a legal point of 
view, members of the European family’ (www.euractive.com 2009).
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analysis suggests that ‘the acquisition of dual citizenship does not make 
Moldovan citizens less patriotic’ (2012: 15). Other scholars maintain that 
citizenship applications have an instrumental dimension, allowing appli-
cants to enjoy the benefits of citizenship of an EU Member State, while 
claiming a Romanian national attachment (Danero 2015). These interpret-
ations are in line with surveys on the issue, considering that fewer than 25 
per cent of Moldovans endorse the unification project (BPO 2018). Knott 
(2015) provides a more nuanced interpretation by identifying motivations 
for the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship according to five types of 
identification with Moldova and/or Romania: organic Romanians; cul-
tural Romanians; ambivalent Romanians; Moldovans; and Linguistic 
Moldovans. With the exception of Linguistic Moldovans, all categories 
expressed their interest in, or had already engaged in, processes of reacquisi-
tion of citizenship for complex and intricate reasons (e.g. security, benefits 
of EU citizenship, etc.) and symbolic motivations.
Analyses focusing on the issue of migration in Romania support these 
observations. Alexe and Păunescu depict a nuanced landscape, although 
no specific differences are made between Moldovans with and without 
Romanian passports. They observe that unlike immigration from China and 
Turkey, Moldovan migrants are attracted more by education and employ-
ment opportunities than by entrepreneurial activities (Alexe and Paunescu 
2010). The focus on education is in line with other studies. Moldovan 
beneficiaries of scholarships for secondary, university and post-university 
education funded by the Romanian state justify their interest mainly in 
relation to the quality of the education system or the opportunities pro-
vided by the job market in Romania. Interviewees quoted by Gamurari et al. 
declared: ‘Toată lumea din Chișinău reacționează pozitiv când știe că tu ai 
făcut facultatea în România’ [People in Chișinău react positively when they 
know that you went to college in Romania]; ‘Niciodată nu m-am gândit la 
posibilitatea de a face facultatea în Moldova. Pentru că știam din start cum 
stau lucrurile acolo. Nu există oportunități de dezvoltare, nu există piață de 
muncă, nu putem vorbi de transparență și corectitudine’ [I never thought 
about the possibility of going to college in Moldova. I knew from the very 
start how things work here. There are no opportunities for development, no 
job market, there is no transparency or fairness] (Gamurari et al. 2013: 6).
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Despite the emphasis on the opportunities provided, scholarships in 
smaller Romanian towns are less attractive, and sizeable percentages of the 
budget are not allocated (6 per cent in the 2007–8 academic year, 10 per 
cent in 2008–9, 4 per cent in 2009–10, 18 per cent in 2010–11 and 36 per 
cent in 2011–12). Moldovans complain about limited financial resources and 
suggest a reorganization of the system, with fewer scholarships and more 
funding. Owing to these financial limitations, most students are obliged to 
work illegally, as the administrative procedures for the legal employment 
of residents are considered complex (Gamurari et al. 2013: 7–8). Still, 80 
per cent of foreign citizens studying in Romanian universities come from 
Moldova; the attractiveness of the Romanian higher education system 
is increased not only by the numerous scholarships but also by potential 
access to the EU higher education system. In relation to the job market, the 
Moldovan community is mainly employed in the building sector, clothing, 
commerce, banking and financial services, as well as agriculture.
If we focus on Romanian society, behind symbolic support for the 
project of unification, the relationship with the kin-community from the 
RM is more complex. Ghinea et al. (2011) show that the RM is not a ter-
ritory of major interest for Romanian citizens; not only do they not travel 
regularly to the RM (only one in four has ever visited the RM) but they 
declare relatively few direct personal contacts with people originating from 
the RM and the eastern bank of the Prut. When it comes to perceptions 
of the Moldovan community, Romanians are more likely to designate 
the inhabitants of the RM as Moldovans or as citizens of the RM than to 
refer to them as Romanians, or as Romanians of Moldova, or Russified 
Romanians or Bessarabians (Ghinea et al. 2011).
Conclusions
As Angelescu notes (2011:  131), ‘the question of identity affected not 
just the talks about a possible reunification, but more general rela-
tions between Moldova and Romania’. The competing, and sometimes 
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conflicting, questions of identity have had an impact on the meaning 
of state sovereignty. More specifically, the complex politics of identity 
have challenged the international sovereignty of the RM, considering 
that various groups in Romania, including the former Prime Minister 
Druc, interpreted the 1991 recognition of the RM’s independence as a 
strategic mistake. Following the same logic, the former president Băsescu 
depicted the reunification of the two territories as a reparatory act for the 
abuses of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. In relation to domestic sover-
eignty, the implementation of a permissive regulation on the reacquisi-
tion of Romanian citizenship was considered a voluntary infringement 
of the loyalty due from Moldovan citizens to their home state. In 2007, 
while simultaneously raising territorial claims to Romania’s province of 
Moldova, President Voronin accused Romania of being the last European 
empire (Iordachi 2009). Signs of tense relations multiplied, including the 
2009 declaration that the Romanian ambassador in Moldova was persona 
non grata, while Romanian officials laid emphasis on the non-reciprocal 
expulsion of the Moldovan ambassador. Chișinău imposed a visa regime 
on Romanian citizens, making Romania the only EU member state whose 
citizens required a visa (euobserver.eu 2009).
At a general level, the principal conclusion is that the analysis of 
Romanian–Moldovan relations reveals an emblematic case of the preva-
lence of diplomacy over confrontation, demonstrating that, beyond the 
Crimean case, radical forms of ethnic-derived politics are far from being 
the only political solution in the region. At an institutional level, the case 
under scrutiny illustrates that a kin-state can influence domestic politics 
in relation to the kin-community outside its borders, particularly through 
material aid (e.g. structural investments, grants, etc.) and political support 
(e.g. lifting visa requirements, relations with the EU, etc.). However, the 
position of the kin-state, Romania, as a key actor within Moldovan politics 
is limited by its unstable relations with the relevant parties in power, as 
well as by its weak capacity to mobilize support within the kin-community 
as a whole. The heart of the matter is that co-ethnicity is not fully recog-
nized by the kin-community in RM and this weakness has been fully ex-
ploited by pro-Russian political parties since 1994 (Knott 2015, 2017, 2018). 
Indeed, Romania’s portfolio of programmes and policies for RM has been 
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regularly used as proof of an attempt to cultivate disloyalty to their state 
among Moldovan citizens.
Given all this, the present analysis contributes to theoretical work on na-
tions and national identities by providing a more nuanced understanding of 
the dynamics behind the processes of renationalizing communities. Beyond 
these observations, the analysis points to the fact that Romanian legislation 
promoted a distinct, territorially defined citizenship (Knott 2016; Waterbury 
2014); the definition of a particular case of restored citizenship, seen as a 
reparatory act for historical injustices, was based on proofs of descent from 
citizens living in former Romanian territories. Accordingly, Moldovan citi-
zens are perceived as natural members of the national Romanian community, 
since they are direct descendants of the original inhabitants of a Romanian 
province. Proof of linear descent includes elements that pull together the 
members of the same ethnic group beyond current borders: having lan-
guage, religion, history, myths and symbols in common. Within Moldovan 
politics, rejection and/or reticence prevails over unification projects. These 
conclusions join previous research on the puzzling synchronization between 
the deterritorialization of the state and the continued ethnicization of citi-
zenship in the Balkans (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). Indeed (from the 
demand side) in Romania, as in Croatia or Serbia, it is possible to equate the 
practices of citizenship for kin-communities with forms of post-territorial 
nationalism, in which potential irredentism is hermetically controlled by 
the constant adherence of the parties in government to recognition of the 
sovereignty of the Moldovan state. As in Croatia (Knott 2017), emotive and 
reparative justifications have provided the core elements of Romanian law on 
Citizenship since 1991. However more pragmatic logics increasingly prevail, 
particularly when it comes to the relevance that the ‘electoral capital’ of the 
kin-community represents for the parties in Bucharest. From the perspective 
of the supply side, heterogeneity is the key word, with instrumental-strategic 
attitudes cohabitating with both emotional investments and hostility to-
wards Romanian citizenship.
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that preferential access to 
citizenship is influenced by both domestic and international considerations. 
With regard to the home-state, it is intuitive that if the definition of who 
belongs to the kin-community is consensually assessed by both political 
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parties and the citizenry, the easier it is for co-ethnics to be considered as 
strategic investments in rebuilding an organic community. However, this 
consensual assessment could be fine-tuned by the kin-state’s engagement 
with international socialization projects (e.g. those of NATO and the EU). 
Meanwhile, we expect the desirability of preferential access to citizenship 
among kin-populations living abroad to depend on the kin-state’s capacity 
to push the targeted population to accept it not only as pragmatically ap-
pealing, but also as trustworthy. In parallel, I suggested that the level of 
attractiveness of preferential access to citizenship among the kin-population 
should increase when the rights regarding the new status are combined not 
just with political and social entitlements in the kin-state, but also with 
limited losses in the original community. In relation to these assumptions, 
the analysis has illustrated that in Romania, since the early 1990s, privileged 
relations with the RM have been unanimously and consistently endorsed by 
both the political community and civil society. Because of this consensus, 
the Moldovan issue has never been a divisive topic in the political arena. 
Scholars like Waterbury have nevertheless identified a potential domestic 
outcome: the incentives for a wide incorporation of new Romanian citi-
zens of Moldovan origins are instrumental to a change in the demography 
of Romania and, more specifically, to diluting the impact of the ethnic 
Hungarians (Waterbury 2014: 40). However, until the 2007 enlargement 
and even afterwards, Romania voluntarily aligned with European bench-
marks not only on such matters as an accelerated rate of transformation 
on delicate issues like the market economy or justice reform, but also on 
foreign policy. In brief, in order to secure EU accession, Romanian parties 
in power refrained from any ‘politically unfit’ behaviour. The endeavour to 
promote positions that could be interpreted as irredentist was particularly 
obvious in the early 2000s. The intensity of involvement in relations with 
the RM increased in the aftermath of EU integration and has been a pillar, 
particularly, of the second mandate of President Băsescu. Turning to the 
supply-side perspective, the desirability of Romanian citizenship among 
the Moldovan community is difficult to assess. According to the limited 
data available, a complex pragmatic dimension prevails, although symbolic 
motivations are particularly important for certain groups. Prior to the 
2014 visa-free agreement, the desire to have access to the free circulation 
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area increased the appeal of a Romanian passport. Similarly, elimination 
of transitional restrictions on migrant workers in Romania should main-
tain the high pragmatic interest in joining the Romanian community. 
More detailed and structured information on the motivations is needed. 
Knott’s illuminating ethnographic research on the Moldovan kin-majority 
is a major contribution to this open space of analysis, and more in-depth 
research into this would provide additional impetus to current theoretical 
debates on post-territorial citizenship.
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The Constitutional Crossroads in Spain
abstract
Since the Constitutional Court ruling (31/2010) – which included the declaration that 
interpretation of references to Catalonia in the 2006 Statute of Autonomy as ‘a nation’ 
and to its ‘national reality’ were devoid of legal effect – the Spanish central government 
has taken approaches to territorial power distribution which have had increasingly severe 
negative impacts on the autonomy of the Basque Country and Catalonia. Specifically, while 
the Basque and Catalan Autonomous Communities have begun to question why the cur-
rent model cannot adapt to some of the more ambitious expectations of self-government, 
in the Spanish State the present model of devolution has been questioned precisely for 
the opposite reason: a perception that the model has gone too far. Facing such a complex 
panorama, this chapter examines the characteristics of the current Constitutional cross-
roads in Spain, proposing a new constitutional consensus based on the development of 
democracy and deepening of human rights.
The Starting Point
Throughout recorded history, Spain has been subject to the acquisition 
and the imposition of so many ‘identities’, ethnic, religious and social, 
that their reconciliation under the banner of a single ‘State’ remains to 
this day one of the most difficult problems faced by any government. It is 
little wonder, then, that the model of political decentralization in Spain 
has suffered constant political tensions since its inception.
Although the Basque nationalist parties did not take part in the consti-
tutional consensus, the 1978 Constitution acknowledged the uniqueness of 
the Basque provinces, on the basis of historical rights. The first Additional 






La Constitución ampara y respeta los derechos históricos de los territorios forales. 
La actualización general de dicho régimen foral se llevará a cabo, en su caso, en el 
marco de la Constitución y de los Estatutos de Autonomía.
[The Constitution protects and respects the historic rights of the territories with 
traditional charters (fueros). The general updating of historic rights shall be car-
ried out, where appropriate, within the framework of the Constitution and of the 
Statutes of Autonomy.]
The historical rights of the Basque territories engage directly with claims 
of a right to special status for the Basque territories, based on the idea of 
the constitutional recognition for a subject: the Basque people.1 The con-
stitutional recognition of the forality (Basque ancient legal order) means 
the legal recognition of the existence of a Basque Country, which has the 
capacity to govern by itself and for itself (Lasagabaster 2014: 129). The 
recognition by the 1978 Constitution of these historical specialties was 
considered by the Basque nationalist parties and the supporters of the an-
cient law of Navarre as a tool that allowed the Southern Basque territories 
(the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and Navarre) a 
greater degree of autonomy than other regions in Spain. Through this 
recognition, the Basque territories could design and implement public 
policies in education, public safety, economic development, and environ-
mental protection, along with a full taxation and financial capacity. Over 
time, however, this interpretation was challenged legally by the restrictive 
view of the Constitutional Court in several judgements on the legal scope 
of the historical status.2 Consequently, this has reduced the possibility 
for an asymmetric development of the self-government system, allowing 
the central state to define the extent of regional powers. Likewise, tax-
ation and financial autonomy, which was initially considered to be a full 
power of the Basque territories to finance their competencies, has been 
subjected to central State supervision and control.
 1 See also the Additional Provision of the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque 
Country, and the first Additional Provision of the Statute of Autonomy of Navarre 
(so called LORAFNA).
 2 See Constitutional Courts’ Decision no. 76/1988 (2 and 4 legal basis); no. 76/1988 
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At the very same time as the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was approved, 
the problem of the territoriality of the Basque Country arose.3 Two separate au-
tonomous communities were created, one for Navarra and another for the rest 
of the Basque provinces. The territorial configuration was rigidly established, 
and also consolidated by the constitutional prohibition of federations between 
autonomous communities.4 In any case, the 1978 Constitution introduced a 
special clause for an eventual territorial integration of all the Basque territories.
Following the fourth Transitional Provision of the Spanish 
Constitution:
En el caso de Navarra, y a efectos de su incorporación al Consejo General Vasco o al 
régimen autonómico vasco que le sustituya, en lugar de lo que establece el artículo 
143 de la Constitución, la iniciativa corresponde al Órgano Foral competente, el cual 
adoptará su decisión por mayoría de los miembros que lo componen. Para la validez 
de dicha iniciativa será preciso, además, que la decisión del Órgano Foral competente 
sea ratificada por referéndum expresamente convocado al efecto, y aprobado por 
mayoría de los votos válidos emitidos.
[In the case of Navarre, and for the purpose of its integration into the General Basque 
Council or into the autonomous Basque institutions which may replace it, the pro-
cedure contemplated by section 143 of this Constitution shall not apply. The initia-
tive shall lie instead with the appropriate historic institution (órgano foral), whose 
decision must be taken by the majority of its members. The initiative shall further 
require for its validity the ratification by a referendum expressly held to this end and 
approval by the majority of votes validly cast.]
This clause has never been implemented.
The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country was passed in 1979, 
and then approved by a referendum.5 In Navarre, the Statute of Autonomy 
was approved in 1992 by a unique procedure, as an Improvement of the 
Ancient Legal Charter, and without a referendum.6
 3 With regard to the precedents see the Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country 
of 1936.
 4 See article 145.1 of the Spanish Constitution.
 5 Organic Law 3/1979, of 18 December, on the Statute of Autonomy for the Basque 
Country.
 6 Organic Law 13/1982 of 10 August, on Reintegration and Improvement of the 










The Statute was drafted with a view to attributing to the Autonomous 
Community of the Basque Country (ACBC) all the powers and compe-
tencies not reserved by the 1978 Constitution to the central state. It also 
recognizes the right of the ACBC and of Navarre to almost full financial 
autonomy through the system of economic agreement or ‘covenant’. Also 
recognized were the powers of the ACBC to manage essential public ser-
vices such as education and health, welfare and public safety as well as a 
number of powers in economic matters, such as in agriculture, fisheries, 
transport and communications, housing, industry and energy.7
The major political parties in Spain (minor parties in the Basque 
Country) have consistently tried to impose conditions on Basque 
self-government. This was reflected in the Autonomy Agreements signed by 
the major political parties, which we will refer to below. All the self-govern-
ment reforms prior to 2004 had been promoted and largely controlled by 
the central government with the support of both the party in office and the 
main nation-wide opposition party. In 1981, the two major political par-
ties agreed on the first (so-called) Autonomy Agreement. That Agreement 
closed the definitive map of autonomous communities in Spain and de-
termined the competencies of each one. It also established the internal or-
ganization of the autonomous communities, recognizing legislative powers 
to all of them, and created a homogenous system of relations between the 
central state and the autonomous communities, to the detriment of the 
bilateral relationship established in the Statute for the Basque Country. In 
short, the agreement was designed to control the timing and the process 
by which the Autonomous Community would acquire greater powers.8
 7 See Articles 9, 10, 11, 12 of the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.
 8 On the basis of this first Autonomy Agreement, the Organic Law for 
Harmonization of the Autonomy Process was adopted, regulating aspects of the 
management of the autonomic process, and also developing the scope of the powers 
of the State. The Constitutional Courts’ Ruling no.  76/1983, of 5 August, over-
turned much of the content of this law, saying that it contained merely an interpret-
ation of the Constitution, intruding upon the jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court. Since then, the definition of the power-sharing system has been fixed by the 
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In 1992, the second Autonomy Agreement came into force as a result 
of a new pact between the two major nation-wide political parties. The 
aim of this second agreement was to make equal the competencies of all 
autonomous communities.9 At the end of the 1990s, and as a result of these 
top-down reforms, the Statutes of Autonomy of all the autonomous com-
munities formally reached similar levels of power. This egalitarian approach 
would adversely affect the historical autonomous communities, which 
would be limited to levels of powers not exceeding the standards accepted 
by the state parties, also limiting bilateral agreements to strengthen their 
autonomy. Autonomy was hence homogenized.
The Proposal to Reform the Statute of Autonomy of the 
Basque Country of 2004: A Missed Opportunity
In December 2004, the Basque Parliament passed a proposal to reform 
the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country (entitled Proposal for a 
New Political Statute of the Community of the Basque Country). Any 
reform of a Statute of Autonomy, although formally initiated and pro-
posed by the Autonomous Community’s Parliament, had to be submitted 
to the Spanish Parliament for approval.10 The proposal was adopted by 
the Basque Parliament, by absolute majority. In January 2005, it was sent 
to the Spanish Parliament to be debated and voted on.11
 9 This was performed firstly by a Transfer Law (authorized by Article 150.2 of the 
Constitution) on the basis of which some state powers were transferred to the 
Autonomous Communities  – Law 9/1992 of 23 December; and secondly, the 
Statutes of Autonomy were reformed in 1994, accommodating their content to the 
competencies previously transferred to the Autonomous Communities.
 10 See article 147.3 of the Spanish Constitution.
 11 In Spain the Statutes of Autonomy are finally adopted by an Organic Law of the 
Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) requiring the favourable vote of the abso-










On 1 February, the consideration of the proposal for a new Statute for 
the Basque Country was refused by the Spanish Parliament. The Basque 
proposal was firmly rejected at the initial stage of submission. The reason 
for the rejection was the proposed new scheme for the relationship between 
the Basque Country and the Spanish state, based on a free association 
status, on the grounds that it was not in line with the Constitution. The 
central state tried by every means to avoid any discussion on the merits of 
the proposal approved by the Basque Parliament, using arguments of le-
gitimacy and legality, thereby avoiding a democratic debate (Lasagabaster 
2005: 1035). The Spanish Parliament thus prevented an actual debate on 
the quality of Basque autonomy and the will of the Basque institutions as 
representatives of the Basque people (Lasagabaster 2005).
In fact, the three pillars of the new proposal were the following: first, 
the recognition that the Basque people have their own identity; second, the 
legal acknowledgement of the right to decide the community’s own future 
and its relations with the Spanish state; and third, the statute of autonomy 
would turn the Basque Country into a community freely associated with 
the Spanish state, with the potential for further change according to the 
principle of self-determination.
Article 13.3 of the Proposal for a New Political Statute of the 
Community of the Basque Country contained a clear expression of the 
democratic principle, harnessing the future legal status of the Basque 
Country to the popular will. On the basis of this democratic legitimacy, 
the Political Statute prescribed that, in the case of a clear majority vote 
of the Basque people in favour of sovereignty or independence, both the 
Spanish State and the Autonomous Community would be compelled to 
start a negotiation process. This system was based on the doctrine estab-
lished by the Supreme Court of Canada to which we will refer later.
Two further features of the proposed reform that also aimed at pre-
serving areas of exclusive competence for the Basque institutions were the 
mechanisms for power distribution and the system of self-government 
guarantees. The distribution of powers was set on the basis of ‘public pol-
icies’ rather than on a functional division of competences. The objective 
was to avoid unilateral interference by the central government in areas at-
tributed to the Basque Country ( Jauregi 2005: 1010). Thus, in those areas 
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in which the proposal determined that the Community of the Basque 
Country could develop public policies, the central state would have no 
power to intervene without the consent of the Basque institutions. The 
new system of legal guarantees was based on the principles of mutual in-
stitutional loyalty, co-operation and balance of powers (Article 14 of the 
proposal). Two mechanisms for conflict resolution were proposed: the 
Basque Country–Spanish State Bilateral Commission (Article 15) and a 
special chamber in the Constitutional Court (Article 16).
After the proposal’s rejection by the Spanish Parliament, the Prime 
Minister of the ACBC in 2008 promoted the approval of a Basque law 
regulating a public consultation for the purpose of ascertaining opinion 
in the ACBC on starting negotiations in order to achieve peace and pol-
itical normalization. In June 2008, the Law was finally passed by the 
Basque Parliament.12 However, the president of the Spanish government 
brought an unconstitutionality appeal against it, which was approved 
by the Constitutional Court in its Ruling no. 103 of 2008, declaring the 
Basque law unconstitutional:
La Ley recurrida presupone la existencia de un sujeto, el ‘Pueblo Vasco’, titular de 
un ‘derecho a decidir’ susceptible de ser ‘ejercitado’ [art. 1 b) de la Ley impugnada], 
equivalente al titular de la soberanía, el Pueblo Español, y capaz de negociar con el 
Estado constituido por la Nación española los términos de una nueva relación entre 
éste y una de las Comunidades Autónomas en las que se organiza. La identificación 
de un sujeto institucional dotado de tales cualidades y competencias resulta, sin em-
bargo, imposible sin una reforma previa de la Constitución vigente.
[The appealed law presupposes the existence of a subject, the ‘Basque people’ holder 
of a ‘right to decide’ likely to be ‘exercised’ [art. 1 b) of the contested law] equivalent 
to the holder of sovereignty, the Spanish people, and able to negotiate with the State 
constituted by the Spanish nation the terms of the new relation between the state and 
one of the Autonomous Communities in which it is organized. The identification 
of an institutional subject provided with such qualities and authorities is, however, 
impossible without a previous reform of the current Constitution.]13
 12 See <http://parlamento.euskadi.net/pdfdocs/leyes/y20080009_f_cas.html> ac-
cessed 16 August 2018.
 13 Constitutional Court Ruling no. 103/2008 of 11 September, 4th legal basis (English 






The argument of the Court reveals the existence of different conceptions 
of the democratic principle. For the Basque institutions, the law was con-
sidered to be a tool to channel popular will and popular legitimacy, to 
start a process for changing the current sharing of power. In contrast, the 
Spanish government understood the Constitution as non-negotiable, as 
it was so considered by the Constitutional Court.14
True to the Spanish state’s traditional aspiration to uniformity, the 
only holder of sovereignty, the Spanish state, interprets territorial unity in 
the strictest possible sense. In short, Spanish institutions were unwilling 
to increase self-government as an acknowledgement of the right to decide. 
However, as we shall see later, the Constitutional Court has recently ruled 
again on the constitutionality of the right to decide, loosening its previ-
ously rigid interpretation.
The Crossroads
After a 2010 ruling in the Constitutional Court (31/2010), the central 
powers of the Spanish state have taken a recentralization approach to 
power distribution, with an increasingly severe impact on the quality of 
autonomy in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Specifically, some com-
munities (especially the Basque and Catalan Autonomous Community) 
have begun to question why the current model cannot adapt to some of 
the most ambitious expectations of self-government; in the Spanish state, 
the present model of decentralization has been questioned precisely for 
the opposite reason, with arguments that the current model of political 
decentralization has gone too far. For the first time since the transition 
to democracy, representatives of the central powers of Spain favoured 
self-government involution, with the preference now for centralism and 
cuts in the self-government powers of the current autonomy framework. 
 14 This was the term used by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference re 
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As a result of the current crisis of territorial organization in Spain, several 
scenarios can be discerned.
First, some legal scholars are in favour of a constitutional reform in 
order to centralize de jure the Spanish state. They argue that the distri-
bution of power between the state and autonomous communities is ob-
scure, inefficient and inadequate (Muñoz Machado 2012: 125; Fernández 
Rodríguez 2013). In fact, a rethinking of the relationship between the cen-
tral state and autonomous communities is proposed, giving advantage to 
the former. The use of harmonization laws is also proposed as a means of 
reconciling the rulemaking provisions of autonomous communities. The 
ability of central legislature to enact harmonization laws is provided for 
in Article 150.3 of the Constitution:
El Estado podrá dictar leyes que establezcan los principios necesarios para armonizar 
las disposiciones normativas de las Comunidades Autónomas, aun en el caso de 
materias atribuidas a la competencia de éstas, cuando así lo exija el interés gen-
eral. Corresponde a las Cortes Generales, por mayoría absoluta de cada Cámara, la 
apreciación de esta necesidad.
[The State may enact laws laying down the necessary principles for harmonizing the 
rulemaking provisions of the Self-governing Communities, even in the case of mat-
ters over which jurisdiction has been vested to the latter, where this is necessary in 
the general interest. It is incumbent upon the Cortes Generales, by overall majority 
of the members of each House, to evaluate this necessity.]
In addition, the legislative power of the Autonomous Community is 
called into question.
Second, more nuanced positions can be observed, suggesting that the 
decentralized system has worked reasonably well, serving to both encourage 
political participation and also to foster the development of each region 
in Spain (Quadra-Salcedo 2012; Sánchez Morón 2013).
Third, there is another view, also characterized by dissatisfaction with 
the current political development, but arguing for the breaking up of the 
constitutional agreement. These critics claim that the political autonomy of 
autonomous communities serves only to manage the policies of the central 
state (Viver 2011). This view leads to political positions demanding constitu-
tional reform aimed at federalizing the state, and even to political positions 
supporting full sovereignty on the basis of the right to decide (Lopez 2015: 35).
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All in all, there are different political options, increasingly far-removed 
from one another, and giving rise to difficulties when it comes to reaching 
a new constitutional consensus. In fact, we really are at a crossroads where 
we are witnessing two opposing processes of nation-building.
There has been an economic crisis, and also a constitutional and 
values crisis in Spain. In this context, there is a need to rethink the cur-
rent system of distribution of powers between the central government 
and the autonomous communities.15 Beyond purely jurisdictional issues, 
new perspectives are needed to cope with questions about the territorial 
configuration of the state, and address the claims for a greater degree 
of sovereignty raised by Catalonia and the Basque Country. The recent 
legal reforms driven by the central government are moving along another 
road, that of a nation-building process, with the aim of centralizing the 
Spanish state and making it uniform. From the opposite perspective, 
there is clear dissatisfaction with the current development of power 
sharing and the decrease in regional powers, giving rise to proposals 
for a very different constitutional reform, in a federal direction (Seijas 
2013: 24) or towards the full sovereignty of autonomous communities. 
The latter involves a second process of nation building, of a constituent 
character.
Adapting the Legal Frame of Reference to Political Changes
The right to self-determination is a constantly evolving right which will 
continue to develop in the future. We should note that this right has not 
undergone the same development in all geographical or historical con-
texts, and the conditions governing it are still debated, with a range of 
views regarding its scope and the validity of this right when applied to 
 15 See Muñoz Machado (2012: 45) and Quadra-Salcedo (2012) for the view that the 
regional model and the territorial distribution of power have worked reasonably 
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non-colonial contexts.16 The international community is divided about 
this, and the International Court of Justice has not yet ruled openly on 
this matter.
Even though decolonization may be considered a common expression 
of the right to external self-determination, there have been many develop-
ments thereof outside the colonial context. To name just a few, apart from 
the Bangladeshi example, we could consider the reunification of Germany, 
the international scenario after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia 
or Czechoslovakia as well as Eritrean secession from Ethiopia.17
In the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory18 there is a clear statement that the right to 
self-determination is a right that can be applied outside contexts of de-
colonization. The right to self-determination implies freedom of peoples 
to decide their political status.19 Self-determination is simply the right to 
live in a democracy.
In the view of some, secession is seen just as a remedial measure, and a 
remedial right, whereby if a mother-state fails to permit a people forming 
 16 See Hannum (1996: 28).
 17 Generally, international practice has established the right to self-determination to 
be achieved principally through so called ‘internal self-determination’, by means of 
autonomy arrangements enabling a people to attain a certain degree of political, 
social, cultural etc. independence within the framework of an existing state. To what 
extent the notion of self-determination implies a right to ‘external self-determin-
ation’, and thus enables minorities to secede in order to become independent or as-
sociate with a new state, however, remains controversial. See Crawford (1998: 86).
 18 ICJ Advisory Opinion of 9  July  2004, on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, paragraph 88, page 39, 
and paragraph 122, page 184. This clearly states that today self-determination is an 
erga omnes (i.e. universally applicable) right (cf. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 
1995 I.C.J., page 102, paragraph 29). See also Case Concerning East Timor (Port. 
v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102–3 (30 June) (characterizing East Timor as a ‘non-self-
governing territory,’ whose people ‘has the right to self-determination’).
 19 In the case of the Western Sahara the court of justice stated that the right to 











part of it to develop freely, or systematically blocks its development, it is 
legitimate for that people to have recourse to secession.20 Remedial seces-
sion is seen as an option for special cases. Although neither the principle of 
self-determination nor the remedial character has been formally resorted 
to in many secession processes that have taken place in Europe, the inter-
national community has recognized such states.
The practice of the international community suggests that there can 
be other methods or ways for achieving independence. In this regard the 
Quebec case21 and especially the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada 
concerning Quebec’s secession is of particular interest.22
The Supreme Court of Canada, after finding that Canadian domestic 
law did not support a right to unilateral secession,23 explained that under 
international law, ‘the right to self-determination of a people is normally 
fulfilled through internal self-determination within the framework of an 
existing state.’24 After that, the Court went a step further, drawing on ‘the 
principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, 
and respect for minorities’ enshrined in the Canadian Constitution to 
outline a process of negotiated secession. Following the Supreme Court 
of Canada: although Canadian domestic law does not condone unilateral 
secession, ‘a clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of 
secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative 
which all of the other participants in Confederation would have to recog-
nize.’25 The democratically expressed will of the people of Quebec to secede 
would oblige the Canadian state to engage with Quebec in negotiations 
 20 See Buchanan (2007:  331–400) presenting a comprehensive argument that 
‘[i] nternational law should recognize a remedial right to secede’ where ‘secession is 
a remedy of last resort against serious injustices’.
 21 An approach to the context can be found in Dodge (1999: 287). For an in-depth 
consideration of the possible contours and consequences of Quebec’s secession, see 
Young (1998: 34–40).
 22 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
 23 Ibid., paras 32–108.
 24 Ibid., para. 127.
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concerning possible separation, at least as a way of obtaining the accept-
ance of the result by the international community.
From its wording two important conclusions can be drawn: first, the 
Supreme Court of Canada proclaimed the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of a 
hypothetical secession process, provided that a clear majority26 of Québécois 
support it by answering a clear referendum question. Second, based on that 
legitimacy, a negotiated process is required.
Bearing this in mind, let us underline the non-univocal nature of 
the relationship between secession and the right to self-determination. 
Secession may come about as a result of self-determination, but not only 
in that way. Secession can also be based on democratic principles without 
using the right to self-determination.
In the same way, the International Court of Justice considers that there 
is not an emerging prohibition of secession arising from the principle of 
territorial integrity. The conclusion of the International Court of Justice in 
the Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 on the Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo27 
is that ‘[t] he scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the 
sphere of relations between States’.28
There are no provisions in international law that regulate secession. 
The secession will be legal if it is an effective political fact. International 
law does not recognize the right to secession as such, but neither can it 
be affirmed that international law denies its existence. Despite the inter-
national community being extremely reticent with regard to secession, this 
 26 The Court did not answer the question of what a clear majority is. In 2000, the 
Canadian government passed the Clarity Act, which obliges Canada to negotiate 
with Quebec over the terms of a possible separation only in the case of a vote on a 
question that sets forth a stark choice between either full separation or continued 
inclusion in the Canadian state. Clarity Act, 2000 S.C., Chapter 26 (Can.). In 
2006, based on a proposal made by the EU, Montenegro held a referendum on sep-
aration from Serbia that required a majority of 55 per cent to succeed. See Office of 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, Serbia and Montenegro Referendum 21 May 2006, 14 March 2006, at 3–4.
 27 General List No. 141, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 22 July 2010.








is not prohibited by international law, based on the fact that the principle 
of territorial integrity applies to States.
Things seem clearer, in this regard, if secession is founded upon the 
right to self-determination as this will provide a more straightforward 
motivation for recognition by third states. If, on the other hand, secession 
is not linked to the right to self-determination, international law cannot 
be said to prohibit making it effective (Summers 2010: 16). In this case 
secession is not forbidden, it is merely not privileged; and the privilege 
will be even less forthcoming if the mother-state refuses to recognize the 
secession. Even so, in cases where secession is not privileged, third states 
may still recognize the entity that has seceded as a state on the basis of the 
democratic legitimacy of the process (Urrutia 2012: 138; 2014).
Following Ralph Wilde’s approach here, for sub-state groups who aspire 
to independence the central matter is not so much what the international-
law position is on the legality of declarations of independence, but rather 
their prospects for enjoying the support of at least the kind of critical mass 
of other states that will make their claim practically viable (Wilde 2011: 153).
Thomas M. Franck contends that ‘[i] t is wrong, to say there is no 
right of secession if by that one seeks to convey the impression that any 
secession is prohibited by international Law’ (2000: 335). Malcolm Shaw 
opines in the same sense:
It is true that the international community is very cautious about secessionist at-
tempts, especially when the situation is such that threats to international peace and 
security are manifest. Nevertheless, as a matter of law the international system nei-
ther authorizes nor condemns such attempts, but rather stands neutral. Secession, 
as such, therefore, is not contrary to international law. (Shaw 2000: 136)
Approaching Secession?
In Spain a pro-independence vision is emerging. The right to decide, whose 
first normative expression was contained in the Draft of the Political 
Statute for the Basque Country, has become the hub of the sovereignty 
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claim. In Catalonia, the social push in favour of the right to decide has 
given way to political statements made by the Parliament of Catalonia on 
the sovereignty of the Catalan people and their right to decide.
The Parliament of Catalonia Resolution 5/X of 23 January 2013 
adopted the Declaració de sobirania i el dret a decidir del poble de Catalunya 
[Declaration of sovereignty and right to decide of the people of Catalonia] 
which asserted that Catalonia ‘sea un ente soberano y “acuerda iniciar el 
proceso para hacer efectivo el ejercicio del derecho a decidir para que los 
ciudadanos y ciudadanas de Cataluña puedan decidir su futuro político 
colectivo”’ [is a sovereign entity and ‘marks the beginning of a process by 
which the citizens of Catalonia will be able to choose their political future 
as a people’].29
The Constitutional Court, reaching a unanimous decision,30 declared 
the first part of the text, which stated that ‘El pueblo de Cataluña tiene, por 
razones de legitimidad democrática, carácter de sujeto político y jurídico 
soberano’ [The people of Catalonia are, for reasons of democratic legit-
imacy, a sovereign political and legal subject] to be ‘unconstitutional and 
void’ (3rd legal basis).31 However, it added that the people of Catalonia 
have ‘the right to decide’, though not the ‘right to self-determination’ 
(4th legal basis).32 The Court recognized that ‘Catalan citizens’ right to 
 29 The Declaration was approved with eighty-five votes in favour, forty-one against 
and two abstentions.
 30 See Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 25 March 2014.
 31 See Ruling 25 March 2014, 3rd legal basis (‘Se declara inconstitucional y nulo el 
denominado principio primero titulado “Soberanía” de la Declaración aprobada 
por la Resolución 5/X del Parlamento de Cataluña’ [The unconstitutionality 
and nullity are hereby declared of principle one, entitled ‘Sovereignty’, in the 
Declaration approved by Resolution 5/X of the Parliament of Catalonia]).
 32 See Ruling 25  March  2014, 4th legal basis (‘Estos principios, como veremos, 
son adecuados a la Constitución y dan cauce a la interpretación de que el “de-
recho a decidir de los ciudadanos de Cataluña” no aparece proclamado como 
una manifestación de un derecho a la autodeterminación no reconocido en la 
Constitución, o como una atribución de soberanía no reconocida en ella, sino como 
una aspiración política a la que solo puede llegarse mediante un proceso ajustado 
a la legalidad constitucional’ [These principles, as seen below, conform to the 










decide’33 fits into the Constitution, if it does not imply self-determination. 
Such a right is
una aspiración política a la que solo puede llegarse mediante un proceso ajustado a 
la legalidad constitucional con respeto a los principios de ‘legitimidad democrática’, 
‘pluralismo’, y ‘legalidad’. De hecho, el Tribunal destaca que la Constitución puede ser 
reformada a través de los procedimientos previstos para ello, incluso cabe ‘modificar 
el fundamento mismo del orden constitucional.’
[a political aspiration which can only be achieved through a process totally in line 
with the Constitutional order, following the principles of ‘democratic legitimacy’, 
‘pluralism’ and ‘legality’. In fact, the Court points out that the Constitution can 
be reformed according to legal procedures, including ‘to modify the fundamental 
grounds of the Constitutional order’.]34
Moreover, the Court urged the political powers to talk and find agree-
ments, and pointed out that all parts of the current Constitution can be 
reformed.
The Court wrote that the problems that arise when a particular terri-
tory wishes to change its legal status cannot be solved by the Constitutional 
Court. It could only check that the applicable legal procedures to organize 
this dialogue are properly complied with. The Court invoked also the prin-
ciples of institutional co-operation and loyalty to the Constitution, and 
held that if a region submits a proposal to change the Constitution, the 
Spanish Parliament should take it into account.
of Catalonia’ is not proclaimed as a manifestation of a right of self-determination 
not recognized in the Constitution, or as an unrecognized attribution of sover-
eignty, but as a political aspiration that may only be achieved through a process that 
conforms to constitutional legality]).
 33 See Ruling 25 March 2014, Ruling point 2 (‘Las referencias al “derecho a decidir de 
los ciudadanos de Cataluña” […] no son inconstitucionales’ [the references to ‘the 
right to decide of the citizens of Catalonia’ […] are not unconstitutional]).
 34 See Ruling 25 March 2014, 4th legal basis ‘El planteamiento de concepciones que 
pretendan modificar el fundamento mismo del orden constitucional tiene cabida 
en nuestro ordenamiento’ [Any approach that intends to change the very grounds 
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There is, definitely, a cry here for the political branches to assume the 
burden of negotiating a political solution to a deeply problematic meeting 
of opposing views at a constitutional crossroads.
This judgement reveals a new and positive approach to the issue, to 
the extent that it urges political powers to talk and find an agreement. 
However, the judgement reveals again a clash of legitimacies: on the one 
hand, the legitimacy of the constitutional legal order and, on the other, 
the political legitimacy of the Parliament of Catalonia.
It does not follow from denying a people a certain way of exercising a 
right that this right does not exist in and of itself. The core question is not 
whether the Spanish Constitution allows the Catalan people to exercise 
their right to decide through a referendum, but rather whether the Catalan 
people is vested with such a right (see Turp 2017: 60).
Definitely, the way opened up by the Supreme Court of Canada leaves 
open the possibility of a negotiated secession. The approach taken by the 
Supreme Court of Canada seems to have been assumed, perhaps in a more 
nuanced way, by the Spanish Constitutional Court when it demanded a 
negotiation between the Spanish central state and the representatives of 
the people of Catalonia, or of the Basque Country.
Conclusion
The current recentralization process in Spain presents novel characteris-
tics. In a context of the economic downturn, a constitutional mutation 
of the horizontal relationships occurred in the exercise of public power. 
A constitutional mutation or transformation of the nature of political de-
centralization in Spain emerged which affects the regional capacity to es-
tablish public policies on key areas of the welfare state, cultural areas and 
self-government. Also, we can observe the weakening of social and cultural 
rights, which are mainly provided by the Autonomous Communities.
This imbalance has produced a situation that makes it difficult to ac-
commodate the national realities and the desires for greater self-govern-




that promote a constitutional rupture and are in favour of creating new 
constitutional legitimacies. We are facing two opposing processes of nation 
building, working face to face from opposite perspectives.
The unilateral recentralization process breaks the statutory consensus 
upon which the Autonomous Communities were created and prevents the 
Basque Country from fully exercising the tools and powers provided by the 
autonomous institutions. As a result, the capacity for self-government is 
weakened and opportunities for building up an adequate level of well-being 
and the sustainable development of its territory are limited within the cur-
rent legal framework. The self-government model seems to be exhausted due 
to a de facto constitutional mutation, which lacks the necessary consensus.
At this stage the major unresolved issues relating to the Basque Country 
include its future relationship with the state, the recognition of the right to 
decide and the territorial articulation of all the historical Basque territories 
in order to ensure an appropriate welfare system. In this situation, priority 
should be given to ensuring the transition to a new phase without violence, 
thus ensuring opportunities to all policy options that can be defended by 
democratic means. Basque society is becoming aware of the important 
role it has in this new phase. The final outcome will depend solely on an 
accord between the central state and the democratically expressed will of 
the Basque people. We are facing a constitutional crossroads at which a 
negotiated democratic solution is needed.
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Ethical Nationalism: Social Citizenship in 
Multi-National States
abstract
This chapter explores the role social policy plays in sub-state nationalist politics in Scotland 
and Flanders by analysing the political discourse framing social policies as well as the pol-
icies themselves. Regional social policies are examined to ascertain whether they diverge 
from the national status quo and thus might alter the nature of social citizenship. In order 
to understand how these social policies relate to sub-state nationalism, the manifestos and 
parliamentary discourse of sub-state nationalist parties are analysed. The chapter concludes 
that in pursuit of congruence between national and political units, political actors may, 
where possible, use social policy at a regional level in order to foster national solidarity or 
convey understanding and assumptions about people and their needs.
Introduction
Over the past two decades we have seen a major shift of political authority 
away from the national level towards both sub-national (devolution) and 
supra-national bodies (European integration). In the case of devolution, 
the transfer of political authority to sub-state entities was, in part, meant 
to assuage concerns over language rights, cultural policy and education 
as well as representation vocalized by nationalist parties active in regions 
of Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium. However, despite the status 
upgrade of minority languages, far-reaching devolution and proportional 
representation, sub-state nationalism has continued to persist in several 
European regions.
In fact, in cases such as Scotland, Flanders and Catalonia, nation-






governments. In Scotland we even witnessed a referendum on independ-
ence, and Catalan politicians organized a plebiscite regardless of objections 
from Madrid while, in Flanders, nationalists garnered the largest voter share 
in federal, regional and local elections. In light of the many concessions 
made by their respective states, the enduring surge in sub-state nationalist 
mobilization seems inconsistent with expectations. As such, the search for 
what drives and makes nations and nationalism has continued unabated 
since Renan, Gellner, Anderson and Smith.1
Over the past two decades, studies aimed at explaining and under-
standing sub-state nationalism have focused on a wide variety of factors, 
ranging from European integration (Hepburn and McLoughlin 2011; 
Hepburn and Elias 2011; Jolly 2015) and national identity (Kymlicka and 
Norman 2000; Moreno, Arriba and Serrano 2007; Boonen and Hooghe 
2013; Dodeigne, Gramme, Reuchamps and Sinardet 2016), to federalism 
(Swenden 2006; Máiz 2007) and regional interest groups (Keating 2014; 
Keating and Wilson 2014).
An avenue of scholarship which has received some, though not always 
sufficient, attention is that of the relationship between nationalism and 
social policy.2 This, despite the fact that the strategic importance of social 
policy in territorial politics and nation-building has been pointed out 
repeatedly:3
Where power rests with central government, social policy can be utilized to mediate 
regional conflicts and reinforce national integration, strengthening the authority and 
legitimacy of the state in the face of challenges from territorial minorities. Conversely, 
where social programmes are developed and managed at the sub-state level, they can 
strengthen regional cultures and enhance the significance of regional governments 
in the everyday lives of their citizens. (Banting 1995: 270–1)
 1 That is to say, since the best-known general theorists of nations and nationalism. 
For a comprehensive overview see Özkirimli (2010).
 2 For the purposes of this chapter we understand social policy to mean the entirety 
of public policy and practice in the areas of healthcare, social services, inequality, 
education and labour.
 3 See also: Béland and Lecours (2007), Taylor and Francis Online (publishers’ data-








Although I do not claim that social policy is the sole, or even the most 
relevant, force driving nationalism and nationalist mobilization, this 
chapter will argue that part of the reason some sub-state nationalist strug-
gles persist is not only that social policy has become a new focal point of 
contention since the development of the welfare state in the second half 
of the twentieth century but that it has come under considerable pressure 
at the start of the twenty-first century.
Many of the works on social policy and nationalism consider this 
relationship in terms of the effects territorial politics may have on social 
policy (McEwen and Moreno 2005; McEwen 2006; Greer 2006; Birrell 
2009; Mackinnon 2015). They describe and theorize the implications of 
devolution for social policy making, yet tend to dwell only briefly on what 
this means for the nature of nationalism and the nation. To be sure, certain 
students of nationalism have looked into social policy’s role in nation-
building (Mooney and Scott 2011; Law and Mooney 2012), though their 
analyses have tended to deal with the issues of policy divergence and elect-
oral support rather than address the question of how social policy questions 
are intrinsically linked to the nation and nationalism. Scott L. Greer and 
Margitta Mätzke (2009) do much to flesh out the connection between 
social citizenship and the nation in Greer’s edited volume on devolution 
and social policy in the United Kingdom; however, the contributions fol-
lowing the introduction soon revert to political and policy analysis.
Only a small number of works have bucked the trend of remaining 
in the realms of policy analysis and political economy when exploring the 
relationship between social policy and sub-state nationalism. One such 
work is Daniel Béland and Andre Lecours’ 2008 book Nationalism and 
Social Policy: The Politics of Territorial Solidarity, which examines this rela-
tionship in Belgium, Scotland and Canada. In this comparative study the 
authors delve deeper into what they call the nexus between nationalism 
and social policy than most before them. They explicitly theorize the role 
social policy plays in the contest for citizens’ allegiance to one nation or 
another. Indeed, Béland and Lecours do more than theorize as they delve 
into the historical development of nationalist movements and their re-
spective socio-economic and institutional contexts. This way they examine 
how social programmes play a central role in national identity building 
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and territorial mobilization, as well as study how nationalist movements 
can affect social policy making through the territorial structuring of policy 
reform and implementation (Béland and Lecours 2008: 40). That being 
said, the authors do not engage in a systematic analysis of nationalism 
and its discursive and policy-based manifestations in the three cases they 
present.
This chapter endeavours to theorize what lies behind social policy’s 
rise to prominence in territorial politics and nationalist mobilization since 
most traditional concerns over language, culture and representation have 
been assuaged. The chapter argues that this aspect of nationalism’s con-
tinuing push and pull on politics can be captured and understood in an 
integrated theory of ethical nationalism, combining communitarian ethics 
and social citizenship.
I intend to achieve this by exploring the notion that many nations’ 
national identities and representations of national identity do not merely 
include the traditionally described linguistic, cultural and territorial elem-
ents; but in some cases can also be said to include ethical elements. These 
ethical elements describe distinctiveness in an ethical dimension. That 
is to say that they represent the nation as an ethical community as ex-
plained by David Miller (1995). After an elaboration of Miller’s ideas on 
the nation as an ethical community, we will go on to illustrate how we 
can see ethical considerations and representations at work today in dis-
putes surrounding Marshallian social citizenship4 in the form of political 
discourse and social policies. Conceptions of social citizenship form the 
bridge which allows political actors to translate their ideas of the nation 
as a particular kind of ethical community into concrete policy-talks and 
social policies, thus reproducing and reinforcing these ideas on the nation’s 
public culture and engaging in nationalist mobilization on the basis of social 
policy issues. Aside from relying heavily on Miller and Marshall’s concep-
tual work, the chapter will employ empirical examples drawn from two 
cases – Scotland and Flanders – to illustrate what the proposed notion of 
 4 T. H. Marshall’s take on social citizenship will be explored later in the chapter. For 




ethical nationalism looks like in practice, and how we might better under-
stand where it originates.
The Nation as an Ethical Community
David Miller (1995) argues that nations can be viewed as ethical com-
munities in the sense that aside from deriving distinctiveness from 
common cultural practices (such as language), shared belief and mutual 
commitment, from being extended in history, being active in character, 
and occupying a particular territory, nations may also mark themselves 
off from other communities through sharing particular interpretations 
of what we owe our fellow nationals. Miller describes the nation as an 
ethical community in which members ‘recognize duties to meet the 
basic needs and protect the basic interests of other members’ (Miller 
1995: 83).
Indeed, in Miller’s view, each nation has a distinct public culture which 
determines ‘a set of ideas about the character of the community which also 
helps to fix responsibilities’ (Miller 1995: 68). Miller describes this public 
culture as being the product of political debate and therefore as having 
an ideological coloration (Miller 1995: 69). More specifically a nation’s 
public culture is formed by political debate held in the past as well as in 
the present. This debate is characterized as a process of reflection on equal 
footing by all members of the community. The public culture and conse-
quent obligations that emerge from this historical debate are not merely 
traditional, but instead ‘bear the imprint of the various reasons that have 
been offered over time in the course of these debates’ (Miller 1995: 70). 
Depending on the public culture resulting from this historical process, a 
nation’s public opinion may attach more importance to, for example, indi-
vidual freedom and self-sufficiency or to collective solidarity. These values 
and preferences would then, in turn, inform the community’s obligations 
towards fellow members; such obligations would include providing the 




shape their own lives in the first case; or providing a wider array of public 
goods in the second case.
Furthermore, Miller describes public culture as resilient and open to 
interpretation. This allows public culture to ‘serve as a source of ideas that 
may then be used to justify or criticize the policies of a particular govern-
ment’ (Miller 1995: 70). In other words, citizens or political actors may 
appeal to public culture or invoke public culture values when arguing in 
favour of or against policies or engaging in electoral campaigning. Miller 
illustrates this idea using the example of a national health service. He argues 
that if, in a democratic society, one has the obligation to contribute to the 
functioning of a national health service, this obligation is ‘grounded in the 
reasons given for having the health service when it was first introduced, and 
reaffirmed from time to time when the health service is debated’ (Miller 
1995: 70). What this might look like in the case of sub-state nationalist 
politics will be illustrated with a number of examples in the later stages 
of this chapter.
In a national community (unlike in face-to-face communities), des-
pite the guiding light of public culture, there is no clear understanding of 
what or how we are expected to contribute towards the welfare of other 
members in a practical sense. This reminds us of Benedict Anderson’s 
reflection that the nation is still, essentially, an imagined community 
(Miller 1995: 68). In order to bring Miller’s view of the nation as an eth-
ical community well and truly into the world of politics and policy, we 
need to look at how obligations owed to co-nationals can be fulfilled. 
In the past such obligations have often included ‘serving one’s country’ 
by way of civil or military service or simply paying one’s taxes. However, 
in modern industrialized countries, ever since the development of the 
welfare state in the second half of the twentieth century, obligations 
are most commonly fulfilled by means of different social policies. After 
all, what better means are there to fulfil one’s duty ‘to meet the basic 
needs and protect the basic interests of other members’ (Miller 1995: 83) 
than social policy which entails the actions that affect the well-being 
of members of a society through shaping the distribution of and access 
to goods and resources in that society (Cheyne, O’Brien, and Belgrave 
2005). The gap between the nation as an ethical community and a set of 
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social policy rights and obligations can be bridged best by the concept 
of social citizenship.
From Imagined Community to Material Community: Social 
Citizenship
The most commonly recognized conditio sine qua non for participation 
in the rights and duties that come with group membership is citizenship. 
Thomas Humphry Marshall divides citizenship into three elements: civil, 
political and social. The civil element includes the rights that are vital 
to individual freedom such as liberty of the person, freedom of speech, 
thought and faith, property rights, freedom of contract and the right to 
a fair trial. The political element entails the right to political participa-
tion and organization, thus involving the rights to stand for election and 
hold office (Marshall 1950). In the aftermath of the Second World War he 
formulated social citizenship as a third set of rights that exist aside from 
basic political and civil rights, acquired gradually over the period between 
the seventeenth and twentieth centuries.
Social citizenship, as it was coined by Marshall, means: ‘the whole range 
from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right 
to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized 
being according to the standards prevailing in society’ (Marshall 1950: 14). 
More concretely, this entails the set of socio-economic rights and obliga-
tions held by members of the community which pertain to socio-economic 
instruments such as taxation, redistributive programmes such as unemploy-
ment benefits and family allowances, all manner of social services, pensions, 
education, healthcare, criminal justice and public transport. In short, the 
aspects of policy primarily concerned with human well-being and welfare.
Marshall’s definition of social citizenship consists of two important 
parts. The first is the so-called ‘what’, namely a modicum of economic wel-
fare and security and the right to share in the social heritage and to live 




captured in the phrase ‘to the standards prevailing in the society’. Or, in 
other words, what the container of economic security ought to include. In 
order to vindicate the compatibility of our two theoretical protagonists, 
we will now proceed to demonstrate how these two elements tie in with 
David Miller’s idea of the ethical community.
The first element of the definition, what constitutes ‘a modicum of 
economic welfare and security’, is shaped, in Miller’s words, by interpret-
ations of what obligations are owed. Obligations towards co-nationals thus 
determine conceptualizations of social citizenship which, in turn, inform 
concrete social policy preferences. More concretely, they help shape – 
among other things – different nations’ ideas on social policy and the 
limits of the welfare state. As we have seen, these obligations are usually 
fixed through public culture, for which we move on to the second element 
of social citizenship: standards prevailing in the society.
The second element in Marshall’s definition, as mentioned earlier, 
concerns the ‘prevailing standards’ qualifier, an important proviso which 
allows for the existence of diverse interpretations of what one member 
of a national community owes another. After all, different societies may 
well have gone through different political debates conditioned by diver-
ging historical paths, thus leading to different public cultures which help 
fix the rights and obligations of co-nationals, and so resulting in different 
ideas of what a ‘modicum of economic welfare and security’ entails in 
practical terms.
For example, public opinion in different nations may have a distinct 
idea of when a jobless person should receive unemployment benefits; or 
of the extent to which a richer co-national’s income should be taxed. To 
mention two examples, US public opinion seems to prefer limited gov-
ernment interference in the social economy and emphasizes individual 
freedom and private initiative; whereas in a country such as France public 
opinion favours strong government regulation and involvement in society 
and the economy as a way of ensuring equality. Thus, it can be said that 
the theories of both Marshall and Miller include provisos allowing for or, 
indeed, elucidating variation in social policy preferences between national 
communities. The matter of how we might trace the origins of public 
cultures will be addressed more elaborately in the section of this chapter 
preceding the conclusion.
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Sub-state Nationalism and the Ethical Community
With the provisos allowing for divergence in obligations and social citi-
zenship, we move ever closer to our specific cases of sub-state nationalism. 
How do the theories of the ethical community and social citizenship 
interact with the sub-state nationalists’ drive for congruence between the 
national and the political unit?
As we have seen so far, rights and obligations which stem from nation-
ality are generally systematized through codification of these rights and 
obligations into the more practical terms of citizenship. People’s rights and 
obligations as enshrined in citizenship sans plus are based upon ‘their par-
ticipation in a practice from which they stand to benefit’ (Miller 1995: 71). 
In other words, as citizens they are entitled to the use of public goods 
such as social assistance, infrastructure and education, and in return they 
are obliged to pay their dues, obey the law and sustain the co-operative 
arrangement.
Indeed, the majority of rights and obligations of nationality are dis-
charged through the state and citizenship, in which enforcement mech-
anisms exist to induce compliance. However, it would be wrong to think 
that nationality ceases to be relevant the moment such a practice of state-
citizenship co-operation is established (Miller 1995).
After all, this kind of co-operation would be based on the principle 
of fairness. A rational citizen would demand rigorous reciprocity from 
the other participants. Indeed, they would expect their benefit from 
the arrangement to be equal to their contribution. Miller illustrates the 
limitations of such an arrangement using the example of redistributive 
taxation:
So, for instance, redistributive taxation would be agreed to only in circumstances 
in which each person thought it was rational to insure him- or herself through the 
state against the possibility of falling below a certain level of resources. Given the 
possibility of private insurance, we would expect states that lacked a communitarian 
background such as nationality provides to be little more than minimal states, pro-
viding only basic security to their members. In particular, it is difficult to explain 
why states should provide opportunities and resources to people with permanent 




According to Miller, the reason we find arrangements considerably more 
generous than this one in the world today is thus due to the prior obliga-
tions of nationality  – which do include obligations to contribute to the 
provision of benefits beyond those that serve rational self-interest, for in a 
national community one’s own interests tend to be viewed as inter-twined 
with the interests of the group as a whole to some extent or another. Hence, 
one has less trouble recognizing and fulfilling Miller’s duties regarding basic 
needs and interests of co-members (1995: 83). Where mutuality of recogni-
tion fails, however, the character of the community to which one thinks one 
belongs is put in question. This could mean that there exist fundamentally 
different views between members of what obligations are owed, leading to 
the possible collapse of the co-operative arrangement of social citizenship.
As such, there exists the potential for an ethical motive to drive the pur-
suit of national and political units to coincide. After all, when obligations 
of citizenship are informed by obligations of nationality, redistributive ar-
rangements can go well beyond what rational self-interest would otherwise 
allow. When two or more conceptions of obligations clash, on the other 
hand, at least one of the groups in question is likely to feel they are being 
cut a ‘bad deal’. Indeed, they might even feel they need increased political 
autonomy in order to satisfy their conception of social citizenship, or, in 
Gellner’s words, to obtain congruence between the national and political 
unit (Gellner 1983); which in this case means: congruence between the 
ethical and the political unit, in order to determine the rights and obliga-
tions of citizenship based on their views on obligations of nationality. This 
is when the connection between ideas of social citizenship and nationality 
and the expression thereof becomes particularly relevant. In other words, 
this is when we might see the occurrence of ethical nationalism.
Ethical Nationalism and Where to Find It
Now, in order to ascertain whether our theory of ethical nationalism 




of sub-state nationalism, we must look at territorial politics in each 
region. Nationalism may be manifested through discourse but also in 
policy. Therefore, to establish whether elements of ethical nationalism 
are present we will, after explaining how they may be used in nation-
building, analyse both nationalist discourse and regional social policy. 
In the case of discourse we would expect to see political actors making 
claims about different public cultures being dominant in their respective 
regions as opposed to the ‘state’s’ public culture. They will evoke these 
distinct public cultures when arguing for region-specific social policy 
and increased autonomy or independence. Where regional social policy 
is concerned, we would expect to see attempts at reterritorializing the 
focus of national solidarity through unique and diverging social policies 
only available in the region in question and in line with the proclaimed 
public culture.
First, however, we must explore the historical development of each 
case to trace the development of a possibly distinct public culture. After all, 
as we have seen, public culture lies at the heart of the obligations that we 
now acknowledge. Considering that these obligations ‘bear the imprint of 
the various reasons that have been offered over time in the course of these 
debates’ (Miller 1995: 70), we must examine history to identify those devel-
opments and consequent political debates which shaped public culture – 
we cannot view nationalism’s contemporary manifestations independently 
from history – and only then can we engage in the analysis of discourse and 
policy to establish whether ethical nationalism is present or not.
Historical Development and Public Culture Formation
As mentioned earlier, the conditions and preferences underlying the sur-
facing of ethical nationalism do not materialize overnight. They are the 
result of a historical process of socio-economic development and political 
debate. Therefore, in order to understand how ethical nationalism may 




development of the nation in question and identify critical junctures or 
evolutions that have helped shape the community’s public culture.
In the case of Scottish public culture, one critical juncture is the welfare 
retrenchment under the consecutive Conservative governments of John 
Major and Margaret Thatcher. In places like Scotland, where an alterna-
tive identity existed, Britishness was particularly wedded to the universal 
benefits and protection provided by the welfare state. After all, Scotland 
was comparatively reliant on national heavy industries and social pro-
grammes; and ever since the demise of the British Empire, the welfare state 
and National Health Service had replaced it as the main source of utility 
and prestige attached to Britishness. Hence, the Thatcherite policies of 
welfare retrenchment and privatization ‘weakened the foundation of this 
implicit “social contract” and simultaneously presented a strong challenge 
to Scotland’s societal and administrative autonomy’ (Béland and Lecours 
2008: 95). As the Conservative Party did not obtain a majority in Scotland 
throughout this period, the Labour Party put itself forward as the defender 
of Scottish interests and values. This also meant that Scottish voters were 
underrepresented in the Westminster government.
At the same time, centralizing policies were viewed as a grave threat 
to the administrative and societal autonomy of Scotland. This enraged 
Scottish civil society. Organizations such as professional groups, labour 
unions, churches and cultural associations mobilized support for the de-
fence of Scottish particularism; and later on for devolution (Greer 2007).
This potent mixture of welfare retrenchment and centralization 
made up the context which shaped the resurgence of the movement to-
wards home rule. The imminent threat to Scottish household incomes 
across the region meant that this time potential support for home rule 
was to be much broader. The argument was that in order to protect 
Scotland from Thatcherite neo-liberalism, political autonomy was needed. 
Then, Scotland could formulate the progressive social policies Scots 
needed and wanted. This dynamic caused two major political shifts. 
First, Scottish Labour, until then a strictly unionist party with social 
democratic policies, shifted to supporting devolution as a way of seizing 
the mood and regaining power after eighteen years out of office (Béland 
and Lecours 2008).
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The second shift pertains to the Scottish National Party. The SNP had 
always steered clear of ideology so as not to lose any nationalist voters; how-
ever, throughout the 1970s and 1980s the party moved clearly towards the 
left (Béland and Lecours 2008). Its rhetoric transformed from Scottishness 
being ‘somewhat ethnic and occasionally exclusive to being now civic and 
inclusive’ (Leith 2008): a fresh focus was placed on Scotland’s ideological 
distinctiveness, rather than on linguistic or ethnic markers. In brief, it was 
to be a crucial period in the formation of Scotland’s public culture. The 
Thatcher era remains a point of reference to this day, for the threat that 
Westminster and the Union may pose to Scottish livelihoods and values.
In the Flemish case, the example of public culture formation is some-
what more gradual in nature, although there are some political crises that 
spurred on public debate in a particular direction. One such event is the 
so-called school struggle (schoolstrijd) that gripped Belgium throughout 
the 1950s. The issue is an excellent example of how a pre-existing traditional 
marker of identity – in this case the dominance of Catholicism among the 
Flemish population – had an influence on political debates and, in turn, 
went on to influence social policy preferences and shape public culture. 
The school struggle is the term generally used to indicate the competition 
for the government’s favour and the public’s preference for the secular or 
the Catholic education establishments. After the Second World War, state 
schools and Catholic schools across Belgium were struggling to cope with 
the sharp increase in students. The former had a structural problem as there 
were considerably fewer state schools in the country, whereas the latter 
had a financial problem as Catholic schools did not receive subsidies, and 
therefore had to hike their tuition fees.
The Christian-Democrat governments in power from 1950 to 1954 
allocated subsidies to Catholic schools, which were significantly more 
popular in Flanders. However, in 1955 the new minister for education, the 
Francophone socialist Leo Collard, attempted to pass reforms slashing 
subsidies for Catholic schools, tightening conditions required for the 
acquisition of these subsidies and vastly increasing the number of state 
schools. The public’s reaction was intense. A concerted mobilization effort 
by schools and Christian unions resulted in a protest of around 100,000 
people on 26 March 1955 in Brussels alone. Newspapers reported that 
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Catholic Flanders had marched into Brussels and laid peaceful siege to 
the capital, despite the government’s best efforts to obstruct the influx 
of protesters. Although Walloon Catholics had also participated in the 
movement, the episode was most commonly depicted as a moment of so-
lidification of Christian-Democrat and centre-right support in Flanders. 
The intermittent protests continued until the re-election of a Christian-
Democrat government in 1958, which consolidated the subsidy system. Thus 
the place of Christian values and institutions together with a preference 
for right-of-centre policies in public culture was confirmed and reinforced. 
Overall, the school struggle is a prime example of the ‘Flemish right’ versus 
‘Walloon left’ dynamic that was to intensify in the years to come with the 
1960–1 strikes and would eventually be part of the reason for the split of 
political parties along linguistic lines (Béland and Lecours 2008). This 
split and the subsequent establishment of regional constituencies for fed-
eral elections are factors that congealed the ideological division between 
north and south. It is a division visible in voting patterns and social policy 
preferences to this day.
Ethical Nationalist Mobilization: Political Discourse
What does all this mean for nationalist politics in practical terms? How 
can we recognize politics of ethical nationalism and tell them apart from 
other forms of nationalist politics? By connecting traditional elements of 
nationality such as territory, history, culture, or language to understand-
ings of social citizenship, nationalist actors may add an ethical element 
(what obligations one should fulfil towards other group members within 
this territory) into the definition of nationality. They are representing the 
nation as an ethical community. And, as we have seen, we expect this to 
be accompanied by evocations of a shared public culture, described as dif-
ferent from that of the state.
How might political actors mobilize support based on ethical nationalist 




of a specific conceptualization of social citizenship can be said to be part of 
national identity, and this element of national identity is compromised (or 
perceived as being compromised), sub-state nationalist politicians may be able 
to mobilize support on this basis, just as this has been done in the past based 
on threats to other elements of national identity such as language, culture, 
or territory. Ethical nationalist arguments can be viewed as just another way 
of saying: ‘Our way of life is under threat!’ Only that, in this case, the aspect 
of this ‘way of life’ is not cultural or linguistic per se, but is that part which 
deals with how to take care of the elderly in society, who should be respon-
sible for a child’s education, or whether healthcare is a right or a privilege.
The theme of nationalist mobilization based on socio-economic 
issues is present in Béland and Lecours’ work (2008). In their study the 
authors examine several central claims about the nexus between nation-
alism and social policy by looking at three case studies: Quebec, Scotland 
and Flanders. Several of their claims are useful for the objectives of this 
chapter. We will use two of these claims as a means of testing the nation-
alist discourse and employ them as a barometer to indicate the presence 
or absence of arguments relating to conceptualizations of social citizen-
ship, and thus the representation of the nation as an ethical community. 
This will allow us to identify whether elements of ethical nationalism are 
present and to provide one or two brief examples of discourse to illustrate 
the point more concretely.
A first indication of ethical nationalism would be social policy be-
coming ‘a major component of the effort of nationalist movements to build 
and consolidate national identity, and an important target for nationalist 
mobilization’ (Béland and Lecours 2008: 23). As national identity is a con-
structed concept, it takes place mainly in the discursive sphere. What we 
are looking for concretely in this case are statements linking the national 
identity in its traditional sense – language, history, culture, religion, terri-
tory, traditions – to social policy preferences. Usually, in order for the con-
nection to be stronger, we would expect these statements to ascribe to the 
nation such characteristics as ‘progressive’, ‘compassionate’, ‘hardworking’, 
or ‘entrepreneurial’.
A striking example of this value-ascription comes from the 1999 
Scottish Parliamentary Elections campaign of the Scottish National Party, 
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wherein the election manifesto’s social policy chapter is introduced with 
the phrase: ‘Traditionally Scots have believed in the values of compassion, 
community and the common weel’ (Scottish National Party 1999: 19).
The values of compassion and community are said to be things Scots 
have ‘traditionally’ believed in. National identity – represented by ‘trad-
ition’ or ‘traditional beliefs’ – is connected to values which inform a distinct 
socio-economic outlook. Furthermore, the use of the phrase ‘the common 
weel’ (also spelt ‘weal’) is tremendously relevant. The common weal is an 
old Scots phrase meaning both ‘wealth shared in common’ and ‘for the 
wellbeing of all’. The use of a phrase embodying a distinctively Scottish 
concept to describe a set of social policies including public housing and 
free healthcare and education, evidently illustrates an attempt to establish 
a link between ideas of social citizenship and national identity.
In the Flemish case, too, we can find interesting examples of such dis-
course. In their election manifesto for the 2007 federal elections the Nieuw-
Vlaamse Alliantie [New Flemish Alliance] or N-VA for short, Flanders’ 
largest sub-state nationalist party, put forward a similar argument. After 
explaining how the Flemish prefer initial medical care to be provided by 
local general practitioners, before referral, while the Francophones prefer 
seeing specialists at public hospitals immediately, the conclusion frames 
the public healthcare debate in national terms: ‘In Belgium there is a clear 
‘care-border’. A ‘care-border’ which coincides with a cultural border: the 
language border’ (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 2007: 50).
The implication of this argument is that the language border is also an 
ideological border. North of the border, in Flanders, people prefer centre-
right policies focusing on subsidiarity – a Catholic political concept – with 
limited state intervention through subsidies; south of the border, large-scale 
publicly provided uniform social and health care is preferred.
Béland and Lecours identify a second indicator of ethical argu-
ments: ‘[T] he focus of nationalist movements on social policy is not simply 
the product of economic self-interest, yet references to the fairness of fi-
nancial transfers between territorial entities become effective mobilization 
strategies’ (2008: 25). Although some nationalist discourse may refer to 
actual structural differences, the differences in economic interest are not 
necessarily the sole driving force behind nationalist politics. Although we 
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cannot, here, engage in an analysis in the interests of individual political 
actors, references to fairness and justice in nationalist discourse would be 
indicative of an ethical characterization.
A telling example here would be that in their 2003 election manifesto 
for the Federal Elections the N-VA attempt to redefine solidarity from 
a Flemish perspective when denouncing the inter-regional transfers in 
Belgium flowing from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels. After describing 
how Flemings and Walloons have different preferences regarding public 
transport, healthcare and employment, the manifesto goes on to refer to 
‘Real solidarity with Wallonia instead of transferring billions’ and states:
Every year Flemings pay around 10 billion euros for Wallonia. This boils down to 
5.000 euros per year for every average Flemish family with one child. But the average 
Walloon is not served by all this money […]. The stream of money to Wallonia is 
not solidarity, but injustice. And that has to end […]. Solidarity means giving money 
voluntarily and knowing what this money will be used for. Not the unnoticed and 
unsolicited taking money from your wallet. (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 2003: 7, 19)
This argument does not represent an outright rejection of the idea of fiscal 
inter-regional transfers – that would make for a much shorter quotation – 
but what we see here is rather the breakdown of the co-operative scheme 
because it is not, according to the N-VA, based upon shared and mutually 
recognized nationality. In other words, since the scheme is based purely 
on obligations stemming from citizenship, that is to say, a connection 
based on the principle of fairness, then strict reciprocity is demanded. 
The quotation indicates that the N-VA subscribes to a different idea of 
what obligations Flemings owe Walloons than what current citizenship 
arrangements impose.
To reiterate, based on the theoretical understandings above, this 
chapter suggests that the presence of these three claims in sub-state na-
tionalist discourse points to the presence of ethical nationalism in some 
shape or form. This, of course, does not mean nationalist mobilization 
is driven exclusively by ethical nationalist arguments, but it does suggest 
that it plays a role. This, together with their substantial electoral support, 
would seem to signify that some nations may view their national iden-
tity as incorporating an ethical element, or at least respond to political 
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mobilization based on ethical nationalist arguments. Moreover, this would 
seem to suggest that even if the traditional markers of national identity 
have already been safeguarded, the fact that the ethical aspect of national 
identity is compromised allows for nationalist mobilization.
Social Citizenship beyond Discourse: Policies Reproducing 
the Ethical Community
Ethical nationalism goes beyond discourse, however. As Marshall’s defin-
ition suggests, social citizenship is more than just policy-talks: it includes 
actual policies which provide the aforementioned ‘modicum of economic 
welfare and security’. In pursuit of congruence between national and pol-
itical units, political actors may, where possible, use social policy at a re-
gional level in order to foster national solidarity (McEwen 2002) or convey 
understanding and assumptions about people and their needs (Mooney 
and Williams 2006: 610). In this dynamic, regional governments may rep-
resent autonomy as a prerequisite for the ‘right’ socio-economic policies or 
represent themselves as guarantors of social protection where the central 
state fails (McEwen 2002). This dynamic ties back neatly to the theory of 
nationalist mobilization based on a perceived threat to an element of na-
tional identity or ‘way of life’ – in this case the so-called ethical element.
The idea behind ethical nationalism in the form of social policy is that 
when regional governments, especially when led by autonomist or nation-
alist parties, enact social policies that diverge considerably from the status 
quo on the national level, they alter what ‘modicum of economic welfare 
and security’ citizens in their region are entitled to. In other words, they are 
implementing different citizenship rights and obligations, based on regional 
variations of nationality rights and obligations, informed by what they view 
as the predominant public culture, or indeed ‘the standards prevailing in 
the society’. Of course, regional governments are limited in what they can 
achieve by the constitutional arrangement of the state. Though social policy 




have been known to test the limits of their legislative and executive pre-
rogatives where social policy is concerned. To illustrate what I mean by 
this, I will provide examples of policies in concrete cases.
In the United Kingdom the Scottish programme introducing universal 
free personal care for the elderly is such an example. In 2000 planning for 
the programme was initiated by the Scottish Labour–Liberal Democrat 
government after the Sutherland Report on long-term care had made re-
commendations in that direction. The Westminster government, also led by 
Labour, favoured a means-tested programme, unlike the Scottish Executive, 
which leaned towards cradle-to-grave universalism.
In fact, the UK Labour Party raised objections to the Scottish plans 
to fully implement the Report’s recommendations for free personal care, 
as they considered it an act of defiance by its Scottish arm, and as it would 
effectively mean British citizens living in Scotland would enjoy different 
social rights based purely on territorial parameters. Scottish Labour was 
torn and the decision was postponed. Meanwhile, the Scottish National 
Party was free to campaign vigorously for the full implementation of the 
Sutherland Report’s recommendations, as they were ‘delighted at having 
found an issue on which to open up a divide between Edinburgh and 
Westminster’ (Marnoch 2003: 258). The episode clearly illustrates the dy-
namic between party competition and the quest for national distinctiveness 
in post-devolution Scotland, which led to a game of social policy chicken.
Eventually, as Liberal Democrats, Scottish nationalists and even 
Scottish Conservatives colluded to vote in favour of universal coverage, 
at the end of June 2001 the Scottish Executive made an unambiguous 
commitment to funding free personal care for the elderly. The policy is 
clearly in line with the claims made surrounding Scottish public culture, 
and the public discussion at the time reflected this as Scottish values and 
preferences were regularly invoked throughout the affair. In the end the 
policy took Scottish public culture and Scottish society as the relevant 
reference point for solidarity. As such, the programme brought Scottish 
social citizenship closer to the proclaimed Scottish ideas on obligations 
owed to co-nationals.
A policy that had a similar effect on social citizenship in Flanders is 
the Flemish Insurance for Non-medical Care. It is an additional mandatory 
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insurance scheme for non-medical aid and service provision to individuals 
that have been assessed as in need of such help. The scheme came into being 
on 1 October 2001 by Flemish Parliamentary decree. Individuals residing 
in the Flemish Region are obligated to join whereas residents of Brussels 
have the option to do so. Residents of Wallonia, on the other hand, cannot 
join unless they fulfil a number of stringent requirements such as being 
signed up to the Belgian social security system as a result of employment in 
Flanders, and having lived in a third member state of the EU, the EEA or 
Switzerland immediately prior to or during their employment in Flanders. 
Unsurprisingly, these are conditions a marginal number of Francophone 
Belgians fulfil. The insurance scheme is meant as one element of the over-
arching Flemish Social Protection. There is no doubt that the Flemish Care 
Insurance Act, both in content and framing, could be regarded as a clear-
cut example of a policy initiative which influences what is entailed in the 
rights and obligations that come with citizenship. The invariable mention 
of the adjective – Flemish – is aimed at creating a bond with the region 
(Beyers and Bursens 2010). In practical terms, the rights and obligations 
are affected in one specific region: Flanders. After all, the implementation 
of the Flemish care insurance programme is changing the nature of social 
citizenship insofar as it implies a very concrete difference in what the ‘right 
to a modicum of economic welfare and security’ entails. In Flanders (and 
Brussels to a lesser extent) it now includes the right to financial support 
for non-medical care, whereas in the rest of Belgium it does not.
The fact that throughout the insurance scheme’s life and inception no 
fewer than five legal cases seeking to annul or alter it have been brought 
against the Flemish government further serves to illustrate its relevance 
for territorial politics. After all, four of these originated with Francophone 
or Walloon regional governmental bodies, whereas one was brought by 
a federal organ. The regions and the federal government are thus clearly 
locked in a struggle for the prerogative to determine the relevant national 
community for social solidarity, and what that solidarity ought to look like. 
Politically this was played off by nationalist and even moderate autonomist 
parties in Flanders as being a clear case of the central government – and, 




In this chapter we have attempted to formulate an answer to the question 
of why and how sub-state nationalism persists in some European regions 
today. We have done so by positing that national identity and its represen-
tations may not only include traditional markers such as language, reli-
gion and culture; but may also include ethical elements which determine 
what obligations we owe co-nationals. Using the tool of social citizen-
ship, governments attempt to realize their ideas of what co-nationals owe 
one another. Sub-state nationalist mobilization focused on social policy 
may occur if a community is forced to accept a set of social citizenship ob-
ligations they do not subscribe to, or if they are engaged in a co-operative 
arrangement with one or more groups they do not consider co-nationals. 
Should attempts at mobilization include references to national iden-
tity in function of social policy and references to the fairness of inter-
regional transfers, this chapter argues that we are dealing with a specific 
type of nationalism: ethical nationalism. In order to better understand 
where ethical nationalism comes from, we have looked at the historical 
development of public culture as a source of ideas about the character of 
the community which also helps to fix responsibilities. Finally, we illus-
trated what all this might look like in practice, by going through histor-
ical public culture formation, nationalist discourse analysis and regional 
social policy-making in the cases of Scotland and Flanders. In the process, 
it has become somewhat more clear why and how nationalism persists in 
these regions and, although it is not claimed that ethical nationalism is 
the only force at play, we believe that it may also help us to better under-
stand the dynamic of sub-state nationalist politics in other cases.
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NATIONALISMS ACROSS THE GLOBE
Although in the 1980s the widely shared belief was that nationalism had 
become a spent force, the fragmentation of the studiously non-national 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s into a multitude 
of successor nation-states reaffirmed its continuing significance. Today all 
extant polities (with the exception of the Vatican) are construed as nation-
states, and hence nationalism is the sole universally accepted criterion of 
statehood legitimization. Similarly, human groups wishing to be recognized 
as fully fledged participants in international relations must define themselves 
as nations. This concept of world politics underscores the need for open-
ended, broad-ranging, novel and interdisciplinary research into nationalism 
and ethnicity. It promotes better understanding of the phenomena relating 
to social, political and economic life, both past and present.
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